SinoInsight 1
1. Liao Guoxun, mayor of Tianjin City, “tragically passed away at the age of 59” on April 27 due to “a sudden illness and a failure to rescue him,” according to local official media Tianjin Daily.
According to information circulating on Chinese social media, Liao reportedly hanged himself in his office and his city government secretary-general attempted suicide several days early by taking sleeping pills. Liao reportedly committed suicide because his corruption in Guizhou, where he had served for the bulk of his career, was uncovered, and his cronies were being investigated.
Analysis: Liao Guoxun’s career trajectory indicates that he was well-regarded by the Xi Jinping camp and was being groomed for higher office. In analyzing Liao’s promotion to Tianjin deputy Party secretary and mayor in September 2020, we noted that he is a former subordinate of Li Zhanshu, a close ally of Xi’s. We also noted in early April that Liao could replace Li Hongzhong as Tianjin Party secretary or be transferred to another province to serve as Party boss. Liao’s untimely death would affect Xi’s 20th Party Congress personnel arrangements, and if it was a suicide, would somewhat tarnish the Xi camp.
It is unclear if the information circulating about Liao Guoxun’s corruption in Guizhou is accurate, but it would not be unlikely given the prevalence of corruption in the CCP officialdom. If Liao was indeed investigated, the new Guizhou anti-corruption chief could have something to do with it. Li Yuanping, the former Gansu Organization Department chief, was transferred to Guizhou in December 2021 to serve as provincial Discipline Inspection Committee secretary and a Standing Committee member of the Guizhou Party Committee. In January 2022, Li was appointed director of the Guizhou Supervisory Commission.
It is possible that Li Yuanping opened an investigation into Liao Guoxun to quickly stamp his authority and accrue political achievements. It is also possible that the investigation into Liao was the result of factional struggle; enemies of Liao and Xi Jinping could have handed “evidence” (real or fake) of Liao’s corruption to Li shortly after the latter took office, prompting an investigation.
2. The 13th Guizhou Provincial Party Committee held its first plenary meeting in Guiyang City. During the meeting, Shen Yiqin (age 63, female) was re-elected as Guizhou Party secretary, Li Bingjun (59) and Shi Guanghui (55) were elected as deputy Party secretaries, and nine cadres were elected as members of the Guizhou Party Committee.
April 29
1. The first plenary meeting of the 8th Hainan Provincial Party Committee re-elected Shen Xiaoming (59) as Party secretary, Feng Fei (60) and Xu Qifang (57) as deputy Party secretaries, and nine cadres to the Hainan Party Committee.
2. Xu Ruisheng (60), vice governor of Guangdong Province, resigned. Xu was earlier elected as vice chairman of the Guangdong Provincial Political Consultative Conference in January 2022.
April 30
Sun Shaocheng (62), Ministry of Veterans Affairs head, was promoted to Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region Party secretary. The official personnel reshuffle notice said that outgoing Party secretary Shi Taifeng (66) was “reassigned” (另有任用) without providing further details.
OUR TAKE
The personnel movement in Guizhou and Hainan follows Xi Jinping’s reshuffling “rules” and hints at some future personnel arrangements at the 20th Party Congress.
Shen Yiqin
Shen Yiqin, the re-elected Guizhou Party secretary, is a full member of the 19th Central Committee and was previously an alternate member of the 17th and 18th Central Committee.
Shen is a Guizhou local official and spent the bulk of her career undertaking Party affairs and political work. She formerly served as Guizhou’s provincial propaganda chief (May 2007 to May 2012), vice governor (May 2012 to April 2015; was in charge of government executive affairs work), and provincial Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary (April 2015 to April 2017). Shen was made acting Guizhou governor in September 2017 before the 19th Party Congress before becoming governor, and was elevated to provincial Party secretary in November 2020.
Shen Yiqin served under close Xi ally Li Zhanshu (August 2010 to July 2012), Xi ally Zhao Kezhi (July 2012 to July 2015), and Chen Min’er (July 2015 to July 2017) when the latter three were Party bosses of Guizhou. Shen was likely appointed as Guizhou Party secretary in 2020 and re-appointed recently at their recommendation. Barring unforeseen circumstances, Shen appears to be primed to join the Politburo at the 20th Party Congress and could replace Sun Chunlan as the second-rank vice premier.
