SinoInsight 1
On July 7, the official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission published on its front page a nearly 12,000-character article by Qu Qingshan, dean of the Central Party History and Documentation Research Institute.
Titled “New Journey, New Thought, New Chapter | Understanding and Grasping the ‘Two Establishes’” (新征程 新思想 新篇章 | 從未來維度認識把握“兩個確立), the article makes the case for Xi Jinping’s importance in safeguarding the CCP regime and leading the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” (The “Two Establishes” are “establishing Comrade Xi Jinping as the core of Party Central and the core of the whole Party,” and “establishing the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”)
The article’s introduction endeavors to greatly elevate the political significance of the “Two Establishes.” The “Two Establishes” are said to be the “profound summary of the historical experience of the Party’s century of struggle, and especially of the great practical struggle since the 18th Party Congress.” The “Two Establishes” are also “the most important political achievement formed under the historical conditions of socialism with Chinese characteristics entering a new era.” Further, “history, reality, and the future are interlinked,” and “history and reality have eloquently proved the decisive significance of the ‘Two Establishes.’”
The article then lays out why the CCP requires the “Two Establishes” in three segments with the following subheadings:
- “The urgent need to deal with great changes in the world unseen in a century.”
- “The urgent need to prevent and respond to various risks and challenges, and realize the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
- “The urgent need to advance the Party’s self-revolution and embark on a new road to taking the test.”
In the first segment, the article praised Xi Jinping for his “profound insight into the general trend of the times and historical laws” in coming up with the “major strategic judgment” that the “world is undergoing great changes unseen in a century.” The article then quotes Xi from his “series of important expositions” on the topic made previously.
The article proceeds to draw four conclusions:
- The essence of “great changes in the world unseen in a century” is the division and integration of international forces, the struggle between national powers, the struggle between systems, and the struggle of ideas.
- Once the “international pattern” formed by the division and integration of international forces “takes shape,” it will not undergo fundamental adjustments and changes overnight.
- The need for change in the international structure and global governance system is “unavoidable.” Also, the “direction of change in the international system will not change” (i.e. change from a U.S.-led world order to a CCP-led world order) and “the democratization of international relations has become an unstoppable trend of the times” (i.e. U.S. hegemony making way for CCP-dominated “multipolarism”).
- The various variables in the “great changes” can be classified into two types. The first is “reverse variables” such as “hegemonism and power politics, unilateralism, trade protectionism, anti-globalization thinking, and other trends.” The second is the “democratization of international relations, multipolarization, economic globalization, and other positive variables.” The clash between the two variables constitutes the “main contradiction” in the “great changes unseen in the world in a century,” and is “profoundly affecting the development dynamics” of the global setup.
The article added that China faces both “very serious challenges and rare opportunities for development” as the world undergoes “great changes unseen in a century.” Also, China is the “biggest variable” in the “great changes.” The article claimed that “Western countries headed by the United States” do not want to see “the emergence of a strong China, let alone a strong socialist China,” and argued that the “strategic game” between the U.S. and China is a “struggle between two social systems and two ideologies.”
The article noted that Xi Jinping’s “great power diplomacy,” the “innovative concept” of “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” and the “Belt and Road Initiative” (China’s “best international public product to the world”) are countermeasures to deal with “great changes in the world unseen in a century.”
The article’s second segment stated that the “Two Establishes,” from the “perspective of the future,” provide a “fundamental guarantee” for “preventing and coping with various risks and challenges” and “realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” The article then connected the survival of the CCP regime with the “rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” setting the Party’s “struggle goal” for the second centenary as “the grand blueprint for realizing the Chinese dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The article called for preventing and coping with various internal and external risks and challenges, which have become “more complex than any time in history,” to realize the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Domestically, “risks in various areas are accumulating and even emerging in a concentrated manner.” Domestic risks have mainly manifested as “Westernization and differentiation traps” in politics and ideology, as well as the “middle-income trap” in economics and social development.
The article added that risks often do not exist in isolation and are likely to “overlap, intertwine, transform, interact and form a risk complex.” This results in “small risks developing into large risks,” “external risks turning into internal risks,” and “economic risks transforming into political risks.” Moreover, there may be an “overall risk that delays or interrupts the process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, for which we must be highly vigilant” (i.e., the CCP is anticipating the emergence of risks that could collapse the regime).
The third segment of the article argued that the “Two Establishes,” from the “perspective of the future,” provides a “strong political guarantee” for adhering to “self-revolution” and treading well the “new road to taking the test.” The article revisits Mao Zedong’s “cycle” conversation (窯洞對) and governments escaping the “rise-and-fall” of political power, and stressed that Xi Jinping is “adhering to self-revolution” to ensure that “the Party does not change character, change color, and change taste.”
