1 CCP looks to outflank the West in pushing ‘multilateralism,’ ‘greater democracy’
The Xi leadership has noticeably stepped up its diplomatic game following the 20th Party Congress after a three-year “absence” from the world stage owing to the “zero-COVID” epidemic prevention and the difficulties of power consolidation at home. At the 2023 Two Sessions, the CCP authorities boosted its diplomatic spending by 12.2 percent to 54.84 billion yuan (about $8 billion). On March 15, the PRC brokered a peace deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia; the top diplomats of both Middle Eastern countries later met in Beijing on April 6 and signed a joint statement announcing the resumption of diplomatic relations with immediate effect.
Leaders and senior officials from Malaysia, Singapore, Spain, and Japan, as well as former ROC president Ma Ying-jeou, have traveled to mainland China to meet with Xi Jinping or other senior PRC officials since the conclusion of the Two Sessions in late March. Josep Borrell, the European Union’s foreign policy chief, is scheduled to visit China from April 13 to April 15.
Red carpet for Macron, cold shoulder for von der Leyen
The Xi leadership has been discriminating in its renewed outward push. This was made clear through the contrasting treatment European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and French president Emmanuel Macron received in their visits to China during the week of April 3.
France
Macron arrived in Beijing on April 5 with a delegation of 50 French business executives, including the bosses of Airbus and Électricité de France. He received the red carpet treatment—Macron was welcomed upon touching down by PRC foreign minister Qin Gang; greeted by firing cannons and a military parade; treated to a state banquet; received personally by Xi Jinping at the steps of the Great Hall of the People; and had tea, guqin music, and a stroll together with Xi sans ties in Guangzhou. A French official told Politico that Xi and Macron were expected to spend six to seven hours together.
In speaking with Macron on April 6, Xi said that the PRC and France, who are “major countries with a tradition of independence” and “firm advocates for a multi-polar world and for greater democracy in international relations,” have “the ability and responsibility to rise above differences and obstacles, keep to the overall direction of a comprehensive strategic partnership that is stable, mutually beneficial, enterprising and dynamic, and practice true multilateralism for global peace, stability, and prosperity.”
Macron told Xi that “France is committed to an independent foreign policy and to the strategic autonomy of Europe, and opposed to stoking confrontation, division and bloc rivalry,” state mouthpiece Xinhua reported.
According to PRC official media, Xi and Macron witnessed the signing of bilateral cooperation documents covering agrifood, science and technology, aviation, civil nuclear energy, sustainable development, and culture. Official media also noted that Airbus signed a purchase agreement for 160 commercial aircraft with a Chinese partner and would open a second assembly line in Tianjin as part of a deal made during Macron’s China visit; the CCP authorities had in fact approved the aircraft purchases in a July 2022 agreement.
On the last day of Macron’s trip, he and Xi signed a 51-point joint declaration covering five topics, including strengthening political dialogue and promoting mutual trust, promoting world security and stability, promoting economic exchanges, restarting people-to-people and cultural exchanges, and jointly tackling global challenges. The joint declaration pledged to “support all efforts to restore peace in Ukraine” without making any concrete commitments from the PRC such as influencing Russia to end the war, details of future peace talks, or a possible dialogue between Xi and Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky. The declaration also agreed to “deepen dialogue” between the People’s Liberation Army’s Southern Theater Command and the Asia-Pacific command of the French military.
Xinhua later reported that Xi told Macron that a “ceasefire and cessation of the warfare” in Ukraine “as soon as possible would be consistent with the interests of all parties and the whole world.” Xi also welcomed France offering “concrete proposals on a political resolution of the crisis,” adding that the PRC would be “willing to support it and is willing to play a constructive role.”
EU
The CCP’s treatment of Ursula von der Leyen contrasted sharply with how it accommodated Emmanuel Macron. Von der Leyen was received by PRC ecology minister Huang Runqiu at the regular passenger exit of the commercial plane that she boarded to Beijing. She gave a press conference at the EU delegation’s headquarters while Macron was attending the state banquet. Official PRC media attacked von der Leyen as a stooge of the U.S. while touting Sino-French relations.
After a trilateral meeting with Xi Jinping and Macron, von der Leyen issued a statement where she talked about “de-risking” and “diversifying” the EU’s trade and investment relations with China. She also said that China is expected to “play its role and promote a just peace” in Ukraine, especially one that respects the latter’s “sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Von der Leyen added that the EU counts on China “not to provide any military equipment, directly or indirectly, to Russia.” Further, she said that the EU has “deep concerns about the deterioration of the human rights situation in China,” with the abuses in Xinjiang being “particularly concerning.”
