Edited on Sept. 21, 2022.
SinoInsight 1
Easing ‘Zero-COVID’
May 27 to June 3
Several local governments in the PRC ceased requiring nucleic acid testing certificates for travel and area access. Some also “dynamically adjusted” the epidemic prevention requirements for people moving in low-risk areas.
On May 27, the Anhui local government stopped demanding that freight vehicles arriving from low-risk areas produce a 48-hour negative nucleic acid test certificate.
On June 2, the Jiangxi local government announced that it had “strictly forbidden” the application of “layer upon layer of restrictions” and excessive epidemic prevention measures. The local government also said that it would strive to achieve maximum epidemic prevention and control at minimum cost. In Jiangxi Province, people are allowed to move “freely and orderly” in low-risk or epidemic-free areas, and are no longer required to produce a negative nucleic acid test certificate. Those traveling from low-risk or epidemic-free areas to Jiangxi also do not need a negative nucleic acid test certificate to do so.
On June 3, the Jiangsu local government lifted epidemic prevention traffic restrictions, including checking at expressway exits whether travelers have a 48-hour negative nucleic acid test certificate, for passengers, freight vehicles, and personnel traveling to the province from low-risk areas. Vehicles arriving from medium- to high-risk areas like Shanghai must still produce a negative nucleic acid test certificate and adhere to closed-loop management measures like advance reporting and point-to-point transportation.
Railway stations in Guangzhou, Zhanjiang, Dalian, Chengdu, Zhengzhou, and some other areas have also stopped demanding that passengers from low-risk areas produce a 48-hour negative nucleic acid test certificate upon arrival.
June 2
Mi Feng, PRC National Health Commission (NHC) spokesman and deputy director of the NHC’s propaganda department, said during a State Council press conference that the epidemic prevention and control situation in China continues to improve. He added that the number of new local confirmed and asymptomatic cases fell to less than 100 a day for the prior three days.
June 5
Lei Zhenglong, deputy director of the NHC’s Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention, said during a State Council press conference that all localities are required to unswervingly adhere to the general strategy of preventing imported infections and internal outbreaks (外防輸入, 內防反彈), as well as the general policy of “dynamic zero-COVID.”
Lei added that under the aforementioned premise, all localities must more efficiently coordinate epidemic prevention and control, and economic and social development. All localities are also required to improve the scientific, precise, and targeted nature of epidemic prevention and control measures. Further, all localities must resolutely avoid simplification, “one-size-fits-all,” and “layer upon layer of restrictions” approaches to implementing epidemic prevention and control measures, as well as resolutely achieve the “nine prohibitions” (九不准).
The “nine prohibitions” are:
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily expand the scope of restricted travel from medium- and high-risk areas to other areas.
- It is prohibited to forcibly send away, send to quarantine, and impose other restrictive measures on people from low-risk areas.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily extend the epidemic management and control period in medium- and high-risk areas, as well as in closed and controlled areas.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily expand the scope of isolation and management and control measures beyond infected persons.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily prolong the isolation and health monitoring period of infected persons.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily refuse medical services to critically ill patients and patients that require regular diagnosis and treatments on the grounds of implementing epidemic prevention and control.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily isolate and apply other epidemic prevention and control measures to college students who are eligible to leave campus and return to their hometowns.
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily set up epidemic prevention checkpoints and restrict the passage of passengers, truck drivers, and personnel who “meet requirements” (i.e. are traveling from low-risk areas, have a valid 48-hour negative nucleic acid test certificate, etc.).
- It is prohibited to arbitrarily lock down low-risk areas so as to ensure normal production and livelihood.
June 6
Semi-official mainland media The Paper published an editorial titled, “What Time Are We in Already, Why Are We Still Implementing Layer Upon Layer of Restrictions?” (都什麼時候了, 還在層層加碼?)
The editorial pointed out that the relevant government departments have repeatedly and clearly objected to “simplification” and “one-size-fits-all” approaches to carrying out epidemic prevention and control. However, unauthorized restrictions on travelers still occur from time to time in the localities even now.
