A ‘historical resolution’ will be unveiled at the Sixth Plenum; Xi moves against the ‘Sun Lijun political gang’

The Politburo meeting repeated the CCP’s propaganda narratives, including touting the Party’s “success” in helping the Chinese people “stand up” from a “century of humiliation” and how the Party is leading the Chinese nation towards “rejuvenation.” The meeting promoted the “significant achievements” made by “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” noting that they provided “institutional guarantees,” “material foundation,” and “spiritual strength” for “national rejuvenation.” Further, the meeting noted that “national rejuvenation” has entered an “irreversible” historical process.

The meeting also called on the Party to be “vigilant in times of peace and danger,” persevere in “strict governance of the Party,” and “unite” people of all ethnicities in China.

We previously noted that both Mao and Deng used their respective “historical resolutions” to obliquely declare victory over their vanquished factional rivals and affirm the “correctness” of their policies. Unlike Mao and Deng, however, Xi has yet to best his political foes even though he has an edge over them in factional struggle. This is reflected in currently available official and semi-official information about what Xi’s “historical resolution” would be about, that is, summarizing the CCP’s “centennial struggle,” as well as promoting Xi’s “core role” in guiding the Party to its 100th anniversary milestone and how Xi’s leadership is necessary to continuing the Party’s “struggle” over the next hundred years.

Put another way, Xi’s “historical resolution” is shaping up to be the latest in a string of political gestures (promoting the “Four Histories,” “common prosperity,” “whole-process people’s democracy,” “Xi Zhongxun’s family characteristics,” etc.) meant to boost his “quan wei” and lay the theoretical groundwork for him taking a norm-breaking third office term at the 20th Party Congress in 2022. Xi’s “historical resolution” is looking less likely to be the sort of capstone document announcing Xi’s complete dominance over his factional rivals, or one that automatically puts him on par with Mao and Deng in terms of “quan wei.”

Political Black Swans between now and the Sixth Plenum, however, could see Xi produce a “historical resolution” akin to those of his predecessors. For instance, Xi could be forced to act before the Sixth Plenum to arrest prominent “big tigers” and eliminate the Jiang Zemin faction if they seriously undermine his leadership, or if Xi believes that they are going to do so imminently and he must act preemptively to preserve his rule. In such a scenario, Xi could issue a “historical resolution” that, along with its current content, also exposes and denounces the “another Party Central” challenging him. Publicly available information at present suggests that the probability of the aforementioned scenario is low.

2. Signs that Xi Jinping is introducing a more modest “historical resolution” at the Sixth Plenum indicates that he still lacks “quan wei” to subdue opposing voices in the Party and have things done his way. This is despite Xi’s crackdown on Jiang faction strongholds in the regime (tech, finance, entertainment, political and legal affairs apparatus, etc.) and efforts at power consolidation over the past nine years.

Warnings in official mainland media of an “emperor emeritus” and “Lin Biao” coup suggest that the Jiang faction and the “anti-Xi coalition” still have substantial influence in the CCP regime. As long as his opponents retain influence and Xi lacks “quan wei,” Xi cannot move too quickly in cleaning out rivals or growing his political base without incurring significant political risks. Meanwhile, Xi’s enemies have ample opportunities to leverage the “perfect storm” of problems facing the PRC (deteriorating economy, power crunch, debt bomb, property bubble, food crisis, infectious diseases outbreaks, growing social instability etc.) and CCP bureaucratic tics (“prefer left rather than right,” “one-size fits all” solutions, etc.) to create trouble for Xi.

Xi will almost certainly intensify the “rectification” of the regime and personnel reshuffles ahead of the 20th Party Congress to eliminate enemies and pave the way for a third term. Xi could also step up the purging of disloyal political and legal affairs officials before the Sixth Plenum to “kill the chicken to scare the monkey” and ensure that his factional foes do not ruin the unveiling of his “historical resolution.” Xi’s moves, however, invite pushback from his rivals.

