1 Analyzing Xi’s New Year address
On Dec. 31, Xi Jinping delivered his annual New Year’s address via state broadcaster CCTV and the internet.
Notable takeaways from his address include:
- China’s GDP for the whole of 2022 “exceeded 120 trillion yuan.”
- China secured a “bumper harvest” for the “19th year in a row.”
- The CCP authorities adhered to “precise prevention and control” measures “in light of the evolving situation” and to “protect the life and health of the people to the greatest extent possible.”
- China has entered a “new phase of COVID response where tough challenges remain.”
- Xi mentioned the passing of Jiang Zemin and paid “high tribute to his towering achievements and noble demeanor,” as well as “the great legacy he left behind.”
- Xi said that China today is “brimming with vigor and vitality.” The economy “enjoys strong resilience, tremendous potential, and great vitality,” and the “fundamentals sustaining its long-term growth have remained strong.”
- Xi said that China today is “closely linked with the world.” Also, “changes unseen in a century are unfolding at a faster pace, and the world is not yet a tranquil place.”
- Xi mentioned the Politburo Standing Committee’s visit to Yan’an after the 20th Party Congress, and used the Chinese saying, “Just as polishing makes jade finer, adversity makes one stronger” (艱難困苦, 玉汝於成).
- Xi called for “unity” and building “consensus through communication and consultation.” He added that it is “only natural for different people to have different concerns or hold different views on the same issue.”
- Xi said that “both sides of the Taiwan Strait are members of one and the same family” and expressed hope that “our compatriots on both sides of the Strait will work together with a unity of purpose to jointly foster lasting prosperity of the Chinese nation.”
Our take
Xi Jinping’s New Year address is typical of the CCP’s “great, glorious, correct” (really “deceit, perniciousness, struggle”) style of propaganda. Instead of openly acknowledging the regime’s struggles and crises, Xi seeks to “spin tragedy into victory” to suggest that all is well with Communist China.
However, Xi’s claims quickly fall apart upon closer scrutiny:
1. China will see about 4.9 percent annual growth if Xi’s assertion that the GDP exceeded 120 trillion yuan in 2022 were true. However, lockdowns in Q2 and Q4, as well as the overall “zero-COVID” situation, likely took a heavy toll on consumption, investments, and manufacturing. Declining global demand resulting from recessionary pressures also impacted China’s exports. The World Bank projected China’s real GDP growth at 2.7 percent in a Dec. 20, 2022 report. Rhodium Group estimated full year growth at 2.5 percent, “with numerous reasons to suspect that the real performance was even weaker.”
2. Xi’s claim of a “bumper harvest” for 19 consecutive years is hardly believable given the implementation of strict “zero-COVID” policies for most of 2022 and previous reports that not all was well with China’s food production. Farmers in many areas were impeded from properly planting and harvesting their crops.
3. Contrary to being more “closely linked with the world,” China became more isolated in 2022. This is partly due to the PRC’s friendliness with Russia and ambiguous stance on the Russia-Ukraine war, as well as growing wariness towards the CCP in many countries. Countries and multinationals are also increasingly decoupling from China through the offshoring of supply chains or the imposition of export controls (such as the U.S. chip ban). Meanwhile, the Xi leadership is moving China towards “semi-isolationism” and self-sufficiency on national security grounds (see here and here).
Xi himself acknowledges that things are not going well for the regime abroad, noting that “changes unseen in a century are unfolding at a faster pace, and the world is not yet a tranquil place.”
4. While repeating the usual boilerplate of mainland Chinese and Taiwanese being “one and the same family,” Xi did not specifically mention opposition to “Taiwan independence” or “reunification.” This suggests that Xi is wary of escalating tensions with the U.S. and its allies over cross-strait issues, and undermines his overall claim that things are looking up for Communist China.
5. Xi’s claims of “protecting the life and health of the people to the greatest extent possible” as the regime enters a “new phase of COVID response” contrasts with spikes in infections and deaths (evidenced by overwhelmed funeral homes and crematoriums), as well as a medical system being pushed to the brink.
6. Xi called for “unity” rather than emphasizing the need for “unity of thought” with Party Central with himself at the core. This indicates that Xi is currently facing strong pushback from all fronts and is looking to maintain intra-Party “consensus” where possible until the regime survives its more pressing crises (see newsletter item 3 for more analysis).
While subtle, Xi’s observation that it is “only natural for different people to have different concerns or hold different views on the same issue” hints at both mounting intra-Party opposition and growing grassroots anger (“blank paper revolution,” etc.).