The editorial noted that the “simplification” of epidemic prevention, “one-size-fits-all,” and the application of “layer upon layer of restrictions” (on people and businesses) is due to local officials adopting a “one-sided understanding of the general policy of dynamic zero-COVID” and reflects their “lack of understanding of the laws of economic and social operations.”
The editorial added that the central government’s requirements are clear, that is, “the epidemic must be prevented, the economy must be stabilized, and security must be maintained.” Therefore, epidemic prevention and control, and economic and social development, must be efficiently coordinated to minimize the epidemic’s impact on economic and social development.
The editorial urged all regions and departments to find ways to be “efficient” and make practical moves in “coordination.” All regions and departments are also to avoid “inaction” and “slow action,” as well as “chaotic action” and imposing “layer upon layer of restrictions.” The editorial then praised several localities for setting positive examples and “making adjustments to their epidemic prevention policy.”
In concluding, the editorial said that the “nine prohibitions” are a “serious reaffirmation” and “timely reminder” that all localities must effectively unify their thoughts and actions with the decisions and deployments of Party Central. All localities must also “adjust epidemic prevention and control measures in a timely manner according to the actual epidemic situation” and not add “layer upon layer of restrictions.”
June 9
1. He Qinghua, a first-level inspector of the National Health Commission’s Bureau of Disease Control and Prevention, said at a State Council press conference that scientific nucleic acid testing strategies are developed according to the needs of epidemic prevention and control, and the scope and frequency of testing have been delineated to avoid blindly expanding the scope of conducting mass testing.
He added that checking nucleic acid certificates should not become the norm in the absence of outbreaks and when there is no risk of imported cases.
2. During a two-day inspection tour of Sichuan Province, Xi Jinping instructed officials to “adhere to the general tone of seeking progress while maintaining stability,” and implement the new development concept in a “complete, accurate and comprehensive manner.”
Officials should also “coordinate epidemic prevention and control, and economic and social development, maintain stable economic development, and maintain general social stability,” Xi said.
Probing testing fraud
May 31
The National Healthcare Security Administration, Ministry of Finance, National Health Commission, and National Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine issued a notice on carrying out unannounced inspection of medical insurance funds in 2022 (關於開展2022年度醫療保障基金飛行檢查工作的通知醫保函 [2022] 24號).
The notice said that the authorities would carry out retroactive inspections of medical insurance funds from Jan. 1, 2020 to the present. Designated medical institutions and medical insurance agencies at the county and district levels nationwide will be inspected, and the inspections could be extended to other relevant institutions and insured persons depending on the situation.
Shi Lichen, a pharmaceutical strategic marketing expert, told mainland media: “There were unannounced inspections of medical insurance funds in years past, but the current inspections will focus on reasonable use of funds and fraud. The current inspections are looking into nucleic acid and antigen testing partly because medical insurance funds were used to pay for those tests in some areas, which is not allowed. Additionally, the chaotic situation with nucleic acid testing should also be within the scope of investigations; interest groups have formed around nucleic acid testing in some areas.”
According to mainland media, the National Healthcare Security Administration had announced on May 19 that the 2021 unannounced inspection of medical insurance funds found that 503 million yuan of funds were suspected of being illegally used.
On May 25, mainland media reported that the National Healthcare Security Administration had notified local medical insurance departments that using medical insurance funds to pay for mass nucleic acid testing is not in line with the current medical insurance policy, and the relevant regions are to rectify the situation immediately.
June 6
The procuratorate of Beijing’s Fangshan district approved the arrest of seven people from Beijing Pushi Medical Laboratory Co. who are suspected of obstructing the prevention and control of infectious diseases, according to state media reports.
On May 21, the Beijing municipal Public Security Bureau announced that Beijing Pushi’s business licenses had been revoked by the health department and it was being investigated over nucleic acid testing issues. Beijing Pushi’s actual controller surnamed Zhou (male, 38) and legal representative surnamed Wu (male, 37), and four other people were detained by the Beijing municipal police.
