SinoInsight 1
Recently, the PRC’s Hong Kong Liaison Office and Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office of the PRC’s State Council (HKMAO) issued statements criticizing pan-democrat Hong Kong lawmakers for “paralyzing the operation of the legislative body.” Pan-democrat lawmakers responded by noting that the Liaison Office and the HKMAO had not respected Article 22 of the Hong Kong Basic Law. Article 22 states that “no department of the Central People’s Government and no province, autonomous region, or municipality directly under the Central Government may interfere in the affairs which the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region administers on its own in accordance with this Law.”
On April 17, the Hong Kong Liaison Office addressed the Article 22 issue in a press release. In a linguistic “sleight of hand,” the Liaison Office argued that it and the HKMAO are merely “authorized by the central government to handle Hong Kong affairs” and do not count as departments under the central government. Hence, “in representing the central government, [the Liaison Office and HKMAO] have the right to exercise supervision and express solemn attitudes on affairs regarding Hong Kong and the mainland, in order to ensure correct implementation of the Basic Law, the normal operation of the political system and the overall interests of society,” read the press release. The Hong Kong Liaison Office’s response to the Article 22 issue is disingenuous because both it and the HKMAO are official government organs that answer directly to the PRC central government, not government proxies.
On April 18, Hong Kong police arrested 15 pan-democrats, including notable figures like former Hong Kong Democratic Party chairs Martin Lee and Albert Ho, Labor Party’s Lee Cheuk-yan, Civic Party’s Margaret Ng, legislator Leung “Long Hair” Kwok-hung, and Apple Daily founder Jimmy Lai. The move was condemned by human rights groups, government officials, and politicians from Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement, “The United States condemns the arrest of pro-democracy advocates in Hong Kong. Beijing and its representatives in Hong Kong continue to take actions inconsistent with commitments made under the Sino-British Joint Declaration that include transparency, the rule of law, and guarantees that Hong Kong will continue to ‘enjoy a high degree of autonomy.’”
In a separate statement, U.S. Attorney General Bill Barr condemned the “latest assault on the rule of law and the liberty of the people of Hong Kong.” Barr added, “These actions—along with its malign influence activity and industrial espionage here in the United States—demonstrate once again that the Chinese Communist Party cannot be trusted.”
OUR TAKE
1. In the April 16 edition of this newsletter, we wrote that the CCP “can come up with all sorts of reasons to arrest [Hong Kong] pan-democrat lawmakers, make them fight lawsuits, or even find ways to alter LegCo rules to prevent pan-democrat lawmakers from filibustering or protesting in the legislature.” Sadly, part of our prediction has come to pass with the arrest of the 15 pan-democrat figures by the Hong Kong police on April 18.
By targeting moderate pro-democracy figures, some of whom are prominent and respected thought leaders in Hong Kong, the CCP is likely looking to “kill the chickens to scare the monkeys” (殺雞儆猴), heighten the climate of fear in Hong Kong, and intimidate the Hong Kong people. At the very least, the CCP has essentially “muzzled” leading pro-democracy figures with the April 18 arrests, forcing them through circumstances to show “restraint” in subsequent protests or face further prosecution (whether the pro-democracy figures will actually show “restraint” is another matter entirely).
2. The arrest of Hong Kong pan-democrat lawmakers is almost certainly part of the CCP’s strategy to get the city’s Legislative Council (LegCo) to enact controversial national security laws (Article 23) before the LegCo elections in September 2020. As we previously explained, “given the strong anti-CCP sentiment in Hong Kong, the CCP cannot guarantee that the pro-Beijing camp will maintain its majority in the Hong Kong LegCo after the LegCo elections in September. Thus, the CCP will likely attempt to push through Article 23 before September when conditions are more favorable to manipulating Hong Kong affairs.”
From the CCP’s perspective, manipulating the Hong Kong legislature into passing Article 23 before September is a risky but critical move because it concerns regime survival:
- The CCP cannot allow unrest and anti-CCP sentiments in Hong Kong to spread to the mainland. And ensuring the passage of Article 23 in Hong Kong, regardless of how provocative the move might be, is pretty much the only way for the CCP to bring the city to heel through non-kinetic means under present circumstances. This is because the CCP knows that it has already lost the hearts of a majority of the people in Hong Kong. Anti-CCP sentiments skyrocketed during the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests, leading to a massive defeat of Hong Kong’s pro-Beijing camp at the 2019 Hong Kong district council elections. The coronavirus pandemic has also led even more Hong Kong people to change their views of the CCP regime.
