1 Beijing’s social control headaches increase with Chinese actor Yu Menglong controversy
The death of Yu Menglong, social reaction, and CCP censorship
Official account of Yu’s death
Chinese actor Yu Menglong reportedly fell to his death from a residential building in Beijing’s Chaoyang District on Sept. 11, according to mainland media. Per reports, Yu had dinner with friends at the home of a friend in the building on Sept. 10. Around 2 a.m. Beijing time, Yu went to a bedroom, locked the door, and went to sleep. Then around 6 a.m. when the gathering was dispersing and Yu was nowhere to be seen, his friends went downstairs and discovered his body.
The Chaoyang police ruled out foul play within 12 hours of Yu Menglong’s death, and declared that he died from an “accidental fall after drinking.” Yu’s studio later issued a statement about his passing and noted that “criminal suspicion has been ruled out” after a police investigation. After public scrutiny and speculation about Yu’s death intensified in the following days, the studio released a statement allegedly from Yu’s mother noting that her son “fell from height after drinking alcohol, leaving us forever.”
Netizen theories and response
The Chinese public noted several suspicious things about Yu Menglong’s death after the news broke:
- The Chaoyang police were quick to rule out foul play in Yu’s death. However, Yu’s abdomen was reportedly wrapped in bandages when his body was found, with a “leaked” autopsy report surfacing later claiming that his abdomen had been sliced open and his genitals mutilated. Netizens also spotted details from photos of the apartment window where Yu supposedly fell from that hinted at a struggle, including the window’s mesh screen looking like it was torn off rather than pried open and marks on the window suggesting that someone was pushed out. Finally, Yu’s body was allegedly cremated relatively rapidly after his death.
- Netizens noted that three other young actors under Yu’s studio — Qiao Renliang (officially suicide by wrist-slashing due to depression), Ren Jiao (his nude body was found after a fall, but his death was officially ruled not a homicide), and Ben Xi (officially suicide by jumping) — had previously died under suspicious circumstances. Netizens also noted that Netflix removed Yu’s name from the cast list of “Eternal Love,” the period drama that shot Yu to fame.
- Yu’s associates and those familiar with China’s entertainment industry either faced censorship or dropped cryptic hints that something was afoot. Chinese entertainment critic and Yu’s mentor Song Zu wrote an angry social media post condemning mainland media’s blackout of news about Yu’s death, but his post was censored within five minutes. Sun Derong, Yu’s first acting teacher and manager, repeatedly issued apologies, said he was powerless to help, and hinted at high-level interference. Finally, influential Hong Kong film producer Tiffany Chen, who is pro-CCP and known to have triad ties, said in a livestream that she dares not get involved in Yu’s case.
Netizens both inside and outside China also circulated accounts and speculation linking Yu Menglong’s death with dark practices in China’s entertainment industry and members of the CCP elite:
- Yu allegedly refused the “casting couch” rules (i.e. sexual favors) from filmmakers connected with the CCP elite at the gathering. He then tried to flee, but was caught, beaten, and hung outside a window to intimidate him. He was then allegedly thrown from the building twice.
- Yu was reportedly blacklisted for refusing advances from powerful figures. On the night of the gathering, he was allegedly drugged, raped, anesthetized with pufferfish toxin, had his abdomen cut open and genitals mutilated, then thrown from the building. The “powerful figures” are allegedly linked to senior CCP officials like Cai Qi, Zhao Leji, and relatives of Xi Jinping.
- Yu allegedly gathered evidence of money laundering involving senior CCP officials and became a casualty of factional struggle. Police then rushed to close Yu’ case because those involved had “powerful backgrounds,” allegedly involving factional rivalry between Cai Qi, Zhao Leji, and Xi Jinping’s camp. A blogger claiming to be a Party princeling alleged, “Orders from above were: Do not pay attention, do not discuss, resolve quickly (the Yu Menglong case).”
The seemingly unusual circumstances around Yu Menglong’s death and the CCP authorities’ handling of the case sparked a huge public backlash. Netizens quickly shifted from shock to anger, circulating posts about Yu’s death with phrases like “the truth cannot be buried,” “entertainment industry corruption,” and “abuse of power.” Chinese citizens also flooded message boards (a move dubbed “storming the towers,” or “沖塔”) on CCTV, Beijing Culture and Tourism Bureau, China Court Network, and the State Council petition app with millions of comments about the Yu Menglong case. Police hotlines were reportedly overwhelmed with queries about Yu, and netizens circumvented the “Great Firewall” to post demands for the CCP authorities to release surveillance footage of Yu’s death and a full autopsy report. Finally, some held gatherings overseas to mark Yu’s memory.
