Appearance of SSF commander, removal of defense industry scientist offer insights into PLA anti-corruption probe; what Xi’s meeting with retired military cadres say about his control over the PLA

  1   Appearance of SSF commander, removal of defense industry scientist offer insights into PLA anti-corruption probe

Jan. 29
1. Local official media in Guizhou reported that the Fourth Inspection Team consisting of National People’s Congress deputies belonging to the People’s Liberation Army held a centralized inspection meeting in Guiyang City. The inspection team included representatives from the Central Military Commission’s discipline inspection and supervision units, the Strategic Support Force, PLA National Defense University, and other military units.

Guizhou official media footage of the meeting showed that Strategic Support Force commander Ju Qiansheng and Zheng Weiping, a vice-chairperson of the National People’s Congress Education, Science, Culture and Public Health Committee and former Strategic Support Force political commissar (August 2017 to December 2020) were in attendance.

Subsequently, the social media accounts of official mainland media deleted their content where Ju Qiansheng was spotted and left only the official press release about the meeting.

***
Ju Qiansheng’s appearance at the meeting in Guizhou caught the attention of observers as he was rumored to have been placed under investigation or was facing an uncertain future. The rumors and speculation about Ju emerged after observers noticed that he had not participated in public events that military leaders were supposed to attend for nearly half a year, including the reception for the 96th anniversary of the founding of the CCP on July 31, 2023.

Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist Yuan Hongbing told New Tang Dynasty Television in a program on Jan. 19 that the recent rectification of the PLA allegedly began with Ju Qiansheng. Yuan claimed that Ju was a key purge target because he was considered to be a “two-faced person” who is “absolutely disloyal politically.”

Yuan said that he learned from Party insiders that Ju Qiansheng allegedly showed a particularly cooperative attitude when confessing his guilt and made thorough disclosures. Party insiders claimed that Ju gave up all his private communications where he expressed dissatisfaction towards Xi Jinping, and those communications were what led to a large-scale crackdown in the PLA.

2. State broadcaster CCTV reported that Wang Xiaojun was removed as a representative of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference at the 13th chairman meeting of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC.

Wang, 54, is a scientist who led the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology. Wang is known for working on the PRC’s space program and in leading the development of the Long March 7 rockets.

The China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, which is also known as the First Research Institute of China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (中國航太科技集團有限公司第一研究院), is affiliated with the state-run China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). The CASC is the PRC’s largest missile weapons and launch vehicle development, testing, and production center.

  Backdrop

The Xi leadership has been “rectifying” the PLA, and especially the PLA Rocket Force, since the second half of 2023, or around the time that former defense minister Li Shangfu “vanished.”

In December 2023, the NPC and CPPCC revoked the seats of nine military generals and three senior executives in the PRC’s defense industry. The executives that were purged previously served at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation.

  Our take

1. How to read Ju Qiansheng’s public appearance in Guizhou depends on whether or not he was actually investigated as rumored.

If Ju had indeed been probed and if Yuan Hongbing’s claims are accurate, then it is possible that the former’s Guizhou appearance is meant to signal that the Xi leadership has decided to show leniency towards him and afforded him a “soft landing” for cooperating satisfactorily with their investigation.

Xi Jinping stands to benefit by sparing instead of purging Ju Qiansheng. First, Xi could be indicating to other corrupt or disloyal generals and senior officials that they will not be harmed as long as they switch their allegiances and report those who oppose Xi. Second, Xi would be partly refuting rumors of rampant corruption in the military and mass purges by allowing Ju to make public appearances.

Ju attended the meeting in Guizhou with several retired generals. In the scenario where Ju is investigated but was let off, his appearance in the aforementioned manner suggests that the 62-year-old is being tipped to join the National People’s Congress upon his retirement.

If Ju Qiansheng was not probed and the rumors about his being in trouble are inaccurate, then his recent lack of public appearances could be explained by more mundane factors like illness or Ju gradually taking a back seat as he prepares for retirement.

In the event that Ju is preparing to “retreat to the second line” (退居二線) or is probed, the position of Strategic Support Force commander could see a reshuffle in the near future unless Xi Jinping has other plans for the force.

2. The removal of Wang Xiaojun from the CPPCC indicates that the Xi leadership is still in the process of investigating the PRC defense industry and rooting out corrupt elements. Wang’s removal reinforces reports and rumors about major corruption in the PLA Rocket Force.

 

  2   What Xi’s meeting with retired military cadres say about his control over the PLA

Jan. 30
CCP official media and CCTV’s evening primetime “Xinwen Lianbo” program reported that the Central Military Commission held a cultural performance in Beijing to celebrate the upcoming Lunar New Year and extend well wishes to retired and veteran military cadres based in the capital.

