◎ Xi is reasserting his paramount authority in the face of political pushback.
The Trump administration and administration advisors recently signaled that the Xi leadership had encountered resistance to reaching a trade deal with America. U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer said at a recent congressional hearing that “some forces in China decided” that Xi Jinping’s trade team had “had gone too far, went out beyond their mandate.” Meanwhile, Michael Pillsbury, a scholar with the Hudson Institute who advises U.S. President Donald Trump on China, said that “President Xi has got politics” at home and has to “play to the Maoists” and “powerful hawks in China.”
News that Xi faces strong resistance at home should be familiar to our readers. We have written many articles about the “you die, I live” factional struggle between the Jiang faction and the Xi camp. The factional struggle has steadily escalated over time, and especially so with the worsening of the Sino-U.S. relationship. With the latest impasse over the trade talks, both Xi Jinping and President Trump have a strong incentive to meet each other at the G20 meeting in Osaka.
For Xi, meeting Trump without incurring fierce backlash from the Jiang faction and other “hawks” is a tricky problem. To avoid being criticized for being too “soft” on America and retake the initiative in the factional struggle, Xi has to both assert his paramount authority in the regime and outwardly project a hardline stance. We see that in Xi’s remarks made during a recent Politburo study session and the content of a prime time state news program.
The backdrop:
On June 25, Xinhua News Agency published a piece on a Politburo group study session chaired by Xi Jinping held the previous day. The theme of the study session was “stay true to the original aspiration and advance self-reform.”
Xi made remarks during the study session. Noteworthy points include:
- The Chinese Communist Party has “again and again weathered foul winds and bloody rain and re-emerged from desperate straits” because it never forgot its “original aspiration”;
- During the Party’s 70 year reign, various “threats” that “go against the original aspiration and mission” and “shake the foundation of the CCP are everywhere inside the Party”;
- Party cadres must have the “consciousness to face up to problems and the courage to conduct self-examination”;
- Cadres must resolve problems with “thorough self-reform spirit”;
- Cadres “persevere in self-purification, self-improvement, self-innovation, self-elevation” and “continuously purify Party members”;
- Cadres must “advance the Party’s self-reform” and strengthen the Party’s “centralized and unified leadership” to resolve the “Party’s internal problems” in an integrated manner;
- Party members and cadres, especially leading cadres, “should have the courage to fight against behaviors that weaken the Party’s leadership, shake the Party’s governance foundation and violate the Party’s political discipline and rules.”
In the evening of June 25, state broadcaster CCTV made the rare move of spotlighting four anti-American articles published by state and Party media on its prime time “Xinwen Lianbo” program. The four articles are:
- “People’s Daily Commentary: Dare to Struggle to Win Dignity”;
- “People’s Daily article by commentator Zhong Sheng: Open Cooperation and Hand-in-Hand Collaboration is the Right Path — Safeguarding International Morality for Global Joint Prosperity”;
- “Xinhua Commentator Article: Use the Keys of Innovation to Open the Future — Persevere in Must-win Confidence and Respond to Risk Challenges”;
- “Global Times Commentary: Pompeo is the Source of All Chaos on the World Stage.”
This was the first time that “Xinwen Lianbo” had highlighted a Global Times commentary. More unusually, the commentary piece had aggressively called for a “punitive expedition” (討伐) against U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo.
Our take:
1. In May, we noted that the investigation of former securities regulator Liu Shiyu signals that “Xi’s authority has been weakened.” We also noted that Xi’s rivals had likely “seized upon his failure to prevent an escalation in the trade war to pushback against his leadership.” Put another way, Xi was heading into the G20 from a disadvantaged position in the factional struggle.
Xi’s remarks to the Politburo on June 25 read like an attempt to reassert his paramount authority in the face of political pushback. This message is most clear in Xi’s call for cadres to strengthen the Party’s “centralized and unified leadership,” i.e. Xi Jinping.
Xi also sought to put opposing forces on notice. In particular, Xi’s comments about how threats that “shake the foundation of the CCP are everywhere inside the Party” and how cadres should “have the courage to fight against behaviors that weaken the Party’s leadership, shake the Party’s governance foundation and violate the Party’s political discipline and rules” are clearly aimed at rivals. We believe that Xi’s call for “self-reform” can later be used against “hardliners” who try to challenge his rule; challengers can be purged in the name of Party “self-reform.”
Meanwhile, by using relying on the rhetoric of “staying true to the original aspiration,” Xi has instilled enough Party orthodoxy in his remarks to insulate him against criticism from the “Maoists” and “hardliners” in the Party. Based on our research into Xi Jinping, we believe that he has been “signaling left to turn right” on policy. We previously noted how Xi’s rivals have “weaponized” his use of Party orthodoxy against him.
2. The “Xinwen Lianbo” broadcast on June 25 appears to be largely aimed at projecting toughness. We believe that there are two possible explanations for the program’s ham-fisted move of highlighting four consecutive commentaries from state and Party propaganda, including the Global Times.
First, Xi Jinping does need to placate the “hardliners” in the regime and win their trust before he can meet with Trump. If the “hardliners” and Xi’s political rivals sense that he is too soft and might compromise, they could find ways to make it politically impossible for him to even attend the G20.
Second, the CCP propaganda apparatus and the Global Times have long been swayed by the Jiang faction. While Xi replaced the leadership of the propaganda department and apparatus at the 19th Party Congress, completely weeding out the Jiang faction’s remaining influence would take time. Thus, it cannot be ruled out that the Jiang faction could have a hand in shaping the overly tough messaging in the June 25 “Xinwen Lianbo” program. By broadcasting tough messaging before the G20, Xi would find it very difficult to offer concessions to Trump, and Trump would likewise get the impression that Xi is not going to back down.
3. Xi’s propaganda messaging and recent foreign affairs activities—courting Russia, visiting North Korea, talking to Iran and the Taliban—are all designed to project toughness and even belligerence towards the United States. We believe that the tough image is directed primarily towards the domestic audience and specifically towards addressing factional struggle issues. As written in the previous point, the “hardliners” could cause big trouble for Xi if he is insufficiently hardcore.
Xi’s opponents can find reasons to challenge him regardless of whether he is “soft” or “hard” on America. However, Xi has a better chance of surviving factional skirmishes by going the “hard” route (see our analysis on regime survival in our May 15 article). Also, the “hardliners” and other nationalistic forces will not have an opening to attack the Xi leadership when it acts in a “politically correct” manner by doubling down on tough rhetoric and redirecting blame for domestic woes from the Party to “hostile foreign forces.”
We believe that trade is not the most important reason why Xi and Trump are looking forward to their summit in Osaka. We explore this topic in our special reports on the Trump-Xi G20 meeting.
