SinoInsight 1
June 16
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua published a nearly 6,900-character article (“Courage and Perseverance in Moving Forward Firmly, Wind From a Thousand Miles——A Commentary on General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Leading China’s Economic and Social Development and Seeking Progress While Maintaining Stability”; 勇毅篤行 長風萬里——習近平總書記引領中國經濟社會發展穩中求進述評) promoting Xi Jinping’s political “achievements” in epidemic prevention, economic stabilization, and regime preservation.
The article opened by noting that the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis brought “increased risks and challenges” to the PRC this year, and heightened the “complexity, severity, and uncertainty” of China’s economic development environment. However, due to Party Central’s (“with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core”) “profound insight into the international and domestic overall situation,” the CCP regime was able to “efficiently coordinate epidemic prevention and control and economic and social development; coordinate development and security; persevere in being stable, steady, and progressive; and steer the big ship that is China’s economy along the course of high-quality development to break waves and move steadily forward.”
The article then airbrushed Xi’s failures and governing crises by claiming that there would be “temporary fluctuations in development, but the east wind is mighty in the long run.” Also, “China’s economy has a bright future for long-term improvement.”
Rehashing the standard propaganda line, the Xinhua article credited the “strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” for successful epidemic prevention work. The article also repeatedly emphasized the “scientific nature” and “necessity” of Xi’s “zero-COVID” policy, and notes that “the economy will be stable and the people’s lives will be safe and secure” if the epidemic can be prevented.
The article attributed the CCP’s “series of policy measures to stabilize the macroeconomic market” to “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” but notes that local governments merely “implemented the important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping.”
The article strived to make the case that “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” had “strategic confidence in grasping the times and trends” to cope with various risks and challenges. Party Central had “accurately grasped the new stage of development; implemented the new development concept in a complete, accurate, and comprehensive manner; anchored the goal of high-quality development; accelerated the construction of a new development pattern; and persevered confidently in walking (its) path and doing well (its) work [like “comprehensively strengthening infrastructure construction,” “building a unified national market,” “insisting on comprehensively expanding and opening up,” etc.].”
The article underscored Xi Jinping’s concerns for the Chinese people and their livelihood, noting that “no matter what difficulties we face, we must adhere to the people-centered development philosophy.” The article then listed how the Xi leadership had “coordinated the promotion of economic development and people’s livelihood security” during this “special period” by making a “series of important deployments” revolving around employment, supply, price stabilization, social assistance, pension adjustments, and other matters.
In concluding, the article encouraged “hundreds of millions of Chinese sons and daughters under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” to make good use of the “five strategic advantages” (五個戰略性有利條件) and follow the “five only paths” (五個必由之路) to create a “new miracle of development in the irreversible historical process of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
The “five strategic advantages” are:
- The strong leadership of the CCP.
- The socialist system with Chinese characteristics, which has “significant advantages.”
- A solid foundation for sustained and rapid development.
- A long-term, stable social environment.
- Spiritual power of self-confidence and self-improvement.
The “five only paths” are:
- Adhering to the Party’s overall leadership is the only path to upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics.
- Socialism with Chinese characteristics is the only path to realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.
- United struggle is the only path for the Chinese people to create great historical achievements.
- Implementing the new development concept is the only path for China to grow and develop in the new era.
- Comprehensively and strictly governing the Party is the only way for the CCP to retain eternal vitality and walk well the new road to taking the test. (“Take the test” [趕考] is a reference to Mao Zedong’s remark to Zhou Enlai at Xibaipo in March 1949 as they were preparing to enter Beijing and seize power. Mao was concerned that the CCP, like Li Zicheng of the extremely short-lived Shun dynasty, would not be able to hold onto power after taking the capital.)
2. Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a piece touting Xi Jinping’s political “achievements” in frontier governance titled, “New Face of the Ten-Thousand Mile Frontier——A Summary of Development Achievements in Frontier Areas Since the 18th Party Congress” (萬里邊疆展新顏 ——黨的十八大以來邊疆地區發展成就綜述).
