1 Reshuffles in PLARF leadership confirm purge rumors
PLA and PLARF developments
July 20 – 21
Xi Jinping delivered “important instructions” to the People’s Liberation Army at an all-military Party-building conference held in Beijing, according to state media.
Among Xi’s instructions include:
- “Comprehensively implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress.”
- “Conscientiously summarize the historic achievements and important experiences of military Party-building since the 18th Party Congress, and especially after the military political work conference in Gutian.” (Explainer: Former CMC vice-chair and Jiang faction member Xu Caihou was removed at the 2014 Gutian military political work conference.)
- “Continue promoting the overall strict governance of the Party and the military.”
- “Focus on solving the prominent problems that persist at Party organizations on all levels with regard to enforcing the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, grasping the ability to prepare for war, and implementing Party management and governance of the military.”
Speaking at the conference, Central Military Commission vice chair He Weidong called for:
- “Consolidating and firmly supporting the ‘Two Establishes.’”
- “Comprehensively and thoroughly implement the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.”
- “Gather power forces to improve the ability to prepare for and wage war.”
- “Focus on grasping the high-level and strengthening the grassroots to comprehensively consolidate the organizational system.”
- “Unswervingly and continuously correct behaviors, enforce discipline, and fight corruption, and constantly improve the quality of the Party’s leadership over the military and Party-building work.”
July 24
The CCP Politburo held its seventh collective study session on comprehensively strengthening military governance.
According to state media reports, Xi Jinping presided over the study session and emphasized that comprehensively strengthening military governance is a “profound change” in the CCP’s philosophy and way of governing the military. Xi also urged the need to fully implement the “spirit of the 20th Party Congress,” his thoughts on “strengthening the military in the new era,” and the need to adhere to the Party’s “absolute leadership over the military.”
Xi also proposed the comprehensive strengthening of both “military governance” and “cross-military and local governance” (i.e. overall coordination between the military and local governments).
July 26
Xi Jinping traveled to Sichuan Province to inspect the air force of the PLA’s Western Theater Command. According to state media, Xi “fully affirmed the work and task completion” of the Western Theater Command’s air force since its establishment.
Speaking at the Western Theater Command inspection, Xi requested that the military “closely follow the needs of the mission, adapt to the special environment, and further advance preparations for military struggle.” Xi also said that it was necessary to ensure that the Party “firmly controls” the troops “ideologically, politically, and organizationally,” as well as “pin down the high-level Party Committees [in the military],” “squeeze and compact the political responsibilities of managing and governing the Party at all levels,” and “continue to deepen the anti-corruption campaign.”
July 30
The Financial Times reported that the status of PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) commander Li Yuchao and his deputy Liu Guangbin, as well as either other current or former PLARF officials, is unclear.
The FT also cited two foreign senior government officials who were briefed on related intelligence as saying that the PLARF leaders were being investigated for leaking military information. “The trigger was the fact that we, outside China, have a quite detailed understanding of the Rocket Force’s structure by now. It’s about divulging secrets,” one of the officials said.
July 31
Xi Jinping appointed Wang Houbin and Xu Xisheng as the new commander and political commissar of the PLARF respectively. Both men were also promoted to the top rank of general.
All members of the Central Military Commission with the exception of Xu Qiliang attended the promotion ceremony.
Brief background on the old and new PLARF leadership
Wang Houbin
Wang Houbin (age 62), spent the bulk of his career in the PLA Navy before taking over as PLARF commander. He served as deputy chief of staff of the PLA Navy from April 2018 to December 2019, and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in December 2019. Wang was also appointed deputy commander of the PLA Navy in December 2019, a position he held until being transferred to the PLARF in July 2023.
Xu Xisheng
New PLARF political commissar Xu Xisheng (59) spent his formative years in the PLA Air Force. In July 2017, Xu was appointed deputy political commissar of the Southern Theater Command, in addition to serving as political commissar of the Southern Theater Command’s air force, and would remain in both positions until his transfer to the PLARF. Xu was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in July 2018.
