SinoInsight 1
June 28
Xi Jinping went on an inspection tour in Wuhan City, Hubei Province. He was accompanied by Hubei Party secretary Wang Menghui and Hubei governor Wang Zhonglin while visiting local companies and communities.
Speaking to people gathered (almost certainly pre-arranged) at a local community square, Xi said that the COVID-19 pandemic is a “big test” and the CCP will “persevere in dynamic zero-COVID” and “continuously adjust prevention and control measures according to the times and circumstances” to “protect people’s lives and health to the greatest extent.” He added that China would face “catastrophic consequences” if it adopted a “herd immunity” policy or “laid flat” (i.e. hands-off approach) in dealing with the epidemic given the country’s large population.
Xi acknowledged that the “zero-COVID” policy had “temporarily impacted economic development a bit.” But “if we make an overall evaluation, our COVID-19 response measures are the most economical and effective,” he said. Xi added that with the Party’s leadership and the important “grassroots foundation formed by communities,” the PRC has the “capability and strength to implement dynamic zero-COVID until the final victory is secured.”
Xi said, “We are confident in our ability to strike a balance between COVID-19 response and economic and social development, and strive for a relatively good performance in this year’s economic development.”
June 29
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a nearly 12,000-character-long front page article titled, “Unswervingly Safeguard Hong Kong’s Long-term Prosperity and Stability——General Secretary Xi Jinping Leads the Steady and Long-term Implementation of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ in Hong Kong” (堅定不移維護香港長期繁榮穩定——習近平總書記引領“一國兩制”香港實踐行穩致遠).
The article gives high praise to Xi for advancing the “one country, two systems” policy in Hong Kong since coming to office “from the height of strategic and overall vision.” Xi is said to have pointed out the “direction of progress” and provided “fundamental guidelines” for Hong Kong. The article further claims that with the implementation of “patriots administering Hong Kong” (愛國者治港), the city is better able to resolve all kinds of “deep-seated contradictions and problems that have plagued it for a long time.”
The article cites some examples to show that Hong Kong and the mainland are “connected by blood” (血脈相連) and that the PRC’s national development strategy has brought “historical opportunity” to Hong Kong. The article claims that “the motherland is always first to provide assistance” to Hong Kong whenever the city encounters difficulties, and that the “great motherland” will always be a strong backer for Hong Kong to help it overcome “all risks and challenges.”
The article praised Deng Xiaoping for possessing the “wisdom and boldness of a great statesman” with his “great vision” in proposing the “one country, two systems” policy. Concurrently, the article noted that “one country, two systems” is facing “new situations, new problems, and new challenges” in its implementation. As an example, the article obliquely alluded to the turmoil in Hong Kong that was triggered by the June 2014 State Council Information Office’s white paper on “one country, two systems,” and borrowed arguments from the white paper in claiming that “there are still some people in Hong Kong society who have not fully adapted to this major historical turning point, especially those with vague and one-sided understanding of the ‘one country, two systems’ principle and the Basic Law.”
The article then lauded “Party Central with comrade Xi Jinping at the core” for its far-sightedness in addressing the “complicated, severe, and even turbulent situation in Hong Kong,” unwaveringly adhering to “one country, two systems,” sticking to “bottom line” principles without compromise, and for making “relevant major decisions decisively with great political wisdom and extraordinary boldness.”
The article noted that the “ordinance revision turbulence” (i.e. anti-extradition bill protests) in 2019 plunged Hong Kong into the “most severe situation since the handover,” before crediting the “strong leadership” demonstrated by “Party Central with comrade Xi Jinping at the core” for “fixing both symptoms and root causes” and turning around the situation in Hong Kong “from chaos to order” (由亂到治).
Further, the article attributed the “continually improving situation” in Hong Kong, the “remarkable achievements” of epidemic prevention and control, the “gradual recovery” of the economy, and the maintenance of social stability to Xi Jinping. The article claimed that with “Party Central with comrade Xi Jinping at the core” taking the helm, the practice of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong is able to “cut through waves” like a ship in a storm and “head off disaster” (化險為夷).
