1 CCP uses ‘momentum’ of Beijing parade to prop up Xi
The CCP authorities have ramped up nationalistic propaganda (“unstoppable rejuvenation of the Chinese nation,” China “stands on the right side of history,” etc.) and promoted Xi Jinping’s plan for “global governance” in the wake of the Sept. 3, 2025 military parade and World War II celebrations in Beijing.
CCP holds summary meeting for parade-related activities
Sept. 17
The CCP authorities held a summary meeting for the activities it held to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the “Chinese people’s War of Resistance Against Japan and the World Anti-Fascist War” in Beijing.
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily reported that Xi Jinping met with representatives from various sectors involved in organizing the activities and took a group photo with them. Vice chairmen of the commemorative activities leadership group — Wang Yi, Yin Li, Li Shulei, Zhang Youxia, Wang Xiaohong, Wu Zhenglong, and Liu Zhenli — attended the meeting.
The summary meeting required all regions, departments, and units to transform the so-called “love for the Party and patriotism” aroused by the commemorations into strong motivation to advance Chinese-style modernization. The meeting also conveyed a speech that Xi gave to a recent meeting (People’s Daily did not state specifically when the meeting was held) of the Politburo Standing Committee where he heard a summary report on the commemorative activities.
In his speech, Xi said that the commemorative activities were a “solemn and grand, magnificent, heart-stirring, and inspiring” celebration of the War of Resistance. He added that the activities further strengthened confidence and conviction in fully advancing the “great cause of building a strong country” and “national rejuvenation,” as well as in taking up the responsibility of “building a community of shared future for mankind.”
Xi praised the leadership group for the commemorative activities and its various working bodies for “outstandingly” completing the “political tasks” assigned by Party Central.
Xi stressed the need to make full use of the “powerful positive energy,” “patriotic education,” and “confidence, pride, and morale” generated by the commemorations, and transform them into a “powerful driving force” for implementing Party Central’s decisions and addressing various risks and challenges. He also emphasized the importance of firmly standing on the “right side of history,” seizing “historical initiative,” telling China’s story well, and demonstrating to the world that China is a “staunch defender of the post-war international order.”
State media trumpets CCP’s hegemonic intentions
Sept. 18
State mouthpiece Xinhua published a lengthy commentary piece titled, “The Noble Cause of Human Peace and Development Will Surely Triumph! — General Secretary Xi Jinping’s Important Speech Reveals the Inevitable Logic of Historical Progress.”
The commentary rehashed the CCP’s narrative about China’s so-called “fourteen-year war of resistance” against Imperial Japan, portraying the victory as “a turning point for China from deep crisis to great rejuvenation, and also a major milestone in world development, marking the ultimate triumph of justice, light, and progress over evil, darkness, and reaction.”
The commentary then argues that “peace is the precondition for development” and that peaceful development is “the inevitable logic of history.” From this, it advances the CCP’s so-called “peace initiatives,” including its “community of shared future for mankind,” “multilateralism,” and other global governance initiatives.
Finally, the commentary presents the CCP’s three “commitments”:
- At all times, uphold the common values of humanity and safeguard international fairness and justice.
- At all times, adhere to the path of peaceful development, build a community of shared future for mankind, and safeguard world peace.
- At all times, harbor the people in your heart and the world in your chest, tirelessly advancing the well-being of the people while prioritizing the interests of both the people and the world.
Symposium held to promote Xi’s latest book
Sept. 17
A symposium to promote the recently published “Xi Jinping: The Governance of China, Volume V” was held in Beijing. Cai Qi, a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat, attended the meeting and delivered a speech. Li Shulei, the head of the Central Propaganda Department, presided over the meeting.
In his speech, Cai lauded “Xi Jinping Thought” and urged Party members and cadres to deeply grasp the “powerful truth and practical force” contained in Xi’s “important discourse on Chinese-style modernization,” as well as Xi’s “wise reflections on the grand logic and major trends of human social development.”
Central authorities hold summary meeting on discipline campaign
Sept. 18
A summary meeting of the Central Guidance Group and the Central-Level Task Force on the In-Depth Implementation of the Education Campaign to Study and Apply the Spirit of the Central Eight-point Regulation was held in Beijing. Shi Taifeng, deputy leader of the CCP Central Leading Group for Party-building, attended the meeting and gave a speech. Liu Jinguo, secretary of the CCP Central Secretariat and deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, presided over the meeting.
The meeting stated that the study and education campaign to promote the Central Eight-point Regulation had subjected Party organizations at all levels and the vast number of Party members and cadres to a profound “political tempering.” The meeting added that the conclusion of the study and education campaign is not the end of improving Party conduct, but a new starting point. The meeting further emphasized the need to unite more closely around the Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.
