SinoInsight 1
On April 24, the Standing Committee of the Beijing Municipal People’s Congress announced several key personnel changes. Noteworthy were the changes involving public security personnel:
- Wang Xiaohong, vice minister of public security in charge of daily operations and deputy secretary of the Ministry of Public Security’s Party Committee, stepped down from his position as director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau.
- Qi Yanjun, deputy secretary of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau Party Committee and the Bureau’s executive deputy director, was promoted to director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau and Beijing vice mayor.
OUR TAKE
1. The career and factional background of Wang Xiaohong and Qi Yanjun offer insight into the latest personnel reshuffle at the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau.
Wang Xiaohong
Wang Xiaohong is Xi Jinping’s former colleague and ally. After Xi took office, Wang skyrocketed up the official ranks, taking less than four years to be promoted from a sub-bureau level official to a ministerial-level official holding important positions in the Ministry of Public Security:
Before August 2013: Xiamen City deputy mayor, deputy Party Secretary of the Xiamen Political and Legal Affairs Commission, and Xiamen Public Security Bureau director.
March 2015: Deputy mayor of the Beijing Municipality and director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau.
May 2016: Vice minister of public security
May 2017: Officially promoted to the ministerial rank.
March 2018: Promoted to vice minister of public security in charge of daily operations, or the official number two position in the Ministry of Public Security.
November 2019: Appointed director of the Ministry of Public Security’s Secret Service Bureau. Part of the Secret Service Bureau’s portfolio is providing personal security for leading PRC officials at the sub-national level.
Despite appearances, Wang stepping down as Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau director does not indicate that he is losing Xi’s favor. Under normal circumstances, Wang should have already left the position back in March 2018 after his promotion to vice minister of public security in charge of daily operations. The fact that he remained as director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau suggests that Xi Jinping was feeling insecure about the loyalty of the Beijing Municipal’s political and legal affairs apparatus (a valid concern because Zhongnanhai, the Party’s headquarters, is located in Beijing Municipal) and needed to keep an ally at the helm to ensure control. With the recent purge of Sun Lijun and the promotion of Qi Yanjun (see below), however, Xi likely believes that he is more in control of the political and legal affairs apparatus and can finally afford to have Wang Xiaohong follow standard protocol and step down as Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau director.
Qi Yanjun
Qi Yanjun, who spent much of his career in the public security apparatus’s fire department, had a much slower career progression than Wang Xiaohong. Qi’s career trajectory and background suggest that he is an official that Xi Jinping and Wang trust enough to head the Beijing Municipal Public Security:
August 2015: Deputy director of the Fire Department of the Ministry of Public Security (deputy army level).
May 2016: Transferred to the Beijing Municipal Fire Department to serve as department head.
May 2017: Appointed a member of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau Party Committee.
January 2019: Promoted to vice director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau and deputy secretary of the Bureau’s Party Committee.
April 2019: Promoted to deputy secretary of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau Party Committee and the Bureau’s executive deputy director.
Qi Yanjun served as Wang Xiaohong’s deputy for a year before being recently promoted to director of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau. It is possible that Qi was promoted because he gained Wang’s trust while working together. Also, Xi Jinping would be more willing to promote and trust an official who spent most of his career in the fire department (the fire department, while previously part of the paramilitary and only became fully part of the political and legal affairs apparatus in October 2018, is concerned only with fighting actual fires and not “stability maintenance”) than an official that climbed up the ranks in the political and legal affairs apparatus proper; until very recently, the political and legal affairs apparatus was largely swayed by the Jiang Zemin faction which opposes the Xi leadership.
2. The recent personnel reshuffles in the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau indicate that Xi Jinping is gaining greater control over the political and legal affairs apparatus and has the edge in the CCP factional struggle (at least for the moment).
The series of factional struggle developments since January 2020 corroborates our assessment that Xi could have faced a coup early on in the year and is now pushing back against his political rivals. Key developments include:
January: Xi “vanishes” for a period after confirming the coronavirus outbreak; Kong Qingdong attacks Xi on social media.
February: Xi raises the issue of biosecurity in the regime and clearly outlines what he has done to deal with the coronavirus; Xi deflects blame for the coronavirus outbreak in a national teleconference attended by 170,000 Party members and military personnel; Kong Qingdong attacks Xi again on social media.
March: The “abdication letter” incident.
April: Gunfire is heard in Beijing amid rumors of Bo Xilai “breaking out” of Qincheng Prison; “Cannon” Ren Zhiqiang is officially investigated; Sun Lijun is purged; Xi Jinping sends political signals in Shaanxi; Wang Xiaohong steps down as Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau director.
SinoInsight 2
Kim Jong Un’s health has been the subject of newspaper headlines in recent days because the North Korean leader has not been seen in public since April 11 and missed the celebration of his grandfather’s birthday on April 15. Various rumors have been spreading that Kim is dead, comatose, or in a vegetative state after undergoing surgery. There are also rumors that Kim could have contracted the coronavirus.