Xi Jinping attended the performance and extended greetings to the retired and veteran military cadres who were present. The five members of the current CMC, some former CMC members, as well as the leaders of relevant units of military committees and units in Beijing were also at the event.

Feb. 1 to Feb. 2
Xi Jinping visited Tianjin for an inspection tour. According to official mainland media, Xi was accompanied by Tianjin Party Secretary Chen Min’er and Tianjin mayor Zhang Gong, as well as Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi and Politburo members Li Ganjie, He Weidong, and He Lifeng, when he visited rural parts of the city, historical and cultural districts, and the revolutionary memorial hall. Mainland media added that Xi interacted with grassroots cadres and the masses in Tianjin, and extended Lunar New Year greetings to them.

  Backdrop

Negative rumors concerning Xi Jinping and his allies have been continually swirling in Chinese-speaking circles. Some notable rumors include:

  • Xi is allegedly suffering from pancreatic cancer or some severe illness, as evidenced by his weight loss.
  • Xi is investigating current CMC vice chair Zhang Youxia and former CMC vice chair Xu Qiliang, both of whom are his political allies.
  • Party princelings opposed to Xi reached a “three-point political consensus” critical of Xi (see here and here).

  Our take

1. Footage from official PRC media shows that a number of the retired and veteran military cadres who attended the cultural performance in Beijing served on the CMC during the period between Xi Jinping’s appointment as CMC vice chair at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and his third term as CCP leader at the 20th Party Congress.

Except for Li Shangfu, all members of the current CMC attended the performance.

Former CMC members who attended the performance include:

  • Liang Guanglie (age 83), a member of the 16th and 17th CMC and former defense minister.
  • Li Jinai (82), a member of the 16th and 17th CMC and former director-general of the PLA General Political Department.
  • Chen Bingde (82), a member of the 16th and 17th CMC and former chief of the PLA General Staff Department.
  • Chang Wanquan (75), a member of the 17th and 18th CMC and former defense minister.
  • Fan Changlong (74), a member of the 18th CMC and former CMC vice chairman.
  • Zhao Keshi (76), a member of the 18th CMC and former director of the CMC Logistic Support Department.
  • Xu Qiliang (73), a member of the 18th and 19th CMC and former CMC vice chairman.
  • Li Zuocheng (70), a member of the 19th CMC and former chief of the CMC Joint Staff Department.

Former CMC members who were not present at the performance include:

  • Liao Xilong (83), a member of the 16th and 17th CMC and former head of the PLA General Logistics Department.
  • Jing Zhiyuan (79), a member of the 16th and 17th CMC and former commander of the Second Artillery Corps.
  • Wu Shengli (78), a member of the 18th CMC and former commander of the PLA Navy.
  • Wei Fenghe (75), a member of the 18th and 19th CMC and former defense minister.
  • Ma Xiaotian (75), a member of the 18th CMC and former commander of the PLA Air Force.
  • Fang Fenghui (72), a member of the 18th CMC and former chief of joint staff who was purged in 2017.
  • Zhang Yang, a member of the 18th CMC and former director-general of the CMC Political Work Department who was purged in 2017 and later committed suicide that year.

The attendance of Xu Qiliang and Zhang Youxia at the cultural performance at least partially refutes rumors that Xi Jinping is having them investigated. And even if Xi’s allies in the military are being probed, their continued public appearance suggests that they have not been found guilty of disloyalty towards Xi or serious corruption (this does not mean that they are not actually corrupt, but rather that Xi does not consider their corruption to have sufficiently set the regime back).

Meanwhile, the attendance of former high-ranking military officials from the Jiang faction’s era of dominance such as Liang Guanglie, Chen Bingde, Chang Wanquan, and Li Jinai is noteworthy. On one level, the presence of those Jiang faction generals suggests that the influence of the faction in the military today is not insignificant. On another level, Xi could be looking to co-opt the lingering Jiang faction elements in the military and “use” them for his own political purposes, such as demonstrating to “anti-Xi” Party princelings that he retains broad inter-factional support among veteran and retired military cadres.

We believe that there are several possible reasons why some retired senior generals did not attend the cultural performance. Poor health is a factor that cannot be ruled out, especially given the advanced ages of some of those cadres. Some could possibly be investigated as per circulating rumors, including Wu Shengli and Wei Fenghe.

2. The photos and footage of Xi Jinping at the cultural performance suggest that he has either trimmed down a little or is wearing a better-tailored uniform that makes him look slimmer. And while Xi was walking a little slowly when he entered the auditorium where the cultural performance was held, his stability did not appear to be impaired. Official media content of Xi on his inspection tour in Tianjin also did not reveal that his health was impaired.

It is difficult to discern whether Xi is suffering from cancer or other serious illnesses solely from scrutinizing photos and footage of him from official media. Unless more credible signs that Xi is suffering from poor health emerge, the rumors that he has a serious illness are currently speculative at best.

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