SinoInsight 1
International Olympic Committee (IOC) President Thomas Bach met with PRC leader Xi Jinping in Beijing ahead of the Winter Olympics. Bach praised the PRC for its “efficiency, determination and vigor” in preparing for the Games, according to state broadcaster CCTV.
Jan. 31
In an interview with state mouthpiece Xinhua, IOC President Bach said, “We can see the determination China is addressing the pandemic and how successful this approach is for the people.”
Feb. 3
IOC President Bach said that Chinese tennis star Peng Shuai and IOC staff had a call in the week of Jan. 31. “We know from her explanations during the video conferences that she is living here in Beijing, that she can move freely, that she’s spending time with her family and friends,” Bach said. He added that if Peng wants an official investigation into her allegations, “we would also support her in this, but it must be her decision.”
Feb. 4
1. Duowei News, the Beijing-based overseas Chinese language overseas news site, published an article titled, “The Beijing Winter Olympics is Showing an Unexpected Side of China’s Circle of Friends” (北京冬奧會正在呈現中國朋友圈的意外一面).
The article noted that 25 countries visited Beijing around the opening of the Games, including Russia represented by the country’s leader Vladimir Putin. This “seems to give the impression that Beijing can still welcome some influential countries [to China] amid the wave of U.S.-led ‘boycotts’ by major European powers and America.”
The article added that a “closer look at the list” of 25 countries shows that six of them (Cambodia, Singapore, Egypt, Qatar, the UAE, and Papua New Guinea) are not among the 91 participating countries at the Beijing Winter Olympics. While those countries sent their heads of state to Beijing on the pretext of attending the “Winter Olympics Opening Ceremony and related activities,” Duowei said that their “diplomatic actions unrelated to the Olympics are still notable.”
The Duowei piece also observed that North Korea was an “unexpectedly absent ally,” explaining that the latter’s lack of attendance was not about not giving China “face,” but rather, an effort to “maintain Pyongyang’s position in the diplomatic arena by not creating an atmosphere of a ‘Winter Olympics showdown’ for South Korea.”
2. Dutch public broadcasting correspondent Sjoerd den Daas was finishing a television report outside the Beijing National Stadium when he was unceremoniously dragged off camera by a security guard wearing a red armband. The journalist was only able to finish his report a few minutes later, according to NOS Journaal.
The incident was caught on camera and was condemned by many international journalists and observers. NOS News editor-in-chief Marcel Gelauff said, “Unfortunately, situations like this are increasingly becoming a daily reality for journalists in China.” He added that it was a “painful illustration of the state of press freedom in the country.” The IOC, however, dismissed it as a “one-off incident.”
In a series of tweets, den Daas noted that in “recent weeks, we, like several foreign colleagues, have been hindered or stopped several times by the police while reporting on subjects related to the Games. Therefore, it’s hard to see last night’s incident as an isolated incident, as the IOC claims, although such interference rarely happens live on broadcast.”
Feb. 7
1. The IOC released a statement noting that IOC President Thomas Bach and IOC member Kirsty Coventry met with Peng Shuai for dinner on Feb. 5 at the Olympic club in Beijing.
2. When asked whether the IOC would support an investigation into Peng Shuai’s sexual assault allegation if she requested it, IOC spokesperson Mark Adams said that it was not the committee’s to judge whether such action should be taken. “We as a sports organization are doing everything we can to ensure that she is happy, and I don’t think it’s up for us to judge … just like it’s not for you to judge, in one way or another, her position,” he said.
3. French sports media L’Équipe published an interview with Peng Shuai.
Peng said that her Weibo post (about Zhang Gaoli) from November 2021 had “given rise to a huge misunderstanding from the outside world.” She added, “I hope that we no longer distort the meaning of this post. And I also hope that we don’t add more hype on this.” Peng did not mention Zhang Gaoli, the former Politburo Standing Committee member who was the subject of her Weibo post, throughout her interview.
Peng Shuai said, “I never said anyone had sexually assaulted me in any way,” and that she had deleted her Weibo post because she wanted to. When asked about her disappearance, Peng replied that she had not vanished but could not reply to “so many messages” from people. Peng also announced her retirement from competitive tennis during her interview.
