SinoInsight 1
On May 1, Bauhinia Magazine, a pro-China media outlet based in Hong Kong, published an interview with Qiao Liang. Qiao is a hawkish former People’s Liberation Army Air Force major general who is currently a professor at the PLA National Defence University in Beijing. He is best known for co-authoring the book, “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America,” which calls for the PRC to defeat the United States not through conventional warfare, but through economic, diplomatic, and other means.
Qiao Liang’s interview with Bauhinia Magazine, titled “We Should Not Dance to America’s Rhythm” (我們不應該跟著美國的節奏跳舞) was republished by the U.S.-China Perception Monitor, an initiative by The China Program of The Carter Center that focuses on Sino-U.S. relations. On May 4, the U.S.-China Perception Monitor published Qiao’s reply to a reader’s question about what he had said about Taiwan in his Bauhinia Magazine interview.
Titled “The Taiwan Issue Concerns the Nation’s Fate and Should Not be Handled Recklessly” (台灣問題攸關國運不可輕率急進), Qiao raised the following noteworthy points in his response on the U.S.-China Perception Monitor:
1. Qiao Liang criticized the intense discussions on the mainland about the prospect of attacking Taiwan after U.S. President Donald Trump signed the TAIPEI Act in March. “These sorts of views do not take into consideration internal or external constraints and are based on resolution or confidence (more hotheadedness than anything). [These people] say that they are patriotic, but they are in fact harming the country,” he said.
2. Qiao noted that the U.S. had become “disorderly” due to the coronavirus pandemic and “U.S. military power is shrinking,” and this created the impression that a “brief window of opportunity” had emerged for the PRC to attack Taiwan. However, Qiao believed that unless the pandemic caused the U.S. to “fall and not get up,” seizing the window of opportunity to invade Taiwan “will not resolve future strategic dilemmas.”
3. Qiao believed that two constraints are preventing the PRC from attacking Taiwan at this time. First, the Chinese economy is still dependent on the U.S. and the dollar system. Second, in the event of a PRC invasion of Taiwan, the U.S. can work together with allies to blockade and sanction the PRC, causing problems for Chinese manufacturing (inability to import material and export goods) and China’s ability to attract international investments.
4. Qiao noted that resolving the Taiwan issue is not a primary objective in accomplishing the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”
5. Qiao noted that the Taiwan issue is essentially a Sino-U.S. issue. Once an invasion is launched, Taiwan will end up burdening the CCP and the cost of governing Taiwan would be too high.
6. Qiao noted that a resolution of the Taiwan issue first requires a resolution of U.S. hegemony.
7. Qiao noted that the U.S. was using the Taiwan issue to create a “talking point” about the PRC, and warned that the PRC should not “dance to America’s rhythm.”
OUR TAKE
1. Qiao Liang’s remarks are almost certainly meant to signal to the U.S. that the CCP does not actually plan to take advantage of the coronavirus pandemic to invade Taiwan despite the PLA’s recent maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. In April, the PLA aircraft carrier and its strike group sailed near Taiwan on two occasions.
The CCP definitely wants the U.S. to take notice of Qiao’s remarks. First, Qiao Liang is notorious among America China hawks and military personnel for being the PRC strategist behind the “unrestricted warfare” doctrine. Hence, public remarks by Qiao will likely be closely scrutinized. Second, Qiao took the trouble to respond to a reader question sent to The Carter Center’s U.S.-China Perception Monitor, which focuses on analyzing and tracking American and PRC perceptions.
2. Qiao Liang’s remarks will unlikely cause the U.S. to lower its guard against the CCP regime, especially in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. For one, Qiao’s reputation as a proponent of “unrestricted warfare” might end up working against him and the CCP. The U.S. will likely be skeptical of his claims and maintain vigilance in the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region in general amid pandemic conditions. In an interview with CBS News that was published on May 5, Captain Carlos Sardiello, the new commander of the coronavirus-stricken USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carrier, said that he will not wait for all his crew to clear quarantine before taking the carrier back out to sea. According to a May 7 report in Stars and Stripes, the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier will set sail for sea trials this week.
