1 Xi urges political and legal affairs apparatus to ‘struggle’ and ‘talk politics’
Xi Jinping issued instructions to a two-day (Jan. 7 to Jan. 8) national conference on political and legal affairs work, according to state mouthpiece Xinhua.
Key points in Xi’s remarks include:
- The Party’s absolute leadership over political and legal affairs work should be upheld.
- Political standing and judgment, political comprehension, and political implementation should be improved.
- Persist in carrying forward the spirit of struggle.
Chen Wenqing, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretary, conveyed Xi’s instructions at the meeting. He also stressed the need for officials to uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over political and legal affairs work, persist in coordinating the domestic and international situations, and persist in coordinating the two major issues of development and security. And as per his speeches at recent political and legal affairs meetings (CPLAC plenary session on Dec. 29 and National Court Work Conference on Jan. 6), Chen repeated political slogans in support of Xi like the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.”
Minister of public security Wang Xiaohong presided over the national conference on political and legal affairs work and delivered a concluding speech.
Why it matters
The CCP usually strives to shape the public discourse on issues before it rolls out policies or takes action. Xi’s remarks to the political and legal affairs apparatus hint at major forthcoming policies and actions on that front.
Our take
Xi Jinping’s call for the political and legal affairs apparatus to adhere to the Party’s “absolute leadership” and carry forward the “spirit of struggle” indicates that Xi is still encountering resistance and recalcitrance from the apparatus, including “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai,” “laying flatism,” “publicly complying but privately defying” (陽奉陰違), and other negative political habits stemming from Party culture. This phenomenon is further hinted at from Chen Wenqing repeating Xi’s political slogans during key meetings.
Xi needs the political and legal affairs apparatus to be absolutely loyal to himself and the CCP as social instability and turmoil ratchet up in China. Beijing has almost certainly been troubled by the protests that broke out in the last two months over the lockdowns, labor issues, and other social ills, as well as growing anti-regime sentiments. More such protests could be triggered before and around the Lunar New Year period.
In anticipation of greater unrest, the Xi leadership is stepping up propaganda and discourse control to get the political and legal affairs apparatus completely in line with its agenda.
2 Xi ‘sounds the bugle’ on corruption
On Jan. 7, state broadcaster CCTV began airing a four-episode anti-corruption feature documentary titled, “Always Sounding the Bugle” (永遠吹衝鋒號).
The first episode (“Second Answer”) spotlighted the case of former justice minister Fu Zhenghua. Fu was filmed explaining how he had joined the “Sun Lijun political gang.” The documentary then claimed that Fu met Sun while he was at the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau in 2008 and the latter was deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security’s General Office.
The documentary added that Fu was promoted to director and Standing Committee member of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, deputy secretary of the Ministry of Public Security’s Party Committee, and deputy public security minister through Sun’s “active operations” between 2010 to 2017. Further, the documentary had Li Yonghong (deputy director of the 11th Supervision and Inspection Office of the CCDI and NSC) criticizing the “Sun Lijun political gang” of leaving the Party’s “political and organizational leadership over public security as well as political and legal affairs work” in a state of “suspension,” which “essentially undermined the Party’s centralized and unified leadership, as well as undermined the ‘quan wei’ of Party Central.”
Another corruption case spotlighted in the documentary was that of Zhang Xinqi, the deputy director of the Standing Committee of the Shandong Provincial People’s Congress. The documentary shed light on what it described as the “secret” behind Tomorrow System’s rapid expansion over the last decade. With beginnings in the Inner Mongolia region, Tomorrow System (明天系) relied on “corrupt leading cadres in state agencies and national work staff,” including Zhang, to become a “financial crocodile” throughout China. “Tomorrow System” refers to a network of companies and personnel associated with the diversified investment company Tomorrow Group and its founder Xiao Jianhua.
The documentary also stressed that Xi Jinping’s “answer” to the “cycle” conversation (recently brought up again in propaganda of Xi’s trip to Yan’an after the 20th Party Congress)—an anti-corruption campaign trope—was “self-revolution.”
Finally, the documentary mentioned other corrupt officials who violated Zhongnanhai’s orders on environmental production, real estate, the auto sector, and technology projects, including their partaking in “chaotic investments” and “chaotic behavior.”