June 30
Xi Jinping and his wife Peng Liyuan arrived in Hong Kong by high-speed train to mark the 25th anniversary of the city’s handover to the mainland. Xi and his predecessors previously flew to Hong Kong when they visited. Xi’s official entourage included Ding Xuexiang (CCP General Office director), Xu Qiliang (Central Military Commission vice chairman), Shen Yueyue (National People’s Congress Standing Committee vice chairman), Wang Yi (foreign affairs minister), and Xia Baolong (Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director).
Officials from the Hong Kong government and PRC organs (Liaison Office, national security apparatus, PLA garrison in Hong Kong) in Hong Kong were on hand to greet Xi at the West Kowloon Station, including Carrie Lam (outgoing chief executive), John Lee (Hong Kong chief executive-designate), and Leung Chun-ying (former chief executive and vice chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference).
Xi told reporters at the train station, “Over the past few years, Hong Kong has withstood one severe test after another and overcome one risk and challenge after another. After weathering the storms, Hong Kong has emerged from the ashes with vigorous vitality.”
That afternoon, Xi met with Carrie Lam, John Lee, Leung Chun-ying, Macau chief executive Ho Iat-seng, leading officials in Hong Kong’s executive, legislative, and judicial organs, representatives of various sectors in Hong Kong, representatives of the Hong Kong police, leading officials of PRC organs in Hong Kong, and the heads of major PRC-funded institutions in Hong Kong. Xi also visited the Hong Kong Science Park.
Security was tight wherever Xi went in Hong Kong. Hong Kong police assistant commissioner Lui Kam-ho said that the police will provide Xi with “close security, venue security, and convoy escort,” including setting up “security zones” at places that he visited. Part of Hong Kong and subway stations were also temporarily closed off. The Hong Kong civil aviation authorities also set up temporary flight restriction zones on both sides of the Victoria Harbor and in some places, and invoked a first-ever drone ban in the city.
After his activities in Hong Kong, Xi Jinping took a train to neighboring Shenzhen to spend the night.
July 1
1. Hong Kong commemorated the 25th anniversary of the handover at the Convention and Exhibition Center in Wan Chai. Xi Jinping officiated the swearing-in ceremony of the new Hong Kong administration and the chief executive John Lee.
In a speech after the swearing-in ceremony, Xi noted the “humiliation of the forced cession of Hong Kong” and “heroic struggle” of the Chinese people for national salvation. He added that the CCP’s centenary history of “rallying and leading the people in an extraordinary endeavor contains chapters of the unique and significant contributions of our compatriots in Hong Kong,” whose bond with the mainland is “truly inseparable.”
Xi then put forward four “musts” to ensure that “one country, two systems” keeps advancing in “the right direction”:
- “One country, two systems” must be implemented in both letter and spirit. Safeguarding national sovereignty, security, and development interests is the paramount principle of “one country, two systems. On this basis, Hong Kong and Macau can maintain their existing capitalist system over the long run and enjoy a high degree of autonomy.
- The overall jurisdiction of the central government and the Hong Kong special administrative region’s (SAR) high degree of autonomy must be integrated. The central government’s overall jurisdiction over Hong Kong provides the source of the SAR’s high degree of autonomy, and Hong Kong can only be run well by ensuring the enforcement of the central government’s overall jurisdiction and upholding the SAR’s high degree of autonomy.
- Hong Kong must adhere to the principle of being “administered by “patriots.” Keeping the administration of Hong Kong in the hands of patriots is crucial for safeguarding the long-term governance and security of the city, and this principle cannot be compromised.
- Hong Kong’s unique status and strengths must be maintained. The central government fully supports Hong Kong in maintaining its unique status and strengths on a long-term basis, in consolidating its role as an international financial, shipping, and trading center, in maintaining its free, open, and sound business environment, in retaining its common law system, and in expanding smooth and convenient international ties.
Xi also said that the young people of Hong Kong should be cared for “in particular.” The central government is looking to “heighten their sense of national pride and ownership,” “overcome difficulties in education, employment, business start-up, and home buying,” and “create more opportunities for them to grow and shine.”
In concluding, Xi said that “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has become an irreversible historical process,” and continuing with the “successful practice” of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong is “an integral part of this historical process.”
2. After attending the inauguration ceremony of the new Hong Kong government, Xi Jinping inspected the PLA Garrison in Hong Kong and met with representatives there.