The article asserted that “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” had placed frontier governance in an important position in the governance of the country since the 18th Party Congress. The article also put forward the “strategic idea” of “governing the borders to govern the country” (治國必治邊), deepening action to promote the prosperity of the people at the frontier in the new era, and secure historic achievements in economic and social development in frontier areas. The article further claims that the frontier areas are showing the “good situation” of “the Chinese nation is one family, and is building the Chinese dream with one heart” (中華民族一家親、同心共築中國夢).
The article claimed that “historical achievements” were achieved in frontier areas, citing economic development in Xinjiang, Tibet, and elsewhere. “The frontier area and the whole country are in step in moving towards a moderately prosperous society,” the article continued. The article added that the CCP had carried out in-depth propaganda and education in frontier areas to “forge a sense of community of the Chinese nation,” including efforts to “popularize the common language of the country” and expand “national unity and friendship” activities such as getting Uyghur families to take in CCP cadre “relatives” (where the Uyghurs are placed under surveillance and “Sinicized”).
The article also noted the “effectiveness” of strengthening stability maintenance and grassroots governance, as well as stabilizing overall security, in frontier areas.
3. Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published Xi Jinping’s speech at the the 37th collective study session of the Politburo on Feb. 25, 2022 as an article titled, “Unswervingly Follow the Path of China’s Human Rights Development, Better Promote the Development of China’s Human Rights Cause” (堅定不移走中國人權發展道路，更好推動我國人權事業發展).
In his speech, Xi said that the purpose of the study session is to summarize the “achievements” of the PRC’s “human rights theory and practice development in the new era, analyze the situation of international human rights struggle, unswervingly follow the path of China’s human rights development, and better promote the development of human rights in China.”
Xi said that the CCP “combines the Marxist concept of human rights with China’s concrete reality and the excellent traditional Chinese culture” to establish a “human rights development path that conforms to the trend of the times and suits China’s national conditions.” The “human rights development path” contains six features:
- Adhere to upholding the leadership of the CCP
- Adhere to respecting the main position of the people.
- Adhere to the reality of the PRC.
- Adhere to the right to survival and development as the first and foremost basic human right.
- Adhere to the protection of human rights in accordance with the law.
- Adhere to active participation in global human rights governance.
Xi noted that Western countries have many human rights and social problems, but insist on “forcibly promoting the concept and system of Western democracy and human rights” to the world. He added that Western countries “use human rights issues to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries,” resulting in “frequent wars, long-term social unrest, and the displacement of people” in some countries.
Xi emphasized the necessity of “coordinating both domestic and international situations, deeply understanding the importance and urgency of doing a good job in human rights work, paying more attention to respecting and protecting human rights, and promoting the healthy development of China’s human rights causes.” Development should be focused on the following areas:
- Promote the all-round development of human rights.
- Strengthen human rights protection and the rule of law.
- Promote the correct concept of human rights.
- Actively promote global human rights governance.
- Actively carry out international human rights struggle. Grasp the strategic initiative. Focus on telling the story of human rights in China well. Maximize the international consensus on human rights and occupy the moral high ground of human rights. Overseas Chinese enterprises should be guided to enhance their human rights awareness and self-confidence, and effectively respond to abusive human rights lawsuits orchestrated by some Western countries.
Xi concluded by requiring Party Committees and Party groups at all levels to “shoulder the historical responsibility of promoting the development” of the PRC’s human rights cause.
OUR TAKE
1. In classic CCP “survival-dominance” manner, the Xi leadership’s latest round of propaganda takes advantage of recent favorable domestic and external developments to cover up prominent setbacks and go on the offensive against ideological challenges. The propaganda is also intended to shore up Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) ahead of the 20th Party Congress.
2. The June 16 Xinhua commentary promoting Xi’s political “achievements” was published after the release of economic data for May that showed slight improvement from April. The commentary also came after lockdowns were largely lifted in Shanghai and other places, and with the epidemic situation in China seemingly taking a turn for the better. Further, geopolitical pressures on the PRC appear to be easing (see point 3).
