1 Why the CCP’s nationalism card over Fukushima discharge will backfire
Aug. 22
Sun Weidong, the PRC vice foreign minister, summoned the Japanese ambassador to China Hideo Tarumi to make “solemn representations” about Japan’s plan to discharge slightly radioactive wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean.
Sun accused Japan of “putting self-interest above the long-term well-being of the people in the region and the world” and that the ocean discharge was “extremely selfish and irresponsible.” He added that the PRC expressed “serious concerns and strong opposition.”
Aug. 24
1. Japan went ahead with its plan to discharge Fukushima wastewater into the ocean. The plan would see Japan release more than 1.3 million tons of water with small amounts of radioactive tritium over about 30 years.
The International Atomic Energy Agency had approved Japan’s plan in early July. Both Japan and the IAEA said that the discharges would be similar to those of other nations that operate nuclear power plants, including China. The quantity of tritium from the Fukushima discharge would also be less than those of Chinese plants.
2. The PRC General Administration of Customs announced that it would be completely suspending aquatic imports (including fish and shellfish) from Japan. Previously, the PRC had banned food imports from Fukushima and the prefecture’s surrounding regions.
China is the world’s biggest purchaser of Japanese seafood, importing more than a fifth of the latter’s aquatic exports in value in 2022.
Aug. 28
Masataka Okano, Japan’s vice foreign minister, summoned PRC ambassador to Japan Wu Jianghao to protest China’s import restrictions on Japanese aquatic products over the Fukushima discharge plan.
Okano said that the PRC should properly inform the public “rather than unnecessarily raising people’s concerns by providing information that is not based on scientific evidence.”
Okano also told Wu, “Since the start of the discharge… there have been numerous phone calls and other harassment regarding the discharge that are suspected of originating from China. The situation has not improved since then.”
“A number of similar incidents are also happening in China against Japan-related facilities. This is extremely regrettable and we are deeply concerned,” Okano added.
PRC reactions
The CCP authorities’ response to Japan’s plan to discharge Fukushima wastewater panicked the Chinese public and roused anti-Japanese sentiments.
Salt hoarding
Mainland media reported on Aug. 24 that low sodium and non-iodized salt sold out on many Chinese e-commerce platforms. Salt also became a rare commodity on the shelves of major supermarkets in Macau.
The China National Salt Industry Corporation later issued a statement that night noting that people had rushed to buy salt over the Fukushima discharge. The Beijing municipal authorities also urged residents to hold off from panic buying, assuring them that the city has sufficient supply.
Chinese citizens were concerned that the Fukushima discharge could contaminate seawater and affect salt production. Citizens also hoarded salt after the Fukushima nuclear disaster in March 2011 over fears that sea salt could be contaminated and after believing the rumor that iodized salt can protect against nuclear radiation (iodized salt does not provide protection against radioactive iodine and there are health risks in consuming excessive amounts of iodized salt).
Anti-Japanese sentiments
1. Radioactive contamination fears and anti-Japanese sentiments were high on the Chinese internet. Some people discussed on Chinese social media which Japanese cosmetic products to avoid, claiming that they contain radioactive substances. Meanwhile, radiation detection products started selling well.
2. The official Bilibili account of mainland media outlet NetEase News published a message on Aug. 25 about how its editors believe that “we should make preparations early in view of the discharge of nuclear sewage by our neighboring country,” and respond by “not getting married, not having children, not buying cars, not buying houses, and lying flat at home.”
The account was subsequently blocked.
3. According to Japanese news reports, Japanese schools in Qingdao City and Suzhou City were harassed by people throwing stones and eggs on Aug. 24 and Aug. 25.
4. People boycotted Japanese seafood, resulting in Japanese restaurants in mainland China suffering heavy losses and some Japanese restaurants stating that they would stop using ingredients from Japan. The owner of one Japanese restaurant even smashed up his own shop in anger and declared that he would open a Chinese restaurant in the future.
5. Fears of radiation were extended to all seafood and not just Japanese food products. Some netizens carried out acts of cyberbullying against aquatic product merchants.
6. Videos circulating on Chinese social media show people smashing up Japanese brand cars.
7. People made phone calls to harass Japanese companies, interfering with the latter’s business operations.
8. The CCP censors appeared to scrub articles that sought to explain that the Fukushima discharges would contain less radioactive tritium than mandated by international standards:
- Li Jianmang, a scientist who worked at the China Institute of Atomic Energy for eight years and the Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands for five years, published a post on Weibo explaining how annual tritium discharge from Fukushima will contain much less radioactive tritium (30 TBq) as compared to La Hague in France (11,400 TBq) and China’s Daya Nuclear Power Plant (225 TBq). Li added, “You don’t have to trust the Japanese, just trust the UN’s IAEA. The IAEA sent a special observation team to monitor the Fukushima emissions. In addition to experts from other countries, the team includes one Chinese and one South Korean expert.” Li’s Weibo account was blocked soon after he made the post.