Xi praised the troops for playing an “important role” in transitioning Hong Kong “from chaos to stability” in the face of “profound and complex changes in the situation in Hong Kong in recent years.”
Xi also added that Hong Kong is at “a critical period of transition from stability to greater prosperity,” and the garrison has “heavy tasks and responsibilities.” He further urged the troops to “implement the Party’s ‘Strong Military’ thinking in the new era, implement the military’s strategic policy in the new era, grasp the new situation and mission requirements, and strengthen the overall construction of the military.”
OUR TAKE
Xi Jinping took advantage of his recent trips to Wuhan and Hong Kong to defend his political legacies, including “zero-COVID,” the pacification of Hong Kong in recent years, and the imposition of his supra-authority national security regime in Hong Kong. Xi also took the opportunity to assert and boost his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) ahead of the Beidaihe meeting around the July-August period and the 20th Party Congress at the end of the year.
For “zero-COVID,” Xi is going with the “better than doing nothing” angle, arguing that the epidemic in China and sharp economic decline could be far worse had the CCP authorities not resorted to its draconian COVID-19 prevention and control measures. In visiting Wuhan, the epicenter of the epidemic in 2020, talking about securing “final victory” against the virus under his leadership, and expressing confidence in “relatively good” economic performance this year, Xi is “spinning tragedy into victory” and using propaganda to pave the way to eventually declare his “zero-COVID” policy a “success” before the 20th Party Congress. The Xi leadership’s propaganda narrative on “zero-COVID” also gives Xi Jinping sufficient reason to claim a much-needed political “achievement,” offers a passable explanation for economic underperformance, and helps him ward off intra-Party challenges to his political legacy.
For Hong Kong, Xi is essentially being credited with masterminding a “second return” (二次回歸) of the city to the mainland in the face of a “complicated, severe, and even turbulent situation.” Xi is also credited with resolving “new situations, new problems, and new challenges” with “one country, two systems” that the principle’s originator and “great statesman” Deng Xiaoping never faced. Xi entering Hong Kong by train is particularly symbolic of him overcoming “one country, two systems” problems and overseeing a “second return” of the city because West Kowloon Station has a Mainland Port Area where PRC laws are enforced; put another way, Xi is showing off that the mainland regime is now—thanks to his leadership—more in control over Hong Kong than in the roughly first two decades after the handover. All in all, the Hong Kong propaganda framing adds to Xi’s political legacy and gives him another “achievement” to use in strengthening the case for extending his tenure at the 20th Party Congress.
Xi’s Hong Kong trip, however, also contained signs of his continued insecurity about his actual control over the city despite his various measures in recent years to resolve factional struggle issues and tighten his grip over Hong Kong. As we documented previously, Xi extended the mainland’s national security apparatus to Hong Kong, heavily reshuffled the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus and “rectified” its leadership ranks of Jiang faction officials, installed an “obedient” new chief executive in Hong Kong who is likely to be loyal to the Xi leadership, and moved to control media and cultural operations (and hence public discourse) in Hong Kong (through targeting Zeng Qinghuai, working through Bauhinia Culture Holdings to control media outlets, etc.). The June 29 People’s Daily article on Hong Kong even quietly furthered the marginalization of the Jiang faction by omitting all mentions of Jiang Zemin despite the latter having a genuine historical contribution to the Party’s history by participating in the 1997 Hong Kong handover.
While Xi and the CCP are theoretically more in control over Hong Kong than before, the Hong Kong authorities still had to provide Xi with heightened protection when he was there. Xi also opted to adjourn to Shenzhen for the night instead of remaining in Hong Kong. If Xi really had a handle on Hong Kong and was confident that the situation had indeed transitioned from “chaos to stability,” then he should be comfortable with spending the night in the city instead of slinking off to Shenzhen, a bona fide PRC territory. Xi’s overly cautious approach to his safety in Hong Kong betrays CCP propaganda about greater integration between Hong Kong and the mainland. Xi’s behavior also suggests that he is not entirely convinced that he has completely dealt with factional struggle risks in Hong Kong, including concerns that he could come to harm in the former territory of his political rivals.
