SinoInsight 1
On Aug. 18, the CCP’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) announced the investigation of Shanghai Public Security Bureau head Gong Daoan.
A rectification campaign of the regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus has been underway since the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) called for “scraping poison away from the bones’-style self-revolution” in the second week of July. Recently, the official CPLAC Wechat account said in a post that at least 21 domestic security and judicial officials have been investigated between July 8 to July 15.
According to publicly available information, at least 16 of the officials in the political and legal affairs apparatus who were arrested since July are at the section-level and above:
- On July 1, the Chongqing Municipal CCDI announced the investigation of Mu Guoqing, the Party secretary and chief prosecutor of the Wushan County People’s Procuratorate.
- On July 6, the Tangshan City CCDI announced the investigation of Xu Shaoan, the former deputy Party secretary and deputy director of the Tangshan Public Security Bureau.
- On July 6, Liu Bin, the deputy leader of the Hubei Provincial Public Security Bureau’s Internal Security Corps was placed under investigation.
- On July 6, the Sichuan Provincial CCDI announced the investigation of Liu Tingjie, a Party Committee member and deputy director of the Ziyang Municipal Public Security Bureau.
- On July 9, the Tibet CCDI announced the investigation of Deng Chaokui, a former Party Committee and deputy director of the Linzhi City Public Security Bureau.
- On July 11, the Guangdong CCDI announced the investigation of Lin Chunsheng, the deputy mayor of Jiangmen City and director of the Jiangmen Public Security Bureau. Lin previously served as political commissar of the Narcotics Control Bureau in the Guangdong Provincial Public Security Bureau (Sept. 2010 – June 2011; deputy bureau level post) and Public Security Bureau director of Guangdong’s Yangjiang City and Huizhou City (June 2011 – December 2018).
- On July 13, the Jiangsu CCDI announced an investigation into Yan Ming, director of the Jiangsu Provincial Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference Proposal Committee. Yan previously served as deputy director of the Jiangsu Provincial National Security Bureau (June 2003 – Jan. 2011) and deputy prosecutor general of the Jiangsu Procuratorate (Jan. 2011 – Sept. 2017).
- On July 14, the Zhejiang CCDI announced the investigation of Ding Renren, the director of police technical operations (second grade) in the Zhejiang Provincial Public Security Bureau (sub-bureau level post).
- On July 22, the Qinghai CCDI announced the investigation of Jia Xiaogang, the deputy Party secretary and deputy chief prosecutor of the Qinghai Provincial Procuratorate. Jia previously served as deputy director of the Sixth Procuratorate of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (Oct. 2007 – March 2019).
- On July 22, the Yunnan CCDI announced the investigation of Zhang Xun, the Party secretary and chief prosecutor of the Xishuangbanna Prefecture Procuratorate.
- On July 24, the Inner Mongolia CCDI announced the investigation of Zhao Yunhui, the former Party Committee member and deputy director of the Inner Mongolia Public Security Bureau (bureau-level post).
- On July 30, the Inner Mongolia CCDI announced the investigation of Wu Fengmei, the former Wuhai Municipal deputy secretary and Wuhai Political and Legal Affairs Commission Party secretary.
- On July 31, the Jiangsu CCDI announced the investigation of Luo Wenjin, the former team leader of the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau’s Criminal Investigation Corps and former director of the Criminal Investigation Bureau.
- On Aug. 13, the Heilongjiang CCDI announced the investigation of Yang Gang, a Daxinganling District Party Committee member and Daxinganling Political and Legal Affairs Commission Party secretary.
- On Aug. 14, the Sichuan CCDI announced the investigation of Zhuo Yicai, the former Sichuan Police Academy Party Committee Standing Committee member and vice principal.
- On Aug. 19, the Henan CCDI announced an investigation into Wan Baoping, the deputy Party secretary and deputy executive director of the Nanyang City Public Security Bureau (sub-bureau level post).
OUR TAKE
1. The investigation of Gong Daoan is part of the campaign to rectify the CCP’s political and legal affairs apparatus that was launched in July. The rectification campaign is part of Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress preparations and ongoing effort to clean out disloyal factional elements in the apparatus. As we wrote in the July 9 edition of this newsletter, Xi is “already facing stiff pushback from his factional rivals over removing term limits for the PRC presidency” and is looking to “minimize political risks and pave the way to keep himself in office for a third term.”