Li Yuchao
Li Yuchao (60), the former PLARF commander, spent his entire career in the Second Artillery Corps (what the strategic and tactical missile force was known as before its renaming in 2016). Li previously commanded the 53rd base of the Second Artillery Corps (March 2015 to July 2016) and participated in Xi Jinping’s grand military parade in September 2015 as the head of a conventional missile team. Afterwards, Li enjoyed a smooth progression up the ranks until he was appointed PLARF commander and promoted to the rank of general in January 2022, and elected as a member of the 20th Central Committee in October 2022.
According to rumors circulating on the Chinese internet, Li Yuchao was allegedly taken away for investigation on June 27, 2023. Some rumors also claim that Li was implicated over his son’s selling of PLARF intelligence.
Xu Zhongbo
Xu Zhongbo (62), the former PLARF political commissar, spent the bulk of his career in the PLA Ground Force and in the line of political work. After Xi launched his military reforms, Xu was appointed as political commissar of the Western Theater Command ground force (Feb. 2016 to Dec. 2017), political commissar of the CMC Logistic Support Department (Dec. 2017 to July 2020), and political commissar of the PLARF (July 2022 to July 2023). Xu was promoted to the rank of major general in 2010, to lieutenant general in 2017, and general in 2022 when he was appointed PLARF political commissar.
Wu Guohua’s daughter refutes suicide rumors
On July 30, the daughter of the late former PLARF deputy commander Wu Guohua published a WeChat post (under her online moniker of “Xiao Bei Talks Security,” or 小貝說安全) in classical Chinese that mourned her father and sought to refute rumors about him.
In her post, Wu’s daughter claimed that her father was accomplished in academics, joined the military to serve his country, and had strong patriotic feelings. She added that he had fallen ill in the course of devoting himself to protecting his family and his country, and that illness was the cause of his death.
In the post’s conclusion, Wu’s daughter denounced the rumors that had been spreading about her father’s death, claiming that her father had nothing to do with the corruption that people had been criticizing him for. She added that her father was not after official positions and not greedy for fame and fortune, but had been upright and strong-willed all his life.
Wu’s daughter’s post gained the attention of those overseas and sparked heated discussions on Twitter. At the time of writing, the post has not been censored by the CCP authorities; even if the censors could not understand classical Chinese, the traction that the post was getting overseas should have sparked some reaction from the authorities if it was politically sensitive. It is also atypical for the family members of officials who were investigated for corruption to publicly refute rumors; generally, those family members would stay silent and keep a low profile so as not to invite more trouble upon themselves.
Our take
1. We previously analyzed that whether or not there were high-level probes in the PLA would become clearer around the PLA Day (August 1) period when key personnel changes are sometimes announced. The appointment of a new commander and political commissar at the PLARF before either of their predecessors had reached the retirement age of 65 suggests that there is indeed trouble in the senior ranks of the Rocket Force.
Another indirect indicator that something has gone wrong in the PLARF senior ranks can be seen from the transferring in of senior officers from other military branches to serve as commander and political commissar. Xi Jinping had made a similar move after rolling out his military reforms to reshuffle the PLA Navy’s top brass, and, on the civilian side, has frequently “airdropped” officials from different institutions to take over problematic departments and agencies. Depending on how serious the issues in the PLARF leadership are, the Xi leadership could quietly carry out more intensive reshuffling in the Rocket Force’s senior ranks to “scrape poison from bone,” start afresh, and strengthen the CCP’s “military governance” over the officers who control the regime’s strategic and tactical missile arsenal.
2. From the various publicly available information and rumors at the time of writing, we see several possible explanations for why the Xi leadership is cleaning up the PLARF at this time.
First, as we wrote in the July 31, 2023 edition of this newsletter, the investigations into the PLARF leadership could be part of Xi Jinping’s broader “self-rectification” effort launched after the 20th Party Congress to eliminate the lingering vestiges of opposition to his rule.
Second, there could have indeed been a case of severe corruption concerning national security matters in the PLARF that compelled Beijing to shake up the force’s top leadership. For one, the Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission’s July 26 announcement soliciting information from the public on “equipment procurement and bidding irregularities” since October 2017 sounds like a “retroactive” five-year investigation into procurement problems in the PLA. Another potential corruption and national security-related problem is the selling of PLARF secrets, as suggested in the July 30 FT article and in rumors shared in Chinese-language internet circles.