The CCP will also find it difficult to assuage the U.S. over the Taiwan issue and its global ambitions under any circumstances given the change in U.S. policy on China under the Trump administration from engagement to strategic competition. The U.S. has been quick to call out recent PRC for taking advantage of the pandemic to push its claims in the South China Sea. On April 29, Pacific Air Forces commander General CQ Brown, Jr. hosted a video teleconference with air chiefs and leadership from 19 air forces to share “lessons learned regarding COVID-19 response, desires for resuming engagement and exercises in a post-COVID world, and a commitment to continued cooperation across the Indo-Pacific region,” according to a news article on the U.S. Air Force website. Participants include Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Chile, France, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, New Zealand, the Philippines, South Korea, the Republic of Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, and the United States.
3. Qiao Liang’s recent remarks indicate the CCP fears that rocking the boat too much in an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment will be detrimental to the PRC.
When the U.S. policy of engagement with China was still ongoing, it was common for hawkish senior military officials, diplomats, and scholars to frequently menace Taiwan with belligerent rhetoric. There were virtually no downsides to menacing Taiwan during the period of engagement because 1) the CCP got to play the nationalism card and bolster support for its regime, 2) there was minimal risk of conflict with America because previous administrations were more interested in maintaining Sino-U.S. economic interests and less inclined to stand up for Taiwan.
The CCP, however, is losing its economic leverage over the U.S. as the Trump administration moves to decouple America from China, the “strategic competitor,” economically and in other areas. Also, with the rapid weakening of the Chinese economy, the CCP can no longer afford to play the nationalism card too readily because it risks facing pushback and losing support from angry “nationalists” for not “standing up to the American imperialists.” At the same time, the CCP still has to menace Taiwan every so often due to domestic considerations (keep the “nationalists” appeased, create an external “crisis” to distract the Chinese people from domestic troubles, unite the CCP elite around Party central, etc.). Going forward, Beijing will look to balance its various needs and will continue to send “contradictory” signals over Taiwan.
4. Qiao Liang’s remarks do not indicate that the CCP will not attempt to spark a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis. The CCP, however, will unlikely seek to invade Taiwan at this time.
SinoInsight 2
Recently, the Hong Kong police force, including the Hong Kong police commissioner and senior foreign-born officers, became embroiled in several scandals:
- On April 29, Hong Kong media reported that assistant police commissioner Rupert Dover had broken land and property laws. The reports prompted an investigation by the Hong Kong government. Dover commanded frontline Hong Kong police when they brutally suppressed protesters during demonstrations in June 2019, and was personally involved in making arrests.
- On May 2, Hong Kong media reported that police chief superintendent David John Jordan transgressed land and property laws, prompting a Hong Kong government investigation. Jordan led police “raptor” special squads during the anti-extradition bill protests.
- On May 2, Hong Kong media reported that police superintendent Vasco Gareth Llewellyn Williams also violated property laws, prompting a government investigation. Williams gained notoriety during the anti-extradition bill protests for describing a protester as a “yellow object.”
- On May 3, Hong Kong media reported that Hong Kong police commissioner Chris Tang did not take any action against unauthorized building works at an apartment that he rented in 2016. According to a police statement, Tang claimed that he informed the owner of the violation but the owner did not do anything about it, which led him to move out in June 2019.
OUR TAKE
1. During the 2019 Hong Kong anti-extradition bill demonstrations, the Hong Kong police force had on numerous occasions brutalized protesters, endangered public safety, and took actions that would have ordinarily been considered abuse of power. The pro-Beijing Hong Kong government, however, appeared to ignore most public complaints and the outcry over the Hong Kong police force, and instead defended police behavior as “strict compliance” of the law. Some senior officers even won promotions; David Jordan, the senior officer who was recently outed for flouting land and property laws, was promoted from deputy regional commander to assistant police commissioner this February.
The recent string of police scandals, however, suggest that the police force might not be as “immune” from punishment as previously presumed. In fact, the manner in which the scandals unfolded—reports of wrongdoing in the press before government investigations—is strongly reminiscent of how the anti-corruption probe/factional struggle purges were carried out on the mainland. For instance, the Chinese language press carried negative stories about former security czar Zhou Yongkang in the lead up to his being investigated in 2014. As for Hong Kong, former Hong Kong chief executive Leung Chun-ying found himself challenged by a corruption scandal after Australian media reported on incriminating documents in October 2014, or shortly after the Umbrella Movement broke out. Other senior Hong Kong officials have also suddenly found themselves in trouble for breaking land and property laws. It is unlikely coincidental that the Hong Kong police force is suddenly embroiled in a string of scandals.