7. Xi lauded the late Jiang Zemin, yet still brought up his trip to Yan’an after the 20th Party Congress. This indicates that Xi remains set on purging the remnant Jiang faction and other “anti-Xi” forces even as he strives to make peace with them until the regime tides over its present crises.
2 Decoding the political signals from photos on Xi’s bookcase
On Jan. 1, state mouthpiece Xinhua published an article about the photos on Xi Jinping’s office bookshelves that were seen in his 2023 New Year’s address.
Xinhua called attention to 18 photos:
- Nine photos of Xi’s political activities in 2022, including important meetings, inspections, and foreign trips.
- A photo of Xi with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao on his left.
- A photo of Xi Zhongxun (Xi’s father) and Jiang toasting at the PRC national day gala in 1999.
- Two photos of Xi participating in military events.
- Four photos of the Xi family.
- A photo of Xi taking the oath of allegiance to the CCP constitution on March 17, 2018. Xi abolished constitutional term limits for the presidency and vice presidency at the 2018 Two Sessions. Xinhua said that this photo has been featured on Xi’s bookshelf every year since it was taken.
Why it matters
Observers and media outlets have been paying attention to the photos on Xi’s bookshelf since he began delivering New Year addresses at the end of 2013. The photos can usually be grouped according to Xi’s major political activities at home and abroad for the year, his inspection trips and interactions with ordinary people, his command over the military, and family.
The Xinhua article about the photos appears to be an effort by the Xi camp to call attention to the political signals that the photos convey.
Our take
At a glance, the photos on Xi’s bookcase seem to imply that his political position is secure, the CCP elites are united, the military is fully behind Xi, and the Chinese people approve of him.
However, the photo of Xi together with Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao shows that Xi is encountering immense intra-Party pressure. Prior to this year, photos of Xi’s predecessors had never appeared on his bookshelf. And until Jiang’s death, Xi had been steadily downplaying the achievements of his predecessors and even indicated at the 20th Party Congress that he needs to take “urgent action” to resolve a “number of prominent issues and problems” that can be traced back to the Party bosses before him.
Xi’s sudden display of “camaraderie” with his predecessors is very likely an attempt to maintain “consensus” within the CCP following a spike in anger, resentment, and suspicion towards him beginning from around the 20th Party Congress period. While Hu Jintao’s early exit from the Party Congress was unlikely the result of factional struggle (see here and here), Hu’s allies and others in the Party elite could have bleak views of the incident and become more paranoid of Xi and his actions. Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) were also undermined by the “blank paper revolution” and his glowing tributes to Jiang Zemin (see here, here, and here). Finally, the death and suffering of many CCP cadres (including some senior generals, according to mainland media) after the relaxation of “zero-COVID” (according to overseas Chinese media) due to the overburdened medical system would have increased intra-Party bitterness towards Xi.
By featuring Jiang and Hu alongside him in a photo, Xi is signaling to supporters and associates of both the Jiang faction and the Hu camp that he bears goodwill towards them and wants peace. Given the “you die, I live” nature of CCP factional struggle, however, Xi will likely “delay and wait for change” (以拖待變) before stepping up efforts to rid the regime of Jiang faction influence and remove those disloyal to his rule.
What’s next
Xi Jinping could be looking to further consolidate power and eliminate rivals after he finalizes key personnel reshuffles at the 2023 Two Sessions. Xi could also be waiting for the Chinese economy to stabilize somewhat before moving against his enemies as herd immunity builds up in China with the spread of COVID-19.
Political Black Swans could emerge, however, if Xi is unable to successfully “delay and wait for change.”
3 Xi’s legacy defended at CPLAC plenary meeting
On Dec. 29, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission held a plenary session to study Xi Jinping’s recent instructions and implement his opinions. CPLAC secretary Chen Wenqing presided over the meeting.
The meeting urged the political and legal affairs apparatus to “deeply understand” Xi’s various political slogans, including the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards.” The meeting also stressed that the PRC’s epidemic prevention and control policy over the past three years is “completely correct,” and the current effort to “optimize and adjust prevention and control” is also “completely correct.”
The meeting further urged officials to “resolutely deal, in accordance with the law, with acts of using the epidemic to carry out infiltration and sabotage, spread rumors, and disrupt social order.”
Our take
Chen Wenqing’s defense of Xi Jinping’s “zero-COVID” policy reveals several points.
