1 Why the HK gov’t is rushing to pass Article 23
March 7
Ding Xuexiang, a Politburo Standing Committee member and head of the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs, met with the National People’s Congress delegation representing Hong Kong and Macau and said that Article 23 of the Basic Law of Hong Kong should be legislated as soon as possible.
On the same day, Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee Ka-chiu and his Executive Council gazetted and tabled the full draft of Article 23 to the Hong Kong Legislative Council for deliberation.
March 8
The Hong Kong LegCo held a special meeting to conduct the first and second reading of the Article 23 draft less than three hours after it was gazetted. According to Hong Kong media reports, the LegCo also completed the “suspension for continuation” (中止待續) procedure between the first and second readings in one go; a bill typically goes through three readings in the LegCo before it is voted on, rectified by the Chief Executive, and reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC for the record. Reviews of the legislation by relevant committees were also conducted in the afternoon.
Hong Kong LegCo members are scheduled to spend six days (March 8 to March 13) going over the 212 pages of the Article 23 draft. The LegCo also temporarily suspended the review of other legislation that were originally scheduled for deliberation during this period.
The Article 23 draft contained articles addressing five major types of acts and activities endangering national security, including:
- Treason and related acts.
- Insurrection, incitement to mutiny and disaffection, and acts with seditious intention.
- Theft of state secrets and espionage.
- Sabotage endangering national security and related activities.
- External interference and organizations engaging in activities endangering national security.
Noteworthy parts of the draft include:
- Treason, rebellion, and incitement of members of the PRC armed forces to mutiny are punishable by life imprisonment.
- Espionage activities and activities that endanger national security such as damaging or weakening public infrastructure are punishable by up to 20 years’ imprisonment.
- Failure to disclose the treason of others is punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment.
- Unauthorized disclosures of state secrets are punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment.
- Incitement offenses, which currently carry a maximum sentence of 2 years imprisonment, will be punishable by up to 7 years imprisonment.
- Collaboration with external forces for incitement is punishable by up to 10 years imprisonment. External forces include the government of a foreign country, the authority of a region or place of an external territory, and external political organizations (including its associated entities and individuals). The targets of incitement are expanded from the people of Hong Kong to “people in the Special Administrative Region” (including Chinese citizens).
- Participation in activities of prohibited overseas organizations is punishable by up to 14 years imprisonment and a fine of HK$1 million (about $12,790).
- Detention of persons arrested for endangering national security is extended from 48 hours to a maximum of 16 days. The Hong Kong police can make a court application to prohibit detainees from consulting with lawyers during the first 48 hours of detention. Detainee consultations with individual lawyers can still be restricted on national security grounds after the first 48 hours.
- Under specific circumstances, the police can enter and search premises without a warrant.
- People who attempt to flee Hong Kong after committing national security crimes stand to have their HKSAR passport revoked and have their professional qualifications suspended. Providing assistance to fugitives is punishable by up to 7 years imprisonment.
- Those convicted of endangering national security are not eligible for reduction of sentence unless the Commissioner of Correctional Services believes that they will not pose a risk to national security after their sentence is reduced. This provision applies to sentences handed down before Article 23 is passed (this affects Jimmy Lai’s case and the “Hong Kong 47” pro-democracy advocates charged with conspiracy to commit subversion).
***
Hong Kong media reported that the John Lee government hopes to pass Article 23 before April 15, or the PRC’s National Security Education Day.
Key incidents in legislating Article 23
2020
April 13: The Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and the PRC’s Hong Kong Liaison Office issued two statements condemning pan-democrat lawmakers in Hong Kong’s LegCo for filibustering to “paralyze the operation of the legislative body.”
The two PRC bodies also implied a desire in Hong Kong for the swift implementation of Article 23.
2021
July 7: Pro-establishment Hong Kong lawmakers pressed Secretary for Security Chris Tang on the issue of Falun Gong during a LegCo meeting. Junius Ho, a controversial pro-establishment lawmaker, asked how the Hong Kong government would deal with Falun Gong or other “subversive” groups designated by the CCP after Article 23 was passed.
Chris Tang responded to the pro-establishment lawmakers by reading from his notes for the most part. He also spoke in generalities and hardly made any references to Falun Gong.