Li Bingjun
Li Bingjun, Guizhou deputy Party secretary and governor, served in secretarial positions in the State Council General Office for 22 years before Xi Jinping became General Secretary. Li was the director of then-PRC premier Zhu Rongji’s office in November 2000, and eventually became a deputy ministerial-level secretary in the State Council General Office (September 2007 to July 2013).
Li’s relative lack of career progression during the Jiang-Hu era appeared to be what Xi was looking out for as he looked to avoid elevating or grooming officials with strong factional associations and nurture cadres who would be loyal to him. Li was sent to the provinces (Jiangxi) to gain governing experience in preparation for higher office, and in June 2018, was appointed deputy Party secretary of Jiangxi Province and Party secretary of Ganzhou City. In November 2020, Li was transferred to Guizhou and promoted, serving as provincial deputy Party secretary, deputy governor, and acting governor; Li became full governor in January 2022.
Shen Xiaoming
Shen Xiaoming, the re-elected Hainan Party secretary, served in leadership positions in the Shanghai Jiao Tong University School of Medicine (formerly Shanghai Second Medical University) and its related hospitals, as well as the Shanghai Education Committee, in his formative years. He later served as Shanghai deputy mayor (January 2008 to June 2013), director of Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park management committee (January 2008 to May 2013), Standing Committee member of the Shanghai municipal Party Committee (June 2013 to September 2016), Party secretary of Pudong District (May 2013 to September 2016), and director of Shanghai Free-Trade Zone management committee (April 2015 to September 2016).
Shen’s vigorous promotion of reforms as Shanghai Free-Trade Zone director is likely a factor behind the Xi camp’s decision to elevate him to important positions. The Xi leadership sought to pilot market economy and financial reform in the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone and eventually export successful reforms to other parts of China to break the financial and economic monopoly of the Jiang faction and other influential Party elites. However, the Li Keqiang-led efforts were blocked by pro-Jiang faction local officials and bureaucrats, leading Li to slam his fist on his desk in frustration and boycott the official opening of the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone in September 2013. Ai Baojun, the Shanghai Free-Trade Zone director before Shen Xiaoming and Shanghai deputy mayor, would only be placed under investigation in November 2015, or months after the Jiang faction’s “financial coup” in mid-2015. Shen was named Shanghai Free-Trade Zone director in March 2015 before the official investigation of Ai, and free-trade zone reforms would be more significantly advanced after Xi Jinping consolidated control over the military in 2016.
After Shanghai, Shen Xiaoming would serve as deputy education minister for less than a year before being transferred to Hainan to become provincial deputy Party secretary, acting governor and full governor (March 2017 to December 2020). At the 19th Party Congress in October 2017, Shen was made a full member of the Central Committee. In December 2020, he was promoted to Hainan Party secretary.
Feng Fei
Feng Fei, Hainan deputy Party secretary and governor, holds a Ph.D. in engineering. Feng’s official career marks him as a technocrat with no obvious factional associations, and appeared to be groomed for higher office by a factionless Xi looking to build a power base.
Feng spent his first 21 years as an official in the Industrial Economics Research Department of the State Council’s Development Research Center (October 1993 to January 2014), eventually rising to department head (division bureau level). After Xi took office, Feng was transferred to the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to serve as director of the ministry’s Industrial Policy Department (January 2014 to October 2015), and was promoted to deputy minister less than two years later (October 2015 to August 2016). Feng was then dispatched to the provinces to gain experience, becoming vice governor of Zhejiang and a Standing Committee member of the provincial Party Committee (August 2016 to November 2020). In November 2020, Feng was promoted to Hainan deputy Party secretary, and also served as deputy governor and acting governor. In January 2022, Feng Fei officially became Hainan governor.
Sun Shaocheng
Sun Shaocheng’s career trajectory marks him as an official whose faster promotion during the Xi era is linked to his slow climb up the ranks during the Jiang-Hu era.
Sun served in the Ministry of Civil Affairs for 28 years (July 1984 to August 2012), and spent about three years as a deputy minister. While he was at the ministry, Sun also was a member of the Central Guidance Commission on Building Spiritual Civilization (September 2009 to December 2010) and a member of the National Defense Mobilization Commission (November 2011 to June 2013).