The aforementioned positive developments allowed the Xi leadership to “spin tragedy into victory” and claim credit for being able to “efficiently coordinate epidemic prevention and control and economic and social development.” The mildly better-than-expected economic data released by the authorities also afforded Xinhua the opportunity to make the case that China’s dismal recent economic performance is merely “temporary fluctuations in development.” Xinhua then encouraged investors to keep pouring capital into China by claiming that “China’s economy has a bright future for long-term improvement.”
The Xinhua commentary builds on propaganda rolled out around the Sixth Plenum period that was at the time meant to promote Xi Jinping’s “historical resolution” and boost his “quan wei.” For instance, the commentary hails “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” for showing “courage and perseverance,” possessing “profound insight into the international and domestic overall situation,” caring for the Chinese people, and successfully navigating “complexity, severity, and uncertainty” to “steer the big ship that is China’s economy along the course of high-quality development to break waves and move steadily forward.” This echoes a Dec. 8 Study Times piece by propaganda vice minister Shen Haixiong, where Xi is praised for possessing the “eloquence of a great statesman, thinker, and strategist” who has the “courage and loyalty” to “sacrifice himself for the good of his people.” The Shen article also credited Xi with “saving the day, preventing the building from collapsing, steering the giant ship of China through dangerous shoals and turbulent waves, pioneering a new era of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and chopping the waves on the new journey of achieving the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Clearly, the Xinhua commentary is meant to continue Xi’s “quan wei”-building propaganda push from the Sixth Plenum period to solidify his bid for a third term at the 20th Party Congress.
Aside from assigning credit for the CCP regime’s recent “recovery” to Xi, the Xinhua commentary also seeks to insulate the Xi leadership from criticism by blaming others and the external environment for things that had gone wrong. For example, COVID-19 (and not the “zero-COVID” political epidemic) and the Russia-Ukraine war are faulted for contributing to the “complexity, severity, and uncertainty” of China’s economic development environment. Meanwhile, the repetition of the “scientific nature” and “necessity” of Xi’s “zero-COVID” policy subtly implies that the tragedies caused by the policy were due to local governments not implementing the policy in a sufficiently “scientific” manner. Xinhua also indirectly preempts future finger-pointing over policy failures by attributing leadership and direction to “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” but noting that the local governments are responsible for implementing the “important instructions of General Secretary Xi Jinping,” i.e. when things go wrong, it is not Xi’s policies that are to blame, but local governments’ inability to implement those policies per the “important instructions.”
3. The People’s Daily piece on frontier governance and the publication of Xi’s speech on human rights in Qiushi are likely intended to leverage recent developments that favor the CCP regime. On the domestic front, the Tangshan restaurant incident (see SinoInsight 2) around mid-June has served to distract and divert the Chinese people’s attention away from the CCP’s human rights abuses. Also, the CCP’s draconian “zero-COVID” measures are being somewhat “forgotten” as lockdowns are lifted in many areas and epidemic controls are loosened.
On the external front, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet concluded her trip to Xinjiang and other parts of China in late May by whitewashing the Party’s persecution of Uyghurs and other crimes against humanity. The Biden administration has also signaled in its recently announced China strategy and subsequent actions that it is more interested in pursuing détente and “re-engagement” with the PRC than in competition and confrontation.
Favorable external and domestic factors have allowed the Xi leadership to use propaganda to simultaneously go on the offensive and defensive at home and abroad. The UN’s meekness in addressing the CCP’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang and elsewhere provides the latter with “evidence” of the West’s “hypocrisy” on human rights, justifies the CCP’s Xinjiang policies and its “correctness” in brutal frontier governance, and is an “achievement” in the Party’s “international human rights struggle.”
Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s rapprochement with China lets the Xi leadership argue that it has demonstrated “strategic confidence in grasping the times and trends” to overcome regime-threatening risks and challenges stemming from the Trump administration’s “China challenge” measures. America’s struggles with inflation, economic growth, and mounting social instability as politics and the media become more divisive also fit with Xi’s “the East is rising, and the West is in decline” (東升西降) propaganda push. Xi can now justify to naysayers in the Party elite that he possessed “profound insight” in sticking with “great power diplomacy” (大國外交) and showing “political determination” despite serious setbacks, and in doing so is leaving the CCP regime in a good position to reap the rewards as Washington moderates its approach to China.
