SinoInsight 1
Two NBA teams, the Brooklyn Nets and the Los Angeles Lakers, recently played two exhibition pre-season games in China (Shanghai on Oct. 10; Shenzhen on Oct. 12). Concerns about Chinese nationalism before the games in light of strong PRC backlash to Houston Rockets general manager Daryl Morey tweeting his support of Hong Kong on Oct. 4 proved to be overblown.
According to overseas Chinese language media reports, both exhibition games played to full-house crowds. All tickets (priced between 350 yuan to 18,800 yuan) were sold, and the vicinity of the stadium in Shenzhen was packed with people hours before game time. The scene inside the stadiums at both Shenzhen and Shanghai resembled any ordinary NBA game, with fans turning out in team colors and only a handful of people waving the PRC flag.
Security was very strict inside and outside the game stadiums, according to news reports. Security personnel stopped passers-by near the stadium and searched bags; umbrellas, a symbol of protest in Hong Kong, were confiscated from game attendees. In Shenzhen, public security officers confiscated “patriotic” material from the so-called “Fan Club Girls” (飯圈女孩, a celebrity-chasing nationalistic group who gained prominence for criticizing “Hong Kong independence”), including 3,000 signs which called on Daryl Morey to apologize. Public security officers even summoned members of the “Fan Club Girls” for a “chat.”
The PRC authorities also appeared to tone down nationalistic sentiments instead of fanning shortly after the initial backlash to Daryl Morey’s tweet. “Editors at state news outlets have told reporters to avoid emphasizing the N.B.A. issue for fear that it might become overheated,” The New York Times reported, citing three Chinese journalists. And when asked about where China stands on the NBA issue, PRC foreign ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang merely said, “I’d like to reiterate that no matter it’s in China, the US or anywhere else, an important prerequisite for exchange and cooperation is mutual respect.”
OUR TAKE
1. In our analysis of the NBA controversy, we noted that the CCP would “likely revise the current NBA propaganda strategy” and “propaganda organs could wind down or cease criticism of Daryl Morey and the NBA, and even find ways to criticize those in the mainland for being ‘too nationalistic’ and overly sensitive about the issue.” However, such a strategy shift has “dangerous downsides for the CCP—the Chinese people will see that the CCP is a paper tiger and the double-edged sword of nationalism could cut towards the CCP.”
Our prediction of the shift in the CCP’s NBA propaganda strategy has been verified from the scenes at the Shanghai and Shenzhen NBA pre-season games, official statements, and the information on state media editorial direction obtained by The New York Times. It is clear now that the CCP is trying to curb rather than fan nationalistic sentiment over the NBA issue. Whether or not it will succeed is an open question; NBA superstar Lebron James’s Oct. 14 comment that Daryl Morey was not “educated on the situation at hand” inspired another outpouring of nationalism on Chinese social media.
2. The CCP is fond of wielding nationalism to intimidate the West and get countries to kowtow to China on seemingly petty issues for fear of “hurting the feelings of 1.4 billion Chinese people.” The success of the NBA’s two pre-season games in China, however, has effectively debunked the myth of “Chinese nationalism” and demonstrated the limits of the CCP’s “authoritarian advantage”—while strict policing undoubtedly played a part, Chinese NBA fans showed that they were genuinely more interested in supporting their team and cheering on superstars than protesting the NBA and Daryl Morey out of love for China.
As a result of the CCP’s long-term conditioning, many mainland Chinese have come to look out for their self-interests above all, a phenomenon that observers have called “extreme egoism” (極端利己主義). Further, nationalism in the PRC is often transactional (internet trolls are dubbed the “50-cent army”) and closely tied with self-interests. When nationalism collides with self-interests, mainland Chinese are wont to choose the latter over the former, as demonstrated by the reaction to the NBA pre-season games. Ironically, CCP conditioning of mainland Chinese erodes its ability to wield nationalism effectively, and under certain circumstances, could cause the double-edged blade of nationalism to swing toward the CCP regime instead of against its enemies.
SinoInsight 2
According to recent news reports, Xi Mingze, the daughter of Xi Jinping, had re-enrolled in Harvard College for graduate-level studies and returned to America either in 2018 or 2019.
Observers speculate that Xi Jinping sent his daughter to the United States for safety reasons due to fierce factional fighting in the CCP.
OUR TAKE
1. The news, if accurate, affirms our 2018 analysis of a political crisis in the CCP and its escalation in 2019.
2. On paper, it does not make sense for Xi to allow his daughter to go to the U.S. when America and the PRC are in the midst of a “new cold war.” The reality, however, is that most CCP officials know that they will be safer in the U.S. with the rule of law than in the PRC where the anti-corruption officials can whisk them away for political reasons; that is why America was a top destination for the families of CCP officials to migrate to.