The interview, which lasted for an hour, was held at the Chinese Olympic Committee’s (COC) hotel in Beijing. COC chief of staff Wang Kan accompanied Peng Shuai during the interview and provided translation.
The hour-long interview of arranged questions, the answers to which L’Équipe was required to release in full, was conducted at the Chinese Olympic Committee’s hotel in Beijing inside the coronavirus-fighting “closed loop” set up for the Winter Olympics. Wang Kan, chief of staff for the COC, was with Peng as she spoke. According to overseas Chinese language media, Beijing set four conditions for the interview, namely, that answers should be in Chinese, that the answers should be published in full, that questions should be reviewed before hand, and that no commentary should be added to the interview report.
A picture of Peng Shuai in the 16th floor suite of the hotel in which she was interviewed shows the reflection of a Chinese man in a white shirt with arms folded across his chest caught in the mirror. Many observers speculate that the unidentified man is likely a CCP official whose job is to keep tabs on the interview and keep Peng under surveillance. Observers add that Peng is evidently not free despite her assertions.
A day after the interview, L’Équipe journalist Marc Ventouillac, one of the two who interviewed Peng, told the Associated Press that it is “impossible to say” whether she is safe. “It’s a part of communication, propaganda, from the Chinese Olympic Committee,” he said.
4. Women’s Tennis Association chairman and CEO Steve Simon said in a statement that Peng Shuai’s interview “does not alleviate any of our concerns about her initial post from November 2nd.”
“As we would do with any of our players globally, we have called for a formal investigation into the allegations by the appropriate authorities and an opportunity for the WTA to meet with Peng—privately—to discuss her situation,” Simon added. “We continue to hold firm on our position and our thoughts remain with Peng Shuai.”
5. According to an Associated Press report, NBC is on track for the lowest-rated Winter Games in history based on viewers for the first four nights of competition. The 8 million viewers on Feb. 3 was the lowest on record.
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping would have been hoping to add a scandal-free, largely successful Winter Olympics to his very short list of political “achievements.” However, the continued international attention to the Peng Shuai-Zhang Gaoli affair and refusal to buy the CCP narrative, the “diplomatic boycott” of the Games by the U.S. and several major countries, and the Dutch television reporter incident have already tarnished the image of the event somewhat.
Barring prominent scandals further down the road, Xi is currently on track to pass off the Beijing Winter Olympics as a “success” to the rest of the Party given the largely glowing Western media coverage of the Games more broadly and the efforts by the IOC to “whitewash” traces of the brutal CCP regime that slip through the propaganda cracks. Xi’s rivals, however, would argue that the 2022 Games cannot hold a candle to the 2008 Games (when the Jiang faction was running the show) in terms of grandeur, raising the regime’s profile, and as a diplomatic endeavor.
2. It is noteworthy that IOC President Thomas Bach said publicly that the Committee would support Peng Shui if she decides to call for an investigation into her allegations after he met with Xi Jinping. The IOC’s compliance with CCP “political correctness” and narratives suggests that Bach had Xi’s tacit or implicit “blessing” to make such a remark. If so, this means that the Xi authorities have not completely ruled out investigating Zhang Gaoli, a Jiang faction member, and Peng retains the “agency” to call for that investigation. This development is consistent with our analysis of the Peng Shuai-Zhang Gaoli affairs.
We believe that Zhang’s fate is tied with Xi’s 20th Party Congress political necessities. Xi’s current focus on “self-revolution,” the anti-corruption campaign, and subtle criticisms of Jiang Zemin’s political legacy (see here and here) bode ill for Zhang Gaoli and other Jiang faction “tigers.”
3. At a glance, the Feb. 4 Duowei article seems to defend the CCP regime by making the case that Beijing has many in its “circle of friends” to call upon to support the Winter Olympics despite the “diplomatic boycott” of the U.S. and Western allies.