Our take
1. The “Always Sounding the Bugle” documentary appears to be part of the Xi leadership’s propaganda and discourse-shaping effort before the anti-corruption campaign begins a new round of probes and purges. As the senior officials featured in the documentary all belong to the Jiang faction, the remnant Jiang faction members (including the Zeng Qinghong clan and its associates) are at risk of being investigated next.
2. The documentary makes some “you know what I mean” signaling that might not be obvious to most observers who are unfamiliar with personnel arrangements and factional allegiances.
The mention of Tomorrow Group is aimed at Xiao Jianhua, a “white glove” (bagman) of the Zeng Qinghong clan, Jiang faction associates, and other members of the Party elite. This is another indicator that the Jiang faction is being put on notice.
Meanwhile, the documentary’s account of how Sun Lijun ended up as Fu Zhenghua’s political backer is implausible because Fu is Sun’s former superior, not the other way around. Fu’s political patrons are more likely to be former Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission secretaries Meng Jianzhu, Zhou Yongkang, and Guo Shengkun, as well as Zeng Qinghong, all of whom definitely ranked above Fu from 2008 to 2017. It is possible that this discrepancy was deliberately inserted to obliquely induce observers to consider who are the ones who could be in trouble soon.
Finally, the documentary’s accusation that the “Sun Lijun political gang” had essentially hijacked the Party’s “political and organizational leadership” over public security as well as political and legal affairs work indirectly absolves Xi’s allies of blame for the misconduct of Fu Zhenghua and Sun Lijun. Otherwise, Li Xi (former Organization Department head) and Zhao Kezhi (former public security minister) would have to be taken to task under the CCP’s accountability system for wrongdoing carried out by the Jiang faction cronies.
3. The documentary and CCP propaganda reports of Sun Lijun, Fu Zhenghua, and Xiao Jianhua suggest that they likely cooperated with the Xi leadership while being probed, including divulging valuable and incriminating information about the Jiang faction and Xi’s other political enemies. Xi almost certainly used the dirt gathered on his opponents as leverage to secure his 20th Party Congress agenda items and further consolidate power. Now Xi could use the dirt on his rivals to facilitate the new round of anti-corruption investigations.
Macro view
Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) has been steadily eroded since the 20th Party Congress with the health crisis following the easing of “zero-COVID,” the death of Jiang Zemin, the “blank paper revolution” and rising social instability, as well as the continued deterioration of the Chinese economy. Further, the CCP authorities’ “concessions” in the face of social pressure is weakening the “quan wei” of the regime.
3 CCDI plenum hints at regime danger, coming purges
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection held its second plenary session in Beijing from Jan. 9 to Jan. 10. The meeting was attended by Xi Jinping and other senior Party and state officials like Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, Cai Qi, Ding Xuexiang, and CCDI secretary Li Xi.
Xi delivered a speech at the meeting and made the following noteworthy points:
- Officials should “promote the spirit of thorough self-revolution” and “always sound the bugle … to carry out the Party’s great self-revolution to the end.”
- To resolve the “big Party’s unique problems,” officials must “turn the knife inward, scrape poison from bone, take strong medicine to dispel the disease, and fight chaos with a heavy hand.” This is the necessary “hurdle to overcome” and “tough bone that must be gnawed” for the CCP in the “new era” and “new journey.”
- Xi emphasized the need for political supervision, including the “prompt and accurate discovery” of “noncompliance with orders,” “noncompliance with prohibitions,” “disregarding the overall situation,” “engaging in departmental and local protectionism,” and other “prominent problems.”
- Xi stressed that the fight against corruption is still “severe and complicated,” and the task of “curbing increases [in corruption cases]” and “clearing stock [of corruption issues]” remains arduous. Therefore, officials should “resolutely investigate and deal with corruption where political and economic issues are intertwined; resolutely prevent leading cadres from becoming spokespersons and agents of interest groups and power groups; resolutely prevent political and business collusion, as well as the infiltration of capital into the political field and other damage to the political ecology and economic development environment.”
- Officials are urged to “carry out special rectification of prominent industrial, systemic, and regional corruption problems.”