Before the 18th Party Congress, Sun was transferred to the provinces to gain experience. He served as deputy governor of Shandong Province (August 2012 to September 2014), and later Shanxi provincial United Front Work Department head (September 2014 to November 2016) and deputy governor (November 2016 to February 2017). Sun was then transferred back to the Ministry of Civil Affairs to serve as a deputy minister (February 2017 to May 2017) before transferring to the Ministry of Land and Resources to serve as Party secretary and deputy minister (May 2017 to March 2018).
Sun Shaocheng became a full member of the 19th Central Committee at the 19th Party Congress and was promoted to minister of the newly created Ministry of Veterans Affairs after the implementation of state and Party institutional reforms in March 2018.
Shi Taifeng
Shi Taifeng launched the Inner Mongolia “20-year retroactive investigations” in January 2020, or a few months after he was transferred from Ningxia to serve as Inner Mongolia Party secretary. Those investigations would have helped advance the Xi leadership’s effort to clean up corruption in the CCP officialdom, and possibly put on notice Xi’s factional rivals or challengers like Hu Chunhua and Liu Yunshan.
The announcement that Shi is being “reassigned” from Inner Mongolia indicates that he is primed for further career progression rather than retirement. Like Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director Xia Baolong, Shi Taifeng could serve as a vice chairman in the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, or a National People’s Congress vice chairman, and become a national-level leader.
SinoInsight 2
Weijian Shan, founder and chair of PAG, criticized the PRC government for policies that have led to a “deep financial crisis,” according to a Financial Times report.
“We think the Chinese economy at this moment is in the worst shape in the past 30 years,” Shan said during a meeting. “The market sentiment towards Chinese stocks is also at the lowest point in the past 30 years. I also think popular discontent in China is at the highest point in the past 30 years.”
Shan added that large parts of the Chinese economy had been “semi-paralyzed” by “zero-COVID” policies, which he described as “draconian,” and the impact on the economy would be “profound.” He said, “China feels to us like the US and Europe in 2008. While we remain long-term confident in China’s growth and market potentials, we are very cautious towards China markets.”
Shan said that PAG, which manages more than $50 billion, had diversified away from China and was being “extremely careful” about its China portfolio. PAG is one of Asia’s biggest private equity managers.
Weijian Shan was formerly co-managing partner of private equity group TPG Capital Asia and led JPMorgan’s China team. He founded PAG in 2010, and served on the boards of Bank of China Hong Kong, Baosteel, and Lenovo. Earlier in 2020, Shan joined the board of Alibaba as an independent director.
April 29
1. Xi Jinping presided over a Politburo meeting to analyze and study the present economic situation and economic work, as well as review the 14th Five-Year Plan’s national talent development program.
Official media reporting of the meeting praised Xi’s political “achievements.” All regions and departments were said to have “effectively coordinated epidemic prevention and control” and “economic and social development” under the “strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” in the face of “the complex and overlapping situation of major changes unseen in a century and the pandemic.” The “Xi core” also saw that China’s economic operations “achieved a stable start on the whole,” and the successful holding of the Beijing Winter Olympics and Paralympics. “Those achievements are hard-won,” official mainland media said.
The meeting noted the various crises and challenges facing the PRC, including domestic epidemic outbreaks and the Russia-Ukraine war creating “increased risks and challenges.” China’s “economic development environment” sees rising “complexity, severity, and uncertainty,” while stabilizing growth, employment, and prices face “new challenges.”
The meeting made “important decisions and deployments” and “released important signals” on policies pertaining to the “current epidemic prevention and control policy, macroeconomics, real estate, the internet platform economy, and capital markets,” including:
- Persevere in “dynamic zero-COVID.” The meeting stressed the “clear requirements” of Party Central to “prevent the epidemic, stabilize the economy, and make development safe.”
- Step up macroeconomic policy adjustment to stabilize the economy.
- Implement policies such as tax rebates, tax cuts and fee reductions, and make good use of various monetary policy tools.
- Quickly plan incremental policy tools and step up the degree of control according to timing.
- Comprehensively strengthen infrastructure construction.
- Give play to the leading role of consumption in the economic cycle.
- Stabilize market entities and implement a package of relief and assistance policies.
- Do a good job in ensuring energy supply and stabilizing prices.