However, the article subtly throws shade at Beijing by pointing out that its “circle of friends” comprises smaller countries and those without meaningful participation in the Games. Put another way, Duowei is deliberately calling attention to matters that would make the Xi Jinping leadership lose “face,” and in this case, over a failure of its so-called “great power diplomacy” (大國外交). Such messaging runs counter to the “great, glorious, correct” narrative put out by the CCP and is a rather daring one for the Beijing-based Duowei to put out.
Duowei is widely believed to be part of the CCP’s “Great External Propaganda Plan” (大外宣) network and is known to carry messaging from various factions in the Party elite. We previously analyzed messaging from Duowei challenging the Xi leadership that appears to stem from the Jiang faction or the broader “anti-Xi coalition” (see here, here, and here).
SinoInsight 2
On Jan. 19, an article titled “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping” (客觀評價習近平) was published on the PRC-sponsored overseas Chinese language internet forum 6park (留園網). The over 42,000 character-long article was bylined “The Ark and China” (方舟與中國), was split into three parts (compiled into one piece here by the Chinese language edition of Radio France Internationale), and carries a clear Jiang Zemin faction bias. The piece made the rounds in overseas Chinese language circles, where it was widely reported and commented on in early February.The article is highly critical of Xi and his nearly decade-long reign. Xi is depicted as repressive, regressive, and a potential renegade who will usher in the collapse of the CCP regime if allowed to remain in power, with his failed policies, anti-Midas touch, and “bad luck.” Virtually every single negative trope about Xi that readers of Chinese and English press would be familiar with are recycled in the piece—Xi is presented as a “worst-of-the-worst” tyrannical dictator, a gross human rights violator, an anti-intellectual, power-hungry, dangerous, etc. Xi is also blamed for all of the regime’s ills, including a deteriorating economy, an uninspired officialdom (prevalence of the “prefer left rather than right” attitude towards policy implementation under Xi), and courting “systemic” and “zero-sum” competition with the Western powers.
The article’s portrayal of Xi is unflattering to the point of being self-contradictory. One sentence casts Xi as a sort of strategic mastermind (“Xi is very good at strategy and also acts systematically”) before immediately slamming him for possessing “serious cognitive bias.” Xi is further described as lacking in confidence, and comes across as woefully incompetent country bumpkin—descriptions that are hard to square with the ruthless, Machiavellian strategist that he supposedly also is.
Xi is compared very unfavorably to his predecessors, most of all Jiang Zemin, as well as his fellow Party princeling Bo Xilai. For instance, Xi is portrayed as a leader lacking in confidence and charisma (領袖魅力) whose efforts to emulate the “charismatic” Jiang and Bo end up being poor imitations. Xi’s “common prosperity” policy is dismissed as a “copy” of Bo’s “twelve articles of common prosperity” policy in Chongqing, while Xi’s attempts to imitate Jiang’s diplomatic “cultural temperament” are described as “out of place.” In contrast, Bo is depicted as capable, savvy, practical, accepting of Western society and openness, and having good rapport with intellectuals; Xi comes across as being everything Bo is not and preparing to set China on the path to becoming North Korea. Meanwhile, the article claims that “many people are vaguely nostalgic for the Jiang Zemin era.”
Praising Jiang Zemin and Bo Xilai aside, the article’s Jiang faction bias can also be discerned from how it tackled the topic of religious persecution during the Xi and Jiang eras. Xi is blamed for cracking down on Christianity, Buddhism, and Islam, with the word “Christianity” mentioned six times in the article. However, there is no mention of the persecution of the Uyghurs in Xinjiang although that campaign is what Xi is most notorious for, with the article only noting that Xi “began to assimilate minorities”; this is very likely because the modern-day persecution of the Uyghurs had its roots in the Jiang era while the “assimilation of minorities” is a longstanding CCP policy. The article also fails to mention that the Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction too severely persecuted adherents of religious groups during their time, including Christians, Muslims, and those of other faiths, and particularly practitioners of Falun Gong. Instead, the article spun the Jiang faction’s top political liability—the persecution of Falun Gong—into an “asset” for Jiang Zemin vis-à-vis Xi Jinping. “Among China’s leaders, there are few like Xi Jinping who have been totally rejected from personality to policies. If Jiang Zemin attracts Falun Gong’s hatred, Xi courts resentment from all classes,” the article said.