On May 27, official media reported that Beijing Fangshan District Health Commission deputy director Yang Daqing, medical affairs section chief Jin Changhao, third-level medical affairs director Xing Man, and some others were investigated by the discipline inspection department.
Calming the tech sector
June 1
Ant Group’s 2021 sustainability report contained several senior personnel changes. Hu Zuliu, founder and chairman of Primavera Capital Group, will no longer serve as non-executive director of Ant Group, while Alibaba deputy chief people officer Jiang Fang left Ant Group’s board of directors. Meanwhile, Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing board chairman Laura Cha and Hengfeng Bank independent director Yang Xiaolei joined the Ant Group board of directors as independent directors.
The personnel changes saw Ant Group’s board take on a “2+2+4” structure, namely, two executive directors (Jing Xiandong and Ni Xingjun), two non-executive directors/shareholder representative directors (Cai Chongxin and Cheng Li), and four independent directors (Hao Quan, Huang Yiping, Yang Xiaolei, Laura Cha).
June 3
Economist and former People’s Bank of China adviser David Li Daokui spoke about Beijing’s tech crackdown in speaking to the UOB Private Bank forum via video link.
Li said that in Ant Group’s IPO process, it “caused a lot of political influence, involving the selection of party secretaries in some cities, and that made the top leaders worry.” He added that “the political influence of internet companies is now nil” and the worries of senior officials have been dispelled.
Li believes that China’s tech sector regulatory storm has ended and that restoring investor confidence would be the focus of future policies. He added that the value of Chinese tech companies will also be re-evaluated.
June 6
The Wall Street Journal reported that PRC regulators are concluding a yearlong investigation into Didi Global, and is planning to remove a ban on adding new users and allow the company’s mobile apps back in domestic app stores, citing people familiar with the matter. The people said that the ending of the new user ban and app restorations could take place as early as this week.
The authorities are also lifting new user registration limits on apps by logistics platform Full Truck Alliance and online recruitment company Kanzhuan, two other firms that were subjected to cybersecurity reviews around the same period as Didi. The Journal reported that Full Truck Alliance started accepting new mobile app users late on June 6. Some of the people familiar with the matter said that the three companies are expected to offer 1 percent equity stakes to the state and give the authorities a direct role in corporate decisions.
June 7
The State Anti-Monopoly Bureau noted in its annual report that it collected 23.6 billion yuan in antitrust fines in 2021, or about 52 times the 450 million yuan in 2020. The bulk of the fines came from Alibaba (18.2 billion yuan) and Meituan (3.4 billion yuan) over their monopolistic practices. ByteDance, Didi, and Tencent were also fined for failing to submit their merger and acquisition deals for antitrust reviews.
A PRC scholar’s concerns
May 31
The Guangdong Academy of Greater Bay Area Studies published an article titled, “Zheng Yongnian: Ten Suggestions for Reviving China’s Economy” (鄭永年: 重振中国经济的十点建议). The article is a compilation of what Zheng Yongnian, the director of the Advanced Institute of Global and Contemporary China Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen, said in discussions on the theme of “China’s Current Economic Situation” (當前中國經濟現狀). The article was subsequently censored in mainland China.
Zheng notes three “severe challenges” facing the Chinese economy:
- Abnormal capital outflows, including by some domestic private companies.
- Chinese private sector entrepreneurs are facing epidemic-related supply chain and cash flow crises, resulting in some taking their business out of the country or “laying flat” (i.e. closing down). A large number of small, medium, and micro-sized enterprises have already closed down.
- Employment pressure is unprecedentedly huge. The current youth unemployment rate is 18.2 percent, the highest since March 2020 (when the lockdowns were first imposed). There are a record number of fresh graduates (nearly 11 million) among the unemployed, as well as a large number of education and training practitioners, real estate practitioners, and internet practitioners who lost their jobs due to industry rectification in 2021.