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OUR TAKE

Xi Jinping has stuck with his usual approach to personnel reshuffles with the latest round of personnel arrangements. In particular, the bulk of the incoming provincial Party secretaries first served as governor or vice governor of the province that they were in before moving to the Party side of the CCP regime’s dual Party-state government. Only new Hunan Party secretary Zhang Qingwei, who was a technocrat from the aerospace sector before joining the government, switched provinces from Heilongjiang in the recent reshuffle.

The recent personnel reshuffles also saw the replacement of a number of officials from the Jiang era. With a little more than a year to go before the 20th Party Congress, the period between now and the Two Sessions in 2022 will likely see intensive personnel movement as Xi moves to further marginalize his factional rivals and consolidate his position.

Meanwhile, the transfer of Xinjiang officials to Tibet is likely due to the existence of longstanding persecution campaigns in both regions and the current geopolitical climate. The CCP needs to keep its persecution policies in both ethnic minority-dominant provinces to “maintain stability,” and officials whose hands have already been “bloodied” will be more willing to obey the central government’s orders and not fear sanctions from the international community. The risk of international sanctions also somewhat ties Party Central’s hands in appointing people to Xinjiang and Tibet because those officials will become far less eligible for higher office because international travel and diplomatic work could get complicated for sanctioned officials.

In 2015, Peng, then deputy director of the Cyberspace Administration of China, was reassigned to serve as the head of the CPLAC’s internet public opinion response and legal disposal coordination group and deputy director of the 610 Office. In September 2015, deputy public security minister Fu Zhenghua became director of the 610 Office, with Peng Bo and Sun Lijun serving as his deputies.

Oct. 15
Study Times, a publication of the CCP Central Party School, published a piece by former CCP General Office Veterans Bureau director Xu Zhongyuan titled, “Why Mao Zedong Recommended the Biographies of Huang Qiong and Li Gu to His Old Comrades” (毛澤東為什麼要給老戰友薦讀〈黃瓊傳〉〈李固傳〉). The article was later republished by People’s Daily Online’s Party History Education Net (黨史教育網).

Xu wrote that Mao instructed his staff to send the aforementioned biographies from the “Book of the Later Han” (one of twenty four official dynastic history books) to four leading cadres in the Central Committee, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen, in August 1965. Xu believed that Mao recommended those biographies, and particularly the “good article” in the biographies titled, “Li Gu’s correspondences with Huang Qiong” (李固給黃瓊書), because they were full of “materialism” and “dialectical thinking.” Examples of what Mao was referring to include “(Going) too high is dangerous; overflowing when too full; a full moon is lacking; the sun shifts at noon” (窮高則危, 大滿則溢, 月盈則缺, 日中則移) and “It is easy to give the world to someone else, but difficult to find a wise man in the world” (以天下與人易, 為天下得人難).

Xu also gave a brief historical background of the Eastern Han period in which Huang Qiong and Li Gu lived. He noted that Liang Ji, the leading military commander at the time, was dictatorial, monopolized the imperial government, and made his brother-in-law emperor.

Xu believes that Mao Zedong was advocating that his leading cadres learn from Huang Qiong and Li Gu, and take important matters of the state and regime security as their priority, disregard personal fame and official positions, be upright and outspoken, dare to remonstrate the ruler, and establish “righteousness” among leading cadres willing to listen to differing opinions.

Background: Xu Zhongyuan, 77, was a librarian in Mao Zedong’s library during the latter’s later years. After retiring as CCP General Office Veterans Bureau director in 2004, Xu began researching and writing on Mao. He eventually published four books on the Chairman, including “A Chronicle of What Mao Read in His Later Years” (毛澤東晚年讀書紀實) and “How Mao Read the Twenty-Four Histories” (毛澤東是怎樣讀二十四史的). In 2014, Xu donated 1.2 million yuan to support an educational initiative in Guangxi Province, saying that he was inspired by Xi Jinping’s “China dream.”

