Politics Watch: More Signs Point to Escalation in the CCP Factional Struggle

◎ Gu Zhuoheng’s tweets and Cui Yongyuan’s “reappearance” appear to connect a trail of breadcrumbs which point to an intensification of the CCP factional struggle.


In recent weeks, we have observed unusual developments in China which suggest that Xi Jinping’s political rivals are using the Chinese Communist Party’s political and legal affairs apparatus and the intelligence apparatus to undermine the Xi leadership (see here and here). The pushback against Xi points towards an escalation in the factional struggle between the Xi camp and the Jiang Zemin faction.

Since our observation, new clues have emerged which further affirm our analysis of the situation.

Our take:
In an essay written in 1990 on analyzing Chinese political developments, the late Belgium sinologist Simon Leys noted that the “greatest challenge” of extracting meaning from official Chinese sources was how to “crack the code of the Communist political jargon and translate into ordinary speech this secret language full of symbols, riddles, cryptograms, hints, traps, dark allusions and red herrings.”

We previously showed how the CCP’s “secret language” operates by decoding the different political messaging on the homepage of Xinhua on Feb. 18. The CCP’s use of “secret language,” however, is not limited to official sources. Longtime Party watchers would be able to pick out critical messaging being telegraphed by official, semi-official, and non-official parties involved in the “you die, I live” CCP factional struggle in both old and new media.

Below we examine the recent social media postings of Sing Pao Daily boss Gu Zhuoheng and former state television presenter Cui Yongyuan, two men whose actions of late suggest their deep involvement in the Xi-Jiang factional struggle. (We strongly recommend reading our Feb. 22 and March 1 articles for background on Gu and Cui before proceeding.)

1. Gu promises dirt on Xi, but instead tweets about Cui

In late February, Gu Zhuoheng announced on Twitter that he plans to reveal details of corruption by Xi Jinping’s family members.

Starting on March 5, Gu issued a series of tweets prefaced with the title, “Xi Jinping Family’s Trillion Dollar Corruption Case.” Instead of disclosing dirt on Xi’s family, however, Gu attacked Cui Yongyuan with claims of corruption.

“Secret language” decoding
We previously wrote about Gu Zhuoheng and his links with the Jiang faction-swayed intelligence apparatus. We also pointed out the similarities between Gu’s threats to “expose” Xi Jinping and those of the fugitive businessman Guo Wengui. To briefly recap, Guo lobbed unverifiable “explosive information” about Wang Qishan, Xi’s closest ally, in the lead up to the 19th Party Congress, a crucial period for the Xi leadership. Meanwhile, Gu made broad and unverifiable allegations about the Xi family’s corruption just days before the opening of the Two Sessions, another sensitive period.

Gu has thus far failed to produce verifiable evidence of corruption by Xi’s family. This suggests that he, like Guo Wengui, is more into social media histrionics and hype. The histrionics and hype, however, squarely targets the Xi camp and implies a factional agenda.

In analyzing the recent controversy over the infamous Shaanxi mining case, we noted that Cui Yongyuan’s exposés about the case are “highly politically motivated and are connected with the CCP factional struggle.” Put another way, Cui was likely leaking “explosive information” as a proxy for powerful entities in the CCP elite who have a beef with the Jiang faction-controlled political and legal affairs apparatus. Gu Zhuoheng’s recent tweets about Cui indirectly confirm that the latter’s political backer is very likely from the Xi camp.

2. Cui “vanishes” after the Shaanxi case, then “reappears”

On Feb. 22, Cui Yongyuan mysteriously “vanished” from public and kept radio silence on social media after the “shock turn” in the Shaanxi mining case. We wrote at the time that Cui stands to face criminal charges of complicity due to the “shock turn.”