Zheng claims that three external factors are responsible for China’s economic difficulties:
- U.S. suppression of China. Zheng believes that America has been intent on decoupling from China economically and in high tech since the Trump administration, and that the U.S. government intensified its efforts after Biden took office. Zheng also believes that the Biden administration is using trade policies to guide the transfer of low-end and mid-end industries out of China to cut off China from the global supply chain.
- Some of China’s neighboring countries are rising rapidly and their business environment is improving. These countries actively try to integrate their economies with the West, reform their internal economic structures, and strive to adhere to the West’s “values.” These countries have attracted not just Chinese capital, but capital from all over the world.
- The Russian-Ukrainian conflict that broke out in February brought a new shock to the global economy, and sent the prices of energy, food, and raw materials skyrocketing. The Russia-Ukraine war’s impact on the business environment and enterprises cannot be ignored, and all investors must account for the relationship between economic interests and geopolitics.
Zheng also cites four domestic reasons for China’s economic troubles:
- The business environment of private enterprises was impacted by industry rectification in 2021. Also, the “one-size-fits-all” approach to policy implementation in many places produced a great contracting effect.
- Private entrepreneurs are concerned about the uncertainty and unpredictability of economic policies.
- Some nationalist views about the “guilt of private enterprises” were amplified “infinitely” on social media. Some radical nationalists even attributed all economic problems to private companies and carried out “unrestrained” (無底線) attacks on private entrepreneurs. This further exacerbated the panic felt by private entrepreneurs.
- It will be some time before the consensus on economic development is translated into action.
Zheng Yongnian noted that the aforementioned domestic and external factors, as well as the coronavirus pandemic over the past two-plus years, have brought huge risks to China’s economic operations, created a severe economic situation, led to decreased fiscal revenue, resulted in insufficient enterprise vitality, stagnated consumption, and other problems. Once the economy slows down, the risks associated with these problems are likely to erupt in a cascade. If they cannot be dealt with in a timely and effective manner, China’s economic risks may evolve into systemic social risks and even bring risks to the whole country. It is precisely because of this that the Chinese economics community recently issued calls to “save the economy.”
Zheng further noted that classical Marxist economics, Keynesian economics, and neoliberal economics are all Western propositions and Western solutions to Western economic problems. He added that it would be a big mistake to “mechanically” apply those theories to the Chinese context. Also, restricting capital flows or providing large amounts of funds to state-owned enterprises through quantitative easing will have very limited effect in ensuring employment and social stability. In contrast, private enterprises absorb more than 80 percent of China’s employment, but have difficulties in raising capital and their room for survival is being compressed by the monopoly status of state-owned enterprises
Zheng offered 10 suggestions for developing private enterprises:
- Maintain policy neutrality (i.e. the authorities should not overly favor state-backed companies on economic matters).
- Adjust the structure of SOEs and private enterprises.
- Create an open environment for large enterprises.
- Adjust and optimize the layout of SOEs.
- Create a healthy financial structure.
- Build a unified national market.
- Implement institutional liberalization.
- Encourage private enterprises to go global.
- Strengthen the predictability of policy adjustments.
- Establish a professional and neutral economic policy institution.
In the conclusion of the article, Zheng praised the CCP’s “institutional advantages,” which he claimed has “always represented the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people,” but “does not represent any special interests or have its own special interests.” He suggested that the PRC government coordinate, direct, and lead efforts to integrate the interests of all stakeholders, with professional economic policy researchers assisting the government in formulating balanced economic policies.
OUR TAKE
1. We noted in recent newsletters that China’s economy is doing very poorly and is trending towards a recession (see here and here for examples). The sharp economic deterioration has forced the Xi leadership to put greater emphasis on economic rescue even as it sticks to “zero-COVID.”
Several of the developments above affirm our analysis. For instance, Xi Jinping is now personally promoting “stable economic development” and instructing officials to “coordinate epidemic prevention and control, and economic and social development.” Xi is also encouraging policy adjustments that “adhere to the general tone of seeking progress while maintaining stability.”