The period in which Mao recommended the biographies of Huang Qiong and Li Gu to Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Peng Zhen coincided with his marginalization by Liu Shaoqi. Nine months later in May 1966, Mao began his Cultural Revolution to take down prominent leading cadres at the time. Zhou Enlai aside, the other three were purged, with Liu Shaoqi persecuted to death. Put another way, Mao was in fact putting on notice the four leading cadres to whom he recommended the biographies of Huang Qiong and Li Gu; Mao was accusing them of being dictatorial, monopolizing the regime, and staging a coup against him.

Oct. 16
Public security minister Zhao Kezhi presided over an enlarged meeting of the Ministry of Public Security’s Party Committee and heard work reports from the MPS’s Special Branch and eight bureau-level units on “rectifying and purging poisonous influences.”

Zhao stressed during the meeting that purging the influence of the “Sun Lijun political gang” (孫力軍政治團伙) should always be a top priority, and called on leading cadres and their leadership team take point in “making clear the people and events involved in serious violations of discipline and laws by the Sun Lijun political gang.” He also instructed public security cadres to “drop the(ir) baggage, seize the final window of opportunity, and take the initiative to speak up” in handling the Sun Lijun case.

Oct. 17
Guo Shengkun, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary and head of the National Political and Legal Affairs Education and Rectification Leading Group, stressed during a meeting of the national political and legal affairs education and rectification campaign that inspectors must “politically recognize” the “serious hazards” of the severe violation of discipline and laws by Sun Lijun and others.

Guo added that inspectors should carry out a systematic, comprehensive, and in-depth “investigation and rectification” of “key areas” where Sun and others seriously violated discipline and the law.” Inspectors should “take real and hard action; dig deep and thoroughly investigate; produce people, events, and results; and ensure that there are no hidden problems left behind” in probing the Sun Lijun case, Guo said.

Oct. 18
Tian Zaimou (age 66, retired in August 2015), former chief of the Criminal Investigation Bureau (sub-bureau level) and head of the Shandong Public Security Bureau’s criminal police corps, was investigated.

Analysis: Tian Zaimou, like “judicial mafia”-linked Luo Wenjin from Jiangsu, was also a criminal police chief and was investigated post-retirement. The close proximity of Jiangsu and Shandong means that Tian and Luo would have had ample opportunities for interaction, and suggests that their probes could be linked.

Oct. 20
The MPS published a 2,600 character article on the enlarged meeting of the MPS Party Committee on Oct. 16. The article said that Zhao Kezhi called for the “resolute and thorough elimination of the poisonous influence of Sun Lijun and others” at the meeting, and for public security officials to be “absolutely loyal, absolutely clean, and absolutely reliable.”

The article said Zhao also called on public security officials to “arm their minds with Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, constantly strengthen loyalty to the core, support the core, follow the core, defend the core’s ideological consciousness, political consciousness, and consciousness of action, and always be aligned in ideology and action with Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.”

Zhao said that public security officials must “focus on investigating and dealing with corruption where political and economic issues are intertwined, and resolutely eliminate hidden political dangers within the Party.” Further, officials should “keep an eye on power concentrated, capital intensive, and people’s livelihood-related key work units and key positions.”

Oct. 21
The MPS held a “warning education conference” (警示教育大會) for organs directly affiliated with it, according to a report on the MPS website. The conference was held in-person for those in Beijing and virtually for cadres stationed elsewhere.

During the conference, public security minister Zhao Kezhi emphasized the need for a “deep and thorough investigation of ‘people,’ ‘events,’ and ‘cases’ pertaining to the serious violation of discipline and laws by Sun Lijun and others.”

Zhao added that cadres would face a “light punishment” in accordance with “regulations, discipline, and laws” if they “take the initiative to explain [their discipline and law-breaking actions] during the self-examination and self-correction phase” and “truthfully explain the problem.” However, those who “refuse to explain” their actions and choose to “confront the organization’s investigation” will be punished severely.