Xi again turns to history to bolster his ‘quan wei’ and propaganda; analyzing the updated 20th Party Congress delegates list

     SinoInsight  1     

Sept. 24
An article titled, “Old Comrades Are the Party’s Mainstay and Ocean-calming Cudgel” (老同志是黨得中流砥柱、定海神針) by Gu Wanming, a retired bureau chief of Xinhua’s Guangdong branch, that was published on the official WeChat account of the self-media “Da Ji Zhe You Hua Shuo” (大記者有話說; roughly “Major Journalist Has Something to Say”) went viral on the Chinese internet and was widely commented on.

The article brought up CCP veterans Song Ping (who groomed and helped to elevate Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao), Zhu De (who confronted Zhang Guotao), Ye Jianying (who took down the “Gang of Four”), Deng Xiaoping (who initiated “reform and opening up”) and some others to make the case that “old comrades often at critical moments in the Party’s history have stepped up to the plate (挺身而出), brought order out of chaos (撥亂反正), served as the mainstay and ocean-calming cudgel (中流砥柱 and 定海神針; both idioms can be used to describe individuals who are strong, dependable, and can stabilize chaotic situations), and saved the Party, the country, and the people.”

The article concluded by praising “old comrades” as “valuable revolutionary assets,” and added that they can “ensure that at a critical moment in history, the Chinese ship will not lose its course and safely sail through the dangerous shoals and reefs to reach the great harbor where the people are rich and the country is strong in the midst of the stormy and turbulent waves.”

The article was republished by the Chinese edition of the U.S.-China Perception Monitor, an online publication operated by China Focus of the Carter Center. The article was also subsequently censored on mainland China, and the “Da Ji Zhe You Hua Shuo” WeChat account was blocked.

Sept. 26
State mouthpiece Xinhua reported that Xi Jinping wrote a preface titled, “Forging Ahead Firmly on the Road to Rejuvenation” (在復興之路上堅定前行) on Sept. 20 for the “Rejuvenation Library” (復興文庫) project.

From Xi’s preface and official media reports, the “Rejuvenation Library” project is a large-scale historical documenting series based on the theme of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” and the history of ideas. The “major cultural projects” was approved by Party Central in 2019 and will result in five volumes.

The “Rejuvenation Library” project features a selection of important documents from the 1840 Opium War to the present that are connected to the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The documents show how the Chinese Communists, the so-called “excellent sons and daughters of China,” influenced the “process of China’s development, led the progress of the times, and promoted national rejuvenation.” Official media said that the documents “profoundly reveal the historical logic, ideological origin, and cultural context of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

In his preface, Xi wrote, “On the basis of learning the Party’s history well, we must learn the history of modern China well, learn the history of China well, and be clear about where we came from, where we are going, and what the Chinese Communists are supposed to do, have already done, and still have yet to do.” He added that the Chinese Communists must be clear about “why we were successful in the past and how we can continue to be successful in the future.”

Sept. 27
Xi Jinping visited an exhibition on the theme of “forging ahead in the new era” (奋进新时代) in Beijing with members of the Politburo Standing Committee and other officials, according to state media.

This was Xi’s first public appearance since returning to mainland China from a trip to Central Asia in mid-September.

OUR TAKE
1. The article praising veteran cadres by Gu Wanming is another reflection of how unpopular Xi Jinping currently is in the CCP. Gu’s article suggests that there are some in the Party who view Xi as akin to the “Gang of Four,” and are hoping that the “old comrades” can step in to “bring order out of chaos” by sidelining Xi. We previously cited a Chinese language Voice of America article where a “second generation red” and long-time worker in the CCP system said that 90 percent of her peers do not want to see Xi take a third term at the 20th Party Congress.

Gu’s “old comrades” article also emerged at a time when various unfounded rumors about Xi losing power or being displaced in a “coup” were making the rounds. Some of the more notable rumors include:

• Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao allegedly took control of the Central Guard Bureau on the night of Sept. 14. They then “notified Jiang Zemin, Zeng Qinghong, members of the Central Committee, and former Politburo Standing Committee members” before voting “by a show of hands” to strip Xi Jinping of his military powers.
• Xi Jinping allegedly rushed back from his Central Asia trip and arrived in China on the evening of Sept. 16. Once in the PRC, Xi was “put under control” at the airport before being transported to Zhongnanhai to be placed under house arrest. The rumor says that this “truth” will be announced at the Seventh Plenum of the 19th Central Committee.
• Observers noted that Xi and PRC defense minister Wei Fenghe did not participate in a seminar on national defense and military reform on Sept. 21. They also noted that Li Qiaoming, a former commander of the Northern Theater Command who was removed from his post earlier, had “unexpectedly” attended the seminar and was seated in the front row.
• Information circulating on Twitter claimed that more than 6,000 flights and high-speed railway trips were canceled while officials at the deputy bureau and division level were barred from traveling.
• On Sept. 22, some Chinese netizens circulated a video that allegedly showed an 80-kilometer-long military convoy headed into Beijing.