- Information that the quantity of tritium from the Fukushima wastewater discharge would be less than those of Chinese plants, as well as information about discharge from the Daya Nuclear Power Plant, disappeared from the Chinese internet around Aug. 24
9. On Aug. 28, information circulating on the Chinese internet claimed that almost all Japanese restaurants in Wuhan City were full and no bookings could be made. A similar situation reportedly arose in other cities.
Big picture
Japan has been increasingly aligning itself with the United States and efforts to counter the CCP regime.
For instance, Japan imposed export controls on 23 types of semiconductor technology on July 23, mirroring similar restrictions imposed by the U.S. and the Netherlands in a move that was widely regarded as targeting the PRC.
And on Aug. 18, Japan strengthened ties with the U.S. and South Korea at a summit at Camp David. The three countries agreed to strengthen security cooperation, as well as criticized the PRC’s “dangerous and aggressive behavior” in the South China Sea and “strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific.”
Our take
1. The CCP authorities appear to have seized upon Japan’s plan to discharge Fukushima wastewater into the Pacific Ocean to retaliate against Tokyo for working more closely with the U.S. and the West in countering the PRC and incite nationalistic sentiments to distract the Chinese people from brewing domestic troubles at home.
However, the CCP risks shooting itself in the foot with its boycott of Japanese products and in playing the nationalism card.
2. The fear generated by the CCP authorities over the Fukushima discharge contaminating seafood will impact not just Japanese seafood imports but the Chinese people’s appetite for seafood in general.
According to the PRC Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Affairs’ 2022 national fishery statistics:
- The fishery industry’s total economic output value amounts to 3.09 trillion yuan. Of the total value, marine fishing output accounts for 248.891 billion yuan, marine aquaculture output at 463.884 billion yuan, freshwater fishing output at 27.670 billion yuan, and freshwater aquaculture output at 786.303 billion yuan. The output value ratio of marine to freshwater products is 46.7 : 53.3.
- The fishery industry has about 16.1945 million people, of which 5.1516 million are traditional fishermen.
- There are 9,331 aquatic product processing enterprises and 8,675 aquatic product cold storages in China. A total of 21.4779 million tons of processed aquatic products were produced in 2022, of which 17.0915 million tons (nearly 80 percent) were seawater processed products.
In other words, the CCP authorities’ “anti-Japanese” move risks affecting to a degree China’s over 700 billion yuan worth of seawater product sales, the livelihoods of more than 5 million fishermen, and nearly 80 percent of the aquaculture processing industry chain. Beijing has already acknowledged that there is “insufficient demand” in China; the Chinese people’s wariness towards seafood in general due to the CCP’s own propaganda will further worsen the consumption problem.
The boycott of Japanese restaurants could bring serious losses to the Chinese economy. A research report by Hua Jing Industry Research Institute in April 2023 found that there were 73,100 Japanese restaurants in China in 2021, with a market size of about 180.25 billion yuan. While food consumption may not be affected too much on the whole as people switch to other restaurants, the boycott could lead to a wave of business closures and seriously impact the industry. Some netizens have already begun mocking the Xi leadership on social media for “successfully destroying another industry” by taking action that sparked the boycotts.
We have not been able to independently verify whether the information on Chinese social media about Japanese restaurants in Wuhan and elsewhere being fully booked is accurate. If true, however, then this suggests that the CCP’s propaganda has backfired in at least some parts of China and local residents are indirectly showing their dissatisfaction towards the regime by eating at those businesses. Such behavior would be akin to the long lines outside the first McDonald’s opened in the Soviet Union in 1990 as the Russian people clamored to experience the “rotten capitalist way of life” that the Communist Party had long criticized, or the Hong Kong people patronizing businesses that supported the anti-extradition bill movement in 2019.
The Chinese people showing support for Japanese businesses contains troubling implications for the CCP regime. Instead of nationalism working to keep the Chinese people focused on an external “enemy” and “stabilizing” society, the CCP authorities are falling further into the Tacitus Trap and are undermining their own “quan wei” (authority and prestige) with their own hands. Growing “passive resistance” by the Chinese people will eventually result in political problems for Beijing.
3. Japan, the U.S., and their allies will see the PRC’s vindictiveness over the Fukushima discharge as affirming their assessment of the CCP threat and the regime’s unwillingness to conform to the rules-based international order. Tokyo would be more inclined to distance itself further from the PRC (including economically) and strengthen ties with South Korea and the West.
