SinoInsight 1
‘Zero-COVID’ policy and propaganda
Dec. 5
1. Reuters reported that the PRC may announce 10 new measures to ease COVID-19 restrictions as early as Dec. 7, citing sources familiar with the matter. The 10 new measures will supplement the 20 measures that were rolled out in November.
Reuters also reported that the PRC could downgrade COVID-19 to Category B or even Category C management, citing a comment by an unidentified expert to mainland media Yicai Global. China has been managing COVID-19 under Category A protocols since January 2020 even though the virus is classified as a Category B infectious disease.
2. State mouthpiece Xinhua published a commentary titled “Optimizing Prevention and Control Measures to Build Confidence in Defending Against the Epidemic” (優化防控措施 樹立抗疫自信).
The commentary led off by noting that the PRC faces “new situations and new tasks” in epidemic prevention and control given the “weakening” pathogenic nature of Omicron, the “universalization” of vaccination (i.e. higher vaccination rate), and the regime’s “accumulation of experience in epidemic prevention and control.”
The commentary then defended the CCP’s “zero-COVID” policy, noting that the past three years provided “full proof” that the “epidemic prevention and control guidelines and policies determined by Party Central are correct, scientific, and effective.” As a result, “China became the country with the lowest incidence of COVID-19 and had the lowest number of deaths among major countries in the world.”
However, the commentary noted that the pandemic was not yet over, quoting World Health Organization Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus’s Dec. 2 statement, “We are much closer to being able to say that the emergency phase of the pandemic is over — but we’re not there yet.”
Previously on Dec. 1, Xinhua issued three commentaries to explain why Beijing was easing “zero-COVID.” The titles of the articles are:
- “Quickly Lockdown and Quickly Lift Them; Solve as Much as Can Be Solved” (快封快解 應解盡解)
- “In Fighting the Epidemic, We Must Help Disadvantaged Groups Survive” (抗疫,要幫特殊人群兜住底)
- “In Fighting the Epidemic, Everyone is an Important Link in China, and the Chain Cannot Be Dropped” (抗疫, 每個人都是重要一環, 不能掉鍊子)
3. Tong Zhaohui, a respiratory expert and vice-president of the Beijing Chaoyang Hospital, said in a news briefing that “international and domestic monitoring” confirmed that the “virulence and pathogenicity of the Omicron variant and its evolutionary branches are significantly reduced compared with the original COVID-19 strain and Delta variants,” according to state media.
Tong added, “Compared with the 2009 global influenza pandemic, the proportion of Omicron variant causing pneumonia or severe or critical illness is relatively low.”
Dec. 6
Xinhua reported that many Chinese cities, including Beijing and Shanghai, had made adjustments to their epidemic prevention and control measures, including:
- Negative nucleic acid test certificates are no longer required for taking public transportation or entering and leaving some public places.
- Many places no longer carry out “normalized” nucleic acid testing.
- Medical institutions are forbidden from refusing to diagnose patients without a negative nucleic acid test certificate. People are also no longer required to register their names to purchase medicine.
Dec. 7
The PRC’s Joint Prevention and Control Mechanism Comprehensive Team issued a notice on “further optimizing and implementing COVID-19 prevention and control measures” (關於進一步優化落實新冠肺炎疫情防控措施的通知).
The notice urged all “relevant departments” in the localities to “further improve their political position, unify their thinking and actions with Party Central’s decisions and deployments, adhere to the ninth version of CCP’s epidemic prevention and control plan, implement the 20 optimization measures,” and implement the requirements of this notice. The notice also emphasized that officials must “resolutely correct” negative practices such as “simplification,” “taking excessive policy steps,” or resorting to “one-size-fits-all” approaches.
The notice further instructed officials to “minimize the impact of the epidemic on economic and social development to the greatest extent possible.” The notice did not mention certain oft-repeated slogans like “adhere to dynamic zero-COVID.”