Some of the rumors above are too vague or unreliable to be used as evidence that something had happened to Xi, including the cancellation of flights and the “military convoy” into Beijing.

Meanwhile, Xi’s “absence” and Li Qiaoming’s “unexpected” attendance at the national defense and military reform seminar are not out of the ordinary. Xi only attended the seminar the first three times it was held and did not participate in it thereafter. Also, observers likely mistakenly believed that Li had been ousted when he was “removed from office” (免職) earlier in the month; per CCP operations, an official is “removed from office” as part of regular job transfers or promotion, or when subjected to a temporary suspension under disciplinary measures, or as a prelude to being purged for “serious violations of discipline.” We noted in our 20th Party Congress report that Li Qiaoming could become the next defense minister; his seating in the front row of the defense and military reform seminar and incumbent defense minister Wei Fenghe’s absence from the event lends weight to our forecast.

Rumors that Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao worked with Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction to oust Xi runs contrary to the logic of factional struggle. Jiang and his clique controlled and undermined the Hu-Wen leadership when they were in power, and even attempted a coup against them after the “Wang Lijun incident.” The Hu camp has been allied with the Xi camp against the Jiang faction since Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang’s failed coup in early 2012. It is extremely unlikely that Hu and Wen would abandon Xi at this crucial junction to side with their mortal enemies.

Finally, rumors that Xi has been displaced in a “coup,” is under “house arrest,” or has lost power in some other dramatic fashion are refuted by his still being prominently promoted in CCP propaganda. Notably, the PLA Daily ran an over 6,800-character piece in the week of Sept. 19 (when rumors were flying thick and fast) where it stressed the importance of the “CMC chairman responsibility system” almost 30 times, noted the Party’s “absolute leadership” over the military, and again criticized purged Jiang faction officials and former CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Articles such as the one by the PLA Daily would not have been published if Xi was “stripped of his military powers” or was successfully removed in a coup.

As for Xi’s “disappearance” from public view after traveling back to China from Central Asia, it should be noted that his first public appearance since the trip came on the 11th day of his return. It is possible that Xi’s “disappearance” is due to him following the PRC’s quarantine protocol (seven days in a quarantine facility, followed by three days at home) rather than him being suddenly sidelined from power.

2. The “Rejuvenation Library” project, like the “Four Histories” project, Xi’s “historical resolution,” and “Chinese civilization exploration” project, are aimed at furthering Xi’s political agenda.

The aforementioned projects are Xi’s way of adding a veneer of historical “legitimacy” and theoretical underpinning to his “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” slogan. The Xi leadership is also trying to whitewash the CCP’s role in destroying authentic traditional Chinese culture and civilization, as well as perpetuating human rights abuses and the death of millions in various political campaigns. At the same time, the Xi leadership hopes to “rebrand” CCP cadres and those who push pernicious Party culture as “excellent sons and daughters of China.”

Xi is also turning to history to strengthen the CCP’s propaganda efforts and his own “quan wei” (authority and prestige), which is built on propaganda more so than tangible political achievements. Ironically, Xi’s effort to delve into Chinese history to prop up his and the CCP regime’s political legitimacy betrays a lack of confidence in “Sinicized Marxism” and exposes the hollowness of Xi’s attempts to bring about the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”

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• The decade since the 18th Party Congress is an “extremely unusual and extraordinary” one in the “process of the development of the Party and the country.” The Party faced a “complex and severe situation and environment,” as well as “onerous and difficult tasks that are rare in the world and in history.”
• General Secretary Xi Jinping, with the “grandeur, foresight, and grand strategies of a Marxist statesman, thinker, and strategist,” planned the “overall situation at home and abroad, promoted reform, development, and stability, internal affairs, foreign affairs, national defense, as well as the governance of the Party, the country, and the military.” Xi also “fully demonstrated the political wisdom, strategic determination, mission responsibility, public sentiment, and leadership art of a leader of a large Party and a large country.”
• Under the leadership of the “Xi core,” the “great transformation of the new era in 10 years” is of “milestone significance” in the “history of the Party, the history of new China, the history of reform and opening up, the history of socialist development, and the history of the development of the Chinese nation.