The article proposed realizing the so-called “four selves”—“self-purification, self-refinement, self-innovation, and self-improvement” (自我淨化、自我完善、自我革新、自我提高)—to advance in “self-revolution.” Self-purification refers to “consciously operating on lesions in the body to remove all viruses that erode the Party’s healthy body.” Self-refinement means “constantly building a system that is complete, scientific and standardized, and runs effectively.” Self-innovation calls for “resolutely getting rid of all anachronistic ideologies and concepts, and institutional disadvantages.” Self-improvement requires cadres to “continuously improve in the realms of politics, ideology, and morality, and perpetuate the Party’s vitality.”
In concluding, the article urged the Party to have the “courage to face our own problems and have ‘scraping poison from bone’ determination and will to eliminate all elements that undermine the Party’s advanced nature and purity.” Only then will it be possible to “form an effective way to realize the ‘four selves’ under the conditions of the Party’s long-term rule.”
OUR TAKE
1. Qu Qingshan’s article perpetuates Xi Jinping’s latest propaganda offensive to boost his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) ahead of the Beidaihe meeting and the 20th Party Congress. As we analyzed in the July 5 edition of this newsletter, the Xi leadership is continuing with the post-Sixth Plenum push to promote “self-revolution” and Xi’s “historical resolution” in propaganda to “spin tragedy into victory” and gloss over serious setbacks for the regime (“zero-COVID” failures, rapidly declining economy, etc.), as well as provide Xi with theoretical and political justification for breaking modern Party norms and extending his tenure.
The Xi leadership is promoting the “Two Establishes” because it emphasizes Xi Jinping’s personal importance to the Party. In contrast, the “Two Safeguards” (兩個維護) focuses on upholding the primacy of Party Central. Qu’s article makes the case that only Xi has the “profound insight” to navigate extremely tricky times (“great changes unseen in a century,” “struggle between national powers,” etc.), and his various solutions (“self-revolution,” “four selves,” etc.) will help the CCP regime stay “on the road to taking the test” and avert collapse. Therefore, the significance of the “Two Establishes”/Xi to the CCP’s fate in its “second centenary” demands that the Party allow Xi to remain in power for a third term and beyond.
2. The CCP’s desire for world domination is clearly reflected in the first segment of Qu Qingshan’s article. Despite using language that is seemingly supportive of globalism, Qu essentially stated that the CCP is looking forward to vanquishing the U.S. and replacing the latter as global hegemon. Put another way, the Party never abandoned the “Cold War mentality” (which it constantly accuses others of having), does not trust the U.S. and the West to engage with the PRC in good faith even if the latter becomes more pro-China (the “international pattern” will not undergo “fundamental adjustments and changes overnight”), believes in the “inevitability” of “the East is rising, the West is in decline,” and is preparing to resolve the “main contradiction” of “great changes in the world unseen in a century” squarely in its favor.
Businesses, investors, and governments must recognize that the CCP “does not change character, change color, and change taste” regardless of who is in charge. They should take this into account when evaluating political risks in China and the PRC’s geopolitical maneuvers.
3. Qu Qingshan’s July 7 article on the CCDI website further affirms our analysis last year that he is not opposing or attacking Xi Jinping in his post-Sixth Plenum piece about reform and opening up. The popular view in China watching circles at the time was that Qu’s article was a manifestation of intra-Party dissatisfaction towards Xi because the piece did not contain a single mention of Xi. However, we concluded after an examination of Xi’s “historical resolution,” Qu’s factional background, and Qu’s previous works that the latter’s article was likely written “in strict accordance with guidelines or instructions from the Xi leadership.”
SinoInsight 2
July 1
The official WeChat account of the Sichuan Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC) reported that Jin Lei, a Standing Committee member of the Sichuan provincial Party Committee, had presided over an executive meeting of the Sichuan PLAC and delivered a speech in the capacity of secretary. The report showed that Jin had recently been appointed as Sichuan PLAC head.
Jin Lei (age 52), a native official of Henan Province, spent the bulk of his career in Henan (July 1992 to Dec. 2019). Jin served mainly in the Henan provincial government before being dispatched to localities in Henan to gain experience in 2015. After about four years (April 2015 to Dec. 2019) in the Henan localities, Jin was transferred to Deyang City in Sichuan where he served as municipal Party secretary (Dec. 2019 to July 2022). Jin was appointed to the Sichuan provincial Party Committee at the local Party Congress on May 30 and became Sichuan PLAC secretary before July 1. Jin Lei has no prior work experience in the political and legal affairs apparatus and does not have obvious factional allegiances.