Our take
1. The summary meeting for the activities the CCP held to mark its (largely ahistorical) Second World War achievements indicates that the regime’s post-Beijing parade propaganda also has the agenda of boosting Xi Jinping’s “quan wei” and generating momentum for the Xi leadership’s effort to improve governing efficiency.
First, Xi gave very high praise to the leadership group for the commemorative activities and its various working bodies, notably for “outstandingly” completing Party Central’s “political tasks.” This suggests that the activities were not purely meant to mark China’s contributions to victory in World War II, but were also designed to accomplish objectives like political mobilization for better governance and growing Xi’s cult of personality.
Second, Xi’s speech to the Politburo Standing Committee regarding the commemorative activities appeared to be carefully worded to generate so-called “powerful positive energy” and confidence. The Xi leadership likely intends to galvanise “lying flat” and “inactive” Party cadres and officials into properly carrying out the decision and deployments of Party Central with “Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” so that the CCP authorities can respond more effectively to various risks and challenges plaguing the regime.
Finally, footage of the summary meeting from CCTV’s Xinwen Lianbo was likely designed to highlight Xi’s paramount position. The footage showed Xi walking a significant distance ahead of the vice chairmen of the leadership group for the commemorative activities, a gesture that is meant to highlight his superior political status.
2. CCP propaganda continues elevating Xi Jinping’s political position and influence, while implicitly hinting that Xi will be the one leading the PRC in winning the struggle with the United States over who gets to lead the global order in the twenty-first century.
First, the promotion of Xi’s latest “governance of China” volume dovetails thematically with recent propaganda praising Xi’s “global governance” initiatives. The subtext of the propaganda drive envisions a future where the U.S. retreats or is less influential in a “multipolar world order” led by the PRC, and with Xi still in charge of China. The Xi leadership is looking to will this vision into existence, at least domestically, partly by having the latest volume of Xi’s “governance of China” and his political theories be mandatory reading for Party cadres and members at Party schools, cadre academies, and universities.
Second, the Sept. 18 Xinhua commentary on Xi’s “inevitable logic of historical progress” implicitly promotes the idea that under Xi’s leadership, the PRC — holding the banner of so-called “peaceful development” — will ultimately triumph over the U.S. on the world stage and displace the latter as global hegemon. This propaganda is consistent with Xi’s speech at the Beijing parade, where he declared that China must “firmly stand on the right side of history,” seize “historical initiative,” and show the world that it is a “firm defender” of the post-war international order.
The CCP’s idea of “peaceful development” is essentially identical in essence to its concept of “multilateralism.” Instead of offering countries genuine multilateralism and freedom of choice in a liberal world order, the CCP seeks to draw them into a global “united front” against the U.S. and its allies. Nations that support the CCP’s “multilateralism” or so-called “great democracy” are, often unknowingly, endorsing its Marxist-Leninist worldview and indirectly enabling its agenda of world communism and domination.
3. The Central Eight-point Regulation study and education campaign summary meeting’s point that the conclusion of the campaign is just a “starting point” indicates that the Xi leadership plans to step up political indoctrination and anti-corruption purges between now and the 21st Party Congress. This development is almost certainly meant to remove potential obstacles to Xi Jinping taking a fourth term in 2027, including suppressing internal discontent and dissent.
2 Analyzing the CCP’s white paper on governing Xinjiang
On Sept. 19, the State Council Information Office (SCIO) released a white paper titled, “The Successful Practice of the Party’s Strategy for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era” (新時代黨的治疆方略的成功實踐) and held a press conference to introduce and interpret it.
Per the SCIO’s introduction, the white paper is about 21,000 characters long and consists of ten sections. The white paper’s central concept is that the “Party’s strategy for governing Xinjiang in the new era” is an important part of Xi Jinping Thought. It summarizes the PRC’s historical experience of governing Xinjiang and the CCP’s practices there, notes that the regime’s overall goal in the region is maintaining social stability and long-term security, and takes “forging a strong sense of community of the Chinese nation” (i.e., enforced Sinicization) as its main objective to achieve stability in Xinjiang.
Noteworthy parts of the white paper are as follows:
Parts I & II: Historical review
The white paper begins with a historical perspective, summarizing how successive central governments governed Xinjiang under the principle of “great unity” (大一統) and how this provides a historical foundation for contemporary governance. It traces the CCP’s so-called “glorious course” of governing Xinjiang, narrating in stages from the revolutionary period to Xi Jinping’s “new era,” as well as highlighting the continuity and progress of its governance.