Meanwhile, official rhetoric like the “nine prohibitions” and repeated warnings to local governments to avoid “simplification,” “one-size-fits-all,” and “layer upon layer of restrictions” approaches to epidemic prevention and control work are clearly intended to facilitate regular economic operations and get local officials to ease off on using draconian measures to curb outbreaks. This indicates that Beijing is backing away from its earlier stance of doing whatever it takes to maintain “zero-COVID,” even if it means sacrificing some economic growth. Beijing’s changing stance in turn suggests that the Chinese economy has likely worsened severely in recent months to the point where regime security is threatened.
The “dynamic adjustment” of epidemic prevention requirements by some local governments also appears to be partly linked to the dire economic situation in the PRC. By now, most local officials would have been aware of Li Keqiang’s May 25 speech to 100,000 officials, noticed the shift to “normalized nucleic acid testing” and “normalized epidemic prevention and control,” and picked up on the authorities’ recent efforts to disallow the use of medical insurance funds for testing. Shrewd officials would have figured out by now that the central government likely will not, and possibly even lacks the means, to bail them out in the event of local economic trouble. This would convince some local governments to more diligently observe the central government’s “nine prohibitions” and ease “zero-COVID” restrictions to promote economic activity.
The authorities’ probe of medication insurance funds and increased investigations of laboratories for testing fraud seem to be the central government’s way of warning local governments and interest groups against exploiting “zero-COVID” measures for profit. Local officials will also be disincentivized from casually locking down areas and carrying out mass testing when they have to pay for the testing out of their own pockets. The central government’s effort to stop local governments from sacrificing the economy in carrying out epidemic prevention and control work hints at the seriousness of China’s economic deterioration.
Zheng Yongnian’s call to “save the economy” is a more refined and scholarly version of former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin’s recent effort to sound the alarm about the PRC’s critical economic situation. Like Hu, Zheng is a prominent apologist and defender of the CCP regime. Zheng earned the moniker “[national] economic adviser” (經濟國師) after he attended a symposium chaired by Xi Jinping with eight other economists in August 2020. Beijing also previously affirmed Zheng’s “second handover” and “rebuilding” proposals for Hong Kong after the anti-extradition bill protests broke out in 2019.
The “Zheng Yongnian: Ten Suggestions for Reviving China’s Economy” article indirectly addresses the severe damage that the Xi leadership’s left-leaning policies (“state advances, private sector retreats,” tech sector crackdown, “zero-COVID,” etc.) have wrought upon the private sector. In addition to Beijing’s actions, U.S. policies, and external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine war are to blame for severe capital outflows, global decoupling from China, and China’s economic slowdown. All in all, internal and external challenges are combining to drive the Chinese economy towards recession.
To obscure what is essentially an acknowledgment that China’s economic deterioration is endangering the CCP regime and stay “politically correct,” Zheng rolled out the usual plaudits of the CCP system (especially in the article’s conclusion) and argued that classical Marxist economics (but not “sinicized Marxism” like “Xi Jinping Thought”), Keynesian economics, and neoliberal economics cannot resolve the PRC’s problems. He then made the case for developing the private sector, “adjusting” the SOEs, and promoting Xi’s “unified national market.” While Zheng praised the “institutional advantages” of the CCP system, he also recommended that “professional economic policy researchers” (presumably like himself) help the government “formulate balanced economic policies” while the latter just “coordinates, directs, and leads” economic efforts; there is a subtle implication here that the CCP authorities should not be intervening in the economy if it does not understand economics.
Despite its apparent attempt at political correctness, Zheng Yongnian’s frank and somewhat passive-aggressive take on what is ailing the Chinese economy and how to fix it is very likely what led to its censorship. Beijing is probably concerned that having a known “[national] economic adviser” and regime apologist like Zheng acknowledge China’s dire economic situation is bad for public confidence. As doubts grow about the CCP’s ability to handle the economy, the Chinese people will eventually start questioning the Party’s political legitimacy and the regime will destabilize.