Some news reports and official remarks, however, indicate that Kim might not be in such a bad condition as rumored.
April 24
- When asked to comment on a report that Kim Jong Un is “gravely ill,” U.S. President Donald Trump dismissed the report as “incorrect” and added, “I’m hearing they used old documents. I hear the report was an incorrect report. I hope it was an incorrect report.”
- According to Reuters, a senior official of the CCP’s International Liaison Department departed for North Korea with a team of medical experts to advise on Kim on April 23. Chinese language media report that the senior official was Song Tao, the head of the International Liaison Department.
April 25
- 38 North, a website dedicated to North Korean analysis, noted that commercial satellite imagery showed that Kim Jong Un’s personal train has been parked at his Wonsan compound off the east coast of North Korea since at least April 21.
- Moon Chung-in, the top foreign policy advisor to South Korean President Moon Jae-in, told CNN that Kim Jong Un is “alive and well” and that he “has been staying in the Wonsan area since April 13. No suspicious movements have so far been detected.”
April 26
North Korean Worker’s Party mouthpiece Rodong Sinmun reported that Kim Jong Un sent a message of gratitude to the workers of a construction project at Samji Lake. The article, however, did not feature a picture of Kim. PRC state mouthpiece Xinhua News Agency reported on the Rodong Sinmun article.
OUR TAKE
1. Based on publicly available information, it is reasonable to suspect that Kim Jong Un does have some form of a health problem. Kim’s health issues may not be trivial because he has not been able to make a public appearance at the time of writing this newsletter. However, the more reliable streams of public information also do not confirm the rumors that Kim is dead, comatose, or in a vegetative state.
2. In analyzing the CCP’s reaction to Kim’s health, we believe that the North Korean leader’s health is not as critical as the rumors indicate.
2.1. Xinhua’s report on the Rodong Sinmun piece about Kim Jong Un sending thanks to workers at Samji Lake is likely intended to address and dismiss rumors of Kim’s demise or incapacitation.
2.2. If Kim is gravely ill, the CCP should have sent a medical team to North Korea much earlier. Also, the PRC medical experts who are currently in North Korea do not seem to require further assistance; there are no reports of China dispatching another medical team over to North Korea at the time of writing.
2.3. If Kim is indeed dead or gravely ill, the CCP would almost certainly have taken more aggressive actions (move troops to the China-North Korean border, attempt to install a pro-China leader, etc.) to ensure that North Korea does not fall out of the PRC’s orbit. The CCP, however, has not made aggressive moves toward North Korea at the time of writing. This suggests that the Kim regime has not yet lost power.
The CCP’s fears of losing North Korea are not without reason. A North Korea without the historical baggage of the Kim regime has more incentive to move closer toward the friendlier South Korea and the United States instead of the CCP regime, which has always sought to control the North Korean regime. Also, the North Korean regime would have doubts about the CCP’s ability to ply it with benefits that ensure it is in the “winning” camp, given the rapidly worsening Chinese economy and sharply increasing international pressure on the CCP.
2.4. Again, if Kim is dead or gravely ill, we would see increased activity from South Korea, Japan, Russia, and the United States. However, the aforementioned countries have been remarkably calm on the issue of Kim Jong Un’s health, with South Korea assuring the world that Kim is “alive and well” and President Trump dismissing a report that Kim is in critical condition.
2.5. If there is something serious going on in North Korea, the CCP regime will likely try to play up the issue and open yet another front of “turbulence” to keep the world distracted. In recent weeks, the CCP has carried out provocative action in the East and South China Sea; sailed naval vessels through the Taiwan Strait; and arrested pro-democracy activists in Hong Kong while pushing the Hong Kong government to enact a controversial national security law. We do not rule out the possibility that Iran’s recent belligerence in the Persian Gulf was influenced by the PRC.
The CCP needs to keep the world distracted with “chaos” so that it can put off being held accountable for the coronavirus outbreak and buy itself time to address its many domestic problems (deteriorating economy, food crisis, etc.). Thus, the CCP will unlikely pass up the opportunity to stir more trouble if Kim Jong Un is dead or incapacitated. However, the CCP has been relatively quiet on North Korea so far.
2.6. Kim Jong Un has long opposed and purged those in the pro-China faction in the North Korean regime; the North Korean pro-China faction is close with the Jiang Zemin faction. Meanwhile, Kim visited Beijing in 2018 and appears to have established good relations with Xi Jinping. We do not rule out the possibility that the CCP factional struggle could have an impact on North Korea. If Kim’s health does turn out to be a serious issue, we also do not rule out the possibility that the situation in North Korea could develop in a manner that influences the CCP factional struggle.