Part III: Introduction to Xi Jinping’s strategy for governing Xinjiang
The white paper outlines the formation, core essence, and guiding principles of Xi Jinping’s Xinjiang strategy. The white paper also makes clear that Xi’s theory — namely “forging a strong sense of community of the Chinese nation” — is the guiding thought of the entire document.
Parts IV–IX: Xi’s main ‘achievements’ in governing Xinjiang
The white paper elaborates on the implementation results of Xi’s Xinjiang strategy across different areas, including social stability, ethnic unity, democracy and rule of law, economic development, cultural prosperity, and improvements in people’s livelihoods. Each section explains Xi’s governance “successes” by moving from policies and measures to concrete data and claimed outcomes.
Part X: Collective efforts and outlook
The white paper emphasizes that Xinjiang’s “success” is the result of Party Central’s leadership, nationwide support, integration of military and civilian forces, and the united struggle of all ethnic groups. In conclusion, it reiterates that the fundamental reason for success lies in Xi Jinping, as the “core” of the Party Central and the Party as a whole, steering the course with the “scientific guidance” of Xi Jinping Thought.
A brief history of PRC subjugation of Xinjiang
Since establishing its regime in 1949, the CCP has continually sought to dominate Xinjiang and the Uyghurs under the guise of “stability maintenance” and achieving so-called “great unity”. Notable history includes:
- After the founding of the PRC, the CCP sent the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang to suppress the Uyghurs. The PLA would kill many Uyghurs who resisted their rule (Wang Zhen, a general who was acting commander and political commissar of the Xinjiang Military Region at the time, boasted that his “killings in Xinjiang have ensured that there won’t be a counter-revolution in 50 years”), seize land and resources, and socially marginalize the Uyghurs. The CCP also promoted atheism and “socialist transformation,” forcing Uyghurs to abandon Islamic customs (which the Party deemed as “feudal superstition”), demolishing mosques, and burning Qurans. All this deepened Han-Uyghur tensions in Xinjiang, generated Uyghur hatred towards the CCP, and left many Uyghurs viewing the Han Chinese as “invaders.”
- The CCP persecuted Uyghur intellectuals during the Cultural Revolution, leading to cultural discontinuity and increased psychological trauma in Xinjiang.
- During the “reform and opening up” period, foreign Islamic influences (such as Saudi Wahhabism and Central Asian jihadism) entered Xinjiang, fostering an Islamic revival. In the 1980s and 1990s, more Uyghurs went on pilgrimage to the Middle East, while underground mosques and Quran schools proliferated. Greater openness, however, also brought extremist currents, notably the Baren Township uprising in Xinjiang in the 1990s.
- Xi Jinping’s first term saw multiple terrorist attacks linked to extremist elements in Xinjiang that led to mass civilian casualties. Examples include the October 2013 Tiananmen car bombing (2 dead, 38 injured), the March 2014 Kunming railway station attack (31 dead, 143 injured), the April 2014 Urumqi railway station bombing (3 dead, 79 injured), and the May 2014 Urumqi market bombing (39 dead, 94 injured). Later, Xi reportedly personally authorized the Xinjiang local authorities to draft counterterrorism laws in response.
- After consolidating control over the military in 2016, Xi dismissed Jiang Zemin faction official Zhang Chunxian as Party secretary of Xinjiang and replaced him with then Tibet Party secretary Chen Quanguo. Chen proceeded to implement Orwellian social controls in Xinjiang, including importing so-called “grid-style social management” and a comprehensive surveillance system from his time in Tibet.
- In 2017, the Xinjiang authorities passed the “de-extremification regulations” (去極端化條例), which provided a legal basis for the establishment of “vocational education and training centers.” From then on, the local authorities began constructing and operating large de facto internment camps to “transform” those suspected of extremism. By 2019, the Xinjiang authorities had admitted nearly 1.3 million people in so-called “training and employment” programs. During the pandemic years (2020-2022), the Xinjiang authorities repurposed some of the internment camps as quarantine facilities.
- After the lifting of “zero-COVID” restrictions, the CCP authorities gradually shifted the focus of governance in Xinjiang from mass detention and forced “transformation” to employment and poverty alleviation. To that end, the authorities established the Xinjiang Free Trade Zone in 2023 and attracted over 9,000 enterprises to the region. Aside from spurring national economic growth, the CCP authorities’ policy adjustment in Xinjiang appeared to be an attempt to use economic means to pacify the Uyghur minorities.
Our take
1. A surface read of the SCIO’s white paper on Xinjiang indicates that it is part of the Xi leadership’s broader propaganda campaign post-Beijing parade to promote the centrality of Xi Jinping to the CCP regime amid escalating risks and challenges. We believe that this propaganda effort is intended to justify and pave the way for Xi to take a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress.