- The CCP cannot afford to wait until after the LegCo elections are held in September to pass Article 23 because it cannot guarantee that their pro-Beijing lawmakers will still be in the majority given the strong anti-CCP ground sentiments. There is also a chance that the CCP could potentially “lose” its ability to pick a pro-Beijing candidate for Hong Kong chief executive if pan-democrats pick up more than half of the seats in the LegCo. At the very least, the CCP will have difficulties influencing Hong Kong affairs if pan-democrats form the majority in the LegCo.
- With global sentiments turning against the CCP due to the coronavirus pandemic, the CCP has greater need to bring the Hong Kong situation under control as soon as possible so that it has one less crisis to deal with.
- The CCP is very likely betting that the world is too distracted by the pandemic and too reliant on China for essential medical supplies and other goods to take tough action against the CCP regime for its actions in Hong Kong.
Going forward, the CCP could next move to influence the Hong Kong government to alter LegCo rules to disenfranchise pan-democrat lawmakers or even disqualify key pan-democrat legislators like LegCo House Committee deputy chairman Dennis Kwok.
3. With the CCP bent on controlling the Hong Kong situation and Hong Kong protesters determined never to bend to Beijing, a humanitarian crisis in the city looms on the horizon unless the international community takes a strong stance against the CCP on the Hong Kong issue.
To forestall another humanitarian crisis in Hong Kong, the U.S. could threaten to use the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019, which calls for the sanctioning of PRC and Hong Kong officials for human rights abuses and the reevaluation of Hong Kong’s special status as an autonomous territory (which entails an ending of special treatments which the U.S. affords to Hong Kong).
SinoInsight 2
In the evening of April 19 (Beijing time), PRC public security minister Zhao Kezhi announced during a meeting that Sun Lijun, the vice minister of public security, was being investigated by the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission.
At the public security meeting, Sun was officially accused of “disregarding political discipline and regulations for a long time, not keeping discipline, not observing regulations, not showing reverence [for the law and authority], acting without restraint.” The meeting requested that all public security members uphold the “quan wei” of Party Central with Xi Jinping at the core and display “absolute loyalty.” Public security members are warned against being “two-faced” and are “definitely not allowed” to form factions or “small cliques and gangs.” Public security members were also told to “purge the pernicious influence of Zhou Yongkang, Meng Hongwei, Sun Lijun, and others.”
According to reports by official Hubei Province media, Sun Lijun was put in charge of public security operations in Wuhan on Feb. 19.
OUR TAKE
1. From the charges leveled against Sun Lijun at the April 19 public security meeting, it is clear that his being purged is linked with the CCP factional struggle.
Sun’s career background indicates that he is a member of the Jiang Zemin faction. Early in his career, Sun was appointed deputy director of the Shanghai municipal government’s foreign affairs office; Shanghai has long been the Jiang faction’s “territory” (地盤). Sun was also once the secretary of former public security minister and Jiang faction associate Meng Jianzhu. By November 2011, Sun was serving as deputy director of the General Office of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS), a key role that the then Jiang faction-dominated Party leadership would likely only give to a loyal Jiang faction member. During the last 12 years of the Jiang era (2000 to 2012), the Jiang faction did its best to appoint its members or associates to key positions in the political and legal affairs apparatus (including public security) and propaganda apparatus so that it could retain a tight grip on both apparatuses and better perpetuate Jiang Zemin’s persecution campaign against the Falun Gong spiritual discipline.