The notice introduced 10 new “optimization” measures:
- Delineate high-risk areas by buildings, units, floors, and households. High-risk areas should not be arbitrarily expanded, and all forms of temporary blockades shall not be adopted.
- Mass nucleic acid testing shall not be carried out according to administrative regions. With the exception of special areas, negative nucleic acid test certificates and health codes are no longer required for entry. People traveling between regions no longer need to produce negative tests or health codes, and landing inspections will no longer be carried out.
- Those with asymptomatic and mild cases can isolate at home or voluntarily isolate themselves at centralized quarantine facilities.
- High-risk areas should be “locked down and unlocked quickly” (快封快解).
- Pharmacies around the country must operate normally and shall not close arbitrarily. The online and offline purchase of over-the-counter medication to treat fever, coughs, colds, etc. shall not be restricted.
- COVID-19 vaccination rates among the elderly should be increased.
- Health status investigation and classified management of key populations are to be strengthened (i.e. epidemic prevention and control measures ought to be tailored to the needs of different segments of the population, such as the elderly and those suffering from chronic illnesses).
- Non-high-risk areas shall not restrict the flow of people, and shall not suspend work, production or businesses. Personnel who are essential for basic medical services and normal social functions are to be “white-listed” under epidemic management (i.e. allowed to move around more freely).
- The blocking of fire exits, building doors, and community doors are strictly forbidden. This is to ensure that the public can access medical treatment and make emergency escapes.
- Schools without cases should carry out regular offline teaching activities, and campus venues should be open as normal. Teaching activities and living order should continue per normal in the non-risk areas of schools with cases.
Official acknowledgment of anti-lockdown protests
Dec. 2
The Wall Street Journal reported that Xi Jinping told European Council President Charles Michel in their three-hour meeting in Beijing on Dec. 1 that the protests that broke out from Nov. 25 to Nov. 28 “were mainly by students and the result of frustration about three years of COVID-related restrictions,” citing people familiar with the situation. Xi also said that the Omicron strain “appears less deadly than earlier iterations, such as Delta.”
A European official said that the discussion about the protests came about when Michel asked Xi about his COVID control measures and “pleaded for the use of vaccines.”
Dec. 3
The CCP Youth League wrote in a post on its official WeChat account that “in the past few days, there have been quite a lot of opinions about local epidemic controls.” The post added that “the incident has initially subsided through prompt communication and improvements” and that the swift response and changes in policy showed a level of response by Party leaders that would not be possible anywhere else in the world.
The Wall Street Journal observed that the Youth League’s post may be the “first official admission of flaws in the zero-COVID policy personally endorsed by leader Xi Jinping.”
Protests and more local policy confusion
Dec. 4
About a hundred students from Wuhan University gathered outside the school’s administrative building for a chat with the university’s leading official on a range of topics, including whether they could voluntarily return to their hometowns instead of remaining on campus (the campus was under lockdown after a student was tested positive), options for attending classes and taking examinations off campus, the gradual reopening of school facilities, and not holding students accountable for certain issues. After terms were agreed upon and an announcement was made on the school’s official website, the students gathered outside the administrative building slowly dispersed.
According to mainland media reports, many institutions of higher learning in the provinces of Henan, Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning, and Fujian had issued notices regarding the adjustment of winter vacation time “according to the epidemic prevention and control situation, as well as the wishes and needs of the teachers and students.”
Dec. 5
1. Radio Free Asia reported that Shanghai, Guangzhou, Chongqing, Chengdu, and several other localities announced on Dec. 1 that they would be loosening some lockdown measures, including only sealing off infected individuals in their home and closing some “fangcang” makeshift hospitals.
Concurrently, Shandong Province and some other areas continued to implement strict lockdowns, including sealing entire residential areas, requiring health codes to access public toilets, and constructing more “fangcang” hospitals.