The article unwittingly reveals the Jiang faction’s fears and schemes. On the one hand, the Jiang faction appears confident that Xi’s incompetence means that he is essentially on his last legs. “2022 will be the biggest turning point for [Xi Jinping]. Even if he manages to stay in power by some magic trick, he’ll face a thorny road ahead and complete collapse by 2027,” the article said. The article also notes on several occasions that Xi lacks mass support in the Party (“aside from his allies, he has hurt almost everyone [in the Party]”), and starkly puts him on notice near the end: “The CCP will not wage a cold war with the world for Xi’s benefit; if he insists on destroying the common good, he will eventually offend everyone. It would be dangerous for Xi at this juncture because people will adopt an ‘anti-Xi, not anti-CCP’ [反習不反共] strategy.”
On the other hand, the Jiang faction is increasingly concerned about Xi’s focus on factional struggle and growing paranoia. Xi “believes that the reason for all his troubles is the lack of power centralization; there are still many factions in the Party constraining him, leading to political disunity,” the article notes. With Xi “unable to create his own legitimacy through achievements” and with the “failure of popular sentiment,” he will find it “easier to choose Mao Zedong’s way rather than Deng Xiaoping’s way to maintain his position in the face of challenges”; Mao’s “way” is explained as “a dead-end of class struggle.” Further, Xi has “ill feelings” about “collusion between Western dignitaries and Chinese elites,” an observation which suggests that the Jiang faction believes that Xi suspects and is on guard against challenges to his rule from a broad “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” coalition of domestic and foreign opponents.
Finally, the Jiang faction is very worried that Xi could attempt desperado tactics that imperil themselves and the regime. The above reference to Xi choosing “Mao Zedong’s way rather than Deng Xiaoping’s way” to stay in power indicates that the Jiang faction is wary that Xi would crush them mercilessly (including purging Jiang Zemin and Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong) and pit the masses against the elites (but the article does not explain why this is a concern given Xi’s “failure of popular sentiment” and courting of “resentment from all classes”) through political campaigns like “common prosperity” and “self-revolution.”
The Jiang faction is also deeply concerned that Xi has been secretly laying the foundations all these years to disintegrate the Party and throw them under the bus. The article notes that Xi has been “eroding the CCP’s ruling foundation layer by layer,” “precisely attacking all of the regime’s vital organs,” “constantly dismantling this totalitarian government in an almost surgical manner,” and has “cut off the Party’s escape route.” The article then speculates that Xi “may have retained his father’s influence,” observing that the “enlightened” Xi Zhongxun found it impossible to push through reforms during his time given great resistance within the Party. “But if Xi Jinping switches tactics and adopts a politically regressive approach, he is instead more likely to [succeed in] subvert(ing) the system,” the article added. “Many people have been wondering from the beginning to the end whether Xi has some democratic intentions beneath his authoritarian appearance; the more people observe him, the more they think that it is he who is subverting the regime.”
Lastly, the article comes across as unpolished, long-winded, and repetitive in several parts, leading some Chinese observers to believe that it is the work of a collective rather than an individual. Moreover, the article contains small but glaring errors, including the use of the Chinese character for “era” instead of “belt” in the “Belt and Road Initiative” (“一代一路” instead of “一帶一路”) and claiming that Mao Zedong headed the Cultural Revolution Group (it was chaired by various elite cadres during its existence, but never by Mao himself).
OUR TAKE
1. The length, scope, and content of “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping” positions it as a sort of unofficial Jiang faction counter to Xi Jinping’s “historical resolution.” The article’s dissemination via an overseas Chinese language internet forum is likely intended to get people talking about how Xi is hugely unpopular within the CCP and how there remains substantial, influential opposition to the Xi leadership despite purges and tightening of control over the elite. Further, the article appears to be a Jiang faction attempt at propaganda and political mobilization in response to Xi’s own recent efforts; the Jiang faction is making the case that to domestic and foreign audiences that allowing Xi to continue his tenure will lead to the inevitable collapse of the CCP regime in what appears to be a bid to frighten them into taking more concrete action in opposing Xi.
