◎ Luo Huining’s appointment does not signal that Beijing is taking a tougher stance on Hong Kong.
Updated on Jan. 6, 2020.
On Jan. 4, the People’s Republic of China’s state-run media Xinhua announced that Luo Huining, a former provincial leader, has replaced Wang Zhimin as director of the Central Liaison Office in Hong Kong. According to pro-Beijing Hong Kong newspapers, Wang “has the approval of Party Central” and has “another appointment” (另有任用).
If the Hong Kong media reports prove accurate, then the Hong Kong Liaison Office personnel reshuffle affirms our analysis made in September 2019. We wrote: “Zhang Xiaoming, director of the Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, and Wang Zhimin, director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office, both face high levels of political risk. Zhang could be investigated, and Wang could be transferred.”
The big picture:
The high-level personnel movement in the Chinese Communist Party’s Hong Kong apparatus follows nearly half a year of anti-extradition bill and pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The CCP and Hong Kong government’s heavy-handed handling of the protests resulted in a crushing defeat for the Hong Kong pro-establishment camp in local district elections and led the U.S. to enact the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 and other legislation aimed at addressing police violence in the city.
The personnel movement in the Hong Kong apparatus also comes ahead of the signing of the Sino-U.S. “phase one” trade deal. On Dec. 31, 2019, United States President Donald Trump tweeted that “high level representatives of China” will be present for the deal signing at the White House scheduled on Jan. 15.
Our take:
1. Luo Huining’s career progression indicates that while he has associations with the Jiang faction which opposes Xi Jinping, he has supported Xi since the latter took office and appears to be a senior official that Xi trusts enough to place in key positions.
Early in his career in Anhui Province, Luo rose through the ranks under former PRC State Council vice premier and Anhui leader Hui Liangyu (1994 – 1998: Anhui governor; 1998 – 1999: Anhui Party Secretary). Hui is a Jiang faction member, and Luo, whose highest appointment in Anhui under Hui was provincial propaganda department chief, can be said to have Jiang faction associations.
Luo Huining’s career progression in Qinghai Province was steady and unremarkable. In April 2003, a 49-year-old Luo was transferred to Qinghai to serve as deputy secretary of the province’s Party Committee. In January 2010, Luo became Qinghai governor. And in March 2013, Luo was promoted to Qinghai Party Secretary.
Luo’s promotion to Qinghai leader coincided with Xi Jinping’s rise to CCP General Secretary. After Xi took office, Luo publicly backed Xi on multiple occasions. Probably because Luo had shown loyalty to Xi, Xi later put him in charge of Shanxi Province (replacing Jiang faction member Wang Rulin) in June 2016 where he oversaw the purge of senior cadres in the provincial Party committee and other anti-corruption work. On Nov. 30, 2019, Luo reached the retirement age of 65 and stepped down as Shanxi Party Secretary. On Dec. 28, Luo was appointed deputy chairman of the National People’s Congress Financial and Economic Affairs Committee (it is common for senior PRC officials who are retired or nearing retirement age to take up “second-line” (二線) or sinecure appointments in the NPC’s various committees). Then on Jan. 4, Luo took over from Wang Zhimin as Hong Kong Liaison Office director.
Several reasons could explain why Luo Huining was thrust from his “second-line” job back into the “frontline”:
- Luo is already past retirement age and has no experience in the Hong Kong and Macau apparatus. This suggests that Xi Jinping does not have many officials that he can rely upon to take over the Hong Kong Liaison Office director position at short notice. Luo’s age also means that he is only an interim option for the directorship.
- From Xi’s perspective, Luo’s age, lack of Hong Kong experience, and “second line” status are most definitely a plus. Being at the end of his career and likely having few (if any) links with various interests groups or political baggage in Hong Kong, Luo can be relied upon to deliver accurate information (particularly on local sentiment) about Hong Kong to Xi and even continue the work of cleaning out entrenched Jiang faction interests in the city.
- Given Luo’s Jiang faction associations, the Jiang faction might not too vigorously oppose his appointment as Hong Kong Liaison Office director and give Xi more headaches in the short-run.
- Party Central could be re-evaluating the role and importance of the Hong Kong Liaison Office in the aftermath of the Hong Kong local district elections (disastrous for the pro-establishment camp) and the Liaison Office’s poor work in handling the Hong Kong situation. If Party Central has decided to “downgrade” the Hong Kong Liaison Office’s role and play a more direct part in overseeing Hong Kong and the work of the Hong Kong police (Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission head Guo Shengkun was a surprise attendee in a meeting between top CCP officials and Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam in December 2019), then it matters not that Luo Huining lacks experience in Hong Kong and Macau affairs.
- Some observers have suggested that Luo Huining’s appointment is an indication that Party Central wants to get “tougher” on Hong Kong, particularly after scrutinizing his career in the provinces. Based on our observation, however, Party Central had already hardened its stance on Hong Kong in November 2019 (see Hong Kong police’s besieging of CUHK and PolyU) but then had to tread carefully after the U.S. passed the Hong Kong Act in December (this does not mean that Party Central has changed its current tough stance). Also, Luo’s work in Qinghai and Shanxi do not offer a clear indication that he will get tough on Hong Kong; if our above analysis is correct, the bulk of the responsibility for subsequent tougher handling of the Hong Kong situation will lie with Party Central, not Luo personally.
2. Wang Zhimin’s career progression suggests that he is in Xi’s camp and was installed in Hong Kong, a long-time Jiang faction bastion, so that Xi had someone there who he trusts.