2. Students at Nanjing Tech University held a protest gathering to request that students be allowed to return home voluntarily instead of remaining on campus, which was placed on lockdown, according to overseas Chinese language media reports. After some school staff tried to move in to break up the protest, some students yelled, “If you touch us, there’ll be a second Foxconn,” a reference to social disturbances and violence at the Foxconn factory in Zhengzhou.
OUR TAKE
1. Beijing’s continued easing of “zero-COVID” affirms our observation in early October (see here and here) that Xi Jinping will do so after consolidating power at the 20th Party Congress. The Xi leadership’s appeal to “science” (Omicron being less pathogenic, higher vaccination rate, etc.) in justifying the relaxation of epidemic prevention and control measures also aligns with our previous analysis.
We also correctly anticipated that Xi’s effort to move away from “zero-COVID” would be stymied by systemic problems and the officialdom’s adherence to Party culture-derived habits (health codes required to enter bathrooms in some areas versus the closing of “fangcang” hospitals in other areas).
Businesses, investors, and governments should not be overly optimistic about Beijing’s determination to exit “zero-COVID” and plan for China’s quick (within a year) return to relative normality. As long as “zero-COVID” is not officially scrapped, “local officials are prone to the ‘cobra effect’ where they find ways to perpetually fight ‘outbreaks’ (working with local testing companies to fake results, etc.) and justify to the central government their decision to be “unwavering” in maintaining lockdowns instead of gradually relaxing ‘zero-COVID.’” Further, the PRC healthcare system is at risk of being overburdened following the rise in cases as epidemic controls are loosened, as well as more people visiting hospitals for ailments other than COVID-19.
A vicious cycle could emerge where Beijing is forced to alternate between relaxing and tightening epidemic restrictions, causing more policy confusion in the localities, the volatile build-up of social anger, and greater political instability in the PRC.
2. Xi may have long planned to move away from “zero-COVID” at this time and is following a prearranged schedule. However, the occurrence of the “blank paper revolution” and the PRC’s own subtle acknowledgment (Xi’s remarks to European Council president Charles Michel and the CCP Youth League’s Dec. 3 Weibo post) that the protests were triggered by three years of pent-up frustrations will deepen the popular perception that Beijing is accelerating the “optimization” of epidemic prevention and control measures because the Chinese people took to the streets. This perception could inspire more anti-lockdown and anti-regime protests in China, as well as embolden the United States and its allies to praise and encourage Chinese demonstrators as they look to put pressure on Xi and the CCP. Meanwhile, the “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” coalition on the mainland and abroad could accelerate their plans to marginalize or oust Xi Jinping by leveraging and even instigating social turmoil in China.
3. The Xi leadership is caught between a rock and a hard place in dealing with protests, potential protests, and student demands. Its basic dilemma is as follows: On the one hand, clamping down hard on the people could stop some protests, but could trigger greater nationwide social turbulence. On the other hand, tolerating some protests and giving up some ground could appease some areas, but risks encouraging more demands from the people and starting a prairie fire that ultimately results in regime collapse.
Currently, local officials are giving ground to students as they look to avoid having to deal with incidents similar to what happened at the Zhengzhou Foxconn campus. Giving ground, however, does not mean that the students are off the hook; the CCP has a tendency to show “clemency” first to relieve social pressure before settling scores at a later date. But if officials give ground on too many occasions, they and the CCP risk losing “quan wei” (authority and prestige) while emboldening students and protesters to make greater demands of them.
Meanwhile, the local authorities have somewhat suppressed the “blank paper revolution” by stepping up police presence and seeking out “protest leaders.” Yet the authorities can only maintain elevated “stability maintenance” measures for so long given the high costs of doing so. Local “stability maintenance” apparatuses could quickly become overwhelmed with the lifting of “zero-COVID” restrictions and as more people decide to take to the streets to make various demands regarding lockdown and non-lockdown matters.