- Protect and improve people’s lives, stabilize and expand employment, do a good job organizing the supply of important livelihood commodities, and guarantee the operation of core urban functions.
- Ensure the smooth flow of transportation and logistics, as well as ensure the normal operation of key industrial chains and supply chains, anti-epidemic and supply chain enterprises, and key infrastructure.
- Adhere to the position that houses are for living, not speculation, support localities in improving real estate policies based on local realities, support “rigid” (剛性, i.e. buying a home to get married) and “improving” (改善性, i.e. upgrading to better property) housing demand, and optimize the supervision of pre-sale funds for commercial housing.
- Steadily promote the reform of the stock issuance registration system to maintain the stable operation of capital markets.
- Introduce specific measures to support the standardized and healthy development of the platform economy.
- Stabilize the fundamentals of foreign trade and foreign investment.
Companies invited to the symposium include Alibaba Group, Tencent Holdings, Meituan, and TikTok. The authorities’ key message to the companies is that the state wants them to “grow and play a role in Beijing’s efforts to bolster an economy battered by Covid-19 controls, such as through the distribution of consumption vouchers.” A joint regulatory meeting is also set to be convened to “pull regulators on the same page regarding Beijing’s new decision to ease aggressive actions.”
Analysis: SCMP’s information is an indirect sign that Beijing is very concerned about capital outflows, which are partly motivated by the political risks associated with tech sector crackdowns. By signaling an end to crackdowns, Beijing is encouraging foreign investors to keep and increase their investments in Chinese tech. Beijing is also likely concerned about mass layoffs in the tech sector, and is looking to support tech companies and reverse the situation.
That being said, the Xi leadership will likely press on in “rectifying” individuals in the tech sector whom it believes to be problematic, including those involved in factional struggle. The Xi leadership will also likely continue to tackle “disorderly expansion of capital” in the tech sector, but could endeavor to find ways of doing so without causing unnecessary alarm and to limit the impact on the economy.
3. Mainland media reported that China’s three major A-share indexes rose sharply in light of the Politburo meeting. At the close, the Shanghai Composite Index grew 2.41 percent to 3,047.06 points, the Shenzhen Component Index gained 3.69 percent to 11,021.43 points, and the ChiNext Index was up 4.11 percent to 2,319.14 points. Inflows of northbound funds also accelerated in the afternoon, resulting in net inflows of 4.246 billion yuan for the day; this is after nearly 2.5 billion yuan in net outflows in the morning.
Chinese tech stocks also rallied in Hong Kong, with Alibaba up 14.1 percent, Tencent up 10.1 percent, and Meituan up 13.7 percent. The Hang Seng TECH Index closed up 9.96 percent for the day.
Over the past 18 months, Chinese tech stocks became one of the biggest investment risks following the PRC authorities’ crackdown on tech giants. Trillions of dollars of market capitalization were wiped out in New York and Hong Kong, while venture financing for Chinese tech start-ups were hampered.
4. PRC and U.S. regulators are discussing the operational details of an audit deal to avert the delisting of Chinese companies from U.S. exchanges, according to Reuters, citing sources familiar with the matter.
A preliminary framework for audit supervision cooperation has been established, with the PRC likely to classify less information as confidential and potentially allow more information into the audit working papers of Chinese companies. The PRC also discussed details of Public Company Accounting Oversight Board onsite inspections, a move that grants the U.S. audit regulator access to audit working papers.
Beijing hopes the deal can be reached this year, and implemented next year, according to the sources.
Analysis: Progress being made on the Sino-U.S. audit deal is an indirect sign that China’s economic deterioration is severe. The CCP is notorious for “delaying and waiting for change” (以拖待變), and would ideally seek to drag out audit negotiations for as long as possible in the hopes that it would not be reached and Chinese companies will remain listed.
However, the political risk of delisting is a contributing factor to the acceleration of outflows from China, and Beijing needs to do something to mitigate the trend ahead of developments that would worsen the situation like the U.S. Federal Reserves’ forthcoming rate increases and balance sheet shrinking. Sending out positive signals on the audit deal would help to calm foreign investors and stem outflows. That being said, the deal is not yet finalized and the CCP could yet seek to “delay and wait for change” if it can get away with it.