Authorities step up censorship
Shortly after Yu Menglong’s death, the Cyberspace Administration of China launched a sweeping censorship campaign under the name “Clean Internet 2025.” Ostensibly aimed at quelling “rumors” and controlling public opinion, the campaign saw Xiaohongshu, Douyin, and Weibo remove over 4,300 videos and threads related to Yu’s case and shut down over thousands of accounts in the first week after his death. Meanwhile, the websites of the CCP authorities that were flooded with comments about Yu closed their comment section.
On Sept. 22, state mouthpiece Xinhua reported that the CAC had begun a two-month-long, nationwide campaign to crack down on “malicious incitement of confrontation,” “promotion of violent hostility,” and other negative emotions. The effort targeted four categories: “inciting extreme group antagonism,” “spreading panic and anxiety,” “provoking online violence,” and “excessively amplifying pessimism.”
Brief background on Yu Menglong
Yu Menglong, 37, came from an ordinary family and was admitted to the acting department of the Beijing Film Academy in 2007. That year, he finished top 16 in a talent competition and signed with an agency. Yu later found fame as a “period costume heartthrob” after featuring in period dramas such as “Go Princess Go” (2015) and “Eternal Love” (2017), and reportedly had over 20 million fans at one point.
After his rise to stardom, Yu barely gained any screentime for three consecutive years. Media reports said that Yu was “frozen out” by his agency after allegedly rejecting the advances of a female producer or investor. Yu kept a low profile during the period he was sidelined (2020 to 2022), and spent time teaching music and acting in Xinjiang and remote mountain areas. After the 2021 Henan floods broke out, Yu donated 500,000 yuan to the relief effort. Netizens praised Yu for being “humble and hardworking” and observed that he had “zero scandals.”
Our take
1. The bulk of the information and speculation about Yu Menglong’s case is difficult to verify. Regardless, the intense speculation, odd details about the official version of Yu’s death, and the CCP authorities’ handling of the case (including censorship), as well as the actor’s personal sufferings in recent years, appear to have triggered backlash against the Party that is somewhat akin to an online “blank paper revolution” (i.e. the protests that broke out across China near the end of 2022 over people losing their patience over “zero-COVID” and the social problems it created).
The public outcry over Yu Menglong appears to be quite massive because many Chinese see themselves in him. Young Chinese in particular empathize with Yu over what they perceive (correctly or incorrectly) as his tragic fate — a humble, hardworking actor who rose to prominence through merit who was later oppressed after offending powerful elites in the regime and ultimately lost his life at their hands. Yu’s situation somewhat parallels their own — many young Chinese study hard and graduate from college (“hardwork” and “rising through merit”) only to end up delivering food (“oppressed by the elites”) or taking jobs with crazy work schedules (the infamous “996” working hours) with poor prospects. Many young Chinese increasingly believe that with the PRC’s entrenched social hierarchy, elite monopolies, and systemic injustice, ordinary people like themselves and Yu Menglong are essentially slaves to the CCP authoritarian system and have no real future. Their sense of despair is reinforced in perceiving that even the more upright elements of society — Yu was reportedly kind and unassuming — will not be spared by the CCP and regime elites.
Some Chinese also see Yu’s death reflecting how the CCP elites and ruling class view the ordinary people in society as worthless or “spare parts” that can be toyed and abused at will. In Yu’s case, the elites apparently pursued him for his body, and when they could not get it, callously disposed of him. Some netizens drew links between the Party elites’ supposed treatment of Yu and the CCP’s practice of live organ harvesting, a topic that has gained traction recently in light of Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin’s discussion of organ transplants and “immortality” at the 2025 Beijing parade. Aside from the CCP’s targeting of Falun Gong practitioners for their organs, netizens have brought up several other cases:
- Netizens noticed that a large number of children go missing in China each year and have speculated that those children could have been targeted for organ harvesting. They cite the case of Luo Shuaiyu, an intern at the Xiangya Second Hospital in Hunan who died from “falling off a building” in May 2024. Before his death, Luo made audio recordings where he exposed the organ transplant black market in China and indicated that children’s organs were being used.
- In Inner Mongolia’s Xilinhot, the local police announced on Sept. 5, 2025 that they were collecting blood samples from all local male residents to build a DNA database. This raised fears that the move might be linked to organ transplants.