If corruption in the PLARF involved procurement, then there is a chance that the late PLARF deputy commander Wu Guohua (who was rumored to be fluent in Russian) had indeed committed suicide because he was being investigated as per speculation. However, the public refutation of rumors about Wu’s death by his daughter and the fact that the censors have not touched her online post (at least at the time of writing) suggest that it is more likely that Wu had died from natural causes as we had first analyzed.
Third, Xi could be partly looking to “kill the chickens to scare the monkey” by purging the top brass of the PLARF so that the rest of the military would rally solidly behind his leadership during a crucial period of escalating geopolitical tensions and growing dangers for the PRC. Xi has likely acknowledged by now that the CCP is wrapped up in a long-term “new cold war” with the United States, with the potential of a hot conflict looming over the horizon over flashpoints like Taiwan. Xi would have also sought to absorb lessons from Russia’s military problems in its war with Ukraine, including the potential for rebellious elements (like Prigozhin’s Wagner Group) to stir trouble. Hence, Xi could have considered taking advantage of tackling corruption in the PLARF to ensure that the rest of the PLA “deepens” their loyalty toward him, eliminate problems impeding the military’s preparation for future conflict, safeguard the regime’s nuclear arsenal and secrets, shore up national security, and enhance the Party’s control over the military.
3. Because the PLARF corruption scandal involves senior military officials whose promotions Xi Jinping oversaw, it should, in principle, affect his “quan wei” (authority and prestige). The actual impact of the scandal on Xi inside China, however, could be minimal given the Xi leadership’s tight control over propaganda and information in China, as well as Xi’s relatively low-key handling of the leadership reshuffle in the PLARF (at the time of writing, there are still no official announcements of investigations). Unless compelled to by the circumstances, Beijing could only make known the PLARF probe many months later when attention to the matter has died down and the CCP’s internal investigations have more or less been concluded.
The Xi leadership’s handling of the PLARF case could reinforce foreign views that Xi Jinping operates in opacity, is a dangerous “loose cannon,” and is seriously readying the CCP to invade Taiwan. This could heighten global wariness towards Xi and the CCP, to the detriment of Beijing’s efforts to court foreign investments and “rehabilitate” the PRC’s image post-“zero-COVID.”
2 CCP likely to sustain more ‘self-harm’ by mobilizing citizens for counter-espionage
On July 31, the PRC Ministry of State Security published in its first post on its official WeChat account an article about how the whole of Chinese society should be mobilized for counter-espionage work (反間防諜需要全社會動員).
The article claimed that the PRC’s current counter-espionage situation is “severe and complex.” Moreover, because espionage is a “serious and illegal crime with a high degree of covertness, professionalism, and harmfulness,” counter-espionage “not only requires national security organs to play the roles of specialized counter-espionage, but also requires the people’s broad participation and joint prevention so as to build a strong people’s defense line for national security against espionage.”
The article further called for improving mechanisms and establishing a “normalized” mechanism to encourage citizen participation in counter-espionage work.
The MSS’s WeChat post sparked concern among foreign observers, with some describing it as “digital totalitarianism” and “Stasi with Chinese characteristics.” Other commentators made tongue-in-cheek comments about how the CCP’s mobilization of the citizenry for counter-espionage work would make China even more unappealing to investors.
When asked about the MSS’s encouragement of citizen counter-espionage during a press briefing on Aug. 2, U.S. State Department spokesman Matt Miller said, “We do have concerns over it. Certainly, encouraging citizens to spy on each other is something that’s of great concern.” He added, “We are closely monitoring the implementation of China’s new counterespionage law, as we have been, which as written greatly expands the scope of what activities are considered espionage.”
Recent CCP counter-espionage moves
July 1
The CCP’s revisions to the PRC anti-espionage law went into effect. The revised law broadened the definition of “espionage” and “national security interests,” as well as allowed the CCP authorities to launch anti-espionage investigations to access data, electronic equipment, information on personal property, and ban border crossings.