SinoInsight 2
Propaganda outlets vigorously promoted the Party’s governing legitimacy around the 101st anniversary of the CCP’s founding on July 1. During the same period, propaganda outlets also touted Xi Jinping’s political “achievements” in upholding the regime’s “self-revolution.”
June 29
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua published a 5,600-character article titled, “An Answer in the New Era to Escaping the Historical Cycle——Chronicling General Secretary Xi Jinping Leading the Centennial Party in Advancing Self-Revolution” (跳出歷史週期率的新時代答案——習近平總書記引領百年大黨推進自我革命紀實).
The article continues the post-Sixth Plenum’s propaganda narrative about “self-revolution” and the “cycle” theory of a political power’s rise and fall. In the introduction, the article praises Xi’s “self-revolution” as the answer to breaking the historical “cycle.” Xi’s “self-revolution” is then juxtaposed favorably with Mao Zedong’s answer (“supervision by the people” and “diligence of people working in public positions”) to Huang Yanpei in their famous “cycle” conversation.
The article makes the case for Xi’s “answer” to the “cycle” theory in three segments.
In the first segment, the article described “self-revolution” as the CCP’s “historical self-consciousness.” The article noted that Xi had summarized lessons from the rise and fall of Chinese dynasties, the Soviet Union, and other communist countries in the past before arriving at “self-revolution” as the answer to the “cycle” question.
The article then brought up Xi’s May 2015 speech at the Central United Work Front Conference. Xi said “forcefully” at the time, “Has the problem brought up during the ‘cycle’ conversation (窯洞對) been completely resolved? I’m afraid not yet. Some leading cadres are afraid of supervision and do not want to be supervised. They feel uncomfortable and inconvenienced at being supervised all the time.” Xi then “firmly” called for “further deepening the Party’s self-revolution in the new era.”
In the second segment, the article laid out Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption achievements over the past decade, the anti-corruption situation, and how he established a “self-revolution” system by “strictly governing the Party.”
The article said that Xi talked about corruption in the Party with a “clear attitude” when asked by Chinese and foreign reporters after taking office at the 18th Party Congress, noting that “the whole Party must wake up.” The article then said that regimes are most easily subverted by corruption and anti-corruption work requires the “most thorough self-revolution.” The article goes on to list Xi’s anti-corruption achievements like “investigating Zhou Yongkang, Bo Xilai, Sun Zhengcai, Ling Jihua, and other ‘big tigers,’ eradicating ‘fly corruption,’ ‘rodent infestation,’ and ‘vermin.’” Also, “tigers and flies are both taken out, with no exonerating ‘red book and iron coupons’ (丹書鐵券, an idiom akin to ‘get-out-of-jail-free’ card) and no ‘iron-cap princes’ (鐵帽子王, or someone who is above the law). Under Xi, the anti-corruption situation shifted from being “still severe” to “still severe and complicated” to “overwhelming momentum is taking shape” to “overwhelming victory.”
The article added that General Secretary Xi took “initiative in shouldering the historical responsibility” of carrying out anti-corruption work, a “major political struggle that cannot be lost and must not be lost.” In having the “courageous determination” to enter mountains where tigers lurk, Xi “won the hearts and minds of the Party, the military, and the people.”
The article then pointed out that the “two establishments” (establishing the core position of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core and the whole Party; establishing the guiding position of Xi Jinping Thought) provide a “strong political guarantee for self-revolution.”
In the third segment, the article focused on the “never-ending” path to “taking the test” (趕考) and how the Party should be “always on the road” of “self-revolution.” The article also noted that Xi Jinping has “pointed out the direction for the whole Party and won the support of the people” on the new road of “taking the test.”
The article brought up the story of how Cui Ronghai, an octogenarian from Jiangsu Province, asked a local deputy to the National People’s Congress to relay his gratitude to Xi when the Two Sessions was held in Beijing in March 2022 and described Xi as “the lucky star of the country and people” (全國人民的福星). Cui previously met Xi when the latter inspected Zhenjiang City in Jiangsu on Dec. 13, 2014, and reportedly held Xi’s hand while saying, “You are the nemesis of corruption and the lucky star of the country and the people!” The article claimed that Cui represented the “heartfelt support of hundreds of millions of Chinese people” for what Xi was doing.