Li Xi gave Xi Jinping’s speech high praise (“rich in connotation,” “incisive exposition,” etc.) and described it as having “strong political nature, instructive nature, and pertinence.”
The plenary session instructed discipline inspection and supervisory agencies at all levels to take studying and implementing the spirit of the 20th Party Congress as the primary political task “for the present and in the future.” The meeting also identified key areas with “high concentrations of power, funds, and resources” where political supervision needs to be strengthened, including “finance, state-owned enterprises, political and legal affairs, as well as the grain purchasing and marketing system.”
Our take
Xi Jinping has hinted strongly in remarks to the second CCDI plenary session and to a lesser degree in his instructions given to the national conference on political and legal affairs work (see newsletter item one) that he is still encountering significant bureaucratic resistance and noncompliance from the officialdom (the “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” problem) despite having consolidated power to a high degree. He also suggested at the CCDI meeting that the problem of business-official collusion and corruption in the regime is very severe.
Xi has further signaled that regime security is in peril if it does not resolve the “big Party’s unique problems” and overcome the “hurdle” that is corruption. Calls for “special rectification” of areas with “high concentrations of power, funds, and resources” indicate that the anti-corruption will gain steam in the near future instead of winding down as some observers have claimed. Those observers believe that Xi has no use for the anti-corruption campaign since he has already sidelined all his political enemies and is undisputed in the Party; we have been arguing exactly the opposite.
Xi’s agenda-setting at the CCDI plenary session affirms our analysis in the Nov. 7, 2022 newsletter that the CCP general secretary is preparing a “big rectification push.” We also correctly identified the areas that the Xi leadership would focus on, including the financial sector, the state sector, problematic industries, and other places where there are “high concentrations of power, funds, and resources.”
4 Mass PLAC reshuffles take place before Two Sessions
Thirty-three senior political and legal affairs officials in 17 provinces were reshuffled over the span of about two weeks. Those officials were mostly transferred out from their respective areas, and some were appointed to a different branch of the political and legal affairs apparatus.
Dec. 30
- Gu Xuefei (age 59), Henan deputy governor and public security chief, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Henan Province. Gu’s predecessor Chen Yong (59) was earlier transferred to Shanghai in July 2022 to serve as municipal procurator-general.
Jan. 7
- Hou Jianjun (60), Yunnan High Court president, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Fujian Province. Hou is positioned to replace Huo Min (59) as Fujian procurator-general.
Jan. 8
- Ge Xiaoyan (59), Jiangxi High Court president, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Sichuan Province. Ge is positioned to replace Feng Jian (59) as Sichuan procurator-general.
- Fu Xinping (59), Guizhou procurator-general, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Jiangxi High Court. Fu is positioned to replace Ge Xiaoyan as Jiangxi High Court president.
- Ding Shunsheng (59), Hebei procurator-general, was transferred to Jiangxi Province to serve as deputy procurator-general. Ding is positioned to replace Tian Yunpeng as Jiangxi procurator-general.
- Dong Kaijun (61), Anhui High Court president, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Hebei Province.
- Zhang Yingjie (55), Shenzhen Municipal Intermediate Court president, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Yunnan High Court.
- Tang Yijun (62), PRC justice minister, transferred to Jiangxi to serve as Party secretary of the provincial political consultative conference Party group.
- Jia Yu (60), Zhejiang procurator-general, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Shanghai High Court. Jia is positioned to replace Liu Xiaoyun (61) as Shanghai High Court president.
Jan. 9
- Gao Jiming (59) stepped down as Heilongjiang procurator-general.
- Liu Yongzhi was appointed Heilongjiang deputy procurator-general, and is positioned to replace Gao Jiming as Heilongjiang procurator-general.
- Dang Guangsuo (54), Shaanxi deputy procurator-general, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Heilongjiang High Court. Dang is positioned to replace Shi Shitai (61) as Heilongjiang high court president.
- Li Yongjun (58), Xinjiang procurator-general, replaced Li Qilin (62) as Inner Mongolia procurator-general.
- Zheng Haiyang (52), director of the public security ministry’s railway public security bureau, was appointed deputy governor and public security chief of Henan Province. Zheng replaced Gu Xuefei as Henan deputy governor and public security director.