Another factor to consider is the literal “you die, I live” factional struggle in the CCP. In our brief guide to CCP factional politics, we touched on assassination attempts against Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping. The viciousness of the factional struggle means that Xi Jinping cannot properly guarantee the safety of his daughter and other family members when they are in China where his political rivals are still influential and can more easily pull off assassination attempts.
While Xi’s rivals could still conceivably get to his daughter in America, they would have a far harder time doing so. For one, the U.S. government would become partly responsible for her safety and would this security job very seriously because it would be an international scandal if harm were to befall her during her time in the States. Xi’s rivals would also unlikely find it easy to assassinate Xi Mingzhe if she is under American protection. And even if they were successful, Xi’s rivals would face an uphill task in ousting Xi and convincing the U.S. government to back their new regime after executing a political assassination on American soil.
There is at least one notable example of a CCP elite’s offspring escaping the tribulations of the factional struggle by virtue of being abroad. While Xi’s rival Bo Xilai languishes in jail serving a life sentence as a result of the fierce Xi-Jiang factional struggle, his son Bo Guagua is still leading a luxurious life overseas.
SinoInsight 3
On Oct. 16, Jimmy Sham, convenor of the Civil Human Rights Front (CHRF), was attacked by at least four non-ethnic Chinese assailants in Hong Kong’s Mong Kok district. Sham was on his way to a CHRF meeting to organize a protest march on Oct. 20. In August, Sham was also attacked by masked men wielding baseball bats and rods.
The CHRF said that Sham’s assailants hit him with hammers and spanners, leaving him bloodied on the floor. Hong Kong police said they found Sham bleeding from his head and arms. Sham was taken to a hospital and is in stable condition, according to news reports.
The Islamic Union of Hong Kong, a Muslim nonprofit, issued a statement condemning the attack on Jimmy Sham. The statement added that the Muslim community would pray for Sham and that the purpose of the attack was likely to divide society. The statement also noted that Muslims have been living peacefully with the Hong Kong people for the past 200 years and that they will continue to stand by the Hong Kong people to strive for a more equal and harmonious society.
Discussions of the attack on Jimmy Sham in Hong Kong’s online forums expressed skepticism and suspicion about the many calls for “retaliation” against South Asians that were raised after Sham was attacked.
OUR TAKE
1. We have reason to believe that the recent attack on Jimmy Sham is an attempt by the CCP to engineer an ethnic conflict in Hong Kong and discredit the anti-extradition bill protest movement. (We earlier covered CCP incitement logic and other strategies to suppress the anti-extradition bill protests.)
The “ingredients” for engineering an ethnic conflict are already in place.
First, more and more Hong Kong protesters are radicalizing in the face of increased Hong Kong police brutality and the Hong Kong government’s callous handling of the anti-extradition bill situation. No longer trusting the authorities to carry out justice, the expanding “brave martial clique” (勇武派) has in recent weeks been taking matters into their own hands by launching retaliatory “counterattacks” against pro-CCP elements who target protesters, including triad members and triad-backed businesses.
Second, virtually all of Hong Kong is participating in the anti-extradition bill protests in one form or another, including ethnic minorities. As with communities in all societies, there are ethnic minorities that assimilate or go along with the bulk of society, and there are ethnic minorities who join society’s outcasts by forming their own gangs or triads. Thus, there are undoubtedly ethnic minorities in Hong Kong who join the protesters and those who are triad members; the latter group has tended to side with Beijing and cooperated with the Hong Kong police during the protests.
The CCP typically resorts to incitement as a way to divide a population in the throes of an uprising. Hence, it is not beyond the CCP to try to spark an ethnic conflict in Hong Kong by getting ethnic minorities to brutally assault a chief organizer of protest marchers. Should Hong Kong protesters fall for the CCP’s ploy and carry out “counterattacks” against ethnic minorities, the entire protest movement would definitely lose its moral high ground. With the movement discredited, the CCP has an excuse to carry out “normalization” in Hong Kong.
2. Judging from the comments in Hong Kong’s online forums, the CCP’s attempt to engineer an ethnic conflict in the city will unlikely succeed. The people of Hong Kong are especially vigilant for the CCP’s dirty tricks, having already observed imposter protesters carrying out acts of violence, vandalism, and arson.
Already, there is discussion on the Hong Kong online forums about protecting the Muslim community, places of worship, and residences during the Oct. 20 protest march. Some suggestions include positioning “brave martial clique” members near ethnic enclaves to protect the ethnic minorities and prevent moles from causing trouble.