The article goes on to quote Xi Jinping on winning the hearts and minds of the people. “The times produce the test, we sit for the test, and the people are the markers,” Xi said. He also once noted that how long a political party can govern is dependent on its relationship with the people, and whether the people are supportive and satisfied with the party. Xi said to bear in mind that “the people hate corruption the most” and the CCP “must conform to the will of the people” in “fighting tigers, swatting flies, and hunting foxes” without pause. Further, the Party must “resolutely guard against” what the people “oppose and hate,” and must “point the sword” at behavior and actions that “cause resentment and harm the interests of the people.”
In concluding, the article argued that the CCP’s two “answers” to the “cycle” theory—“supervision by the people” and “self-revolution”—reflect the “same truth,” namely, that “the hearts and minds of the people have a bearing on the Party’s survival.”
Analysis: The Xinhua piece builds on Xi’s post-Sixth Plenum propaganda push to promote his anti-corruption campaign and boost his “quan wei” before the 20th Party Congress.
The article makes subtle references indicating that Xi is preparing to “point the sword” at the Jiang faction if necessary to extend his tenure or preserve himself at crunch time. Jiang Zemin is put on notice through Xi’s requirement that the Party guard against what the people “oppose and hate”; when Xi read out “oppose and hate” during his 19th Party Congress report, the CCTV broadcast of Xi’s speech panned briefly to Jiang in the audience. Meanwhile, Zeng Qinghong is singled out in the article’s mention of “no exonerating ‘red book and iron coupons’ and no ‘iron-cap princes’”; we previously explained how “iron-cap prince” came to be a coded reference for Zeng when the term first entered the Xi leadership’s anti-corruption lexicon in 2015.
Viewed from the perspective of factional struggle, the article lays the groundwork for Xi to take a norm-breaking third term and more directly criticize Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction when necessary. Jiang and the Jiang faction are indirectly faulted for rendering Mao’s “answer” (“supervision by the people”) to the “cycle” theory unworkable when they perpetuated the culture of corruption in the regime during their era of dominance (1997 to 2012). Xi then had to step in with his “self-revolution” to save the Party and the regime from collapse, as well as answer the people’s aspirations. Meanwhile, Xi’s power consolidation and third-term bid are justified because “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” is essential for ensuring (“a strong political guarantee”) the success (“overwhelming victory”) and continuation (“always on the road”) of crucial “self-revolution.”
2. Xinhua published a 6,500-character “Manifesto” titled, “What is the CCP and What Does the CCP Do?” (什麼是中國共產黨，中國共產黨幹什麼).
The article repeated the propaganda narrative that the Party is “an enlightened entity armed with Marxism, the guardian of the interests of the broadest masses of people, the leader of human society’s development direction, and the struggler of the brightest, most just, and most magnificent cause.” The article describes Xi Jinping as a “true Marxist.”
The article attempted to make the case that the CCP puts the people first by noting that “the country is the people, and the people are the country,” as well as “the people’s hearts are the greatest politics.” The article added that “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” mobilized the whole Party and country to “eliminate absolute poverty” and “emphasize common prosperity.”
The article also boasted that the CCP works “for the happiness of the people and the rejuvenation of the nation,” as well as “for the progress of mankind and the world community.”
In concluding, the article said that the CCP was able to “go through a century of ups-and-downs” and remain “at the forefront of the times” because it “always maintained the spirit of self-revolution, the courage to turn the blade inward, and constantly purify, surpass, and innovate itself.”
3. The CCP published “One Hundred Years of the Chinese Communist Party,” a book by the Central Institute of Party History and Literature.
According to official media reports, the book is divided into four volumes (“New Democratic Revolution Period”; “Socialist Revolution and Construction Period”; “Reform and Opening Up and Socialist Modernization Period”; “New Era of Socialism With Chinese Characteristics”), and contains 860,000 characters and 455 pictures.
Official media reports said that the Central Institute of Party History and Literature compiled the book under the guidance of “Xi Jinping Thought” and according to Xi’s instructions on Party history. The reports added that the book “comprehensively and systemically” reflects the “longest time span and the most systematic and complete content” of the CCP’s history.