Sun Lijun would continue to be entrusted with key public security positions that are crucial for preserving the Jiang faction’s interests after the 18th Party Congress. In March 2013, Sun was appointed director of the MPS’s First Bureau, which handles domestic political security and Hong Kong security affairs, well as director of the MPS’s Twenty-sixth Bureau, which is the ministry’s “anti-cult activity” department. Concurrently, Sun served as deputy director of the central “610 Office” (March 28, 2013 to March 2018) which coordinates the persecution of Falun Gong, as well as the director of the MPS’s Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan affairs office. Sun was able to get his appointments and promotions because the Jiang faction still largely swayed public security during Xi Jinping’s first term in office. Guo Shengkun, a Jiang faction member, was public security minister during Xi’s first term; Xi was only able to appoint his ally Zhao Kezhi as public security head in 2017 after five years of power consolidation.
During Xi’s second term, Sun Lijun, who was by then already a member of the MPS’s Party committee, was promoted to vice minister of public security in March 2018. We believe that Xi promoted Sun at the time because he was dissolving the “610 Office” as part of state institutional reforms in March 2018 and needed to dispel the Jiang faction’s concerns that he was going to end the persecution of Falun Gong and endanger Jiang Zemin’s political legacy.
2. The purge of Sun Lijun is also likely linked to Xi Jinping’s clean up of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs apparatus (see here and here) and the CCP’s attempt to ram through Article 23 in Hong Kong (see SinoInsight 1).
We noted in SinoInsight 1 that it is risky for the CCP to interfere in Hong Kong affairs because the Hong Kong people are determined to resist the CCP’s steady erosion of freedoms in Hong Kong and the “one country, two systems” arrangement. Put another way, the Hong Kong people are almost certainly going to protest the CCP’s attempt to see Article 23 through the Hong Kong legislature. In this scenario, the Xi leadership will look to suppress the protests with as little controversy as possible to avoid international scrutiny. And if this is indeed Xi Jinping’s plan, then he cannot have Sun Lijun in charge of Hong Kong security affairs given his background and what transpired during the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill protests.
We already traced Sun’s factional background in the previous point. Sun’s career trajectory also suggests that he has experience in the public security ministry’s intelligence wing; Sun would have experience handling Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan matters when he was deputy director of the Shanghai municipal government’s foreign affairs office (it cannot be ruled out that Sun could then already be covertly working for public security apparatus), and the MPS’s First Bureau handles Hong Kong security affairs and has similar functions to the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Thus, Sun Lijun would have been the person directing and overseeing the Hong Kong police force’s suppression activity during the anti-extradition bill protests.
As the person in charge of Hong Kong security affairs and intelligence work during the protests last year, Sun Lijun would be responsible for many incidents that led to the escalation of the Hong Kong situation. Notable incidents include the police shooting of protesters and the brutal police siege of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Polytechnic University. Controversial incidents include the numerous mysterious “suicide” cases involving protesters, a phenomenon that Hong Kong residents believe was the work of CCP intelligence operations in the city. According to a Hong Kong LegCo Finance Committee report, there were 8,148 “discovered” dead bodies and 713 suicide cases in Hong Kong in 2019; both figures were higher than in 2018, and the “dicovered” bodies count reached a three-year high. If Sun was indeed the man behind the escalation of the Hong Kong situation, then Xi Jinping would unlikely want him around just as the CCP prepares the next phase of operations to tighten its grip over Hong Kong without overly antagonizing the Hong Kong people.
3. The purge of Sun Lijun is also likely linked with the Xi leadership’s attempt to implement the Sino-U.S. “phase one” trade deal. We wrote last December that Xi would look to “rein in” his political opponents to prevent a “reneging” of the trade deal, as was the case with the draft deal in May 2019. To that end, Xi could “begin to purge or sideline a handful of mid- to high-ranking officials in opposing factions to ‘kill the chickens to scare the monkeys.’ Xi would likely use the six months of chaos in Hong Kong and the Wang Liqiang/Xiang Xin case as an excuse to target Hong Kong, intelligence apparatus, and even political and legal affairs apparatus officials who are associated with or members of rival Party factions.”
We also predicted in our China 2020 outlook that PRC officials in political and legal affairs, propaganda, intelligence, finance, and Hong Kong and Macau affairs are at high risk of being purged this year.
Sun is a Jiang faction member, is part of the political and legal affairs apparatus (as vice minister of public security), and was in charge of Hong Kong security affairs as head of the MPS’s First Bureau.
Given the current trajectory of CCP elite politics and the factional struggle, we expect to see more purges this year that are in line with our prediction.