Wang spent his formative years as a PRC official in Fujian and Hong Kong. From 1992 to 1998, he served in the Xinhua’s Hong Kong bureau office (the previous incarnation of the Hong Kong Liaison Office) as deputy department chief of the Xinhua bureau’s Women and Youth Affairs Department. In 1998, Wang became an assistant to the mayor of Xiamen in Fujian Province. From 1999 to 2006, Wang served as director of Fujian’s Entry-Exit Inspection And Quarantine Bureau; during this period, Xi Jinping was governor of Fujian (1999 to 2002) and was Wang’s superior.
In 2006, Wang was transferred to the Hong Kong Liaison Office and was promoted to deputy director in 2009. Publicly available information suggests that Wang, a native of Fujian Province, had an advantage in building networks with the local pro-establishment “Fujian Clique” (福建幫) in Hong Kong. From October 2007 to November 2012, Wang would again have Xi Jinping as his superior as Xi, then PRC vice president, headed the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Leading Small Group.
Barely halfway through Xi’s first term in office, the Hong Kong Umbrella Movement protests broke out in September 2014 and ended in December of the same year. In April 2015, Wang Zhimin was promoted to deputy director of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office and also served as its Deputy Party Secretary. In July 2016, Wang was promoted to head of the Macau Liaison Office (a ministerial-level appointment), and subsequently replaced Zhang Xiaoming as Hong Kong Liaison Office head in September 2017.
Wang’s appointment as director of the Hong Kong Liaison Office must be viewed in the larger context of Xi eroding the Jiang faction’s influence in the military (through sweeping reform and reshuffles) and the Hong Kong and Macau affairs apparatus (through reshuffles and purges) starting in 2016. Wang was formerly Xi’s subordinate and his receiving promotion during Xi’s first term in office suggested that he had the latter’s trust to handle Hong Kong where Jiang faction interests remain deeply entrenched.
3. In our analysis of the Hong Kong situation in September 2019, we wrote that while Zhang Xiaoming and Wang Zhimin face high levels of political risk, “Zhang could be investigated, and Wang could be transferred.” Our rationale then for why Wang faces a transfer instead of investigation is because he is from the Xi camp and would unlikely be dealt with harshly by Xi Jinping.
Developments after September 2019 to the present further affirm our believe that Wang would escape investigation even though he has been removed as Hong Kong Liaison Office director.
First, as stated in an earlier point, Party Central had hardened its stance on Hong Kong in November and there are no signs yet that it is shifting that stance. The Xi Jinping leadership continues to publicly support the Hong Kong government; in mid-December, Hong Kong leader Carrie Lam met with Xi and other senior CCP officials overseeing Hong Kong and Macau affairs in Beijing. Given the Xi leadership’s tough stance on Hong Kong, it would unlikely move to punish one of its former senior officials in Hong Kong and risk signaling weakness to the Hong Kong people, especially when it no longer has a pressing need to influence the 2020 Taiwan presidential election (see our analysis of the Wang Liqiang incident here and here).
Second, the Hong Kong people have shown no signs of backing down in protesting the Hong Kong government and the CCP regime. A new year’s day march saw a turnout of more than 1 million people; had the Hong Kong police not intervened and halted the previously approved rally, there was a good chance that over 2 million people could have protested on Jan. 1, 2020. This gives the CCP reason to maintain its tough stance, which in turn sustains and could even grow the Hong Kong protest movement.
Given present circumstances, Wang Zhimin could potentially take over from Zhang Xiaoming as head of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office before or at the Two Sessions meetings in March as Xi Jinping seeks to strengthen his control over the Hong Kong and Macau affairs apparatus.
4. We have said on multiple occasions that Zhang Xiaoming, the current Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office director and a Jiang faction member, is at high risk of being purged. Signs have emerged last year which indicates that Zhang is already being marginalized (see here and here).
We believe that Zhang is at risk of being investigated. There is less of a “face” issue for the Xi leadership in investigating Zhang because he is based in Beijing and is officially not “on the ground” like Wang Zhimin. Also, if Wang does replace Zhang as we analyzed in the point above, then Party Central is signaling to the Hong Kong people that it is not backing down and remains just as tough as before.
In the best case scenario for Zhang, he could be demoted and receive a comparatively light punishment. Regardless of how Zhang is “dealt with,” it is unlikely that the CCP will make it public that he is being punished over the months of chaos in Hong Kong.
5. After the anti-extradition bill protest movement broke out in Hong Kong, there have been media reports that the central PLAC (Guo Shengkun) and public security (Zhao Kezhi) heads are currently serving as deputy heads of the Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Leading Small Group. Other media reports say that Party Central has set up a “crisis center” across the Hong Kong border in Shenzhen, and top CCP officials have been summoning top Hong Kong officials to meet at the “crisis center.” Put another way, the Hong Kong Liaison Office has already been somewhat marginalized as compared to before the protests as Party Central seeks more direct involvement in handling the Hong Kong situation. Given Party Central’s more hands-on approach to Hong Kong, it might not be surprising if Hong Kong Liaison Office directors who come after Luo Huining lack experience in Hong Kong and Macau affairs.
6. We previously analyzed the difficulties facing Xi Jinping as the PRC prepares to sign a “phase one” trade deal with the United States. To overcome difficulties involving the CCP factional struggle, Xi has to resort to purges, reach a compromise with his political opponents, or do a bit of both. How Xi deals with Zhang Xiaoming will reveal his plan for dealing with the factional struggle.