July 1
1. Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published a speech by Xi Jinping delivered at the Jan. 11, 2022 seminar for leading cadres at the provincial and ministerial level on learning and implementing the spirit of the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee. Xi’s speech was in excess of 12,000 characters and was titled, “Better Grasp and Apply the Historical Experience of the Party’s Centennial Struggle” (更好把握和運用黨的百年奮鬥歷史經驗).
Xi’s speech mainly:
- Emphasized the necessity and importance of Xi’s “historical resolution” passed at the Sixth Plenum;
- Stressed the need for “educating” (i.e. brainwashing) the “broad mass of cadres and the masses” in the newly recompiled Party history to ensure that the CCP regime “doesn’t change character, doesn’t change color, and doesn’t change taste” (不變質不變色不變味).
- Specially emphasized the need for senior officials in the Politburo to safeguard the “quan wei” and centralized leadership of Party Central, and take the lead in implementing the decisions and deployments of Party Central.
Xi also addressed five key issues:
- Promote the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism;
- Correctly grasp the main social contradiction (unequal development) and the central task (common prosperity);
- Pay attention to strategic issues;
- Keep the Party’s Marxist identity forever;
- Promote the normalization and “long-termization” (長效化) of Party history learning and education.
In speaking about the fourth issue, Xi brought up the anti-corruption and “self-revolution” campaign and said, “Here, I will strike the drum again with a heavy mallet. Party Central’s attitude is very clear, Party discipline and state laws will have no mercy regardless of who it is who flouts Party discipline and the law! This is especially so for those who seize the interests of the country and the people, erode the Party’s ruling foundation, shake the power of the socialist state, and who engage in political gangs, small cliques, and interest groups within the Party; they will be relentlessly and resolutely investigated and punished!”
Analysis: Xi’s speech is designed to get senior officials to accept the theoretical basis (“historical resolution” and revamped Party history) that he has put forward in making the case for why he should break modern Party norms and take a third term.
Like the June 29 Xinhua article listed above, Xi’s speech in Qiushi also touches on factional struggle by warning that those who “engage in political gangs, small cliques, and interest groups within the Party” will be “relentlessly and resolutely investigated and punished” regardless of the cadre’s seniority or position in the Party.
2. The official website of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and National Supervisory Commission published an article (“Comprehensively Govern the Party Strictly, Moving Forward With Courage and Perseverance, Brilliant Achievements”; 全面從嚴治黨勇毅前行成就輝煌) containing anti-corruption data for Xi Jinping’s decade in office.
The article claimed that the anti-corruption authorities achieved the following between the 18th Party Congress in 2012 to the end of April 2022:
- Reviewed and investigated 4.388 million cases involving 4.709 million people;
- Investigated and punished 723,000 cases involving violations of the eight-point regulation (八項規定), and handed out Party disciplinary and administrative punishments to 644,000 people;
- Used the four forms of discipline (四種形態) to criticize, educate, help, and punish 11.344 million people.
Other anti-corruption data includes:
- 74,000 people voluntarily surrendered themselves to the anti-corruption authorities since the 19th Party Congress;
- Between the 19th Party Congress and the end of April 2022, there were 496,000 cases of corruption and behavior problems in the field of people’s livelihood that were investigated and dealt with, and 456,000 people were subjected to Party disciplinary and administrative punishments.
- A three-year (2018 to 2020) special investigation of corruption and behavior problems in poverty alleviation work turned up 280,000 cases and led to 188,000 people receiving Party disciplinary and administrative punishments.
- From the launch of the campaign to fight against gangs and triad elements (掃黑除惡) in 2018 to the end of April 2022, a total of 101,000 cases of involving gangs, triad elements, corruption, and “protective umbrella” issues were investigated and dealt with, and 92,000 people were subjected to Party disciplinary and administrative punishments.
Analysis: Per the anti-corruption authorities’ own numbers, Xi’s “self-revolution” campaign has negatively impacted nearly 17 million cadres. This at once reflects the massive corruption in the CCP regime, and by extension, the scale of resentment towards Xi among Chinese officials at all levels.
3. The People’s Liberation Army Daily published an editorial on its front page titled, “Maintaining Loyalty to the Core, Commit to the ‘Strong Military’ Struggle” (忠誠維護核心 矢志奮鬥強軍).
The editorial repeats various oft-used CCP propaganda narratives, including, “without the CCP, there would be no new China, and there would be no great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” “adhere to the Party controlling the gun,” etc.
