◎ Through the use of “chain stratagems,” the CCP is looking to turn a negative situation into a positive one for its regime.
The Chinese Communist Party would ideally want Hong Kong to be a prosperous international hub with a populace that is largely in favor of its authoritarian rule before the “one country, two systems” arrangement ends in 2047. To achieve its ideal, the CCP has been slowly transforming Hong Kong since the handover in 1997: Local business and political elites are co-opted; attempts have been made to introduce mandatory pro-CCP “patriotic education” in schools; the implementation of genuine universal suffrage for the election of Hong Kong’s chief executive has been continually delayed; and the city’s population is being “mainlandized” through large numbers of mainland Chinese making so-called “political migrations” to Hong Kong each year. Through the aforementioned measures, the CCP hopes to tighten its control over Hong Kong and shift the city closer and closer to its ideal.
The 2014 Umbrella Movement and the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests, however, have shown the CCP that its previous measures are not effective enough to change Hong Kong before 2047. More crucially, the CCP appears to have lost the hearts and minds of many people of Hong Kong due to its handling of the anti-extradition bill protests.
Based on our long-term research and understanding of the CCP and its operations, we believe that the CCP will not back down from its goal of transforming Hong Kong. If Hong Kong is not more like the mainland before it joins the “one country,” then there is a risk that the city, with its embrace of freedoms and liberal values, will end up undermining the communist regime. And since the CCP’s future survival is concerned, it will find new ways of pursuing its priority agenda for Hong Kong despite recent setbacks and steep challenges.
We have observed that the CCP is currently implementing “chain stratagems” (連環計) from the Thirty-Six Stratagems to reassert its control over Hong Kong and continue to change the city. From the CCP’s latest moves, we have identified four stratagems that it is currently utilizing:
‘Advancing to retreat’ (以進為退)
We explained this strategy in an earlier article: “The ‘advancing’ part of the strategy is convincing the world that the PRC will deploy troops into Hong Kong for another Tiananmen-style crackdown at a moment’s notice. The ‘retreat’ involves ‘meeting’ the demands of the Hong Kong protesters in a backhanded way in the hopes that public anger will die down and the city will return to normalcy. The CCP’s goal of ‘advancing to retreat’ is to calm things down in the city and focus its energies instead on other pressing matters, such as the Sino-U.S. trade war and the 2020 Taiwan presidential election.”
Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam’s unexpected announcement in early September that her government will fully withdraw the extradition bill fits with the CCP’s “advancing to retreat” stratagem. The stratagem also appears to have somewhat worked in shaping how the Trump administration is approaching the Sino-U.S. trade war in a manner which benefits the CCP.
‘Delay and wait for change’ (以拖待變)
Historically, the CCP has favored the “wait it out” approach when faced with overwhelming difficulties or problems that it cannot resolve in one swoop. From Carrie Lam’s belated announcement to withdraw the extradition bill to her government launching a public dialogue with Hong Kong residents only after the protests surpassed the 100-day mark, it is quite clear that the CCP is prepared to “delay and wait for change” in Hong Kong. This stratagem “chains” off “advancing to retreat.”
The CCP would preferably want the anti-extradition bill protests to die down in the lead up to the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China on Oct. 1. But unless the protests dramatically escalate, the CCP will not feel that it has suffered a huge setback by failing to suppress Hong Kong before the Oct. 1 celebrations (there will, however, be ramifications for the CCP factional struggle).
There are limitations to the CCP’s “delay and wait for change” stratagem. Ideally, the CCP would want to grind down the protesters in a “war of attrition” and let the protest movement “burn out” over time. However, the delay stratagem could run into trouble if the protest movement ramps up with time and forces the Hong Kong government and the PRC to pour more and more resources into the city for “stability maintenance” work; as both the Hong Kong and Chinese economies are deteriorating, and there is a limit to how much funding both governments can devote to keep up the suppression in Hong Kong.
The CCP is likely aware of the risks involved with “waiting things out.” Hence, it has simultaneously deployed two other stratagems in the “chain” to replace itself as a key protest target with a scapegoat and generate additional funds to sustain “stability maintenance” work in Hong Kong.
‘Sacrifice the plum tree to preserve the peach tree’ (李代桃僵)
Recently, the CCP designated a new “landlord” class for the Hong Kong people to struggle against—Hong Kong’s business and property elites. In early September, PRC media began pushing the narrative that the root of the anti-extradition bill protests lay with the city’s long-term economic and social problems which were created by Hong Kong’s business and property elites. The narrative is aimed at deflecting the protesters’ ire away from Beijing and towards Hong Kong’s elites. While the CCP sought to cultivate good relations with Hong Kong’s elites earlier on as a means to strengthen their control over the city, they would have no qualms about sacrificing them (the plum tree) now to preserve the CCP regime’s survival (the peach tree).
