SinoInsight 1
On Jan. 11, Xi Jinping delivered a speech during the opening ceremony of a seminar for leading provincial and ministerial-level officials on the “implementing the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee” in Beijing. Premier Li Keqiang, the other five members of the Politburo Standing Committee, and PRC vice president Wang Qishan were in attendance.
Highlights of Xi’s speech include:
- Xi defined the period after the 19th Party Congress in 2017 as a “new development stage” for China and an “important stage” in China’s socialist development towards “building a modern socialist country” over the next 30 years.
- Xi said that “the world is seeing turbulence unprecedented in the past century,” but “time and momentum” are on the CCP’s side. “This is where we show our conviction and resilience, as well as our determination and confidence.”
- Xi believes that “opportunities and challenges [facing the CCP] are unprecedented but, all in all, the opportunities we face outweigh our challenges.”
- Xi talked up his political achievement since the 18th Party Congress in 2012. He attributed “historic achievements and changes” in China’s economic development to his “new development concept.” Xi said that the “new development concept” is a “systematic theoretical system” that “answers and clarifies” the CCP’s “political stance, value orientation, development model, development path, and other major political issues.”
- Xi emphasized that the entire CCP must “completely, accurately, and comprehensively implement the new development concept,” “must enhance danger awareness, adhere to bottomline thinking, and be ready to deal with more complex and difficult situations,” “uphold political security,” as well as “dare to struggle,” “be good at struggling,” and “comprehensively strengthen ourselves.”
- Xi stressed that the “dual circulation” strategy is a “major strategic task” of the CCP’s 14th Five-Year Plan.
- Xi emphasized the need to strengthen the Party’s overall leadership over the regime.
- Xi called on officials at all levels, and particularly senior officials, to “earnestly understand” the 14th Five-Year Plan recommendations and “implement Party Central’s arrangements.”
OUR TAKE
1. Since 1999, the CCP has held 20 seminars (including the one on Jan. 11) for leading provincial and ministerial-level officials at the Central Party School virtually every year (with the exception of 2001, 2009, and 2020). Such seminars are aimed at explaining to senior CCP officials the major problems facing the regime and the major policy decisions and arrangements that Party Central wants implemented to address those problems. In short, Party Central seeks to “unify” the thinking of its senior cadres on the upcoming challenges and stir them to faithfully implement solutions proposed by the CCP leadership.
Xi Jinping has presided over seven Central Party School seminars for leading provincial and ministerial-level officials since taking office in 2012, and delivered keynote speeches at the opening of each seminar. In 2019, the theme of the seminar was “persevering with the bottom line in mind to guard against major risk,” and the 2021 theme is “implementing the spirit of the Fifth Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee.”
Xi’s speech embodies the CCP’s “survival-dominance” dynamic. This is best seen from his assessment that “opportunities and challenges [facing the CCP] are unprecedented but, all in all, the opportunities we face outweigh our challenges.”
2. By extolling his achievements since assuming office, Xi is attempting to legitimize his move to highly centralize power in his person, particularly after the 19th Party Congress in 2017. This is seen from his promotion of so-called “new development concept,” “high-quality development,” greater “opening up” and “structural reform,” as well as “socialist development” in China. Xi needs to “sell” his (questionable) achievements, “spin tragedy into cause for celebration” (喪事當喜事辦), and push “pie in the sky” (畫大餅) goals to convince the Party to keep following his leadership.
The CCP regime, however, has not changed in essence. China’s economy has severely deteriorated since Xi took office, with few signs of successful “high-quality development.” It is also debatable whether Beijing has truly liberalized the Chinese economy and financial markets; foreign companies get to become major shareholders in mainland joint ventures, but the CCP has concurrently rolled out laws, policies, and propaganda aimed at ensuring that the benefits of greater foreign capital inflows remain biased towards the regime, while preventing outflows if needed. In other words, Xi’s speech is echoes the same tune of his predecessors in that grandiose promises are given about the PRC’s future to give the Chinese people and foreigners new “goal posts” to aim for (Four Modernizations, “moderately prosperous society,” etc.), yet offer no guarantees about the delivery or execution of said promises. Businesses, investors, and governments need to separate Xi’s rhetoric from reality, and not be persuaded by the propaganda.
3. Xi is not being duplicitous in acknowledging the “unprecedented” challenges facing the CCP regime. We have repeatedly emphasized how the regime faces a “perfect storm” of problems, including a rapidly slowing economy, a debt crisis about to explode, food shortages, and another wave of the coronavirus.
Xi likely sees “unprecedented” opportunities and believes that “time and momentum” are on the CCP’s side in view of the outcome of the 2020 U.S. presidential election (see Di Dongsheng’s brag). Xi spun the CCP’s strategy of outlasting the Trump administration through “delaying and waiting for change” (以拖待變) as “conviction and resilience,” and will look to leverage on his “victory” over the U.S. to boost his “quan wei” in the Party.