Another possible reason for why the Zheng article was taken down is that his suggestions for reviving the economy will erode the CCP elite’s control over the regime. Contrary to Zheng’s assertion that the CCP “does not represent any special interests or have its own special interests,” the Party is in practice a special interest group, and has long strived to keep the “commanding heights of the economy” firmly within its grasp and strengthen its control over people and society. In times of crisis, the CCP’s instinct is to tighten control, and not ease off by developing the private sector over the state sector or reducing government intervention in the economy.
A case in point is Xi Jinping’s crackdown on the tech sector in 2021. The CCP is concerned that tech giants like Alibaba and Tencent could eventually become serious political challengers with their monopoly, wealth, and resources (data, social surveillance, etc.). Companies like Ant Group also engaged in financialization that would have saddled Beijing with immense risks. Moreover, Xi does not want his factional rivals to benefit from Ant’s risky financialization at the expense of his leadership. Thus, Xi moved to erode the influence of his political foes, further consolidate power, and reaffirm that it is the CCP, and not private companies, who is in command by targeting the “disorderly expansion of capital” and carrying out “anti-monopoly” moves toward the tech sector.
There are several possible reasons for why Beijing is now easing restrictions on large tech companies and signaling that the crackdown on the tech sector is “over.” News that Didi and two other tech companies are offering equity stakes to the state and giving the government a more direct role in corporate decisions suggests that similar arrangements were made or are underway at other tech firms. The CCP could also have quietly installed various supervision and control mechanisms in tech companies (appointing “independent” directors to boards, etc.) to ensure their absolute compliance to the regime. Further, the Xi leadership could have successfully eroded the influence or seized control over tech firms with links to his factional rivals like Ant Group after a year of “rectification” work. This would explain why Li Daokui noted that “the political influence of internet companies is now nil” and senior officials are no longer worried.
Severe economic deterioration is another reason why Beijing is suddenly relaxing the tech sector crackdown. To restore investor confidence and attract capital back to China, the Xi leadership is signaling that it is pretty much done with “rectifying” tech companies, even if there are still some ways to go before the regime is done with tackling the “disorderly expansion of capital” and monopoly problems. Beijing could still proceed with “rectification” efforts going forward, albeit in a more targeted and low-key manner.
2. Aside from helping to promote a return to more regular economic operations, “nine prohibitions” also serve to shift blame for the problems of “zero-COVID” away from the central government and onto local governments. Local governments are guilty of “simplification,” “one-size-fits-all,” and “layer upon layer of restrictions” approaches to epidemic prevention and control work, and the central government is now swooping in again as the “savior” by correcting their mistakes.
In the PRC, however, “the top has policies, but the bottom has countermeasures” (上有政策, 下有對策). Local governments may not be able to work with interest groups to profit off mass testing or use medical insurance funds to pay for them under “normalized epidemic prevention and control” and “normalized nucleic acid testing.” But they will inevitably find ways to take advantage of the new “voluntary and pay at own expense” model of testing, and create new headaches for the central government.
Beijing’s self-contradictory policies and the deficiencies of the CCP system will see local officials struggle to meet the central government’s demands to “prevent the epidemic, stabilize the economy, and secure development” (疫情要防住、經濟要穩住、發展要安全).
SinoInsight 2
Xi-centered propaganda
May 23 to June 8
State mouthpiece Xinhua began issuing a series of articles under the column, “Following the General Secretary’s Footsteps” (沿著總書記的足跡). The column’s introduction said that the series would contain 31 articles featuring interviews in places that Xi Jinping inspected since coming to power at the 18th Party Congress.
The series seeks to promote Xi’s “tireless” efforts to observe and listen to the people’s sentiments at the grassroots and demonstrates his “strategic arrangements to lead the new era” and his “red-blooded love for the people.” The series also strives to reflect the localities’ appreciation and obedience toward Xi’s leadership after his inspections, their earnest implementation of his orders, and the remarkable political achievements that the localities achieved.