2022
Oct. 10: The John Lee government withdrew a bill to pass Article 23 that was submitted by the Carrie Lam government earlier in the year. In responding to a reporter’s question the next day, Lee said that his government needed to conduct “more comprehensive research” before passing Article 23 in considering the “many different methods of endangering national security.”
2023
Feb. 13: Lo Man-tuen, vice chairman of the pro-Beijing All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, published an article in Hong Kong media where he argued that legislative work to pass Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law should not be carried out that year and it is not even appropriate to start public consultations on the subject.
Feb. 14: Chief Executive John Lee said that the HKSAR has a constitutional responsibility to pass Article 23 “as soon as possible.” He added that the goal is to complete the legislation “as soon as this year, and if not, next year.”
April 13 to April 18: Xia Baolong, the executive deputy head of the Hong Kong and Macau Work Leading Group and director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office carried out a six-day “inspection tour” of Hong Kong.
Xia met with senior officials in the Hong Kong government during his trip. He said that the central government supports the Hong Kong government’s effort to “improve” its judicial and legal system, including finishing legislation work for Article 23. Chief executive John Lee also said that his administration will strive to complete the relevant work for Article 23 by 2023 at the earliest and no later than 2024.
2024
Jan. 30: The Hong Kong government officially started public consultations on Article 23. On that day, the Hang Seng Index fell below 16,000 points to close at 15,703 points (down 2.32 percent). During intraday trading, the index was down over 400 points at the lowest.
Feb. 28: Public consultations on Article 23 concluded. On the same day, the Hang Seng Index closed at 16,838 points, an increase of nearly 800 points compared to Jan. 29 (16,077 points).
March 6: Hong Kong Secretary for Justice Paul Lam Ting-kwok responded to a Bloomberg article claiming that social media apps like Telegram and Signal would be banned under Article 23 by stating that no social media platforms would be barred under the national security law.
Lam said that Hong Kong is an “international financial and trade center” that “relies heavily on the free flow of information” and criticized the social media ban accusation. The Hong Kong government also stated that it does not plan to ban any social media, video-sharing platforms, or streaming platforms from operating in Hong Kong and slammed the Bloomberg report as “fake news.”
Western criticism
Feb. 28
United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron “strongly urged” the Hong Kong government to “re-consider their proposals and engage in genuine and meaningful consultation with the people of Hong Kong” over Article 23.
“As a co-signatory to the Joint Declaration, the UK has a responsibility to ensure that those rights and freedoms are maintained,” Cameron added.
Feb. 29
U.S. State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said in a statement about Article 23 that the U.S. is “particularly concerned by Hong Kong authorities’ proposal to adopt broad and vague definitions of ‘state secrets’ and ‘external interference’ that could be used to eliminate dissent through the fear of arrest and detention.”
Miller added that the U.S. is concerned that the Hong Kong government will “apply Article 23 extraterritorially in their ongoing campaign of transnational repression to intimidate and restrict the free speech of U.S. citizens and residents.”
Miller added that enacting “additional national security legislation with vaguely defined provisions and purported extraterritorial reach would further violate the PRC’s international commitments and undermine the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ framework.”
March 1
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade noted in a statement on Article 23 that Australia is concerned that the legislation will “further the erosion of rights and freedoms as guaranteed under the Basic Law and Sino-British Joint Declaration which has occurred since the imposition of the National Security Law.”
Australia is also concerned “by potential efforts to curtail the rights and freedoms of people outside of Hong Kong, including those living in Australia.”
Zhang Xiaoming dismissed
On March 2, the fifth meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference dismissed Zhang Xiaoming as deputy secretary-general of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC.
Zhang, 61, previously served in the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus for many years before moving to the CPPCC. In the earlier part of his career, Zhang served as secretary to Liao Hui, a Jiang Zemin faction official who was the former director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office. After Jiang faction number two and former Politburo Standing Committee member Zeng Qinghong headed the Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs in 2003, Zhang was promoted to deputy director of the HKMAO the following year.
In December 2012, Zhang Xiaoming was appointed as director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office and joined the Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs. In September 2017, Zhang succeeded Wang Guangya as director of HKMAO.