However, Xi may not be out of the woods just yet. We previously wrote that “‘competition without confrontation’ under a Biden administration could also mean a discriminating policy that is tough towards Xi and less so towards the Party and ‘Chinese leaders who want China to play a constructive role in world affairs.’” Put another way, the pro-China elements in the West will likely shift their focus towards ousting Xi from office after disposing of President Donald Trump. Xi’s rivals will also continue to find opportunities to undermine his rule. Expect Xi to keep harping on “political security” in the regime and step up rectification of problematic government organs like the political and legal affairs apparatus.
SinoInsight 2
On Jan. 13, PRC state mouthpiece Xinhua reported on the construction of makeshift quarantine facilities in Zhengding County on the outskirts of Shijiazhuang City in Hebei Province to hold people designated for “centralized quarantine.” The quarantine facilities take up an area of 500 mu (about 33.33 hectares) and contain 3,000 makeshift shelters.
On Jan. 12, the Hebei provincial government convened an urgent press conference to announce the implementation of “total area lockdown management” (全域封閉管理) in the cities of Shijiazhuang, Xingtai, and Langfang, according to PRC state media. Under “total area lockdown management,” people and vehicles are forbidden from leaving their area unless absolutely necessary.
Residents of medium and high-risk areas in the three aforementioned cities are subject to even stricter containment measures. According to the Hebei government press conference, the residents of 15 villages with COVID cases (three of which have a high case count) have been transported away from their homes and placed in “centralized quarantine,” while the residents of five neighboring villages that reported no cases are being quarantined at home as a precaution.
Per a CCTV report on Jan. 11, over 20,000 residents from 12 villages in Zengcun Township, Gaocheng District, Shijiazhuang were being held in “centralized quarantine” in a hotel about 40 kilometers away from where they stayed. Buses were chartered to ferry the villagers to the hotel, and everyone onboard was required to wear masks and gloves. Villagers are prohibited from exiting their hotel room during quarantine, and will receive three meals a day, paid for by the government.
Mainland media also report that the Hebei provincial government has set up epidemic control checkpoints at railway stations, bus stations, major highway intersections, national and provincial highways, as well as at the provincial border. Additionally, travelers passing through Shijiazhuang and Xingtai are forbidden from entering Beijing.
According to official PRC data, over 28 million people have been placed under home quarantine as of Jan. 12. On the same day, scientists in Brazil say the Sinovac-produced CoronaVac vaccine only has an efficacy rate of 50.4 percent, far below the 78 percent previously touted. Presently, at least 10 countries have ordered 380 million doses of CoronaVac, but the vaccine has yet to be completely approved by regulatory agencies.
OUR TAKE
1. The lockdown of millions across China indicates the high threat level the new wave of coronavirus poses. The announcement of “total area lockdown management” in Hebei suggests that the COVID outbreak is particularly bad in the province neighboring Beijing, and the CCP desperately wants to stop the virus from threatening its leadership in the capital.
As we warned in our China 2021 Outlooks, the coronavirus situation “could worsen in China” but the CCP will “seek to cover up the truth and blame other countries for the epidemic situation on the mainland.” When the CCP “finally admits that the crisis is serious, the epidemic will likely be beyond its control.”
2. In our annual outlook, we also wrote that “China could see humanitarian crises stemming from food shortages and epidemics.”
The “centralized quarantine” of villages in Hebei Province foreshadows an upcoming humanitarian crisis. Should the CCP deem it necessary, protocol will be to simply bus entire populations off to “hotels” or other specially built “quarantine centers” on the pretext of stemming the spread of coronavirus. The Party will be exporting a version of its Xinjiang project to the rest of China, i.e. incarcerating millions of Chinese on health grounds, but without subjecting the bulk of them to brainwashing and torture (reserved for recalcitrant individuals who challenge “centralized quarantine”). The health conditions of those in “centralized quarantine” could rapidly deteriorate, given that COVID-19 spreads in close contact and in “poorly ventilated and enclosed spaces.” It is also unclear how long local governments can supply those held in “centralized quarantine” with three “free” meals a day and sufficient medical care, especially if epidemic conditions nosedive across the country and impact government purse strings and food reserves.
Chinese citizens under home quarantine may not fare much better than those in “centralized quarantine.” Last year, videos circulated on the internet showing government health workers welding doors shut to prevent people from leaving their homes. Food access is a concern the longer lockdowns continue.
3. The coin-toss efficacy rate of the CoronaVac vaccine does not bode well for it and other PRC-produced vaccines. Last week, a Shanghai vaccine expert declared the Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine the “most unsafe in the world,” with 73 side effects. We warned in our China 2021 Outlook that “China-produced vaccines may have serious quality defects, leaving those vaccinated susceptible to the coronavirus.”
Having vaccines with unassuring efficacy rates or that are straight up faulty leaves Beijing with less ammunition to deal with the latest coronavirus wave. The CCP regime could import safer and more effective vaccines from the U.S. and elsewhere, but risks losing “face” and finances in the process. Meanwhile, countries purchasing PRC vaccines are exposing themselves to significant risks as new COVID strains spread throughout the world.