At the time of writing, 12 of the 31 articles have been published with the following titles:
- “New Tide in Bohai Bay——Following the Footsteps of the General Secretary in Tianjin” (渤海灣畔新潮湧——沿著總書記的足蹟之天津篇)
- “Strive to Take the New Road of ‘Taking the Test’——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Hebei” (奮力走好新的“趕考”之路——沿著總書記的足蹟之河北篇)
- “Vitality Under the Warm Wind——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Shanxi”
- “The Beautiful Grassland is My Home——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Inner Mongolia” (美麗的草原我的家——沿著總書記的足蹟之內蒙古篇)
- “Compose a New Chapter of Comprehensive Revitalization——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Liaoning” (譜寫全面振興新篇章——沿著總書記的足蹟之遼寧篇)
- “A New Journey at the Changbai Mountain and Songhua River——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Jilin” (白山松水啟新程——沿著總書記的足蹟之吉林篇)
- “Struggling to Write a New Answer to the High-quality Development of Black Land——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Heilongjiang” (奮力書寫黑土地高質量發展新答卷——沿著總書記的足蹟之黑龍江篇)
- “Many Oars Struggle to be First in Line——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Jiangsu” (奮楫爭先開新局——沿著總書記的足蹟之江蘇篇)
- “The Tide of the Qiantang River Rises High With Each Wave——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Zhejiang” (錢江潮湧逐浪高——沿著總書記的足蹟之浙江篇)
- “Fast Sails in the Yangtze River and the Huai River——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Anhui” (潮湧江淮風帆勁——沿著總書記的足蹟之安徽篇)
- “Play a Magnificent New Symphony Between the Mountains and the Sea——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Fujian” (在山海間奏起壯麗新交響——沿著總書記的足蹟之福建篇)
- “A New Rise in the Red Land——Footsteps of the General Secretary in Jiangxi” (紅土地上的新崛起——沿著總書記的足蹟之江西篇)
Previously, Xinhua began airing “Footprints” (足跡), a 50-episode short video series about Xi Jinping, on May 23.
Propaganda apparatus reshuffles
May 5
Li Shulei (age 58), the vice president of the Central Party School in charge of daily operations, attended a Ministry of Ecology and Environment event in Liaoning in the capacity of executive vice minister of the Central Propaganda Department overseeing daily operations, according to an article on the Ministry of Ecology and Environment’s official website.
News that Li is now executive vice propaganda minister means that he had been promoted and replaced Wang Xiaohui (59), who was promoted and transferred to Party secretary of Sichuan Province on April 22. While it was not officially announced, Li would likely also have inherited the position of Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization Office director from his predecessor Wang.
June 7
1. Fu Hua (57), deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department and editor-in-chief of Xinhua News Agency, was appointed president of Xinhua.
2. Lü Yansong (55), Central Propaganda Department deputy director, was appointed editor-in-chief of Xinhua.
OUR TAKE
1. CCP propaganda outlets have recently been lessening their coverage of Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID” policy and ramping up emphasis on economic policy. However, propaganda about Xi has not decreased, but has instead shifted from promoting “zero-COVID” to highlighting Xi’s concern for the grassroots and the Chinese people, and the people’s support for him, since he came to power in 2012. This is part of Xi’s effort to paint himself as a “man of the people” (“people’s leader”) to protect and boost his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) ahead of the 20th Party Congress.
2. The recent propaganda personnel reshuffles are part of Xi’s effort to strengthen his grip over the propaganda apparatus and pave the way to make key appointments at the 20th Party Congress.
Li Shulei
Li Shulei spent the bulk of his career at the Central Party School (Dec. 1984 to Jan. 2014). He served as Central Party School vice president from December 2008 to January 2014, and was Xi’s deputy when the latter was Central Party School president (2007 to 2012). According to mainland media reports, Li is responsible for writing some of Xi’s speeches before he became CCP General Secretary.