The CCP could be targeting senior members of the Hong Kong police force now to “kill the chickens and scare the monkeys” while it simultaneously moves to push the Hong Kong government and pro-Beijing lawmakers to enact national security legislation in the city (Article 23 of the Basic Law). Previous attempts to enact Article 23 have led to massive protests, and it’s very likely the CCP does not want overzealous police officers to escalate the situation by suppressing future demonstrations with excessive force. While the police, the Hong Kong government, and the CCP have largely gotten away with brutalizing protesters for the bulk of the anti-extradition bill protests, they will unlikely escape culpability for similar actions now with the United States having passed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019. In fact, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo hinted strongly in a press conference on May 6 that the U.S. is keeping a close eye on the Hong Kong situation when he noted that the Department of State is delaying a report to Congress that will assess Hong Kong’s autonomy “to allow us to account for any additional actions that Beijing may be contemplating in the run-up to the National People’s Congress that would further undermine the people of Hong Kong’s autonomy as promised by China when they entered the agreement with the people of Hong Kong.”
We do not rule out the possibility that the Xi Jinping leadership is subtly signaling to both the Hong Kong people and the Trump administration through the recent Hong Kong police force scandals and the reshuffle of personnel overseeing Hong Kong affairs (including public security) that it does not wish to see an escalation of violence in Hong Kong
2. The recent Hong Kong police force scandals are also likely connected with the CCP factional struggle, as the following timeline of events would reveal:
April 13
- The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the PRC’s Hong Kong Liaison Office issued two statements condemning pan-democrat lawmakers in Hong Kong’s Legislative Council.
April 15
- Hong Kong Liaison Office director Luo Huining strongly indicated that Beijing wants Hong Kong to quickly enact Article 23. On the same day, Yang Jian, the vice director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, was removed from his post.
April 18
- Hong Kong police arrested 15 prominent pan-democrat figures.
April 19
- Sun Lijun, a PRC vice minister of public security, was officially investigated by the Central Committee for Discipline Inspection. Sun also headed a department that oversaw security work in Hong Kong and was previously a deputy director of the “610 Office.”
April 20
- The Hong Kong police announced that a parcel addressed to police commissioner Chris Tang that had been sent to the police headquarters in Wan Chai contained a “partially functional” homemade bomb. The police noted that it had warned previously about the rise of “local terrorist activity.” Many Hong Kong netizens believe that the “homemade bomb” incident was staged by the police themselves, citing as evidence the rapid release of a video about bomb threats on the official Facebook page of the Hong Kong police force.
- PRC justice minister Fu Zhenghua was no longer listed as the ministry’s Party group deputy secretary on the ministry’s website.
April 21
- A 38-year-old Hong Kong police sergeant from the Kwai Tsing Police District was arrested by the New Territories North Regional Crime Unit for obstructing justice. Earlier in the month, the police sergeant had arrested a Hong Kong student for allegedly planting a petrol bomb outside the Kwai Chung Police Station. According to Hong Kong media reports, the police sergeant is suspected of planting evidence to make a sham arrest.
April 22
- Hong Kong chief executive Carrie Lam appoints five new ministers in the cabinet reshuffle after the 2019 anti-extradition bill protests.
April 29
- Fu Zhenghua stepped down as PRC justice minister, and was replaced by Liaoning governor Tang Yijun.
May 4
- According to Hong Kong media reports, two off-duty police officers were arrested for illegal gambling and have been suspended from service.
May 7
- According to Hong Kong media reports, two policemen from the Kowloon West Regional Anti-triad Unit were arrested on suspicion of drug trafficking early that morning.
As we previously analyzed, Xi Jinping is rectifying the CCP regime’s political and legal affairs apparatus and tightening his control over Hong Kong to secure an advantage in the factional struggle. The recent Hong Kong police force scandals are in line with our analysis.
