SinoInsight 1
Chinese observers speculated that the Xinjiang Party secretary reshuffle could mean that Chen was being primed for further promotion, including joining the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress.
On Dec. 27, Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao reported that Chen Quanguo was appointed deputy head of the Central Rural Work Leading Group (a sub-national leader rank position), citing a source in Beijing. PRC vice premier Hu Chunhua is currently head of the leading group. Ming Pao added that Chen was not spotted in CCTV broadcasts of the recently held Central Rural Work Conference (Dec. 25 and Dec. 26).
OUR TAKE
Zhang Chunxian’s political stagnation is very likely the result of fierce factional fighting between the Jiang Zemin faction (which Zhang belongs to) and the Xi Jinping camp. When Zhang was transferred out of Xinjiang, there was barely any international pressure over human rights abuses in the province (this is despite the CCP’s strengthening efforts since the Urumqi incident in 2009 to eliminate minority cultures and religious practices) and technically no urgent reason demanding his removal before the 19th Party Congress personnel reshuffle. However, Zhang’s tenure in Xinjiang did coincide with at least 10 terror attacks in 2014 (including an explosion incident when Xi toured Urumqi from April 27 to April 30) and at least 16 terror or violent attacks in 2015 in the province. Outside Xinjiang, 2014 saw the Kunming attack and in 2015, there were at least six Xinjiang-related terror attacks in Liaoning, Hebei, Henan, Shanxi, Guangdong and Zhejiang.
There may or may not be any connection between Zhang Chunxian’s factional background and the uptick in terrorist incidents during his tenure. But the Xi camp would definitely suspect Jiang faction’s involvement in some manner (including “lax” maintenance of stability in Xinjiang, not properly following Beijing’s orders, etc.), and acted accordingly to wrestle control over Xinjiang away from the Jiang faction and halt the province’s transformation into an “anti-Xi” base (Xi’s expansion of the regime’s national security apparatus over Hong Kong follows a similar logic). After all, the Jiang faction had strong incentive to push back against the Xi camp during that period because Xi Jinping was moving against Jiang faction “big tigers” like Zhou Yongkang, Xu Caihou, and Guo Boxiong, as well as purging officials associated with the faction in provincial governments and various apparatuses. Paranoia is also par for the course in the CCP elite given the “you die, I live” nature of factional struggle. Thus, Zhang Chunxian found himself pushed to the “second-line” while Chen Quanguo, a hardliner who appears to be loyal to Xi, replaced him as Xinjiang boss.
2. The replacement of Chen Quanguo with Ma Xingrui in Xinjiang appears to be guided by several factors, including Xi Jinping’s third term preparations, major personnel reshuffle at the 20th Party Congress and earlier, and growing international pressure against Xi and the CCP over the persecution of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang.
Ma indicated in his speech after taking office that the CCP would not depart from its Xinjiang policies. However, his taking over from Chen definitely indicates that Beijing is preparing to make policy changes with regard to Xinjiang. The Xi leadership could believe that changes are due in Xinjiang to deflect intensifying global scrutiny on gross human rights abuses in the region and improve the CCP’s international standing; since the second half of 2021, Xi and the CCP have incurred greater pushback over Xinjiang, including U.S. sanctions, “diplomatic boycotts” of the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics, and a PRC-EU trade agreement stuck in limbo.
Should he have stayed on in his current post, Chen Quanguo’s continued iron-fisted governance of Xinjiang could court more international pressure for Xi and the CCP in the sensitive 20th Party Congress year. Greater international pressure would in turn give the Jiang faction and Xi’s other political rivals another strong reason to block his bid for a norm-breaking third term in office. While Chen undoubtedly helped Xi to “stabilize” Xinjiang and thwart whatever plans the latter’s factional rivals could have to “transform” the province into an “anti-Xi” base, Chen’s “usefulness” in Xinjiang is now more of a liability than an asset for Xi in factional struggle. Hence, Xi would naturally seek to replace Chen Quanguo the hardliner with someone of milder character like Ma Xingrui the technocrat to signal and facilitate the rollout of “softer” Xinjiang policies.
Note that “softer” policies does not mean the end of “wolf warrior” rhetoric regarding Xinjiang or the persecution of ethnic minorities. Rather, the Xinjiang persecution campaign could “go to ground” and become less publicly obvious in a manner similar to how the previously high-profile Falun Gong persecution campaign “went to ground” after 2003.
3. Ma Xingrui’s appointment to Xinjiang benefits Xi Jinping’s 20th Party Congress personnel arrangements. Ma’s previous posts in Shenzhen (Party secretary) and Guangdong (governor) clearly indicate that he is a trusted official who is being groomed for higher office. His move to Xinjiang means that he will join the Politburo at the upcoming Party Congress, giving Xi another ally in the top leadership.
Chen Quanguo’s future career trajectory is harder to anticipate, but will likely be linked with Xi’s political requirements and current political strength.
If Xi has enough “quan wei” to secure a third term, does not seek to eradicate his factional rivals, and is only looking to make changes in Xinjiang policy, then Chen, like Zhang Chunxian, will likely remain in a “second-line” position (Central Rural Work Leading Group deputy head; vice chair in either the NPC or CPPCC; etc.) for the remainder of his career.
If Xi lacks “quan wei” to secure a third term and believes that he must move against his factional foes to improve his chances, then Chen could eventually be appointed to more important office and apparatuses where his ruthlessness would be useful to Xi in factional struggle. For instance, Chen could replace Guo Shengkun (Jiang faction member) as Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary before the 20th Party Congress and be tasked with overseeing a more thorough “rectification” of the apparatus (i.e. purge of Jiang faction members and associates plus “anti-Xi” elements) in the lead up to the political conclave; in this scenario, Guo could be made to step aside after the conclusion of the ongoing political and legal affairs “education and rectification” campaign in March 2022 on the pretext of there being excessive corruption in the apparatus during his tenure or his being involved in a high-level corruption scandal. Another scenario could see Chen Quanguo join the Politburo Standing Committee at the 20th Party Congress and replace Zhao Leji (Jiang faction member) as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
A Chen Quanguo “comeback” from the “political wilderness” is not improbable given that Xi Jinping had previously established the precedent of bringing “second line” officials back to the “front line.” A recent example is Xia Baolong, whose political prospects seemed to have been effectively dead when he was appointed as a CPPCC vice chairman in 2018. In 2020, Xia, who was already at retirement age, returned to the “front line” after he was appointed Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director, replacing Jiang faction member Zhang Xiaoming. A less analogous example is Wang Qishan, who appeared to be headed for retirement at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 when he failed to make the Central Committee. Wang later “bounced” back to the top leadership and the “front line” with the vice president appointment at the 2018 Two Sessions and his informal role as the “eighth” Politburo Standing Committee member.