4. All in all, the recent CCP propaganda serves to counter domestic and geopolitical pressures against the Xi leadership while boosting Xi Jinping’s bid for extending this tenure to lead the Party to success in its second centennial.
Propaganda, however, can only do so much. The PRC still faces regime-endangering economic and social problems that cannot be easily resolved over the short term. Xi also has factional struggle issues to overcome, and factional struggle in the Party elite can yet lead to Black Swans before the 20th Party Congress. Xi’s effort to establish his “quan wei,” preserve the CCP’s political legitimacy, and push for global hegemony through propaganda will backfire when the PRC’s situation becomes too dire for propaganda to obscure.
SinoInsight 2
Anti-corruption study session
June 17
Xi Jinping presided over the 40th study session of the CCP Politburo, according to official mainland media. The theme of the study session was, “Promote as One Body Not Daring to Be Corrupt, Not Being Corrupt, and Not Wanting to Be Corrupt” (一體推進不敢腐、不能腐、不想腐).
Speaking at the study session, Xi largely rehashed his leadership’s anti-corruption propaganda and stance, including propaganda narratives that were promoted after the Sixth Plenum of the 19th Central Committee.
Xi stressed that the fight against corruption is the “most important political struggle that affects the people’s hearts,” and is a “major political struggle that cannot be lost and must not be lost.” He urged officials to elevate their “ability and level” in “not daring to be corrupt, not being corrupt, and not wanting to be corrupt” so that the CCP can “comprehensively win the tough and protracted struggle against corruption.”
Xi spoke about the importance of anti-corruption work, noting that the “courage to carry out self-revolution” is in the “character” of the CCP’s centennial struggle. “Promoting the fight against corruption” is a series of new concepts, ideas, and strategies in the new era, and “self-revolution” is an effective way of escaping dynastic cycles. Xi then listed the “remarkable achievements” and “important experience” accumulated in the fight against corruption since the 18th Party Congress, including anti-corruption work under the Party’s overall leadership, punishing corruption with a “zero-tolerance attitude,” resolutely eliminating “two-faced” people who “publicly comply but privately defy” (陽奉陰違), grasping the institutional “cage” to prevent and control corruption, and strengthening constraints and supervision on the operation of power.
Xi added that the fight against corruption is “extremely complicated and difficult,” with “no room for concessions and compromises.” He called for “resolutely cutting off the cancer, removing the source of the poison, and eliminating residue poison” so as to ensure that “the Party never deteriorates and the red regime never changes color.” While “overwhelming victory” has been won in the fight against corruption and anti-corruption work has been “consolidated in an all-round way,” the situation “remains grim and complex.”
Xi also pointed out that leading cadres at all levels have a responsibility in fighting corruption. He urged leading cadres to focus on key areas and links; unswervingly “fight tigers,” “swat flies,” and “hunt foxes”; resolutely clean up risky and potentially grave industrial and systemic corruption; and effectively prevent and resolve corruption risks and associated economic and social risks. Xi further demanded that senior officials, and especially those in the Politburo, be strict with themselves and manage themselves and their family well.
Political and legal affairs ‘rectification’
June 15
Zhao Zhigang (51), Party group deputy secretary and deputy chief prosecutor of the Jiangsu Provincial Procuratorate, was investigated.
Zhao mainly worked in media organizations affiliated with the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) early for a good portion of his career (July 1994 to June 2013), eventually rising to the position of vice president of the China Procuratorial Press (Feb. 2012 to June 2013). Zhao was subsequently transferred to the SPP’s Procuratorial Technology Information Research Center to serve as deputy director, and later, director (June 2013 to Dec. 2019). He was then promoted to president of the China Procuratorial Press (Dec. 2019 to Oct. 2020).