4. It cannot be ruled out that Beijing’s effort to ease off on “zero-COVID” could lead to a period of “false prosperity” as investors anticipating a rebound “buy the dip” and businesses become more bullish about China’s prospects. However, businesses, investors, and governments must be aware that the PRC still faces several intractable crises, including with the economy, the real estate sector, a population time bomb, and reduced demand as a global recession looms.
For example, CNBC reported that U.S. manufacturing orders in China are down 40 percent, with Chinese factories expected to shut down two weeks earlier than usual for the Lunar New Year over the decreased orders. On Dec. 7, the National Bureau of Statistics reported that exports contracted 8.7 percent in November from a year ago, the worst performance since February 2020 and well below analysts’ expectations of a 3.5 percent decline.
On the demographic front, the number of deaths in China (5.31 million) exceeded births (5.23 million) in the first half of the year according to mainland media reports, a first in the PRC’s recorded history. Mainland media also reported on Dec. 2 that there were just 7.643 million marriage registrations (involving roughly 15.28 million people) for 2022 thus far, the first time since 2003 that the number of marriages fell below the 8 million mark. Also, the number of individuals registering their first-ever marriages in China fell below 12 million for the first time in 2021, a 51 percent drop from the peak in 2013.
As China’s prospects dim, more mainland Chinese (particularly the wealthier classes) and foreign companies could opt to “vote with their feet.” Chinese who cannot leave could become more prone to protest. Growing social instability in China would in turn deter foreign investors and increase the sense of pessimism about the PRC’s future, creating another vicious cycle.
SinoInsight 2
Dec. 5
1. Xinhua reported that the remains of Jiang Zemin were cremated at the Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing. Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Han Zheng, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, Li Xi, Wang Qishan, and former Party boss Hu Jintao went to the PLA General Hospital to pay their last respects to Jiang before escorting his body to the cemetery for cremation. Xinhua also mentioned that other active and retired senior officials from the central government, as well as Jiang’s friends and relatives, were present at the ceremony to send Jiang off.
Footage from state broadcaster CCTV showed black-clad military, domestic security, and government personnel with white flowers lining up on both sides of the road from the PLA General Hospital to Babaoshan Cemetery. Some curious onlookers were also spotted in the crowd.
After Jiang’s hearse entered Babaoshan Cemetery, Xi, other senior officials, and Jiang’s relatives “bid farewell forever to Jiang” in the cemetery’s auditorium, according to Xinhua.
2. Yuan Hongbing, an Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist with channels to CCP insiders, revealed information obtained from “people of conscience in the Party” about the Xi-Jiang factional struggle around the period of Jiang’s death in an interview with Kanzhongguo, the Chinese-language edition of Vision Times:
- Jiang was brain-dead on Nov. 13, 2022, but the CCP kept this a secret. Later, Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong produced a pre-written eulogy for Jiang’s wife Wang Yeping and his eldest son Jiang Mianheng to attach their names to and submit to the central government. Wang and the younger Jiang also threatened that if the official eulogy for Jiang Zemin did not follow the contents of what they had written, then Jiang’s family, relatives and friends would hold funeral and memorial services for him on their own. According to Yuan, this represented a counterattack by the Jiang faction remnant and was a “decisive political challenge to Xi Jinping.”
- Xi was reportedly incensed at Zeng Qinghong’s move and called an urgent meeting of the Politburo Standing Committee to discuss whether or not to publicly criticize Jiang Zemin’s “political line.” Yuan said that Xi had been preparing to openly denounce Jiang and had prepared the relevant documents, but just needed the right political opportunity.
- During the urgent meeting, new Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi was in favor of “completely squeezing the abscess that is Jiang Zemin.” New Central Military Commission vice chairman He Weidong was also firmly in favor of carrying out a comprehensive purge of the Jiang faction both politically and economically.
- The “blank paper revolution” that broke out after the Urumqi fire incident, however, left Xi in a precarious situation. To block the remnant Jiang faction from seizing the opportunity to strike and cause a subversive political crisis, Xi had no choice but to agree to Wang Yeping and Jiang Mianheng’s “request” (that was masterminded by Zeng Qinghong) and promised to give Jiang Zemin a state funeral with the highest courtesy.