In February 2020, Party Central upgraded the Central Coordination Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs to the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs. Xia Baolong, who was then a vice chairman and secretary-general of the National Committee of the CPPCC, was appointed director of the office of the central leading group. Meanwhile, Zhang Xiaoming was demoted to HKMAO deputy director with responsibilities over daily operations, as well as deputy secretary of the HKMAO Party group (ministerial level). In June 2022, Zhang was transferred to the National Committee of the CPPCC.
Our take
1. Hong Kong’s domestic security law is intended to complement the one imposed by Beijing in 2020 in the wake of the anti-extradition bill protests.
In tracking the key incidents leading up to the legislating of Article 23, it appeared that the Hong Kong government and Beijing had essentially “slow-walked” the passage of a domestic security bill for about three years since the PRC-imposed National Security Law. We believe that there are several possible reasons for this:
- Beijing was working to improve relations with the United States and other countries to lower geopolitical pressures against the PRC and buy time for the regime to rescue the economy. To that end, Beijing toned down its “wolf warrior” policy and stepped up traditional diplomacy to “meet the requirements of the new situation.” Beijing likely also believed that delaying Article 23 would help “rehabilitate” the PRC’s image abroad.
- Beijing was looking to court Taiwan towards “peaceful reunification” and influence the outcome of the 2024 Taiwan presidential election in its favor. In theory, delaying Article 23 would leave Taiwanese less alarmed about the PRC’s treatment of Hong Kong and more inclined to vote pro-Beijing candidates to office.
- The Jiang faction could still have important influence over the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus. If so, Xi Jinping needed time to install his allies and loyalists (e.g. replacing Jiang faction official with Xi confidant Ding Xuexiang as head of the Central Leading Group on Hong Kong and Macau Affairs at the 20th Party Congress in 2022) in the apparatus and rebalance power networks before feeling comfortable enough to have the Hong Kong government pass Article 23 and minimize the risk that Jiang forces take advantage of the domestic national law to undermine the Xi camp’s interests and agenda.
- Xi is keeping the “Falun Gong card” in play against the Jiang faction (see here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here).
Recent changes relating to some combination of the reasons above have likely changed the Xi leadership’s calculations and caused the Hong Kong government to accelerate the legislation of Article 23:
- Beijing’s efforts at diplomacy have not improved its perception much, particularly due to the PRC’s unwillingness to renounce its “no limits” partnership with Russia and fears that the People’s Liberation Army will invade Taiwan as conditions deteriorate for the PRC (we do not subscribe to this view). As such, the Xi leadership could have weighed that the passage of Article 23 will have negligible impact on how the international community already views the PRC and there is no point in delaying it.
- The 2024 Taiwan elections concluded with an acceptable outcome for Beijing.
- The Xi leadership could have brought the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus more closely under its control and further weakened Jiang faction influence. Zhang Xiaoming’s early dismissal from the National Committee of the CPPCC is particularly noteworthy; as a ministerial-level official, Zhang should have retired at 65 and was prematurely removed at 61. If Zhang Xiaoming is being investigated, this indicates that the Xi leadership is moving to eliminate the remnant Jiang faction.
- Xi Jinping has less reason to keep the “Falun Gong card” in Hong Kong as the Jiang faction fades and he further strengthens authoritarianism in Hong Kong and the regime.
2. Another possible reason why Article 23 is being accelerated at this time is because Xi Jinping believes that he faces heightened political risks from both domestic and foreign enemies, and wants to be able to bring things under control in Hong Kong if the situation calls for it. We previously analyzed that part of the reason why Beijing passed the Hong Kong National Security Law in 2020 was to prevent the region from becoming an anti-CCP and anti-Xi base; rumors circulating during that period indicated that Party princelings were financially supporting the anti-extradition bill movement.
The Xi leadership is currently making moves that increase the chances of pushback from the “anti-Xi coalition.” Beijing has made cleaning up corruption in the financial system a priority, and the Ministry of State Security has been warning “foreign forces” against shorting China. Meanwhile, “anti-Xi” forces in the mainland are at risk of losing their wealth and assets in Hong Kong following anti-corruption investigations with the Mainland Civil and Commercial Judgements (Mutual Enforcement) Ordinance and Rules coming into effect on Jan. 29, 2024 and the Hong Kong High Court ordering the liquidation of China Evergrande.