The end result of the PRC’s petty bullying of Japan is a deepening of “new cold war” tensions and a worsening of the internal and external crises plaguing the CCP regime.
2 Xi’s post-BRICS Xinjiang visit, political rumors hint at internal challenges
Xi’s recent travels
Aug. 22 – 24
Xi Jinping made an official state visit to South Africa and attended the 2023 BRICS summit in Johannesburg. This was Xi’s second international trip of the year.
Xi was supposed to deliver remarks at a business forum on Aug. 22, but did not show up for the event. Instead, PRC commerce minister Wang Wentao read out the speech that Xi was supposed to give.
Xi’s absence led observers to speculate about what happened to him, including the state of his health and whether Xi had more important domestic matters that required his urgent attention. When asked about Xi’s absence at a regular press conference, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin declined to provide further details.
Aug. 26
Xi visited the Xinjiang region in his first inspection tour since returning from the BRICS summit. In Xinjiang, Xi listened to work reports from the provincial Party Committee and government, as well as the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps. Xi also said that the top priority for Xinjiang is maintaining “hard-won social stability” and stability must be used to “guarantee development.”
Political rumors
Aug. 18
Wu Zuolai, a Chinese political commentator and independent scholar residing in the United States, posted a cryptic message on X (formerly known as Twitter) about what Xi Jinping (referred to in the post as “The Chief”) had allegedly said at Beidaihe.
Noteworthy excerpts from Wu’s post include:
- The Chief lectured officials at Beidaihe one by one, including members of the Politburo Standing Committee.
- The Chief said that he “didn’t want to do [his job] anymore.” He added, “Whoever of you wants to do [my job], do it. I need to take a break. I’m also human. You can find me when you have difficulties, [but] I’m not a god.”
- The Chief said, “Deng [Xiaoping], Jiang [Zemin], and Hu [Jintao] had no sense of responsibility, they passed me the parcel to have it blow up in my hands. Don’t even think about it, I’ll blow up all you b******s with the parcel and none of you can escape; it’s better to blow up the Communist Party [so we can] have a New China. You all are not even communists anymore; blow it up and the Chinese nation will be revived.”
- The Chief bitterly berated the “financial sector, the banks, the real estate developers, and the bureaucrats” for being unconscionable by “emptying the country’s coffers, leaving a pile of debt and a pile of bombs which they dedicate to the Party.”
- The Chief then recited poems by himself on the beach, laughing wildly and cursing “You’re all hostile foreign forces spreading rumors.”
Aug. 22
Beijing-based Chinese dissident and journalist Gao Yu retweeted a post that claimed that Ma Xiaowei, the head of the PRC National Health Commission, was arrested when he was in a ward for senior cadres at the Peking Union Medical College Hospital on Aug. 17. Other rumors claim that Ma was arrested because he disclosed Xi Jinping’s “stroke condition” to CCP elders, and Xi traveled to South Africa to prove that he was not suffering from a stroke.
Xi, however, did not show signs of having suffered from a stroke from the videos of him in South Africa. The National Health Commission also featured Ma Xiaowei in reports on its official website on Aug. 23 and Aug. 29, which can be interpreted as an indirect refutation of rumors that he had been arrested.
Aug. 26
SinoInsider obtained information from sources with knowledge of the matter that Xi Jinping is greatly concerned about the possibility of assassination attempts against him, and has placed heightened importance on ensuring his personal safety.
Backdrop
Around the time of the Beidaihe meeting, the CCP authorities were mishandling flooding in Hebei, while the release of dismal economic data for July and the first half of the year, worsening property sector crisis, and brewing trouble in the shadow banking industry led to a global crisis of confidence (including outflows from the mainland and fewer investments) in China’s growth prospects.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping’s trip to Xinjiang immediately after returning from the BRICS summit in South Africa is somewhat unusual.
One possible reason why Xi made the Xinjiang trip was that he was looking to dispel rumors surrounding his health. The idea of the PRC leader getting right back to dealing with domestic affairs after an international trip builds on the “people’s leader” image crafted by the CCP propaganda apparatus and signals that Xi is full of vigor.
Another possible reason is that Xi is preparing to take bolder anti-corruption moves imminently as part of his effort to perpetuate regime “self-rectification” and eliminate lingering factional enemies. If so, then Xi is covering his bases first by securing the “peripheries” of the regime (see point 4), including traveling to Xinjiang to check on matters in the “stability”-troubled region. By making a personal appearance in Xinjiang, Xi is showing support for his political ally Ma Xingrui and the local authorities there in carrying out their mission.