Li would be steadily promoted up the ranks after Xi took office. He spent three years in local government from January 2014 to December 2016, serving as head of the Fujian provincial Propaganda Department and secretary of the Beijing Municipal Commission for Discipline Inspection. Li would then return to the central government to serve as deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (Dec. 2012 to Dec. 2020). At the CCDI, Li headed the office for pursuing fugitives, and served as dean of the China Academy of Discipline Inspection and Supervision, deputy director of National Supervisory Commission, and secretary of the CCDI and NSC organization Party Committee. In December 2020, Li was promoted to full ministerial rank and served as vice president in charge of daily operations at the Central Party School.
By appointing Li Shulei as Central Propaganda Department executive vice minister, Xi Jinping could be preparing a personnel reshuffle scenario where current propaganda head Huang Kunming joins the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress and is replaced by Li, who will join the Politburo.
Wang Xiaohui
Wang Xiaohui is a career propaganda official and climbed the ranks during a period when the Jiang Zemin faction controlled the propaganda apparatus.
When the propaganda apparatus was in the hands of Jiang faction official Liu Yunshan during Xi’s first term in office, Wang was promoted to executive deputy director of the Central Policy Research Office (ministerial level) and deputy propaganda minister. After Liu handed over the propaganda apparatus to Wang Huning (no relation to Wang Xiaohui) at the 19th Party Congress, Wang continued to win promotion, serving as executive deputy director of the Central Propaganda Department, director of the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization Office, deputy director of the Central Policy Research Office (Jan. 2014 to Oct. 2020), and director of the China Film Administration (May 2018 to April 2022).
While Xi Jinping has been “rectifying” the ranks of Jiang faction officials and associates, Wang Xiaohui appears to have escaped trouble and continued to serve in senior positions due to his connection with Wang Huning. Wang Huning was Wang Xiaohui’s immediate superior at the Central Policy Research Office for seven years, and could have personally vouched for his loyalty to Xi Jinping. However, Wang’s transfer to the provinces suggests that Xi perhaps feels more secure having a trusted former colleague (Li Shulei) in charge of the Central Propaganda Department instead of someone who was favored and repeatedly promoted during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance.
Fu Hua
Fu Hua’s immediate two predecessors (He Ping and Cai Mingzhao) were career Xinhua officials. Fu, however, spent the bulk of his career in the Beijing municipal propaganda system, and was only a bureau-level cadre when Xi Jinping took office in 2012.
During Xi’s second term, Fu was promoted to the sub-ministerial level and transferred from Beijing to Guangdong to serve as provincial propaganda chief (March 2018 to Feb. 2020). He later returned to the central government to serve as deputy propaganda minister (Feb. 2020 to June 2021), and only moved to Xinhua to serve as editor-in-chief in June 2021.
Fu’s career progression tracks with Xi’s method of quickly promoting those with slow career progression during the Jiang era (which suggests that they were not favored by the Jiang faction) before “parachuting” them into leadership positions of another system (to facilitate “rectification” work, break up established power networks, ensure that Xi’s orders are carried out, etc.).
Lü Yansong
Lü Yansong spent many years in the international department of the People’s Daily (1989 to June 2019), and eventually became the international department director and People’s Daily deputy editor-in-chief.
In June 2019, Lü was transferred to Shanxi Province to serve as provincial propaganda chief and a Standing Committee member of the Shanxi Provincial Party Committee. After gaining experience in the provinces, he was transferred back to the central government to serve as deputy propaganda minister (Oct. 2021 to June 2022).
Like Fu Hua, Lü Yansong is an “outsider” to the Xinhua system and has no connection to established interest networks there. In theory, both Fu and Lü would be loyal to Xi Jinping, and should properly carry out propaganda work per Xi’s instructions under Li Shulei’s leadership. The appointment of Li, Fu, and Lü also suggests that Xi is worried about the propaganda apparatus’s ability to undermine his leadership ahead of the 20th Party Congress given that it had long been under the influence of the Jiang faction, and has sought to nip any potential problems in the bud through personnel reshuffles.
