SinoInsight 1
The fourth issue of the CCP ideological journal Qiushi this year (published Feb. 16) carried an article based on Xi Jinping’s speech on strengthening the Party’s leadership over law-based governance. Xi originally gave the speech on August 2018 at the first meeting of the Central Committee’s Commission for Comprehensive Law-based Governance.
OUR TAKE
1. The Qiushi article on strengthening the Party’s leadership over law-based governance is more or less a rehash of the CCP’s twisted interpretation of ruling by law. The significance of the article is less in its content than why and when it was published.
2. Xi Jinping first rolled out policies to advance “law-based governance” in October 2014. Based on our research, those policies have not been properly implemented by officials in the political and legal affairs apparatus in the past five years. The political and legal affairs apparatus has been resistant to complying fully with Xi because it has long been controlled by the Jiang Zemin faction, and entrenched factional interests remain despite the purge of powerful PLAC officials like Zhou Yongkang (former security czar) and Zhang Yue (Hebei PLAC chief).
3. We previously wrote that Xi moved to consolidate power to a high degree in the regime after he was unable to push through his policies due to immense internal resistance (the failure to enact economic reforms announced at the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee in 2013 is a famous example). Thus far, Xi has been “playing it safe” with power consolidation by reining in important Party or state institutions one at a time in an almost methodological manner—purge lower-ranking officials and reshuffle personnel; go after the “big tigers”; and push through policies that place the institution directly under Party Central’s control. Xi’s effort to establish his control over the military is one example; former Central Military Commission vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou were arrested, and the military shifted from a “CMC Vice Chairman Responsibility System” to a “CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
Xi spent most of his first term scrubbing the political and legal affairs ranks with the purging and reshuffling of officials. After the 19th Party Congress, Xi appeared to take his consolidation efforts to the next stage with the targeting of “protective umbrellas” in a “sweeping black” anti-Mafia campaign in January 2018. In January 2019, the Central Committee introduced new regulations that weakened the Central PLAC’s influence over judicial decisions in the provinces but strengthened Party Central’s control over local PLACs.
4. The Qiushi article on strengthening the Party’s leadership over law-based governance comes as Xi’s authority is being challenged by political rivals over his handling of Sino-U.S. trade war and relations, and during a crucial 90-day trade negotiation period.
The Qiushi article is likely Xi’s way of reminding officials that his “law-based governance” policies are not being fully implemented and that they must shape up, or else. The timing of the article’s publication could also have the effect of placing on notice officials in the political and legal affairs apparatus to deter them from creating trouble for Xi as he moves to finalize a trade deal with America.
SinoInsight 2
On Feb. 15, Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia delivered remarks at a meeting of the military on political and legal affairs work.
Noteworthy points in Zhang’s remarks include:
- A need to “comprehensively and strictly govern the military”;
- The military’s political and legal affairs system must study and implement “Xi Jinping Thought” and “Xi Jinping Strong Military Thought”;
- “Rule by law” must be upheld in the military to “safeguard political security” and “war preparedness”;
- There must be strict adherence to the “law-based governance” to ensure the “cleanliness” (as opposed to corruption), loyalty, and reliability of the troops;
- Military political and legal affairs officials must counter “infiltration and sabotage activities”;
- Military political and legal affairs officials must fight corruption in the military.
OUR TAKE
1. We believe that Xi Jinping plans to use the military’s political and legal affairs apparatus to strengthen his control over the troops and ensure their loyalty. We explained that Xi “probably does not feel confident that he is fully in charge, and/or there is trouble brewing in the ranks” of the military in the Feb. 14 edition of this newsletter; Zhang Youxia’s remarks affirm our early assessment.
2. Xi needs to tighten control over the military now to guard against potential pushback from political rivals should he reach a trade deal with America. Xi needs to make huge concessions to secure a trade deal, and his rivals are likely to oppose the concessions.
On Feb. 15, President Donald Trump tweeted that he was having “important meetings and calls on [the] China Trade Deal,” and that “big progress [is] being made on soooo many different fronts!”
3. Based on our research and understanding of CCP factional struggles, we believe that China and the U.S. stand a high chance of reaching a trade agreement in March if Xi Jinping can withstand the pressure from opposing forces inside the Party.