On March 1, Cui broke radio silence and posted on his official Weibo account thoughts about giving lessons at the Oral History Research Centre of Communications University of China this semester. “I am an impetuous person,” he wrote, and added that he must learn to take things “step by step” and be “solid and meticulous.” A day earlier, the university had issued a press release saying that Cui had accompanied university Party secretary Chen Wenshen in inspecting the university, an event which Sina and Tencent news portals also picked up. By the afternoon of March 1, however, the university press release and news articles about Cui’s presentation, as well as Cui Weibo post, were all deleted.

On March 9, Cui Yongyuan appeared in public at the Liulichang Antique Market in Beijing. On Weibo, Chinese netizens circulated photos of Cui posing with others.

On March 10, a Twitter account which appeared to belong to Cui posted two photos. The first featuring himself standing in front of a big Chinese drum with words on it. The second showing a close up of the words, which read “Tell it like it is [實話實說], Cui Yongyuan, March 9, 2019.”

“Secret language” decoding
Cui’s recent activity appears to telegraph two political signals.

First, while Cui’s March 1 Weibo post is ostensibly about lecturing at the communications university this semester, the points he made about being “impetuous” and needing to be “solid and meticulous” are almost certainly an oblique reference to his part in spotlighting judicial malpractice in the Shaanxi mining case. In other words, Cui is suggesting that he was ill-prepared and too hasty in exposing the Supreme People’s Court, and will proceed more carefully in the future. The March 10 Twitter post to “tell it like it is” is likely an effort to buttress Cui’s claim that his “explosive information” about the Shaanxi case is reliable and accurate, but the opportunity wasn’t right. In sum, Cui Yongyuan is carrying out textbook “you know what I mean” (“你懂的”) code signaling in response to attacks by Gu Zhuoheng and Jiang faction elements.[1]

Second, Cui’s appearance at the Liulichang Antique Market and his social media postings signals that his personal safety is being guaranteed by very powerful political entities in the CCP elite. Signaling that he has the support of powerful backers is important to Cui because he faces high levels of political and legal risk for his role in the Shaanxi mining case. Gu Zhuoheng’s attacks against Cui simultaneously confirm the big target on Cui Yongyuan’s back and hints at the clout and identity of Cui’s political backer.

CCP factional politics are “you die, I live.” Cui Yongyuan’s “reappearance” suggests that he is safe for the moment, but there is no guarantee that he will not be in legal jeopardy (law serves politics in the CCP regime) or be “taken out” further down the road. Indeed, the scrubbing of Cui’s Weibo post and the articles about his university inspection shows that Cui and his political backers know that parties interested in having him “taken out” of the factional games could use his public “reappearance” to give him trouble. However, it is still necessary for Cui to break radio silence, even briefly, to broadcast the message that the camp which he is aligned with has not been defeated. Cui Yongyuan’s “vanishing” and “reappearing” balancing act affirms the cutthroat nature of the factional struggle.

Get smart:
Gu Zhuoheng’s tweets and Cui Yongyuan’s “reappearance” appear to connect a trail of breadcrumbs which reveal heightened efforts by the Jiang faction to attack the Xi leadership during a crucial period for the CCP regime (Two Sessions and delicate Sino-U.S. trade talks). To undercut Xi, the Jiang faction appears to be leveraging on its control over the political and legal affairs apparatus and the intelligence apparatus. And if the plunge in Chinese stocks on March 8 was not “engineered” by the Xi leadership, then the Jiang faction has also likely mobilized loyal elements in the financial sector in mounting a serious challenge against Xi.

To avoid being blindsided by Black Swan events in China and discover hidden opportunities, businesses, investors, and governments must track leading indicators of the CCP factional struggle. Monitoring and decoding the CCP “secret language” on display in publicly available information is one way to gain a decisive advantage.

Notes
[1] In March 2014, a Chinese official told reporters “you know what I mean” in response to questions about whether former security czar Zhou Yongkang was under investigation, and the press gallery burst into laughter. Chinese observers immediately understood the official’s answer to mean that Zhou was in very serious trouble. Zhou Yongkang was officially investigated in July 2014.

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