Jan. 10
- Mao Ronghua (58), Shanghai High Court vice president, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Guizhou High Court. Li is positioned to replace Han Deyang (60) as Guizhou high court president.
- Wang Yongjin (58), Hubei deputy procurator-general, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Guizhou Province. Wang is positioned to replace Fu Xinping as Guizhou procurator-general.
- Li Chenglin (55), Liaoning procurator-general, replaced Sun Hongshan (55) as deputy governor and public security chief of Shanxi Province.
- Gao Xin was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Liaoning Province. Gao is positioned to replace Li Chenglin as Liaoning procurator-general.
- Dai Jun, Chongqing High Court vice president, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Hainan High Court. The former Hainan High Court president Chen Fengchao (61) was transferred in September 2022 to Tianjin to serve as municipal procurator-general.
- Tian Yunpeng (60), Jiangxi procurator-general, was appointed vice president and acting president of the Anhui High Court.
- Lin Yiying (60), Guangdong procurator-general, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of Zhejiang Province.
- Cai Zhaohui took over from Yan Xijun (60) as deputy governor and public security chief of Hainan Province.
- Dou Zhaohui, executive deputy secretary of the Xinjiang Political and Legal Affairs Commission, was appointed deputy procurator-general and acting procurator-general of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region. Dou is positioned to replace Shi Xialian (61) as Ningxia procurator-general.
Our take
1. The mass reshuffling of political and legal affairs personnel before the Two Sessions (scheduled for March 4 and March 5) is unusual and could be linked to Xi Jinping’s effort to step up rectification of the political and legal affairs apparatus.
The Xi leadership has been known to transfer officials away from their longtime base of operations or from areas where they climbed the ranks to facilitate anti-corruption probes and disrupt local power networks. Even if the officials who are currently being reshuffled are not the subject of investigation, they will need time to establish new networks and patron-client relations in their new position. This disorienting effect benefits Xi’s rectification campaign and makes it harder for officials to mobilize against Xi (if they were so inclined).
We previously analyzed that Supreme People’s Procuratorate procurator-general Zhang Jun could be transferred to the Supreme People’s Court to serve as its president. Ying Yong, the current deputy procurator-general of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, could then replace Zhang. We also do not rule out Ying moving to the Supreme People’s Court instead given his judicial experience.
We also noted on numerous occasions that current Supreme People’s Court president Zhou Qiang, a Jiang faction member who has long put up resistance against Xi, could be targeted by the latest clean up of the political and legal affairs apparatus.
2. Of the 33 recently reshuffled political and legal affairs officials, 12 were either transferred out of the political and legal affairs apparatus or retired. The other 21 were appointed to leading political and legal affairs positions.
Of the aforementioned 21 officials, four are provincial public security chiefs, 10 are the leading cadre of provincial-level procuratorates, and seven are the leading cadre of provincial-level high courts. However, most of these officials are nearing or have reached retirement age, with only nine being under 55 years old.
5 Liu Yanping receives a suspended death sentence
On Jan. 10, the Changchun Intermediate People’s Court in Jilin Province sentenced Liu Yanping, the former head of the discipline inspection and supervision team of the Ministry of State Security, to death with a two-year reprieve for taking over 234 million yuan in bribes. Liu’s sentence will be commuted to life in prison without parole after the reprieve.
The court also revoked his political rights for life and ordered the confiscation of all his property.
Why it matters
Liu is one of seven individuals whom the Xi leadership has identified as being part of the so-called “Sun Lijun political gang.” Probes into all seven members were completed near the end of September 2022, and four of them received suspended death sentences that will be commuted to life imprisonment after two years.
Our take
The sentencing of Liu Yanping at this time is likely meant to sync with the Xi leadership’s anti-corruption propaganda and messaging.
Beijing appears to be reinforcing the notion that the political and legal affairs apparatus of the Jiang Zemin era (including Hu Jintao’s tenure) was extremely corrupt. This justifies Xi Jinping taking “urgent action” through the latest round of rectifications to fix the “prominent issues and problems” that took place under his predecessors and save the regime through “self-revolution.”