A third and more speculative possibility sees Xi Jinping making the trip to Xinjiang due to considerations of personal security. For instance, if Xi had caught wind of an assassination plot or other threats to his person while he was in South Africa, he could have taken a leaf out of Mao Zedong’s book and made an “unexpected” and rapid detour to Xinjiang to foil the plans of his enemies. Traveling to Xinjiang at the last minute would also buy time for Xi and his security detail to make new schedule arrangements and stay one step ahead of would-be assailants.
2. The rumor that PRC National Health Commission head Ma Xiaowei is being investigated cannot be completely ruled out given the Xi leadership’s launch of a campaign to rectify the healthcare sector in late July.
For one, it is not unusual for senior officials to still make public appearances even after the emergence of rumors of their being probed. Notably, former security czar Zhou Yongkang made at least three public appearances in 2013 even when there was speculation circulating that the anti-corruption authorities were on to him. For Ma’s case, the NHC’s reports of Aug. 23 and Aug. 29 could possibly be meant to partially dispel rumors that he was being investigated or arrested over revealing damaging information about Xi’s health, while not being solid enough evidence to confirm whether or not Ma was truly out of the woods.
Ma Xiaowei came to his position in March 2018 and almost certainly bears some responsibility for the Xi leadership’s “zero-COVID” policy. Ma could also have been involved with the pharmaceutical and other interest groups that benefited immensely from mass testing and other “zero-COVID” measures. If Xi is thinking about absolving himself of the blame for “zero-COVID,” then Ma is in danger of being sacrificed along with other officials and elements in the healthcare system.
3. Rumors about Xi Jinping’s “insane ravings” from Wu Zuolai and other sources at Beidaihe may not be precise in details, but are likely to be directionally accurate in considering the immense stress that Xi is currently facing and the “inaction” of CCP officials contributing to making matters worse.
Having consolidated power to a very high degree and solidified himself as paramount leader (定於一尊) at the 20th Party Congress, Xi is undoubtedly aware that while he has ultimate authority, he also bears ultimate responsibility for the successes and failures of the CCP regime. With failures heaping up (China’s economy, natural disasters, “zero-COVID,” etc.) and Xi’s orders appearing yet again to not make it past the gates of Zhongnanhai (政令不出中南海), Xi would understandably feel like the whole world has turned against him and his subordinates are trying to do him in by not carrying out their duties. Yet Xi’s intensifying and seemingly endless anti-corruption efforts, including the recent removal of his political allies (see here and here), would only reinforce the inclination of officials to stick with “inaction” as they fear being perceived as “politically incorrect” and offending the Xi leadership to the detriment of their respective careers. The resulting vicious cycle is one where officials become increasingly passive yes-men as they fear retribution from Xi, and Xi becomes increasingly isolated, paranoid, and responsible for the regime’s worsening failures.
There are at least two signs which hint at the seriousness of official “inaction.” First, former Global Times editor-in-chief Hu Xijin brought up the issue of local official “inaction” in an Aug. 21 article. Hu slammed “some localities and departments” for prioritizing the creation of the impression “there are no problems” and engaging in “formalism,” and not daring to actually resolve issues as long as there is a little bit of risk involved. He added that the “excessive caution” of “some localities and departments” conveys to the public a lack of self-confidence, and the root cause behind this self-confidence deficit is “excessive consideration of local interests and even personal interests.”
Another sign of official “inaction” is the lack of significant movement thus far by localities to “adjust and optimize real estate policies in a timely manner” per the July Politburo meeting. Local officials are likely concerned that they must take drastic measures to turn around their respective real estate situation, yet are afraid of being held accountable later for falling afoul of the Xi leadership’s “houses are for living in, not speculation” policy.
4. The appointment of Dong Jingwei, the former vice minister of state security, as director of the Office for Safeguarding National Security of the Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region on July 18 (just before Beidaihe), appears to be a move by Xi Jinping to shore up national security on the regime’s “peripheries” and potentially keep alive a factional struggle play.
Dong’s appointment to Hong Kong suggests that he has Xi’s trust and affirms our debunking of fierce speculation in mid-2021 about Dong’s supposed “defection” to the United States. As an experienced intelligence apparatus official, Dong would likely be able to leverage his influential position in Hong Kong to help the Xi leadership strengthen its control over espionage and anti-espionage operations in the territory, as well as reorganize and clean up the Hong Kong “hidden front.”
Dong would likely also be tasked with rectifying Hong Kong’s national security system. The rectification would technically improve problems with “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” in the territory and allow Xi to keep the “Falun Gong card” in play against the Jiang Zemin faction and other political rivals as factional struggle escalates in the regime with the worsening of regime crises.