Zhao Zhigang moved to the Jiangsu Provincial Procuratorate to serve as Party group deputy secretary and deputy chief prosecutor (bureau level) in October 2020, a promotion from his previous post. Around that period, Xi Jinping had launched the campaign to educate and rectify the political and legal affairs apparatus and the authorities were investigating the “judicial mafia” in Jiangsu.
Analysis: Zhao Zhigang’s promotion to the Jiangsu Provincial Procuratorate could be due to his lack of obvious factional associations given his slow progression up the ranks in the SPP system. His being investigated less than two years after being transferred to Jiangsu suggests that the problems of corruption and “political gangs” in the province’s political and legal affairs apparatus are very serious.
On a related note, Yan Ming, a former deputy chief prosecutor at the Jiangsu Provincial Procuratorate (Jan. 2011 to Sept. 2017), was investigated in July 2020, or at the start of the political and legal affairs education and rectification campaign.
June 16
Meng Bing (49), Party group secretary and full-time vice president of the Liaoning Provincial Law Society, was investigated.
Meng was a career public security official in Liaoning. He once served as deputy political commissar, political commissar, and head team captain of the Liaoning Public Security Bureau’s Public Security Corps (May 2010 to Dec. 2015), director of the Huludao City PSB (Dec. 2015 to Nov. 2017), Liaoning provincial PSB Party Committee member and command center director (Nov. 2017 to Oct. 2018), and deputy secretary of the Liaoning Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission in charge of daily operations (Oct. 2018 to June 2021; bureau level).
June 17
1. Wang Like, former Standing Committee member of the Jiangsu Provincial Party Committee and former Jiangsu Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission, stood trial at the Intermediate People’s Court of Changchun City in Jilin Province.
Wang was accused of taking and offering bribes, harboring and conniving mafia-like organizations, and forging identity documents. Prosecutors said that Wang illegally accepted money and gifts worth 440 million yuan; offered more than 97.31 million yuan in bribes to people including former public security vice minister Sun Lijun; sheltered and served as a “protective umbrella” to the mafia-like organization headed by Lou He; and abused his position to forge multiple resident identification documents for himself, his relatives, and others that have interests with him.
Background: The political and legal affairs apparatuses in Liaoning Province and Jiangsu Province saw several purges around the time that Wang Like was officially investigated. Notable purges include two former Liaoning PSB directors (Li Wenxi and Xue Heng) and former captain of the criminal police corps of the Jiangsu Provincial Public Security Bureau Luo Wenjin.
Tangshan restaurant incident
Early in the morning of June 10, four women were assaulted by a group of men in a barbeque restaurant in Lubei District of Tangshan City in Hebei Province. Surveillance footage of the incident that was posted online showed that one of the women was initially being harassed by a man, who slapped her after she put up resistance. The incident escalated after the man’s associates rushed into the restaurant and began brutalizing the women, punching, kicking, and dragging them on the floor by their hair. The men considered raping the women, according to snippets of conversation caught on the surveillance footage.
According to the authorities, two of the women were sent to a hospital and were in stable condition, while the other two suffered minor injuries. Unconfirmed information circulating online claimed that one of the women had been sexually assaulted and one had died. On June 13, mainland media reported that the Lubei District Women’s Federation had dismissed rumors of a death and added that there was “no emergency at present.”
The local public security authorities announced on June 11 that nine suspects (seven males, two females) had been arrested in relation to the incident. State broadcaster CCTV later noted that three of the nine were members of “Tian’an Society,” a local triad in Jiangsu Province. Also on June 11, the Hebei Provincial PSB ordered the Guangyang Branch of the Langfang PSB (Langfang is a separate city in Hebei) to handle the criminal investigation into the case (a move which suggests gang-related crimes), and the Tangshan PSB announced a “look back” campaign to eliminate gangs and triad elements (掃黑除惡) in the city.
On June 12, the Tangshan authorities launched a half-month special rectification operation to crackdown on gangs and announced that it would be accepting public complaints. The following day, residents began lining up outside the entrance of the Tangshan PSB petition office to submit complaints. Mainland media reported that some of the petitioners had been standing in queue since 7:00 a.m. in the morning and were still unable to submit their complaints after a four-hour wait. Many netizens also began exposing Tangshan gangsters online using their real names (to show that their cases are serious and they are not afraid of reprisals), and official mainland media started reporting on Tangshan’s underworld problem and official-triad collusion.