July 2
The official website of the Beijing municipal government listed Sun Junmin, a newly appointed Standing Committee member of the Beijing municipal Party Committee, as secretary of the municipal PLAC in its “City Leaders” column.
A native of Beijing, Sun Junmin (52, female) served briefly in the Beijing Intermediate Court early in her career (July 1992 to Aug. 1994) before spending 17 years in the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress (Aug. 1994 to Sept. 2011) mainly doing regulations work. After that, Sun served in Beijing’s Fengtai District, the Beijing municipal Party Committee, Shunyi District, and Xicheng District for nearly 11 years (Sept. 2011 to June 2022), and was Xicheng Party secretary (Oct. 2020 to June 2022) before her elevation to the Beijing municipal Party Committee Standing Committee at the municipal Party Congress on June 30. Sun Junmin does not have obvious factional associations.
July 3
Local official media Zhejiang Daily reported that Huang Jianfa, a deputy Party secretary of Zhejiang Province, went to Shaoxing City to talk about the spirit of the 15th Zhejiang Province Party Congress and carry out work inspections. Zhejiang Daily listed “Zhejiang provincial PLAC secretary” when mentioning Huang’s official positions, which meant that Huang had recently been appointed to the role.
Huang Jianfa (57) is a technocrat who spent his formative years at the China Earthquake Administration and Fujian Earthquake Administration (Aug. 1984 to Nov. 2010). Huang eventually became director of the China Earthquake Administration’s earthquake disaster emergency rescue department. Later, Huang was transferred to Sichuan Province (Nov. 2010 to July 2018) and Zhejiang Province (July 2018 to present) to serve in various official roles. In March 2017, Huang became a sub-ministerial level official when he was promoted to the Standing Committee of the Sichuan provincial Party Committee and head of the Sichuan provincial Organization Department. After that, Huang was transferred to Zhejiang where he served as provincial Organization Department director (July 2018 to July 2021), head of the provincial United Front Work Department (July 2021 to July 2022), and provincial deputy Party secretary (July 2021 to present). Huang Jianfa was likely appointed as secretary of the Zhejiang provincial PLAC after the local Party Congress was held on June 23.
OUR TAKE
The three recent provincial PLAC secretary appointments conclude the reshuffle of PLAC secretaries in all 31 provinces in China following key personnel changes around the period of provincial Party Congresses held between the end of October 2021 and the end of June 2022.
A review of the current 31 PLAC secretaries and their publicly available career information yields the following details:
- Of the 31 PLAC secretaries, seven are 58 or older, 16 are between 55 and 58 years old, and eight are younger than 55.
- Two of the 31 PLAC secretaries are currently members of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and four are deputy secretaries of provincial Party Committees.
- Two of the 31 PLAC secretaries came to their position before 2020, four in 2020, nine in 2021, and 16 in 2022.
- Just 10 of the 31 PLAC secretaries had prior political and legal affairs experience. Of the 10, three previously served as director or deputy director of public security bureaus, one was a state security bureau director, four were provincial or below provincial-level local government PLAC secretaries, one was a provincial Central Leading Group on Dealing with Heretical Religions Office (“610 Office”) deputy director, three were presidents or division heads of courts at local levels, and one was a local chief prosecutor. Five of the 10 are 58 and older and three are 57; these eight PLAC secretaries are set to retire in a year or two, or could move on to “second-line” sinecure positions. One of the 10, Ding Xiufeng (age 57) from Inner Mongolia, has obvious Jiang Zemin faction affiliations.
- In terms of work experience, 11 of the 31 PLAC secretaries were vice governors, four were provincial United Work Front Department directors, four were provincial Organization Department heads, 14 were secretaries or deputy secretaries of prefecture-level municipal Party Committees, eight were prefecture-level mayors or deputy mayors, and one headed a state-owned enterprise.
- Thirteen of the 31 PLAC secretaries are native officials of the province in which they are currently in. Four of the 13—the PLAC secretaries of Xinjiang, Tibet, Heilongjiang, and Beijing—had prior experience working in the political and legal affairs apparatus. Wang Mingshan (age 58) in Xinjiang is a career public security official and Liu Jiang (55) in Tibet served in both the local PLAC and public security system; the elevation of these two native officials to head their provincial PLAC is likely due to the CCP’s needing people familiar with local conditions and political and legal affairs work to oversee intensive “stability maintenance” operations in places where there are substantial ethnic minorities. Li Yugang (57) in Heilongjiang once served as Jixi City PLAC secretary when the Jiang faction’s persecution of Falun Gong was at a peak (Oct. 2002 to May 2006) before serving as mayor and vice governor of other localities in Heilongjiang. Meanwhile, Sun Junmin (52) in Beijing municipality had little prior political and legal affairs experience, having only served in the Beijing Intermediate Court for just over two years early in her career and did not hold a leadership position in the local political and legal affairs apparatus.