Xi’s efforts to consolidate control over the political and legal affairs apparatus, once the fiefdom of the Jiang Zemin faction, began as soon as he took office in 2012. A sign that change was afoot came during the 18th Party Congress when the CPLAC boss no longer served on the Politburo Standing Committee member following a move to shrink the membership of the Standing Committee from nine to seven. In the following years, top political and legal affairs officials would be purged one after the other, including Zhou Yongkang, Li Dongsheng, and Zhang Yue. Earlier this year, two sub-ministerial level officials, Sun Lijun and Deng Huilin were investigated. Many of the purged senior political and legal affairs officials were either members or associates of the Jiang faction.
2. A look at Gong Daoan’s career suggests that he is a Jiang faction official that was purged after being moved from his base of operations (調虎離山), a classic Xi tactic.
In November 2010, Gong Daoan, then Xianning City Public Security Bureau director, was promoted to deputy director of the 12th Bureau of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). In October 2012 (before the 18th Party Congress), Gong was elevated to 12th Bureau director. In June 2017, Gong was “parachuted” (a term used to describe an official’s transfer from the central government to the provinces) into Shanghai to serve as director of the Shanghai Public Security Bureau.
The MPS 12th Bureau does “technical reconnaissance” work, including signals intelligence and surveillance, and also approves and purchases technical reconnaissance equipment for the ministry. The 12th Bureau is widely regarded as one of the most powerful departments in the MPS, and it is rumored that provincial-level CCP officials try not to make enemies of those working in the 12th Bureau for fear of reprisals (12th Bureau staff can easily pass on evidence of personal indiscretions to the CCDI). Indeed, the purge of Zhou Yongkang and his allies revealed the importance of controlling surveillance in the factional struggle; in reporting the investigation of former Beijing Municipal Bureau of State Security Liang Ke in February 2014, The New York Times wrote that “Mr. Liang was suspected of aiding Mr. Zhou by illicitly passing on information gathered by the bureau’s network of agents, phone taps and informants in the Chinese capital.” Thus, the 12th Bureau’s significance makes it a must-have “acquisition” for various CCP factions as they seek to gain an edge over their rivals.
Gong Daoan became director of the MPS 12th Bureau about a year after his predecessor Zhang Jian was removed as a result of complex factional struggle reasons (suspected spying on Politburo Standing Committee members, Jiang faction associates moving against each other over self-interests, etc.). While Gong came to the 12th Bureau from a relatively “obscure” public security position (city-level police chief) and technically would be more “obedient” to the MPS chief and other superiors, Xi Jinping would unlikely feel safe allowing an official who came to the crucial position when the Jiang faction was firmly in control of the CCP political and legal affairs apparatus to keep running domestic technical reconnaissance. It also cannot be ruled out that Gong was involved in surveilling Xi on behalf of the Jiang faction before the 18th Party Congress. Thus, Gong was eventually moved on from the 12th Bureau to a similarly prestigious public security position in Shanghai before being investigated recently.
3. Xi’s rectification of the CCP’s political and legal affairs apparatus will inspire both fear and opposition in the regime to his leadership. Increasing U.S. pressure against the regime in the Sino-U.S. “new cold war” will translate into domestic political problems and accelerate divisions in the CCP regime. The probability of political Black Swans in China is sharply rising.
SinoInsight 2
On Aug. 17, the CCP Central Party School announced that Cai Xia, a well-known former professor at the school, had been expelled from the Communist Party. Cai, who is also a Party princeling (or “second generation red”; 紅二代) had earlier criticized the CCP and Xi Jinping in speeches and articles.
Following her expulsion, Cai gave interviews to a number of news outlets, including The Guardian (see here and here) and The New York Times. Some highlights from her interviews include:
- “Under the regime of Xi, the Chinese Communist Party is not a force for progress for China. In fact, it is an obstacle to China’s progress. I believe I am not the only one who wants to leave this Party. More people would like to withdraw or quit this Party. I had intended to quit the Party years ago when there was no more room to speak and my voice was completely blocked.”
- “The Communist Party of China has become a political zombie.”
- “I think within the CCP 70 percent [know that there must be reform], and among middle- and high-level officials the proportion may be even higher. For many of these cadres, their thinking was most deeply affected by the reform era under Deng Xiaoping … Those within the party have experienced the last 20, 30 years and they understand in which direction is right and which is a dead end. We are among a group of cadres who took up our positions after reform and opening.”
- “China is bound to go through political transformation, toward democracy, political freedom, rule of law and constitutionalism. This is the inevitable trend of modern human political civilization. China will enter this stage sooner or later.”
- According to The New York Times, Cai Xia promoted Jiang Zemin’s “opening of the Party to more businesspeople and professionals” (part of Jiang’s “Three Represents” political theory) and “often appeared in the Chinese news media, arguing that the Party could be a vehicle for steady political and economic liberalization.” However, Cai said that she “became increasingly frustrated with Party leaders’ unwillingness to match economic changes with political ones,” was “disheartened” by the “dour authoritarian ways” of Hu Jintao and the “draconian turn” of Xi Jinping.
