1 Xi’s call for more ‘self-revolution’ hints at brewing political troubles
January 8 to January 10
The CCP held the third plenary session of the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection.
1. Xi Jinping delivered a speech at the plenary session. Noteworthy parts of the speech include:
- Xi stressed that he had carried out a strong anti-corruption effort during his decade in charge. However, the “fight against corruption has achieved an overwhelming victory and has been comprehensively consolidated, but the situation remains severe and complex.”
- Xi pledged to “resolutely win the tough and protracted battle against corruption.”
- Xi said that during his 10 years in power, he had practiced and explored “self-revolution” as the CCP’s second answer to “escaping the historical cycle of rise and fall.”
- Xi said that it is necessary to strengthen the Party’s centralized and unified leadership in the fight against corruption.
- Xi emphasized the necessity of continuing to maintain a high-pressure posture in punishing corruption:
- In the face of a situation that is still severe and complex, the CCP must never look back, relax, or be merciful in the fight against corruption. The CCP must also “always sound the bugle.”
- The strict punishment of corruption connected to political and business collusion is a top priority in the war of attrition. The CCP must resolutely crack down on profit-seeking capital that has the backing of political power and resolutely prevent various interest groups and power groups from penetrating the political field.
- Deepen the rectification of corruption in areas where power is concentrated, capital is intensive, and resources are abundant, including the financial sector, state-owned enterprises, energy, medicine, and infrastructure projects. Eliminate hidden risks.
- Xi said there was a need to improve anti-corruption laws and regulations further.
- Xi said that it was necessary to increase the punishment for bribery cases.
- Xi called for persisting in purifying the political ecology:
- Have strict political discipline and rules.
- Resolutely prevent the establishment of “small circles” (小圈子, i.e. forming cliques and factions), “[officials] paying calls to powerful figures in a locale where one has newly arrived” (拜碼頭) and “lower level officials clinging to higher level officials for relations” (搭天線), and effectively crack down on all kinds of political swindlers.
- Strictly prevent bringing the principle of commodity exchange (i.e. exchange of benefits for corruption purposes) into the Party.
- Xi stressed the need to strengthen the construction of disciplinary inspection and supervisory cadres, and eliminate “black sheeps” regularly.
In presiding over the meeting, CCDI head Li Xi touted the importance of Xi’s comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and “self-revolution” to the regime’s development. Li also called for the in-depth study of and implementation of the “spirit” of Xi’s speeches and the “important thought of self-revolution,” and to firmly support Xi.
2. State mouthpiece Xinhua published the communiqué of the third plenary session of the 20th CCDI.
The communiqué said that the CCDI plenary session “carefully studied” and “deeply understood” Xi Jinping’s important speech at the meeting, and heaped praise on Xi’s political theory of “self-revolution.”
The communiqué said that the plenary session reviewed the anti-corruption work in 2023 and that the anti-corruption agencies had:
- Studied and understood “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” with “heart and soul.”
- Continued to deepen the anti-corruption struggle.
- Seriously investigated and dealt with corruption in the areas of finance, state-owned enterprises, universities, sports, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, food purchases and sales, statistics, etc.
- Resolutely eliminated systemic corruption risks and comprehensively consolidated the hard-won “overwhelming victory” against corruption.
The communiqué said that the plenary session proposed that anti-corruption work in 2024 should be guided by “Xi Jinping Thought” and safeguard Xi’s various political theories (“Two Establishes,” “four consciousness,” “four self-confidences,” “Two Safeguards,” etc.). The plenary session also listed eight key points for anti-corruption agencies, including:
- Highlight “Xi Jinping Thought” themed education for personnel at anti-corruption agencies.
- Highlight the political supervision of the “Two Safeguards.”
- Highlight the struggle against corruption.
- Continue to focus on key issues, key areas, key targets, new types of corruption, and hidden corruption.
- Prioritize the punishment of corruption involving collusion between politics and business as a key area of a protracted battle.
- Seriously investigate and deal with corruption in the areas of finance, state-owned enterprises, universities, sports, tobacco, pharmaceuticals, infrastructure projects, and bidding and tendering.
- Resolutely punish corruption that affects the masses.
- Concentrate on rectifying cross-border corruption issues.
- Highlight the implementation of Xi’s Eight-point Regulation.
- Highlight the construction of Party discipline.
- Highlight inspection and supervision.
- Highlight institutional reform and system construction of anti-corruption agencies.
- Highlight the “self-revolution” of anti-corruption agencies.
