◎ The sentencing of Fang Fenghui at this time hints at three possible political developments.
On Feb. 20, state mouthpiece Xinhua announced that a military court had sentenced Fang Fenghui, the former Central Military Commission chief of joint staff, to life in prison.
Based on our research, public announcements on Fang’s case were made before or after major political developments in the Chinese regime. Given the precedent and the Chinese Communist Party’s usual modus operandi, the latest pronouncement on Fang foreshadows big moves by Beijing, and also hints at trouble in the regime.
The backdrop:
1. Fang is mysteriously “vanished”
On Aug. 15, 2017, Fang Fenghui signs a new Sino-U.S. military agreement with Joseph Dunford, the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
On Aug. 21, Fang meets with General Surapong Suwan-ath, Chief of Defense Forces of the Royal Thai Armed Forces, at the People’s Liberation Army headquarters in Beijing. This is Fang’s last public appearance as CMC chief of joint staff.
On Aug. 26, China’s defense ministry identified Li Zuocheng as CMC chief of joint staff in a statement about his meeting with Pakistan army chief Qamar Javed Bajwa in Tajikistan. The promotion of Li, previously the PLA Ground Force commander, to chief of joint staff indicated that Fang Fenghui had been replaced. However, the authorities stayed silent on Fang’s fate.
Political developments:
Fang and Zhang Yang, the former CMC Political Work Department director, were “vanished” with less than two months to go before the opening of the 19th Party Congress. At the 19th Congress, Xi Jinping consolidated power to a high degree and promoted several allies and officials whom he appeared to trust to senior leadership positions in the regime.
In September 2017, we wrote that the vanishing of Fang and Zhang could be connected to Xi’s “discovery of a regime-destabilizing coup attempt against his leadership.” Later, overseas Chinese language media reported that both generals were plotting a military coup against Xi, but were found out and arrested. (For our earlier analysis, see here, here, and here.)
2. Fang’s case moves to the prosecution
On Jan. 9, 2018, Xinhua announced that Fang Fenghui would be prosecuted for corruption, and that his case has been transferred to military prosecution authorities. Hong Kong media South China Morning Post said that Fang was purged because he had close ties with former CMC vice chairs Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. Guo and Xu are members of the Jiang Zemin faction.
On Jan. 10, the PLA’s official newspaper carried a commentary which endorsed the Party Central’s decision to punish Fang Fenghui. The commentary criticized Fang and said that his prosecution was part of an ongoing move to “comprehensively purge the pernicious influence of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou” from the military.
Political developments:
On Jan. 19, the 19th Central Committee passes a decision to amend the state constitution. “Xi Jinping Thought” is written into the constitution, as well as provisions to establish the National Supervisory Commission.
On Feb. 25, state media noted that the Central Committee had deliberated removing term limits for the Chinese presidency and vice presidency. This motion was passed during the Two Sessions meetings in March.
3. Fang is expelled from the Party
On Oct. 16, Xinhua announced the expulsion of Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang from the Party. Xinhua also said that military prosecutors were finished with Fang’s case, and charges were being prepared against him.
Fang and Zhang were accused of being “not devoted to and not honest with the Party,” were “two-faced persons,” and were “politically degenerate” and “avaricious.” Fang was accused of taking “particularly large sums of money.”
Political developments:
Rumors that Party elders were displeased with Xi Jinping emerged after the United States imposed the first wave of tariffs on Chinese goods and around the Beidaihe summer retreat period. Also, propaganda about Xi appeared to lessen for some time.
In early October, anti-corruption authorities announced that former Interpol chief and public security vice minister Meng Hongwei was being investigated for “severe violations of discipline.” Meng’s wife said that he fell out of contact during a trip to China. We analyzed that the Meng case might have been connected with a “soft coup” attempt against the Xi leadership, and that the official expulsion of Fang Fenghui and Zhang Yang is linked with the purge of Meng Hongwei.
4. Fang is sentenced to life in prison
On Feb. 20, a military court found Fang guilty of “accepting and offering bribes, as well as holding a huge amount of property from unidentified sources,” and sentenced him to life imprisonment.
Political and geopolitical context:
The sentencing of Fang Fenghui comes as China and the U.S. enter the final leg of a 90-day trade negotiation period. While President Donald Trump has hinted that he may extend the deadline, the U.S. is still slated to increase tariff rates on Chinese goods after March 1.
The sentencing of Fang also follows the publication of articles in state media in recent days which reinforce Xi’s command over the military. These articles were placed in prominent headline positions on Xinhua’s homepage.
Our take:
1. The CCP has a tendency to carry out intimidation operations to reassert its authority and curb “instability” during periods where it feels threatened. For example, domestic security officials would start arresting dissidents, protesters, or members of religious groups near important anniversary dates. The goal of proactive intimidation operations is to suppress potential “troublemakers” and maintain unchallenged rule.
During Hu Jintao’s final year in office, he ordered the troops stationed in Beijing to shift their military readiness state to the second-highest level between the period of the Two Sessions to after the 18th Party Congress (248 days), according to overseas Chinese language media.
Xi Jinping had previously used his military authority to intimidate political opponents around the period where powerful cadres who were once considered “untouchable” were purged. In July 2014, the PLA held several military exercises which led to major domestic flight delays. Weeks earlier (June 30), Xu Caihou was officially expelled from the Party. On July 29, the anti-corruption agency officially announced an investigation of former security czar Zhou Yongkang.
In April 2015, anti-corruption investigators began probing Guo Boxiong, and the investigation became official in July. In the whole of 2015, the PLA held over 300 joint military exercises, the most it had ever held in a year.
2. The sentencing of Fang Fenghui at this time hints at three possible political developments.
Going by precedent, Xi could be planning something big in the near future. Hence, he has to start “killing chickens to scare the monkeys” by making an example of the “two-faced” and “politically degenerate” Fang. Xi’s plans could involve making huge concessions to secure a trade deal with America and avoid further tariffs.
Xi could also be planning to make prominent arrests. We previously analyzed that Xi is focused on cleaning up the political and legal affairs apparatus to ensure that entrenched interests do not trouble his effort to advance reforms. Pushing through reforms becomes even more crucial for Xi should he secure a trade agreement in March. Based on our research, we believe that incumbent Supreme People’s Court chief Zhou Qiang is at risk of being purged.
Finally, Xi might be facing trouble from the PLA, and needs to again stamp his authority to remind the military that there are consequences to opposing him.
Get smart:
1. Xi Jinping seems determined to reach a trade agreement with President Trump and avert more economic pain. However, the volatile nature of the CCP factional struggle will place Xi at greater risk of encountering Black Swan and Gray Rhino events after he gets a deal.
2. Xi may talk about “biting down on bone” and taking reform to “deep water territory,” but we believe that he cannot overcome inertia and resistance from the CCP system and successfully enact genuine structural reforms. Thus, we anticipate the signing of a Sino-U.S. trade deal, but expect Trump to raise tariff rates and even add tariffs later in the year (see our China 2019 outlook).