First, the CCP is “spinning tragedy into victory” and is prepared to step up “stability maintenance” measures to put down social unrest as the regime muddles its way out of the pandemic. Chen had earlier signaled as such in a Nov. 28 plenary meeting of the CPLAC.
Second, Xi is likely facing intense criticism and even backlash in some quarters (including the “blank paper revolution”) over his “zero-COVID” policy and its “optimization and adjustment.” This is hinted from Chen’s call for the political and legal affairs apparatus to “resolutely deal … with acts of using the epidemic to carry out infiltration and sabotage, spread rumors, and disrupt social order.”
Third, Chen is proving himself as a Xi loyalist in defending his political patron at a difficult juncture.
4 Song Tao in charge of Taiwan affairs
Song Tao (age 67) replaced Liu Jieyi (65) as head of the CCP’s Taiwan Work Office and head of the State Council’s Taiwan Affairs Office, official media reported on Dec. 28.
On Jan. 2, Song published a piece titled “Working Together to Create Great Achievements” (攜手奮鬥 共創偉業) in the state-owned magazine “Cross-Strait Relations” first issue of 2023 where he extended new year greetings to the people of Taiwan. Song added that it is necessary to implement the CCP’s overall strategy of resolving the Taiwan issue in the new era and adhere to the guidelines of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems.”
Why it matters
The CCP’s Taiwan affairs chief is in charge of implementing Beijing’s Taiwan policy, including united front work (infiltrating Taiwanese society, etc.) and propaganda. This makes Song Tao the man to watch as a reflection of Beijing’s moves in cross-Strait relations.
Song’s appointment also comes in the lead-up to the 2024 Taiwan presidential elections, a period during which the CCP is expected to deploy its influence and subversion operations.
Official career
Song Tao worked in state owned companies in Fujian Province in his formative years, but did not serve under Xi Jinping when the latter was Fujian vice governor and governor. He joined the PRC diplomatic corps in 2001 and eventually served as Chinese ambassador to Guyana and the Philippines.
Song succeeded Wang Jiarui as head of the CCP’s International Liaison Department in November 2015. In that role, Song would visit North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, and other countries as Xi’s special envoy.
In June 2022, Song, who was over the retirement age of 65 for ministerial-level officials, was transferred to the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference to serve as deputy director of its education, science, health, and sports committee, a “second line” job.
Our take
Song Tao has no prior experience handling Taiwan matters and is not a member of the 20th Central Committee. Thus, some observers believe that he will merely perform the function of a “liaison” between the Xi leadership and Taiwan. Song’s “changed” role also means that the Taiwan Affairs Office may no longer serve as a facilitator of cross-Straits matters, including helping Taiwanese businessmen invest in China and resolve various problems. Finally, observers believe that Song will have difficulties in working with leading cadres of local governments given his lowered political status.
We have a different view of Song’s appointment and what it entails.
Xi Jinping likely believes that Song Tao is sufficiently loyal to him and will duly carry out the central government’s orders. Thus, Xi bended personnel reshuffle norms and brought Song back from the “second line” to head Taiwan affairs. Xi made similar moves with Xia Baolong (Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director), Luo Huining (Hong Kong Liaison Office chief), and Ying Yong (deputy prosecutor-general).
The “recycling” of Song and other retirement-age officials indicates that Xi only has confidence in a handful of personnel to perform the duties of important posts. While there may be more qualified candidates in the Central Committee to oversee Taiwan affairs, Xi likely had concerns about their factional ties (many Jiang faction members and associates remain in the regime) and loyalty.
Xi wants the Taiwan affairs apparatus to closely adhere to Zhongnanhai to avoid sparking unnecessary cross-strait problems (including with the U.S. and other countries) as the PRC struggles to resolve serious internal and external crises. A clean-up of the Taiwan affairs apparatus could follow Song’s appointment, similar to what took place in the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus after Luo Huining and Xia Baolong took over (see here, here, here, here, here, and here).
While Song Tao is not a Central Committee member and cannot attend certain high-level meetings, other officials will likely view him as Xi’s trusted “special envoy” (not a mere “liaison”) to Taiwan and believe that he now enjoys elevated political standing of sorts. Thus, local officials will believe that they have an incentive to cooperate well with Song and curry favor with him to build political capital with the Xi leadership and improve their career prospects.
What’s next
The Taiwan affairs apparatus could undergo “rectification,” with frequent personnel reshuffles and purges.
Beijing will look to avoid conflict over Taiwan even as it attempts to intimidate the island with military maneuvers and by issuing warnings against moves toward “Taiwan independence.”