The Tangshan restaurant incident sparked a massive public outcry across China. Some people were concerned about the treatment of women in China, including systemic violence against women. Others discussed the issue of triads and gangs in China. Irregularities in the authorities’ handling of the incident were also brought up.
The Tangshan authorities took pains to prevent more information about the incident from getting out. Journalists were violently blocked from entering the hospitals that some of the women were in, according to mainland media. Mainland media also reported that the authorities turned to epidemic prevention measures to restrict access to the city. On June 17, the Tangshan Railway Station issued regulations requiring all residents who were returning to the city and those visiting from out of town to submit detailed personal information and a letter of commitment not to leave their place of residence on the pretext of controlling the epidemic. Upon arrival, out-of-towners were to be transported to their declared destination by government-arranged vehicles, and the drivers were supposed to snap photos of the out-of-towners upon entry and exit of the vehicle.
The Tangshan restaurant incident also saw at least two unusual public security-related developments. According to information circulating on Chinese social media, eyewitnesses who called the police at least five times said that officers were only dispatched from the nearest station more than three hours after the incident broke out despite the police station being located just 800 meters from the barbeque restaurant. Before the incident blew up online, a person who was believed to be associated with the men who assaulted the women revealed in a livestream that they had spent 600,000 yuan to “settle” the incident, a statement that suggested that the local police were likely bought off. Meanwhile, another one of the nine suspects who was arrested was identified by netizens as Ma Yunqi, the son of Jiangsu’s Xinghua Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary Ma Yuanlian.
OUR TAKE
1. The Xi leadership last spotlighted anti-corruption matters around mid-January. Over the next several months, the Lunar New Year holiday period, the Winter Olympics, and the COVID-19 outbreaks saw Beijing shift attention away from trumpeting Xi Jinping’s only unquestioned political achievement. Recent improvements in the CCP’s situation, however, have led the Xi leadership to start claiming credit for steering the regime through various crises and touting Xi’s political “achievements” again (see SinoInsight 1). The June 17 Politburo study session on anti-corruption appears to be part of Xi’s latest “quan wei”-boosting effort.
The focus on anti-corruption matters at this time, as well as recent political and legal affairs purges and trials of prominent characters like Wang Like and Xiao Jianhua, could also be part of the Xi leadership’s attempt to intimidate Xi Jinping’s would-be challengers and factional rivals in the Party elite before the crucial pre-Party Congress Beidaihe meeting around the July-August period. Xi would want to lock up his bid for a third term and secure key personnel appointments at Beidaihe, but likely knows that he will face strong opposition on both matters in light of his many policy failures (“zero-COVID,” economic policy, housing policy, etc.). Hence, Xi prominently reminding the Party elite of the anti-corruption campaign could serve to deter those who oppose his continued rule, and better establish intra-Party “consensus” on allowing Xi to stay on as Party boss and lead the CCP in its second centennial struggle.
It is also possible that the recent focus on anti-corruption foreshadows the arrest of “big tigers” before Beidaihe or the 20th Party Congress. Whether or not Xi actually does go ahead with purging senior officials will likely be dependent on political necessity. If the Party elite are sufficiently cowed and show no signs of challenging Xi and his political agenda, then the Xi leadership could be content to complete the prosecution and punishment of the senior officials that were previously purged before calling it a day. But if elite opposition is strong, Xi could proceed to “kill the chickens to scare the monkey” by officially investigating those higher up the food chain than Sun Lijun and Fu Zhenghua.
2. The Tangshan restaurant incident is both a positive and a negative for the Xi leadership. On the one hand, the incident has temporarily diverted society’s attention away from the “zero-COVID” policy and economic deterioration, taking some pressure off Beijing. The Xi camp could also be taking advantage of the incident to more thoroughly “rectify” a long-time Jiang Zemin faction power base.