The editorial also vigorously promoted Xi’s core position and the role of Party Central with Xi at the core in preserving the regime. Xi and Party Central are credited with “overcoming a series of major risks and challenges, resolving many difficult problems that have not been resolved for a long time, and accomplishing many major things that were aspired to be accomplished in the past but were not done.”
The editorial further stated that all PLA officers and soldiers are “absolutely loyal” to the Xi core. They will “implement the CMC chairman responsibility system, resolutely obey the commands of Party Central, the CMC, and chairman Xi, follow the direction and blueprint drawn up by chairman Xi, and continuously advance the ‘strong military’ work in the new era.”
Analysis: The PLA is taking the occasion of the anniversary of the CCP’s founding to repledge its loyalty to Xi Jinping.
OUR TAKE
There are several likely reasons why the Xi leadership is picking up where it left off with the post-Sixth Plenum effort to promote propaganda pertaining to “self-revolution” and Xi’s “historical resolution.”
As noted above, Xi Jinping needs to enhance his “quan wei” in the leadup to the Beidaihe meeting and the 20th Party Congress. The post-Sixth Plenum propaganda push was earlier paused due to the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, and almost immediately after that, mass COVID-19 outbreaks in Shanghai and several parts of China. With the epidemic situation improving recently and the CCP preparing to declare “victory” over the virus, the Chinese economy rebounding slightly in May (at least per dubious official data), and with the 101st anniversary of the Party’s founding, the Xi leadership likely believes that now is an opportune moment to resume its glorification of the general secretary and his “achievements.”
Xi is also aided by an improving geopolitical situation for the PRC. In particular, the Biden administration’s move towards détente with the PRC (including the likely lifting of some of Trump’s China tariffs and “green light” to U.S. investors holding onto securities of companies with ties to the PLA) and warming Sino-Australian relations after Australia’s government change, as well as the growing social divide in America over political issues, will be viewed by the Xi leadership as “affirmations” that their theory of “the East is rising, the West is in decline” (“dong sheng xi jiang”; 東升西降) and the “inevitability” of the CCP’s success in its efforts to achieve world domination. Reduced geopolitical pressures also give the Xi leadership more leeway to “turn the blade inward” and focus on domestic issues, including going after intra-Party opponents.
The Xi leadership, however, must still contend with China’s rapidly deteriorating economy and the worsening global economic situation. The U.S. Federal Reserves’ measures to curb inflation and growing recession risks in America and other countries will further strain the Chinese economy this year. Mounting economic problems will inevitably lead to greater social instability, and serious social and economic trouble could trigger escalations in intra-Party factional struggle and imperil the CCP regime. The Xi leadership has likely anticipated the emergence of desperate scenarios, and thus has embedded narratives in the “self-revolution” propaganda that allow it to officially pivot to blaming Jiang Zemin and the Jiang faction for the regime’s ills while setting up Xi as the CCP and China’s “savior.”
Xi Jinping could still conceivably proceed to more prominently denounce Jiang and the Jiang faction before the 20th Party Congress even if things proceed uneventfully for the CCP. Yuan Hongbing, the prominent Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist, learned last November from his sources inside the CCP that Xi originally wanted to condemn the “major political mistakes during the Jiang Zemin leadership” and Jiang’s “incorrect political line” in his “historical resolution,” but was prevented from doing so after Jiang faction member Zhang Gaoli led an effort to block the criticism of Jiang Zemin.
In a June 15, 2022 interview with Dajiyuan (Chinese edition of The Epoch Times), Yuan said he learned from his sources that Central Propaganda Department executive deputy minister and Xi’s adviser Li Shulei was preparing three political objectives that Xi could attempt to accomplish at the 20th Party Congress. The “highest objective” was Xi taking the title of Party Chairman (making him Mao’s equal) and publicly criticizing Jiang’s political line; the “middle objective” has Xi retain the General Secretary title but publicly condemn Jiang’s political line; the “minimum objective” has Xi stay on as General Secretary and securing lifelong tenure. On June 28, Yuan Hongbing told Dajiyuan that the latest information he received from Party insiders was that Xi is currently on track to achieving only his “minimum objective.”