5. The renminbi lost 3.8 percent against the U.S. dollar in April, with the onshore yuan closing at 6.5866 per dollar.
April 30
1. The Politburo held its 38th collective study session on regulating and guiding the healthy development of China’s capital in accordance with the law, according to reporting by state mouthpiece Xinhua.
Xi Jinping said during the meeting that “capital is an important factor of production in the socialist market economy.” He added that regulating and guiding the development of capital “is not only a major economic issue, but also a major political issue; it is not only a major practical problem, but also a major theoretical problem.” The development of capital also involves “adherence to the basic socialist economic system, the fundamental national policy of reform and opening up, high-quality development and common prosperity, and national security and social stability.”
Xi emphasized the necessity of “deepening the understanding of various types of capital and its role in China in the new era, regulating and guiding the healthy development of capital,” and allowing capital to “play a positive role as an important factor of production.”
Xi also made the following key points:
- Adhere to the unswerving consolidation and development of the public sector economy, and unswervingly encourage, support, and guide the development of the non-public economy.
- Strengthen anti-monopoly efforts, prevent the disorderly expansion of capital, effectively guard against risks, and maintain fair market competition. Focus on preventing and defusing financial risks, overcoming the tendency of the economy to deviate from the “real” to the “fictitious,” and addressing non-performing asset risks, bubble risks, and other risks.
- Fully affirm the positive role of various types of capital in contributing to the prosperity and development of the socialist market economy.
- Strengthen the theoretical study of capital under new era conditions, and how to regulate and guide the healthy development of capital under the socialist system.
- It must be recognized that capital has a profit-seeking nature. If it is not regulated and restrained, it will bring immeasurable harm to economic and social development.
- The issue of capital and benefits distribution must be handled properly.
- Capital market reform must be deepened, and improvements to the fundamental system of China’s capital markets must continue. The property rights protection system must be improved, the implementation of the fair competition policy must be further promoted, the fair competition review system must be fully implemented, and various market barriers must be eliminated.
- The development of capital must be regulated and guided. “Traffic lights” (or “red light, green light” mechanisms) must be established, and the legal system of capital development must be improved.
- The efficiency of capital markets must be comprehensively improved. Key areas and objects that may bring systemic risks must be handled with finesse, governing foresight and agility must be enhanced, and discovered risks must be handled and resolved early.
- Strengthen anti-corruption efforts in the domain of capital, maintain a state of high-pressure against corruption, resolutely crackdown on the profit-seeking behavior of capital that is connected to power, and put effort into investigating and dealing with the corruption behind the disorderly expansion of capital, platform monopolies, etc.
2. China’s official manufacturing Purchasing Managers’ Index (PMI) dropped to 47.4 in April from 49.5 in March, the lowest level since February 2020. The production sub-index also fell to 44.4 in April from 49.5 in March, new orders fell to 42.6 in April from 48.8 a month ago, and the construction activity sub-index declined to 52.7 in April from 58.1 in March, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
OUR TAKE
1. The various developments listed above affirm our pessimistic outlook on the Chinese economy and recession forecast. Indeed, the PRC’s economic deterioration has become so obvious in recent weeks that analysts have scrambled to revise downward their China annual GDP predictions and have begun to talk about recession risks. Also, prominent financiers like Weijian Shan at PAG are broaching sensitive topics like pointing out China’s “deep financial crisis,” diversifying away from China, and criticizing Beijing’s policies.
The recent Politburo meetings and information about Beijing easing crackdowns on China’s tech giants further underscore the dire state of the Chinese economy. The Xi leadership has essentially acknowledged that its policies to deal with COVID-19 outbreaks, deleverage the property sector, and rein in tech firms have done more harm than good for the economy and the regime. To reverse the damage, Beijing is now looking to moderate the implementation of its policies while still keeping them on the books. Doing so would allow Xi Jinping to preserve his political legacies and stem the impact to his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) in an important Party Congress year. Xi cannot afford to completely walk back his policies now because that is tantamount to admitting that he and his policies were utter failures, which is self-sabotage and political suicide at a time when his factional rivals and foreign enemies are out for his blood.