- The Beijing officialdom is predicting that Xi Jinping plans to purge the Jiang clan and the Jiang faction remnant (including Zeng Qinghong) using the anti-corruption campaign after the “blank paper revolution” crisis subsides.
Dec. 6
A memorial meeting for Jiang Zemin was held in the Great Hall of the People. About 5,000 people attended the meeting, including those from the various central government organs. The meeting was also broadcast live on television, radio, and online news portals.
Xi Jinping delivered a eulogy for Jiang that was based on his official obituary. For instance, Xi described Jiang as an “outstanding leader enjoying high prestige acknowledged by the whole Party, the entire military and the Chinese people of all ethnic groups, a great Marxist, a great proletarian revolutionary, statesman, military strategist and diplomat, a long-tested communist fighter, and an outstanding leader of the great cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” He added that Jiang “was the core of the Party’s third generation of central collective leadership and the principal founder of the theory of three represents.”
Xi also sought to channel his praises for Jiang toward supporting his own political theories and legitimacy. For instance, Xi said that Party Central “calls on the whole Party, the entire military and the people of all ethnic groups to turn grief into strength, carry forward Comrade Jiang Zemin’s legacy, mourn his passing with concrete actions, and write new chapters in the development of the cause of the Party and the country on the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.” This includes “enhancing the four consciousnesses, reinforcing the four self-confidences, and ensuring the two safeguards,” as well as carrying forward the “great founding spirit of the Party, stay true to our founding mission, have the courage to advance self-reform, and see that the Party always serves as the strong leadership core in the course of upholding and developing socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.”
OUR TAKE
1. Xi Jinping and other senior officials held a ceremony to pay last respects to Jiang Zemin’s remains despite the “No. 2 Announcement” of the “Comrade Jiang Zemin Funeral Committee” published on Dec. 1 stating that no ceremony would be held. We see several possible reasons for this; the reasons may overlap or be mutually exclusive.
First, Xi holding the ceremony affirms our earlier analysis of his present political strength after the 20th Party Congress. Instead of being “totally dominant” as many observers believe, Xi still needs time to consolidate his gains and purge his remaining factional enemies from the regime.
Second, Xi could have reconsidered his previous stance on holding the last respects ceremony after weighing his present need to maintain intra-Party “consensus” and “unity” during the current sensitive period. Beijing is in the midst of further easing “zero-COVID” and dealing with growing social instability over the lockdowns. While the Xi leadership has indicated that more “rectifications” are ahead, recent developments, including Jiang’s death, could have forced Beijing to tweak its priorities.
Third, Xi could have received strong pushback from the Jiang faction over his unwillingness to give the Party’s third “core” leader a final farewell at least on the same scale as that arranged for Deng Xiaoping. If so, then this indicates that the Jiang faction still retains substantial influence and Xi is concerned that his enemies could cause serious trouble for him at a time when public anger towards the Xi leadership and the CCP is overflowing.
Meanwhile, Xi may have given ground to the Jiang faction by holding the last respects ceremony, but he certainly took efforts to ensure that they could not hog the limelight. Photos of the send-off mainly featured Xi and his senior officials, with only the few lingering Jiang faction members in the top leadership receiving any airtime. Xi also appeared to have heavily controlled the surroundings of the hospital and the cemetery, as well as the road between them, to prevent unwanted incidents.
2. Official reporting and footage of the last respects ceremony for Jiang Zemin showed that very few people looked like they were truly from “all walks of life” as the CCP claimed showed up to mourn him. In contrast, state media had reported that over 100,000 people from “all walks of life” lined the two-kilometer street from the PLA General Hospital to Babaoshan Cemetery to send off Deng Xiaoping when he died in 1997. Despite having ordered the Tiananmen Square Massacre, Deng had many genuine supporters because he rehabilitated many victims of the Cultural Revolution and oversaw significant improvement in the people’s lives with his “reform and opening up” policy.