According to various Chinese language news outlets, Cai Xia was a strong advocate of Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” theory and speaks well of the Jiang era. Also, Cai appears to still be actively making “bold statements” against Xi and the CCP on WeChat without facing censorship. Some observers are also suspicious as to why Cai was “allowed” to leave the country despite having strongly condemned the CCP and Xi.
OUR TAKE
1. Cai Xia makes several excellent points in her “exit interview” with English-language press, including acknowledging the rottenness of the CCP system (“political zombie”), encouraging the Chinese people to quit the Party, and the promotion of political transformation in China. Being a Party princeling and member of the Party elite, her exhortations carry more weight than the average dissident or Chinese professor.
Cai’s criticism of Xi Jinping hints at wider disapproval of the latter in the Chinese communist regime, as well as Party members’ growing alienation toward the CCP. Cai’s expulsion from the Party, a sign of Xi’s rising intolerance towards dissent in the regime, also points to increasing political instability and fracturing in the upper echelons of the CCP.
2. Some of Cai Xia’s comments sound great at a glance, but are less so upon closer scrutiny.
In Cai’s interview with The New York Times, she seems to distinguish between a seemingly more “liberal” Jiang Zemin and the more “authoritarian” Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. She also expressed frustration at “Party leaders’ unwillingness to match economic changes with political ones.” However, as a Party insider and professor of the CCP’s premier higher education institution for elite cadres, she ought to be more clear-eyed on the CCP’s fondness of deception to achieve its ends. Economic liberalization did not stop Deng Xiaoping from ordering the military to massacre student demonstrators at Tiananmen, and neither did China’s entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001 lead Jiang Zemin to halt his persecution campaign against Falun Gong. In fact, there is a good case to be made that Jiang is one of the more authoritarian CCP leaders: He succeeded Zhao Ziyang because he was willing to get tough on student protesters in Shanghai and would not overturn Deng’s political legacy; the “Golden Shield Project,” the cornerstone of the CCP’s techno-totalitarian state, commenced in 1998; the persecution of Falun Gong, which resulted in atrocities such as live organ harvesting, was launched in 1999.
Cai also claims that 70 percent or more of middle- and high-ranking CCP officials want “reform,” having experienced the last “20, 30” years of CCP rule, or a period corresponding with Jiang Zemin’s time in office and his dominance behind the scene as Party “godfather” when Hu Jintao was General-Secretary. However, she too acknowledges that Party leaders were unwilling to “match economic changes with political ones.” We have reason to suspect that CCP officials today are not so much nostalgic for “reform” during the Jiang era, but the ease at which immense wealth and benefits that could be accumulated through corruption then, or the so-called “making a fortune while keeping a low profile” (“悶聲發大財”). When most cadres have their interests well taken care of, there is little reason to grumble or criticize the CCP. In contrast, CCP officials across the board have much to be dissatisfied with the Xi era when Party discipline is strict (the anti-corruption campaign is a purge at the upper ranks and a genuine discipline effort in the middle- to lower-ranks), wealth and benefits become harder to accumulate, and virtually everyone’s interests (save Xi’s allies) are infringed upon.
More and more CCP insiders like Cai Xia could step out in the future as they become increasingly unhappy with the Xi Jinping leadership and feel that the tide is turning against the CCP regime. However, their claims about “reform” in the CCP in recent decades should always be examined in context because the pernicious nature of the Party has not changed since it came to power in 1949. Also, claims that the CCP can be “reformed” if Xi is overthrown should be viewed with extreme skepticism because the CCP will never allow genuine political reform, an act that would mean the disintegration of the Party, to ever take place. Indeed, advocates of dethroning Xi and “reforming” the Party, or even removing Xi and the Party without a “de-CCP-ization” of China, should be treated with skepticism; no CCP insider is blind to the regime’s evils.
3. We wrote in our China 2020 outlook that “more CCP officials could attempt to defect and expose the regime’s dirty secrets” this year. Cai Xia’s expulsion and global media attention to her case could inspire more CCP insiders to leave the PRC and expose the Party. Regardless of their motivation, a rise in CCP defectors and critics will create the impression that the Party is losing popular support and its mandate to rule China.
Nobody anticipated the fall of the Berlin Wall and the rapid disintegration of the Soviet regime. The CCP’s “Berlin Wall” moment could come sooner than most believe, and will likely be unheralded to those who do not closely follow elite Chinese politics. Businesses, investors, and governments need to prepare for a post-communist China.