Around mid-September, the CCP took aim at Hong Kong business and property tycoon Li Ka-shing. On Sept. 12, the CCP’s Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission accused Li of “harboring criminality” with his calling for leniency to be shown to the young Hong Kong protesters. On Sept. 15, Ng Chau-pei, a pro-Beijing politician and Hong Kong deputy to the PRC’s National People’s Congress, slammed Li Ka-shing for supporting the protesters in a Facebook post. Ng also shared a cartoon featuring Li’s head on a cockroach body and with the words “cockroach king” written on his forehead; CCP propaganda derisively refers to the Hong Kong protesters as “cockroaches.”
The CCP is targeting Li Ka-shing because he has been consistent in showing sympathy for the protesters. In August, Li took out two full-page advertisements in Hong Kong newspapers where he called for an end to violence in the protests but used a Chinese proverb (“The melon of Huangtai cannot bear the picking again,” or 黃台之瓜, 何堪再摘) which signaled that he was assigning greater blame to the authorities for the violence. In a monastery visit on Sept. 8, Li told a small crowd that the authorities should offer an olive branch to the young people of Hong Kong (many of the protesters are young people), whom he described as the “masters of our future.”
The CCP’s recent attack of Li Ka-shing may seem petty, but it serves a larger purpose. By criticizing the leading Hong Kong business and property elite, the CCP is indicating that it will target the other elites in a political campaign against the new “landlords.” The CCP is also signaling to Li and the other elites that they should instead toe the line and show that their loyalty lies with Beijing and not with the protesters. Should Li continue to publicly sympathize with the protesters, he is at risk of being sacrificed by the CCP.
‘Replace the beams with rotten timbers’ (偷梁換柱)
After designating a scapegoat (Hong Kong’s business and property elite) to blame for the anti-extradition protests, the CCP now has an excuse to deal with the scapegoat and “rescue” Hong Kong from chaos. The “rescue,” however, will end up with the CCP tightening its control over Hong Kong, hence the stratagem “replace the beams with rotten timbers.”
Signs that the CCP is looking to “replace the beams with rotten timbers” are present in two recent developments on Sept. 12:
- Reuters reported that the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission had organized a meeting in Shenzhen that was attended by senior representatives from nearly 100 of the PRC’s largest state-owned enterprises, including Sinopec and China Merchants Group. During the meeting, the SOEs “pledged to invest more in key Hong Kong industries including real estate and tourism in a bid to create jobs for local citizens and stabilize financial markets.”
- The pro-Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment and Progress of Hong Kong (DAB) held a press conference where they urged the Hong Kong government to forcibly take back land from private owners for use in building public housing units by invoking an existing law. This move was a U-turn from the DAB’s previous stance on the issue, and some pro-democracy politicians publicly questioned whether the DAB was trying to turn the housing issue into a political issue to boost its chances in the coming Hong Kong district council elections in November.
If the CCP were to take the “replace the beams with rotten timbers” stratagem to its logical conclusion, then there is a possibility that Carrie Lam’s government could eventually proceed with “Lantau Tomorrow Vision,” a controversial artificial island plan that was proposed in October 2018. Various estimates place the final project cost at between HK$500 billion (about $63.8 billion, or half of Hong Kong’s reserves) to as high as HK$1.2 trillion (more than what Hong Kong has in its reserves). If the Hong Kong government does go ahead with “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” (a possible white elephant public project), then China’s SOEs have an excuse to step in to help Hong Kong with the construction. The PRC will also be able to export raw materials and excess production capacity to Hong Kong to meet construction requirements, and in the process rescue the mainland economy at the expense of Hong Kong. Finally, the CCP could use the trillion-dollar construction project in Hong Kong to attract foreign capital and investments, a move which helps the international community “forget” about the PRC’s behavior in the anti-extradition bill protests, weaken Western alliances, and even tilt the balance of Sino-U.S. competition.
Conclusion
By implementing “chain stratagems,” the CCP is looking to turn around a negative incident (the anti-extradition bill protests) and secure a positive outcome for the regime in the long run. However, it should be noted that “chain stratagems” are categorized as “Desperation Stratagems” (敗戰計) in the Thirty-Six Stratagems. Put another way, the Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests have forced the CCP to make desperate moves that have no guarantee of success.
Businesses, investors, and governments must be highly vigilant to the CCP’s stratagems for “restoring” order in Hong Kong and “resolving” the long-term problems in Hong Kong society. Beneath the CCP’s “gleaming future” of a restored Hong Kong lies massive hidden political risks. Further, as seen from the recent attacks against Li Ka-shing, friends of the CCP today can easily become the new “landlords” tomorrow.