Growing public distrust and dissatisfaction with CCP rule has led Yu Menglong’s death to become a rallying point against CCP tyranny. This could spark or contribute to greater social unrest going forward.
2. Party and business elites in China have long involved themselves with China’s entertainment industry. Over the years, the industry has been plagued by sex scandals, money laundering and other corruption (“yin-yang” contracts, etc.). The entertainment industry is also a proverbial battleground for factional struggles; during Xi Jinping’s second term, he cracked down on corruption in the entertainment sector and appeared to target factional enemies like Zeng Qinghuai, the brother of Jiang Zemin’s political enabler Zeng Qinghong. Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that the relatives or associates of current senior CCP officials were involved in Yu Menglong’s death as speculated (“pro-Xi” forces could have replaced the marginalized “pro-Jiang” elements in the entertainment industry following the Xi leadership’s clean up), or that rival factions are taking advantage of Yu’s death to attack each other through fabricating scandals or direct public anger towards the Xi leadership with the goal of undermining Beijing.
Nevertheless, regardless of the truth of Yu Menglong’s death or whether rival factions in the Party elite are actually involved, the CCP authorities will certainly impose strict online censorship and control public discourse. Beijing would not want the “spark” of Yu’s death to ignite a “prairie fire” and reveal more scandals that would embarrass the Party. The CCP could succeed in its suppression and keep the public silenced over Yu’s case, but will ultimately engender more resentment towards the regime and inspire more people to search out the truth about the Party and its various misdeeds.
2 Analyzing Xi’s trip to Xinjiang to mark anniversary celebration
Xi visits Xinjiang
Sept. 23
Xi Jinping traveled to Xinjiang with a central delegation to attend the celebration marking the 70th anniversary of the PRC’s founding of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Xi is the first PRC leader to be present for such a celebration.
Senior officials accompanying Xi included:
- Wang Huning, chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and head of the central delegation.
- Cai Qi, director of the CCP General Office.
- Li Ganjie, head of the United Front Work Department and deputy head of the central delegation.
- Shewket Imin, vice chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee.
- Shen Yiqin, State Councilor.
- Wang Dongfeng, vice chairman of the CPPCC.
- Liu Zhenli, Central Military Commission member.
- He Lifeng, vice premier of the State Council.
- Wang Xiaohong, secretary of the CCP Secretariat and State Councilor.
CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo footage showed the large crowds at the airport (organized by the Xinjiang local authorities) singing, dancing, and waving red flags along the road to welcome Xi, who waved back frequently.
Xi separately met with representatives from all ethnic groups and sectors in Xinjiang, leaders and representatives of the Party, government, military, and police in the region, as well as representatives of religious circles and grassroots religious work cadres. He later posed for photos with them.
Sept. 24
Xi Jinping presided over a briefing session of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region’s Party Committee and government in Urumqi, and listened to reports on regional work.
At the meeting, Xi emphasized that Xinjiang officials must fully and accurately implement his “strategy for governing Xinjiang,” pursue work under the principle of “seeking progress while maintaining stability,” uphold the overarching goals of “social stability” and “long-term peace and order,” strengthen the “sense of community of the Chinese nation” (i.e., assimilating ethnic minorities into Han culture), and advance the “construction of the Chinese national community” (i.e., promoting the idea that Xinjiang belongs within the PRC’s principle of “great unity”).
Xi also delivered some remarks at the meeting. He praised Xinjiang’s achievements, claiming that under the “strong leadership of the Party Central Committee,” the region had undergone “earth-shaking historic changes.” He then put forward development proposals for Xinjiang, including leveraging local resource endowments, developing characteristic industries, promoting integration of culture and tourism, and accelerating the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt’s core area.
Xi emphasized the need to fully safeguard overall social stability and strengthen the people’s anti-terrorism and stability defense line (i.e., citizens monitoring and reporting on each other). He also called for strengthening the “sense of community of the Chinese nation,” advancing the Sinicization of religion (i.e., religions must obey and follow the Party, with the atheist CCP placed above all deities), and intensifying cultural work to “nourish Xinjiang” (i.e., spreading Han culture).
Xi further demanded strengthening Party leadership and using Xi Jinping Thought to “concentrate the heart and cast the soul.”
Sept. 25
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published a front-page editorial titled, “Firmly Establish the Sense of Community of the Chinese Nation, Build a Socialist Modern Xinjiang — Warmly Celebrating the 70th Anniversary of the Founding of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region” to glorify Xi Jinping’s governance achievements.