The CCP’s revised anti-espionage law sparked concern and anxiety outside China after it was announced on April 26, 2023.
July 11
PRC minister of state security Chen Yixin published a piece in the 25th edition of the political and legal affairs magazine “Democracy and the Legal System” (民主與法制) urging the “conscientious study and implementation of the anti-espionage law to comprehensively improve the legalization of national security work” (認真學習貫徹《反間諜法》 全面提升國家安全工作法治化水平).
Chen wrote that PRC revised its anti-espionage law due to “significant changes in the external environment and security landscape; various predictable and unpredictable risks and challenges; and various difficulties, obstacles, and even waves,” which called for “higher requirements for national security work.” He added that the “hidden front” should put the maintenance of national security in the first place.”
Chen further proposed to “give full play to the people’s enthusiasm, initiative, and creativity” in “fighting a good people’s war against espionage.”
July 21
The PRC Ministry of Commerce convened a special policy interpretation and communication roundtable for foreign-funded business associations to explain the revised anti-espionage law to the representatives of foreign enterprises and allay their misgivings about the legislation. Representatives from more than 30 foreign business associations attended the roundtable, including those from the American Chamber of Commerce in China, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in China, the Japanese Chamber of Commerce in China, and the South Korean Chamber of Commerce in China.
Assistant commerce minister Chen Chunjiang said at the roundtable that the PRC government has placed greater importance on attracting foreign investment.
Month of July
Widely circulated rumors on the Chinese internet claim that the leadership of the PLA Rocket Force could have been investigated over national security-related intelligence leaks.
Backdrop
Beijing has been proposing and introducing various measures to rescue the Chinese economy, boost the confidence of Chinese citizens, and attract foreign investments.
Our take
1. The Xi leadership is undoubtedly aware that its counter-espionage measures and broader efforts to strengthen national security are simultaneously hurting its attempt to win over foreigners again and bring in much-needed investments to prop up the Chinese economy.
However, Beijing has likely weighed that it is more important to “be safe than sorry” and openly enlist the Chinese citizenry in the act of countering foreign espionage, as well as other real or perceived “anti-China” moves by foreigners, despite the negative ramifications that its prioritization of national security above all would bring. The Xi leadership would have also likely assessed that it can simply hold more meetings with foreign business associations to assuage them about its growing counter-espionage efforts and rely on past goodwill to sway foreign businesses and investors into remaining and investing in China.
Foreign businesses, investors, and governments must recognize that the CCP adheres to Marxism-Leninism and has long believed that the “ends justify the means” in its perpetual quest for survival and dominance. When push comes to shove, the CCP will clamp down on foreign firms and investors under the guise of its various national security legislation regardless of whatever “assurances” it may give about the revised anti-espionage law and other pieces of legislation that foreigners are concerned about. And even if the central government is interested in living up to its “assurances,” it cannot guarantee that local governments will not abuse their authority to trouble foreign enterprises and investors on national security grounds to secure their local interests. Politics always comes first for the CCP, and foreigners have very good reason to be concerned about the CCP’s anti-espionage drive and take action to mitigate their political risks in China.
2. The immediate negative reaction by foreigners to the MSS’s effort to mobilize the Chinese citizenry to participate in counter-espionage work is a sign of growing awareness in the international community about the brutal nature of the techno-totalitarian CCP regime and the lengths at which the regime will go in the name of preserving national security. Heightened efforts by Beijing to counter foreign espionage and influence will increase “new cold war” fears abroad and convince foreign companies and investors to further “de-risk” and diversify away China, including moving money out from the mainland and shifting headquarters to Hong Kong or Singapore to avoid political and geopolitical risks.
3. It cannot be ruled out that the rumored leaks of intelligence by elements in the PLA Rocket Force could be part of the reason why the Xi leadership is increasing counter-espionage efforts. Xi Jinping’s remaining factional enemies in the Party elite could potentially find ways to exploit Beijing’s recent drive to tighten national security to embarrass or trouble the Xi leadership, and in doing so, further undermine Xi’s personal “quan wei.”