On the other hand, the restaurant incident shows that the Xi leadership still has a long way to go in educating and rectifying the political and legal affairs apparatus in at least some areas. Also, too much social attention on the incident and its attendant problems (triads, ineffective and corrupt public security, treatment of women in China, etc.) will eventually reflect badly on the CCP and erode its political legitimacy.
Problematic Hebei political and legal affairs apparatus
The Hebei political and legal affairs apparatus was dominated by the Jiang faction for decades, and is known to be particularly corrupt. Official-business-triad collusion was also especially prominent in the resource-rich city of Tangshan, including a case in 2007 that drew national attention. According to mainland media reports, then-Tangshan Political Consultative Conference member Yang Shukuan was exposed as a big-time local triad boss who owned an armored vehicle, three military jeeps, 38 guns of various types, 12 police-grade tear gas canisters, and tens of thousands of rounds of ammunition. Yang’s gang had also reportedly extorted at least 800 million yuan from local businesses at the time. In comparison, the Tangshan PSB’s “sweeping black” anti-mafia campaign in 2018 only seized over 170 million yuan in funds and “destroyed” 70 gangs, unsatisfactory results which indicate that the official-business-triad collusion problem in the city is still very serious.
Xi Jinping had not been able to properly “rectify” the Hebei political and legal affairs apparatus during his 10 years in office. In his first term, Hebei was firmly in the hands of Jiang faction officials Zhou Benshun (Hebei Party secretary, March 2013 to July 2015) and Zhang Yue (Hebei PSB director, Jan. 2008 to Sept. 2013; Hebei Provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary, June 2008 to April 2016). Both Zhou and Zhang previously served in the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Public Security for extended periods and were appointed to leadership positions in the central “610 Office,” the supra-authority agency responsible for coordinating Jiang Zemin’s campaign of persecution against Falun Gong.
Xi eventually purged Zhou Benshun and Zhang Yue through the anti-corruption campaign, but was unable to fully rid the Hebei political and legal affairs apparatus of Jiang faction influence. Dong Maosheng, who succeeded Zhang as Hebei PLAC secretary and PSB director, is a Jiang faction official. Dong notably served as PLAC secretary of Yichun City and Yingtan City in Jiangxi Province from 2000 to 2006, a period of peak stability maintenance operations in the PRC as Jiang Zemin escalated his anti-Falun Gong campaign. Liu Kai (age 53), Dong Rensheng’s successor at the Hebei PSB, also has a Jiang faction background. Liu was a career police officer in Shanghai (July 1991 to Aug. 2013), and was promoted to aide of the Shanghai PSB’s Domestic Security Division director (Sept. 1999 to March 2003) just after Jiang launched the Falun Gong persecution campaign; the Internal Security Bureau formerly specialized in suppressing Falun Gong.
Xi Jinping did send his close associate Zhao Kezhi to Hebei to replace Zhou Benshun as provincial Party secretary after the latter was purged. However, Zhao did not have prior experience working in the PLAC apparatus or networks that he could tap to properly rectify the Hebei political and legal affairs apparatus. Zhao’s handicap would also affect his ability to properly fix the public security apparatus when he later headed the Ministry of Public Security after the 19th Party Congress.
Cleaning up public security
The appointment of Wang Xiaohong, another close associate of Xi Jinping, as MPS Party secretary in November 2021 indicates that Xi is looking to make breakthroughs in rectifying the public security apparatus and the PLAC. Wang appeared to have a role in taking down Sun Lijun in April 2020, and will likely replace Zhao Kezhi as public security minister. Recent personnel reshuffles also saw the appointment of 11 new provincial PSB chiefs, while five of the current 30 provincial PSB directors are Wang Xiaohong’s former deputies.
Near the end of May, Liu Wenxi, former deputy head of the disciplinary inspection and supervision group of the Ministry of Public Security, was “parachuted” into Hebei to serve as deputy governor and provincial PSB director. Meanwhile, former Hebei PSB head Liu Kai was transferred to Jilin Province to serve as deputy governor, but has not yet taken over as Jilin PSB director as the reshuffle would suggest. This suggests that Liu Kai may have been moved out of his base of operations (調虎離山) so that he can be later investigated.