As mainland “anti-Xi” forces feel increasingly threatened by the Xi leadership, they could be incentivized to make unprecedented moves such as upsetting Beijing’s market stabilization efforts and other “perish together” measures. Foreign “anti-Xi” forces could work with those in the mainland to undermine Xi; the bulk of northbound funds into the Chinese stock market comes from Hong Kong.
3. If factional struggle and preserving political security are primary factors behind the Xi leadership’s urgency in legislating Article 23, then there is a chance that the Hong Kong government will be very careful in how it uses the domestic security law in targeting various groups to avoid attracting unwanted trouble and attention towards Beijing. To that end, the Hong Kong authorities could tolerate dissident groups like Falun Gong that were persecuted when the Jiang faction was dominant while Beijing fries bigger fish and continues to retain the “Falun Gong card” in case it is needed.
One of the key reasons behind the Hong Kong people’s opposition to Article 23 when pro-Beijing lawmakers floated its passage in 2003 was to prevent the CCP from exporting the Falun Gong persecution campaign to the city. However, the CCP appeared to be more accommodating towards Falun Gong in Hong Kong starting in the latter half of Xi’s second term in office, likely on account of reasons owing to factional struggle. Examples of Beijing’s tolerance include:
- Hong Kong courts issued several rulings and judgments in favor of Falun Gong practitioners, and the Hong Kong police apprehended pro-Beijing thugs who targeted Falun Gong in the territory. These developments were previously unheard of.
- The Hong Kong Youth Care Association, a notorious anti-Falun Gong organization that had been operating for more than a decade, disbanded in December 2020.
- Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong are still permitted to conduct limited public activities like group meditation and the distribution of flyers.
In the long run, the passage of Article 23 still poses a threat to Falun Gong in Hong Kong, as well as other persecuted groups, even if Beijing is not actively targeting those groups at the moment. This will remain the case as long as the CCP continues to rule China.
2 Analyzing an allegation of links between Jiang Mianheng and PLA corruption
Dajiyuan (Chinese edition of The Epoch Times) published on March 12 an interview with Yuan Hongbing, an Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist with channels to sources inside the CCP, where he provided insider information about why the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee has yet to be convened.
From Yuan’s revelations, factional struggle appears to be a primary reason behind why the Third Plenum has not been held. First, investigations into former foreign minister Qin Gang and former defense minister Li Shangfu have implicated an increasing number of high-level officials, including those in the foreign ministry, the defense ministry, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force, Strategic Support Force, as well as senior executives in the PRC defense industry. Many of these implicated senior officials and executives are from the Xi camp. Second, PLASSF commander Ju Qiansheng and former PLARF political commissar Xu Zhongbo allegedly revealed that Jiang Zemin’s elder son Jiang Mianheng is directly involved in the PLA corruption scandal.
Yuan said that the CCP authorities believe that the implicated senior officials and Jiang Mianheng formed a political clique based on economic corruption, collusion, and power-for-money deals. Jiang and the implicated officials had privately criticized Xi Jinping’s incompetent governance during some non-organizational activities (i.e. events and gatherings not organized by the CCP). Yuan added that the military corruption case, which started as disloyalty towards Xi Jinping from within his own camp, has evolved into a major incident involving Jiang Mianheng and the remnants of the Jiang faction.
Yuan said that the Qin Gang and Li Shangfu cases have not been concluded because the number of individuals being implicated in connection with them is still increasing and Xi Jinping has yet to decide on how to proceed. Yuan added that Xi is undecided on whether to use the cases to thoroughly purge Jiang Zemin politically (i.e. officially denounce Jiang and remove his political theory), and Xi’s hesitation is why the Third Plenum has not yet been convened.
Yuan analyzed that Xi’s greatest crisis and dilemma at present is suddenly finding himself surrounded by “two-faced” individuals. This includes the bulk of the bureaucratic team that he has nurtured and senior officials like Qin Gang and Li Shangfu who allegedly formed political cliques with Jiang Mianheng behind the scenes.
Timeline of official military corruption events
May 2023: Hong Kong media began reporting on investigations into corruption involving senior officers of the PLARF.
July 2023: The PLA Equipment Development Department announced the soliciting of information regarding “equipment procurement and bidding irregularities” since October 2017. This suggested that a campaign to rectify corruption involving equipment procurement tenders had begun.