The details above show that the Xi leadership is overlooking experienced political and legal affairs officials who climbed the ranks during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (1997 to 2012) from the provincial PLAC leadership in favor of younger officials with no or little experience in political and legal affairs work. Most of the 16 newly promoted provincial PLAC secretaries are 57 (6 of 16) or younger (10 of 16) and only two of them have prior political and legal affairs work experience. These newly promoted officials are experienced in local governance, with seven of them serving as vice-governors and 10 native officials.
The provincial PLAC secretary reshuffles indicate that Xi Jinping is weakening the position and the influence of the political and legal affairs apparatus in general. Such arrangements are in line with Xi’s first term judicial reforms to preserve regime stability by curbing the ability of local governments to interfere in judicial affairs and allowing the PRC justice system to minimize wrongful convictions (at least in theory).
The provincial PLAC secretary reshuffles before the 20th Party Congress opens up the possibility that the Xi leadership is looking to further weaken the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (CPLAC) and PLACs at all levels.
The PLAC system (the coordinating organ, not the political and legal affairs apparatus) was previously very powerful during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance and early in Xi’s tenure. To make up for his relatively weaker control over the military, Jiang Zemin began enhancing the apparatus’s power when he was in office, including allowing local PLACs to mobilize the armed police for “stability maintenance” operations. The PLAC system’s power was expanded further after Jiang launched his campaign to persecute Falun Gong, with 610 Offices sharing the same premises as PLACs in the localities, and the secretaries or deputy secretaries of local PLACs concurrently serving as head of local 610 Offices. Also, three consecutive CPLAC chiefs from Zhou Yongkang onwards were former public security ministers.
Hu Jintao, a political rival of Jiang Zemin, sought to weaken the PLAC system within the constraints of the “collective leadership.” In April 2010, the Central Organization Department issued a document that forbade provincial PLAC secretaries from jointly serving as provincial public security bureau chiefs. Later, the Wang Lijun incident and the attempted coup by Zhou Yongkang and Bo Xilai brought Hu and Xi Jinping into political alliance against the Jiang faction and gave the latter pretext to weaken the PLAC system. At the 18th Party Congress, the CPLAC secretary no longer served on the Politburo Standing Committee (but remained on the Politburo), which had been downsized from nine to seven members. Also, with the exception of seven provinces (Hebei, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hunan, Yunnan, Gansu, Ningxia), provincial public security directors were no longer jointly appointed as provincial PLAC secretary from around the 18th Party Congress period onwards, but were demoted to the positions of vice governor, assistant governor, or vice mayor.
Xi Jinping has a chance to more thoroughly rid the PLAC system of Jiang faction influence and bring it more closely into his grasp at the 20th Party Congress. Guo Shengkun, the current CPLAC secretary and Jiang faction member, will be 68 after October 2022 and is due to retire. Per Party norms, public security minister and Xi ally Wang Xiaohong should replace Guo as CPLAC secretary. Xi, however, is unlikely to be willing to relax his grip over the Party’s “knife handle” so soon after having gone through the trouble of breaking a personnel reshuffle norm to install Wang as public security minister (something done to tighten his control over the public security apparatus in the first place). If so, Xi will likely break with personnel reshuffle norms again in selecting a new CPLAC secretary.
We currently see two possible candidates replacing Guo Shengkun. The first is Central Rural Work Leading Group deputy head and former Xinjiang Party secretary Chen Quanguo. As we previously analyzed, the appointment of Xia Baolong as Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director after he was sent to the “second line” in 2018 leaves a precedent for Chen to return from the “political wilderness” and serve as CPLAC Party secretary. Having the iron-fisted Chen Quanguo head the CPLAC also signals that the Xi leadership is planning to “turn the knife inward” and deepen the “rectification” of the PLAC system.
Another possible candidate for CPLAC secretary is Supreme People’s Court president and Jiang faction member Zhou Qiang. While Zhou belongs to a rival faction and has disrupted the Xi leadership’s judicial reform efforts, Xi Jinping could still promote him as a show of “goodwill” towards the Jiang faction if the latter does not make serious efforts to block Xi’s third term bid and undermine the Xi leadership ahead of the 20th Party Congress. Factional fighting in the Party elite may be “you die, I live,” but the Xi camp would prefer to maintain the fiction of intra-Party “consensus” where possible and avoid overly provocative actions that ramp up political risks and endanger regime security. That being said, even should Zhou Qiang become CPLAC secretary, Xi will continue to appoint loyalists to key political and legal affairs positions to strengthen the Xi leadership’s control over the apparatus and ultimately render Zhou a mere figurehead.