The editorial, which essentially glorifies Xi Jinping’s achievements in the governance of Xinjiang, stated that Xinjiang had achieved remarkable accomplishments over the past 70 years under the strong leadership of Party Central. The editorial added that since Xi took office, he had visited Xinjiang three times and attended two Central Xinjiang Work Symposiums, delivered important speeches, and formulated the Party’s strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era. The editorial boasted that Xinjiang’s GDP exceeded 2 trillion yuan for the first time in 2024, or 204.3 times that of 1955.
The editorial claimed that Xinjiang’s “70 years of brilliant achievements” fully demonstrate the “great superiority of the socialist system,” and that the Party’s new-era strategy for governing Xinjiang is “completely correct.” It further declared that Xinjiang should be built into a “golden corridor between Asia and Europe” and a “bridgehead for opening up to the West.”
The article concluded by calling for unity “more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and for the comprehensive implementation of “Xi Jinping Thought.”
Backdrop
At the end of August 2025, Xi Jinping led a central government delegation to Lhasa to attend the celebrations marking the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region. Xi was the first PRC leader to personally attend a celebration of the Tibet Autonomous Region’s founding.
On Sept. 19, 2025, the State Council Information Office released a white paper titled “The Successful Practice of the Party’s Strategy for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era,” and held a press conference to expound on it.
Our take
1. The broad political objectives of Xi Jinping attending the anniversary celebration of the PRC’s founding of Xinjiang appear to be identical to those of his recent trip to Tibet, the holding of the 2025 Beijing military parade, and State Council Information Office’s release of a white paper lauding the Xi leadership’s “successful” governance of Xinjiang. That is, Xi is emphasizing his paramount position in the Party (partly to strengthen his “quan wei,” and partly to encourage improved governance) and building important political capital to justify taking a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress. The white paper on the CCP’s “successful” governance of Xinjiang that was released ahead of Xi’s trip
More narrowly, Xi is likely looking to differentiate himself from his predecessors by attending founding anniversary celebrations for both the Tibet and Xinjiang regions. The political message sent is that Xi successfully addressed lingering issues plaguing the CCP’s governance of frontier regions during his tenure that his predecessors were unable to resolve
2. CCTV footage showed that the Xinjiang local authorities had arranged a grand welcoming ceremony for Xi Jinping and created the image that the people of Xinjiang warmly embraced Xi. This propaganda image is intended to whitewash the CCP’s bad reputation regarding its rule of Xinjiang, including its brutal repression of Uyghurs and other ethnic minorities (including the destruction of their culture) in the name of “maintaining stability” or achieving “long-term peace and order.”
State broadcaster footage also showed that when Xi separately met with representatives of various ethnic groups and sectors, as well as the heads and representatives of Xinjiang’s Party, government, military, and police, he was seen walking ahead of them, positioned at a visible distance from other central leaders, and received prolonged applause. This filming arrangement is meant to emphasize and strengthen Xi’s paramount position in the regime (定於一尊) in propaganda, and make it clear that he is firmly in charge.
The propaganda messaging of Xi’s Xinjiang visit, as well as the political accommodations and protocols he received, clearly refute rumors and speculation that are still circulating in overseas Chinese-speaking circles that Xi has “lost power.”
3. As with the Tibet founding anniversary celebration, the military representatives accompanying Xi Jinping in Xinjiang were CMC members and not CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia. There is nothing unusual about this arrangement given that there are no requirements for the CMC vice chairman to attend such events. Also, Zhang is likely tied up with overseeing the Xi leadership’s intense rectification of the People’s Liberation Army, and has to stay in Beijing.
Another possible reason for Zhang’s “absence” is Xi’s future personnel reshuffles. Zhang is due to step down at the 21st Party Congress, but the two CMC members who joined Xi in Xinjiang — Zhang Shengmin and Liu Zhenli — are due to serve another term. It is possible that Xi is preparing to promote Zhang and Liu to CMC vice chairmen at the upcoming Party Congress, with Zhang taking up the political work portfolio and Liu the military operations portfolio.
Of the two, Liu Zhenli seems the more likely one to eventually serve as CMC vice chairman. Liu is relatively young (61 now, 63 by the 21st Party Congress) and served as a reconnaissance soldier in the PRC’s conflict with Vietnam, earning a first-class merit award. Actual combat experience aside, Liu’s political background seems secure as he rose relatively slowly up the ranks during the Jiang-Hu years. The Xi leadership appointed Liu commander of the PLA Ground Force in June 2021 and chief of staff of the CMC Joint Staff Department in March 2023.