July 2023 to February 2024: The Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress and the 14th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference revoked as deputies from their respective bodies several top military officers and defense industry executives. According to Hong Kong and overseas Chinese language media, several of the deputies who were removed had either been dismissed or were placed under investigation.
Jan. 29, 2024: PLASSF commander Ju Qiansheng attended an NPC inspection meeting in Guiyang City, Guizhou Province. Earlier rumors claimed that Ju was under investigation.
March 2024: Former PLARF political commissar Xu Zhongbo and Ju Qiansheng both participated in Two Sessions meetings as part of the military delegation, a sign that both officials were likely afforded a “soft landing” if they were in trouble per the rumors.
Meanwhile, NPC spokesman Lou Qinjian told reporters that former defense minister Li Shangfu is no longer a deputy to the NPC. However, Li’s name still appears on the official list of deputies on the NPC website.
Our take
1. Yuan Hongbing’s information, like his earlier disclosure about “second generation reds” mobilizing against Xi Jinping, is impossible to independently verify.
However, Yuan’s revelation of political instability in the CCP elite is in line with what can be discerned from various public developments since the second half of 2023, including:
- Xi visited Xinjiang almost immediately after returning from the BRICS summit in South Africa near the end of August 2023, an unusual move.
- Xi skipped a G20 leader’s summit in India in September 2023 and sent PRC premier Li Qiang in his stead.
- Xi inspected the Fengqiao Experience Exhibition Hall in Shaoxing City when he was in Zhejiang Province for the Asian Games in September 2023.
- Xi met with representatives from 104 work units that were selected for their “Fengqiao Experience-style Work Method” at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
- Xi intensified anti-corruption efforts in 2023 and continued to emphasize “self-revolution” at the third plenary session of the 20th CCDI in January 2024.
- Several retired senior military officers from the Jiang faction’s era of dominance were among the attendees of a cultural event in Beijing for retired and veteran military officials on Jan. 30. Xi joined the event and extended Chinese New Year greetings to the military cadres present.
- Xi further marginalized the “collective leadership” model at the 2024 Two Sessions with moves to place the State Council firmly under Party leadership.
The information provided by Yuan seems to come from sources aligned with the Xi camp because the Jiang faction is directly implicated in it. Different factions within the CCP have long been known to leak “damaging information” about each other to overseas media and external parties as they struggle against each other.
2. The allegation that Jiang Mianheng is linked with the recent corruption investigation in the military is not far-fetched considering that Jiang likely had close interactions with senior military officials and defense industry executives when he was involved in the PRC’s aerospace program:
- When Jiang Mianheng was vice president of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, he also served as deputy commander of the Shenzhou 5 space program. Jiang also served as chief scientist of the “Chuang Xing 1” microsatellite program and as deputy group leader of the China Lunar Exploration Project (also known as the Chang’e Project) in 2007. In 2008, Jiang served as deputy commander of the Shenzhou 7 human spaceflight mission.
- Li Shangfu began his career with the PLA in 1982 as a technician at the Xichang Satellite Launch Center. In 2003, he became director of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center and later served as commander of the Chang’e 2 mission launch site command. As director of the Xichang Satellite Launch Center, Li would very likely have had opportunities to work with or interact with Jiang Mianheng on occasion.
- Of the military officials who are being investigated, Lieutenant General Zhang Zhenzhong previously served as chief of staff, deputy director, and director (commander) of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center. Lieutenant General Zhang Yulin also served as director (commander) of the Jiuquan Satellite Launch Center from 2004 to 2008, or the period when Jiang Mianheng was involved with the PRC’s space program.
- A number of the military officials currently being investigated are with the PLA’s Equipment Development Department. The General Armaments Department, which preceded the EDD, had several space launch sites under its jurisdiction and was long known to be under the control of the Jiang faction.
3. If Yuan Hongbing’s information is mostly accurate, then intra-Party factional struggle is likely currently quite intense and is set to further intensify. Xi Jinping’s political situation is also likely much less secure than appearances suggest.
Fear of pushback from political rivals could be one of the driving factors behind the Hong Kong government’s rush to legislate Article 23 and why Xi appears to still be keeping the “Falun Gong card” in play. It cannot be ruled out that Xi eventually decides to move hard and fast against the remnant Jiang faction for his own safety and criticize Jiang’s “incorrect political line” in searching for a scapegoat to blame for the many woes currently plaguing China.