The article’s byline, “The Ark and China,” seems like a reference to Noah’s Ark and flood narrative in Genesis. This can be read as the Jiang faction positioning itself as the “savior” of a doomed China under Xi Jinping. The glowing portrayal of Bo Xilai in the piece also positions him as Xi’s replacement in the event that the latter is ousted.
“The Ark and China” has a social media account with 21 articles, the earliest of which was published on Nov. 10, 2020. The articles are critical of China’s politics and economy under Xi Jinping’s leadership, but do not target the PRC totalitarian system. The social media site posted a 17,000-character article promoting Bo Xilai on the same day that it published “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping” on Jan. 19; the article before those on Jan. 19 was posted over half a year earlier on June 10, 2021.
2. The article makes no effort to conceal its Jiang faction bias. Positive depictions of Jiang Zemin and Bo Xilai aside, the article contains crucial details concerning Jiang faction interests and are written in a manner that preserves those interests. This includes the Falun Gong issue, “collusion between Western dignitaries and Chinese elites” on financial issues and the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” effort, and the point about how Xi’s continual accumulation of power and changes to the Party system could actually be paving the way for him to blame the CCP’s ills on the Jiang faction and dismantle the Party.
The last point is not a figment of the Jiang faction’s imagination. We observed on numerous occasions that Xi has been “signaling left to turn right” on policy (see here, here, and here for explanation). The most illustrative case is Xi dismantling the Jiang faction’s supra-authority “610 Office” and replacing it with the national security apparatus, his own supra-authority organization. The national security apparatus allows Xi to sway various organs (at least on paper) from Party Central down to local governments on the pretext of safeguarding “national security”; previously, persecuting Falun Gong was the Jiang faction’s excuse for using the 610 Office to wield supra-authority power over the various government apparatuses. From the Jiang faction’s perspective, Xi’s removal of their supra-authority organization would seem like him “precisely attacking all of the regime’s vital organs” or “constantly dismantling this totalitarian government in an almost surgical manner,” in the words of the article. Worse for the Jiang faction, they have no way to protect Jiang Zemin’s political legacy of persecuting Falun Gong with the 610 Office no longer in place, or ensure that Xi does not some day reverse the campaign and use the momentum to establish “quan wei” to achieve his political ends, including realizing “democratic intentions.” Indeed, the article reveals that the Jiang faction fears that Xi is “cutting off” their and the Party’s “escape route” in preparation to sacrifice both. We believe that Xi will only actualize the Jiang faction’s “nightmare scenario” when he concludes that his political situation is dire, has no other way to save the regime and the Party, and needs to prioritize his personal as well as political future.
Meanwhile, the article’s explicit mention of the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy affirms our previous analysis of it. Recent Western signaling suggests that the strategy is well underway and could become more obvious as the 20th Party Congress draws closer. Also, the article’s mention of Xi being “unable to create his own legitimacy through achievements” also tallies with our observation that Xi lacks genuine political achievements aside from the anti-corruption campaign and hence is short on “quan wei.”
3. The fact that the Jiang faction laid out its fears and threats relatively unambiguously in its anti-Xi screed indicates that intra-Party factional struggle is well into its “perish together” (同歸於盡) phase. The Jiang faction is no doubt aware that Xi Jinping is planning to step up “self-revolution” and the anti-corruption campaign before the 20th Party Congress, which spells catastrophe for them and their fortunes. The article suggests that the Jiang faction is prepared to struggle with Xi to the bitter end and wants the Party elite and foreign interest groups to know the consequences of their actions in the hopes that the latter groups will take action.
However, the Jiang faction’s political mobilization article will likely deepen Xi Jinping’s paranoia about challenges to his rule. This will push the Xi camp to speed up and intensify its ongoing factional struggle endeavors and purges to ensure that Xi Jinping’s third term bid is unopposed. This sets the stage for political Black Swans to emerge in China this year.