Recent personnel changes in Tangshan also indicate that arrangements are being made to clean up the local PLAC and make inroads in tackling official-business-triad collusion problems.
Zhao Jinjin (49), Tangshan’s new PSB director, appeared to have been sent there specifically to deal with the triad problem. A Hebei native, Zhao previously served in the provincial finance department for nine years (July 1995 to July 2006) before spending a little over nine years at the provincial PSB (April 2006 to Sept. 2015). He was then appointed director of the Langfang PSB (Dec. 2016 to June 2021), and Langfang City would later rank first in Hebei Province for combating crime after Xi’s “sweeping black” campaign was launched in 2018. After the conclusion of the first segment of the national political and legal affairs “education and rectification” campaign, Zhao Jinjin was transferred to Tangshan to serve as Party secretary (June 2021) and director (July 2021) of the Tangshan PSB. Notably, the Langfang PSB is being tasked to handle the Tangshan restaurant incident.
Around the same time that Zhao Jinjin was transferred to Tangshan, Lai Guangpu, the Party secretary of Zhuolu County in Hebei, was also transferred to Tangshan to serve as municipal PLAC secretary. Meanwhile, Wu Weidong, a Standing Committee member of the Hebei Provincial Party Committee and Zhangjiakou Party secretary, was transferred to the Tangshan Municipal Party Committee this April. Also noteworthy is the reshuffle of the Hebei Party secretary position in April, with the technocrat Ni Yuefeng replacing Wang Dongfeng.
There is a possibility that Xi camp allowed the Tangshan restaurant incident to blow up to facilitate its clean up of both the local PLAC and triads. According to Maoist mainland websites, Tangshan PSB chief Zhao Jinjin had reportedly been “boycotted” by “local forces” since he took office about a year ago. If accurate, the information suggests that Zhao was facing resistance from his own officials and efforts to tackle triad problems were being obstructed. Under such circumstances, it would make sense for Zhao and the Xi camp to bring national attention to the Tangshan restaurant incident so that “local forces” are unable to sweep things under the rug and the authorities who want to resolve triad and local PLAC problems will find it easier to do so. It cannot be ruled out that Zhao and his higher-ups in the MPS were behind the “leak” of the surveillance footage of the restaurant incident; surveillance video is usually not easy to obtain, but public security officials would have access to it. And if the Xi camp was indeed behind the “leaked” surveillance footage, then they are repeating the playbook used to put former Politburo Standing Committee member and Jiang faction member Zhang Gaoli on notice via the Peng Shuai affair (see here and here).
All in all, the problems with the PLAC in Tangshan and Hebei indicate that Xi Jinping is not overstating the “extremely complicated and difficult” nature of the fight against corruption during the June 17 Politburo session. If the “grim and complex” situation of official-business-triad collusion and other forms of corruption are not properly addressed, the CCP regime will struggle even more to rescue the economy and avert regime-endangering crisis. Failure to bring the Party’s “knife handle” (the PLAC) under control will also result in “the Party deteriorating and the red regime changing color,” to paraphrase Xi.
Backfire potential
The Xi leadership and the CCP may be using the Tangshan restaurant incident to their advantage for the moment to secure political objectives. However, the incident has the potential of sparking serious societal pushback and further exposing the PLAC system for being broken, twisted, and corrupt. In particular, the rush to submit complaints about triad problems in Tangshan and whistleblowing efforts online could eventually lead to complaints about official-triad collusion, especially when local PLAC officials fail to properly address triad issues beyond punishing some thugs.
The CCP also faces a dilemma regarding the whistleblowing wave. Whether it expands or gets suppressed, the phenomenon reflects badly on the CCP and its brutal totalitarian system. As with the “Xuzhou chained woman incident” and the “zero-COVID” policy, the Tangshan restaurant incident will further erode the Party’s political legitimacy in the eyes of the Chinese people and generate greater social instability.