Unless Xi Jinping heavily ramped up security and “zero-COVID” measures in the area to the point where hardly anyone could approach the ceremony, the lack of grassroots support for Jiang at his death is a reflection of his unpopularity. As we noted previously, many Chinese appreciate that China appeared to be relatively more open under Jiang (though not dissidents or victims of the Jiang leadership), but remember him for also having “ruled the country through corruption,” ruthlessly cracked down on those who challenged the CCP’s authority or persecuted religious minorities like Falun Gong and house Christians, being a “national traitor” and selling out national interests, womanizing, and acting in a clownish manner on his trips abroad. As such, there were reports of people in several parts of China setting off fireworks in celebration in July 2011 after it was incorrectly reported by some overseas Chinese language media at the time that Jiang had passed away.
3. Hu Jintao’s appearance at Jiang’s last respects ceremony affirms our assessment that he had not been purged when he was escorted out of the closing ceremony of the 20th Party Congress (see here and here).
Hu and some other Party elders did not attend the memorial meeting on Dec. 6 because “they could not stand up for that long, given their age,” an official source told the South China Morning Post. We see no reason to dispute this account.
4. Xi’s eulogy for Jiang at the memorial meeting undercuts his laying the groundwork to denounce the latter’s “incorrect political line” at the 20th Party Congress and after. Notably, Xi said in his work report that “a number of prominent issues and problems — some of which had been building for years and others which were just emerging” had occurred under his predecessors and demanded “ urgent action.” Xi is also greatly weakening the arguments made in a Nov. 16 Qiushi about how he overcame many “contradictions and problems” during his decade in charge that are implicitly linked to the Jiang faction, and in doing so, “turned the tide” and “prevented structural collapse” of the regime.
Having lavished high praise on Jiang, “validated” his theory, and “affirmed” his legacy, Xi will find it exceedingly difficult to criticize his chief political rival without also negating his own “achievements.” However, Xi still kept the “Falun Gong card” in play by making no mention of Jiang’s top negative political legacy in the eulogy, just as in the obituary. That being said, Xi will end up “owning” the persecution of Falun Gong and all of Jiang’s negative legacies unless he publicly censures the latter.
The “anti-Xi coalition” in China and abroad could take advantage of Xi’s “affirmation” of Jiang and step up efforts in the near future to blame Xi for all of the CCP’s evils. We previously outlined how Jiang faction number two Zeng Qinghong could potentially take advantage of anti-Xi sentiment and work with international interests to oust Xi and even dissolve the CCP regime in favor of establishing a Russia-style authoritarian “democracy.” Yuan Hongbing’s insider information suggests that the “anti-Xi coalition” could have played a role in fermenting or escalating the “blank paper revolution,” and will likely seek to turn growing social anger in China against the Xi leadership going forward.
5. Yuan Hongbing’s information of the Xi-Jiang struggle around the time of Jiang Zemin’s death mostly aligns with our assessment of Xi’s present political strength and the Jiang faction’s outsized influence. Assuming Yuan’s information is accurate, Xi’s personal political risks have increased rather than decreased with Jiang’s passing. Black Swans and Gray Rhinos loom in the horizon should intra-Party struggle intensify as the many crises facing the PRC worsen and compound.
Xi now stands at history’s crossroads. He can choose to preserve Jiang’s legacy with the goal of preserving the Party, but must be ready to suffer the consequences as people in China and abroad increasingly demand accountability from him. Alternatively, Xi can opt to salvage his own legacy by denouncing Jiang, righting historical wrongs, dismantling the Party and its ideology, and genuinely moving China into a new era.
Regardless of the choice Xi’s makes, businesses, investors, and governments should prepare for greater political destabilization in the PRC as the economy and the social situation deteriorates and factional struggle in the Party elite comes to a head.