As with the case with the post-Beijing parade propaganda, the Xinjiang white paper endeavors to prop up Xi, specifically by upholding his image as a leader (Xi’s three personal inspection tours to Xinjiang and various strategic deployments are highlighted), proclaiming his leadership’s governance of the border region as a “political achievement” (Xinjiang’s current “stability and prosperity” are attributed to Xi and his so-called “new strategy for governing Xinjiang”) and indirectly proving Xi’s “irreplaceability” as Party boss.
Yet those who are familiar with the CCP’s gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang and Orwellian controls would find that the white paper essentially repackages the Party’s atrocities as accomplishments. The document whitewashes the CCP’s actions over many years that exacerbated Han-Uyghur tensions in Xinjiang, and sparked acts of terror that led the Xi leadership to impose iron-fisted policies in the recent decade. To suppress what they perceived as growing extremism in the region, the CCP adopted methods similar to what the Jiang Zemin leadership used against Falun Gong practitioners, namely, economic destruction, reputational destruction, and physical destruction. In Xinjiang, this translated to Uyghurs being subjected to forced labor and loss of livelihoods, propaganda smearing Uyghurs as “separatists,” and the building of massive detention camps where Uyghurs were subject to “thought reform,” torture, and even death.
Concurrently, the Xi leadership launched a mass assimilation campaign to essentially “Sinify” Uyghur children, including separating them from their families, placing them in Mandarin-only boarding schools, and prohibiting them from speaking the Uyghur language. The de-emphasizing of Uyghur culture, along with knowledge of Mandarin as the prerequisite for employment in Xinjiang, meant that many young Uyghurs today have essentially forgotten their traditions and are deeply dependent on a Han-dominated economy.
2. Nested in the subtext of the Xinjiang white paper is an implicit nod to factional struggle in the CCP elite. For instance, the white paper notes that the governance of Xinjiang before Xi Jinping took charge was “inconsistent and lacked precision.” The white paper then claimed that Xi would set the direction that resulted in a “stable and prosperous” Xinjiang today, including setting the “general goal of long-term social stability and security” at the Second Central Xinjiang Work Conference in 2014 and elaborating on the strategy at the Third Central Xinjiang Work Conference in 2020. The white paper’s contrast of Xinjiang governance before and after Xi is both an acknowledgment of the fact and a subtle jibe at the Jiang Zemin faction.
The Jiang faction had long dominated CCP politics and had de facto control over domestic security and other key apparatuses for the bulk of the Jiang-Hu era. Before Xi Jinping made a serious bid to consolidate power in 2016, the Jiang faction had been able to cause trouble for the Xi leadership in sectors that it retained some degree of influence over, notably in the financial sector and the 2015 “financial coup.”
Specific to Xinjiang, the Jiang faction appeared to deliberately manipulate Han-Uyghur tensions for their benefit. For instance, eyewitness recollections and scholarly research suggested that the July 2009 Urumqi riots were deliberately instigated by the CCP to justify the elimination of “unstable” elements among the Uyghurs. Under the guise of targeting those “unstable” elements, then-political and legal affairs apparatus head and Jiang faction member Zhou Yongkang would be able to wrangle more power and resources for the domestic security forces from the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao leadership. Years later when the Xi leadership closed in on Zhou over his involvement with Bo Xilai in a coup attempt against the Hu-Xi alliance, extremist incidents suddenly spiked in Xinjiang between 2013 and 2015 (nearly 13,000 “terrorists” were arrested and 1,588 “extremist” groups were dismantled in 2014 alone). It is possible that in addition to Xi stepping up its crackdowns in the region, the trouble in Xinjiang was engineered by the then-still influential Jiang faction as part of a broader move to undermine the Xi leadership and get back at him for purging Zhou Yongkang and other factional “big tigers.”
The factional struggle argument becomes more persuasive in considering that the Jiang faction essentially swayed domestic security in the regime in 2009 and the 2013-2015 period (from 2002 to 2017, the heads of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission [Luo Gan, Zhou Yongkang, Meng Jianzhu] and Ministry of Public Security [Zhou Yongkang, Meng Jianzhu, and Guo Shengkun] were all Jiang faction officials), but the CCP’s governance of Xinjiang mysteriously showed “inconsistency” and “lacked precision” when political power plays were afoot. Beijing then regained control over Xinjiang when the political issues were resolved; the political and legal affairs apparatus would grow bloated and extremely powerful under Zhou Yongkang, earning him the moniker of “security czar,” while Uyghur-related extremism would cease from 2016 after Xi purged the Jiang faction-dominated political and legal affairs apparatus and replaced Jiang faction members in Xinjiang and elsewhere.