As we have noted in several newsletters (such as this one), Xi leadership is looking to deflect blame from policies like “zero-COVID” away from the central government and onto local governments. Through propaganda articles, Beijing is arguing that the problems resulting from its policies are the fault of local officials not implementing policies with sufficient nuance and finesse, and not because the policies are bad. Similarly, the measures brought up at the April 29 Politburo meeting and April 30 Politburo study session lay the groundwork for the Xi leadership to absolve itself of blame for the PRC’s mounting crises while passing the buck to local governments.
2. Beijing’s latest moves to moderate its policies are unlikely to take off given the quirks of the CCP officialdom. Officials tend to default to “prefer left rather than right,” “one-size-fits-all,” and “campaign-style” approaches to policy implementation, and do not handle complications well. They also have a tendency to put local interests before regime interests. For instance, local officials will almost certainly prioritize the more straightforward “zero-COVID” policy (interpreted by them as ensuring no cases in their area) over taking pains to ensure that countrywide “smooth logistics” is also achieved. Thus, truck drivers could continue to find themselves greatly inconvenienced by “zero-COVID” restrictions despite the “smooth logistics” caveat, and manufacturing plants are still at risk of being shut down in the event of local outbreaks or outbreaks in other areas affecting logistics.
Meanwhile, real estate policy is an area where Beijing could get more than what it “bargained” for in easing restrictions. The Politburo meeting’s call to “support localities in improving real estate policies based on local realities” and “optimize the supervision of pre-sale funds for commercial housing” affirm recent news reports about the Xi leadership’s decision to allow local governments to relax curbs on property purchases. The danger of granting local governments greater leeway, however, is that they now can choose to interpret their future loosening of property restrictions, which would help them boost revenue from land sales, as “supporting localities in improving real estate policies based on local realities” and quietly disregard the broader policy of “houses are for living, not speculation.” Over time, Beijing could find itself back on square one with regard to deleveraging the real estate sector and addressing bubble risks as local governments look out for their interests over those of the regime.
We previously explained that Xi Jinping’s efforts to save the economy will be in vain due to a dysfunctional officialdom, factional struggle in the Party elite, and serious deficiencies inherent to the CCP system. We also explained why seemingly practical steps like investing in infrastructure construction are also unlikely to work given the current economic situation in China. With the U.S. economy falling 1.4 percent in the first quarter and the dismal global economy in general, the CCP will soon find that it cannot even rely on its much-vaunted exports to “stabilize the economy” as declared in the Politburo meeting.
3. Xi Jinping’s latest attempt to rescue the economy could also be undone by sabotage efforts from his factional rivals. This possibility was recently highlighted by two “third-generation red” princelings.
On April 25, several screenshots of JD.com CEO Xu Lei’s social media chat group messages were widely circulated on the internet. In those messages, Xu expressed confidence that whoever was behind the epidemic prevention and control fiasco in Shanghai would not dare to cause trouble in Beijing because “the consequences will be terrible” for them. Xu’s message was interpreted by observers to mean that he suspected factional politics was behind at least some of the troubles on the mainland, and he did not want the operations of JD.com’s headquarters in the Chinese capital to be affected. Overseas Chinese language media have alleged that Xu Lei is the grandson of Xu Xiangqian, one of the Ten Marshals of the People’s Liberation Army.
Ye Jingzi, the granddaughter of Marshal Ye Jianying, also expressed her suspicions of factional foul play in Shanghai on Weibo. On April 17, she wrote in a post that “it’s impossible” that people “didn’t deliberately cause trouble” in Shanghai. “Guangzhou and Shenzhen are not so messed up, so how did (Shanghai) get this way? Losses are bigger than in Ukraine,” she added. Ye Jingzi’s post was also interpreted by observers to mean that factional forces were involved in Shanghai’s disastrous epidemic handling, and the economic losses in Shanghai were likely astronomical. The Ye clan were key backers of Xi Jinping when he sought help from Party elders to deal with the Jiang faction following the coup by Bo Xilai and Zhou Yongkang in 2012.
If factional struggle was a factor in the Shanghai “zero-COVID” disaster, then Xi’s political enemies are looking to saddle him with a mini-“Great Leap Forward” as they look to force him to hand over some power like Mao Zedong did after the actual “Great Leap Forward” and resulting famine. Factional pushback would incentivize Xi to take bolder and riskier action to shift the struggle decisively in his favor, paving the way for political Black Swans to emerge in China.