Backdrop
1. In December 2023, the National People’s Congress removed nine generals and the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference removed three senior executives from the PRC’s defense industrial base. We analyzed that the development meant that corruption in the PLA and defense industries in the PLA is very serious.
2. Rumors emerge that “second generation reds” had prepared a statement to express opposition to Xi Jinping and reform the CCP.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping drops several hints in his speech to the third plenary session of the 20th CCDI that his anti-corruption campaign has not been as effective as touted in Party propaganda and that factional struggle is still ongoing.
For instance:
- Xi believes that the anti-corruption situation remains “severe and complex,” that he needs to “resolutely win the tough and protracted battle against corruption” (i.e. the battle is far from over), that it is necessary to adopt a “high-pressure posture in punishing corruption,” and that “self-revolution” must continue. Xi is not likely to exaggerate the corruption situation just for the sake of perpetuating a “forever campaign” to keep his grip on power in light of recent revelations of severe corruption in the military.
- Xi indirectly signaled that he is going after the so-called “independent kingdoms” of the CCP political and business elite by calling for a more thorough “rectification” of areas where “power is concentrated, capital is intensive, and resources are abundant, including the financial sector, state-owned enterprises, energy, medicine, and infrastructure projects.”
- Xi’s call to “purify the political ecology” hints at the continuation of factional politics in the CCP regime despite Beijing’s attempts to stamp it out. Therefore, Xi has urged a crackdown on “political swindlers” and the elimination of “black sheeps.”
2. The communiqué of the 20th CCDI’s third plenary session sought to shore up Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” and the importance of the anti-corruption campaign by emphasizing the following points:
- Xi’s political theory of “self-revolution” and rectification efforts play an important and legitimate role in ensuring the survival of the CCP regime.
- Anti-corruption agencies must safeguard Xi’s “quan wei” and obey his orders.
- Anti-corruption agencies must focus on cracking down on corruption concerning political and business collusion, as well as in other key areas.
Through its emphasis, the communiqué indirectly reveals that Xi is relying on intimidation and indoctrination to get the anti-corruption agencies to preserve his “quan wei.” Also, corruption is serious in not just key areas of the regime, but in the anti-corruption agencies themselves. Hence, Xi is subjecting the anti-corruption agencies to “self-revolution” and looking to further expose its personnel to political indoctrination to retain his control over a vital tool of power maintenance.
3. The Xi leadership may find tackling corruption in the military to be a particularly steep challenge.
For one, the Jiang Zemin faction deeply entrenched corruption in the People’s Liberation Army when Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou served as vice chairs of the Central Military Commission and essentially “normalized” practices such as bribery for promotion and graft in the equipment department. Xi has attempted to dampen the effects of corruption and factional politics on the PLA’s operations by picking and promoting to high positions and ranks officers whose careers had more or less stagnated during the Jiang faction’s era of dominance (i.e. they are less likely to have bribed their way up the ranks or were not in the Jiang faction’s favor). But the fall of Li Shangfu and others who were appointed to high office in part owing to Xi’s personnel selection “method” suggests that the “method” has limited viability in curbing corruption in the military even if it does help to a degree with factional politics.
The Xi leadership could also find it hard to root out corruption given the “patron-client” aspect of political operations in the CCP regime. For instance, new generals who rise to top office are less inclined to expose their predecessors lest they end up harming their own interests in the long run by exposing large deficits in military expenditures and equipment issues. The new generals are therefore more likely to conceal the true extent of corruption in the PLA and even continue various corrupt activities more subtly. Such practices are likely to persist until they have been brought to Xi’s attention such as in the cases of Li Shangfu and the PLA Rocket Force.
4. Xi’s strengthening of the anti-corruption campaign seems to suggest that his grip on power is secure. However, the more Xi takes the campaign into “deep-water territory,” “turns the knife inward,” and “scrapes poison from bone,” the more he is threatening the fundamental interests of the Party’s political and business elites. Xi also risks “uniting” various political groups within the CCP against him (factional rivals like the Jiang faction, Party princelings, Xi’s allies who have become paranoid after the purge of Qin Gang and Li Shangfu, etc.) as they all begin to fear that Xi will ultimately come for them and their interests.
We previously analyzed: “If Xi suspects or believes that his being forced to order probes into his own allies and loyalists is the work of the remnant Jiang Zemin faction or other ‘anti-Xi’ forces in the Party elite, then Xi could decide to play hardball and ‘perish together’ (同歸於盡) with his enemies by expanding the anti-corruption campaign to target previously ‘untouchable’ groups like the princelings, CCP elders like Zeng Qinghong, and lingering ‘anti-Xi’ elements in the military (including princeling-controlled military industrial enterprises like China Poly Group). By taking out both his factional enemies and allies, however, Xi would be generating immense political instability in the regime and would undermine the CCP’s own political legitimacy to the point that preserving the Party’s rule becomes untenable.”
2 CCP in ‘panic’ after alleged princeling ‘warning’ to Xi?
Jan. 8
In an interview with overseas Chinese language media outlet Dajiyuan (Chinese language edition of The Epoch Times), Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist Yuan Hongbing claimed that the CCP was in a “panic” after his Liberty Times piece about Party elites opposing Xi Jinping and calling for reform was published.
Yuan said that the CCP authorities dare not publicly deny the piece for fear of internal backlash, and that the authorities are also thinking of using CCP-infiltrated forces overseas to repudiate the information in his piece. Yuan added that the CCP authorities had tried to get some “second generation reds” to reject Yuan’s revelations, but none of them had done so.
Yuan Hongbing said that he learned of the information in his Liberty Times piece at the end of October 2023 and was told that it was authentic in November 2023. Yuan added that the “second generation reds” had “spoken out to the outside world” in the manner in which they did because Xi is controlling all channels where regime information is released externally through high-tech means and spy networks.
Yuan added that Xi took three actions after learning about the “second generation reds’” move at the end of October 2023:
- Xi comprehensively promoted the “Fengqiao Experience” — the CCP’s attempt to create a “class dictatorship” for the purposes of “maintaining social stability” — to intimidate the “second generation reds.”
- Xi commemorated Mao Zedong in a high-profile manner and gave him an unprecedentedly good evaluation. The PRC authorities also allowed tens of thousands of people to hold a rally in memory of Mao in the Shaoshan area. Yuan claimed that this was Xi’s way of warning the “second generation red” that he would use “Cultural Revolution means” to deal with them when necessary.
- Xi requested that some “second generation reds” publicly deny their statement against him.
Our take
It is impossible to authenticate Yuan Hongbing’s information about “second generation reds” opposing Xi Jinping and Xi’s efforts to counter the opposition.
On the one hand, several public developments before and after the end of October 2023, or when Yuan allegedly received his information, seem to indicate that there was political instability within the CCP elite around that period and appear to track with Yuan’s claims. Those developments include:
- Xi visited Xinjiang almost immediately after returning from the BRICS summit in South Africa near the end of August 2023, an unusual move.
- Xi skipped a G20 leader’s summit in India in September 2023 and sent PRC premier Li Qiang in his stead.
- Xi inspected the Fengqiao Experience Exhibition Hall in Shaoxing City when he was in Zhejiang Province for the Asian Games in September 2023.
- Xi met with representatives from 104 work units that were selected for their “Fengqiao Experience-style Work Method” at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
- Xi intensified anti-corruption efforts in 2023 and continued to emphasize “self-revolution” at the third plenary session of the 20th CCDI in January 2024 (see first item in this newsletter).
In our Aug. 31, 2023 newsletter, we analyzed that Xi could have made his unusual trip to Xinjiang “due to considerations of personal security. For instance, if Xi had caught wind of an assassination plot or other threats to his person while he was in South Africa, he could have taken a leaf out of Mao Zedong’s book and made an ‘unexpected’ and rapid detour to Xinjiang to foil the plans of his enemies.” In the same newsletter, we also wrote that we had obtained information from sources with knowledge of the matter that “Xi Jinping is greatly concerned about the possibility of assassination attempts against him, and has placed heightened importance on ensuring his personal safety.”
On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that Yuan Hongbing’s information was seeded by “anti-Xi” forces to further their political mobilization and factional struggle efforts. For instance, it would not be too hard for “anti-Xi” forces to examine what Xi has done before retroactively fitting an alleged challenge against Xi Jinping to fit their narrative. We previously analyzed that “‘anti-Xi elements in the Party elite and abroad could be looking to shape the external information environment to become even more unfavorable to Xi Jinping and create opportunities to force leadership change in the PRC. Such a move by Xi’s enemies could eventually lead to serious political instability in the CCP elite even if there is only minimal instability at the present.”
Regardless, Yuan’s information about a supposed “three-point political consensus” by the “second generation red” suggests that the political situation in the CCP is likely far less stable than appearances show and Xi’s political risks are increasing. Xi is also creating a vicious cycle in strengthening his anti-corruption campaign; the harder he cracks down on officials in the regime, the more fearful his factional rivals and the CCP bureaucracy would become of him, which would in turn incentivize “anti-Xi” forces to make desperate moves against the PRC leader.