According to Xinhua, Xi said that the PRC and the EU should “respect each other, promote political trust, strengthen dialogue and cooperation, uphold world peace and stability, promote common development and prosperity, and address global challenges together.” He expressed hope that the EU will develop a more “independent and objective perception of China and adopt a pragmatic and positive China policy.”
Xi also said that the PRC “champions true multilateralism and a global governance vision featuring extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefit,” and China and the EU need to “jointly uphold global stability and prosperity, and stand against hegemonism, unilateralism, and attempts to decouple economies or sever supply chains.”
Concerns over escalating geopolitical tensions?
Emmanuel Macron discussed “strategic autonomy” for Europe with Politico and French journalists in an interview while flying from Beijing to Guangzhou.
Macron said that “the great risk” Europe faces is that it “gets caught up in crises that are not ours, which prevents it from building its strategic autonomy.” He added, “The paradox would be that, overcome with panic, we believe we are just America’s followers. The question Europeans need to answer … is it in our interest to accelerate [a crisis] on Taiwan? No. The worse thing would be to think that we Europeans must become followers on this topic and take our cue from the U.S. agenda and a Chinese overreaction.”
Macron also said, “Europeans cannot resolve the crisis in Ukraine; how can we credibly say on Taiwan, ‘watch out, if you do something wrong we will be there?’ If you really want to increase tensions that’s the way to do it.”
Macron further suggested that Europe should reduce its dependence on the “extraterritoriality of the U.S. dollar.” He said, “If the tensions between the two superpowers heat up … we won’t have the time nor the resources to finance our strategic autonomy and we will become vassals.”
‘New cold war’ grows colder
Sino-U.S. tensions continue to simmer after the PRC spy balloon incident in February even as Xi Jinping pursues a global charm offensive. For instance, Macron and von der Leyen’s trip to China coincided with Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen’s California transit and meeting with House Speaker Kevin McCarthy (see item two in this newsletter).
The PRC has also yet to name an ambassador to Washington since Qin Gang left to become foreign minister. The over three-month vacancy of the position is the longest that Beijing has been without an ambassador in Washington since the U.S. and China normalized relations in 1979; Beijing previously recalled its ambassador for two months after then-ROC President Lee Teng-hui traveled to the U.S. in June 1995.
Other recent noteworthy Sino-U.S. developments include:
March 30
U.S. Indo-Pacific coordinator Kurt Campbell said at an event hosted by the Center for a New American Security that the PRC has been “reluctant to engage in discussions around confidence-building or crisis communications, or hotlines,” and that it would be a “responsible step” to have such mechanisms given the proximity in which the PLA and U.S. military forces operate to each other. “We built those during the Cold War. We think that they’re appropriate now,” he added.
Campbell also said the U.S. was in the early stages of a new phase of competitive relations with China. “There’s also a recognition that in many respects our efforts to build a foundation, a floor under the relationship and guardrails, have yet to be successful,” he said. “I think you will see in the coming months whether it’s going to be possible to reestablish effective, predictable, constructive diplomacy between the United States and China.”
April 3
Wang Jisi, president of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies at Peking University, said during a lecture at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore in responding to audience questions that the crux of the deterioration in Sino-U.S. relations lies in their respective political issues, according to overseas Chinese language media reports.
Wang added that no amount of dialogue can improve the bilateral relationship and China no longer has any expectations for Sino-U.S. relations to improve. “[The U.S.] condemns China with their political correctness, and we condemn the U.S. with our political correctness,” he said.
April 5
Politico reported that the PRC is rebuffing the U.S. efforts to reschedule Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s canceled trip to Beijing in February, other trips by top U.S. officials to China, and a phone call between President Joe Biden and Xi Jinping, citing a current U.S. official and a former State Department official.
Our take
1. The CCP has long trotted out “multilateralism” and “greater democracy” as part of its rhetorical strategy to survive crises and cultivate future opportunities to achieve dominance. Before the CCP took power, it pursued “multilateralism” and “greater democracy” by forming “united fronts” and “democratic alliances” with the ruling Kuomintang and other political parties; the CCP would take advantage of these arrangements to subvert the KMT government and seize power. During the “reform and opening up” era, the CCP promoted “multilateralism” and “democracy” as part of its diplomatic rhetoric even as it gradually hijacked the rules-based international order and expanded its efforts to dominate the globe.
The Xi leadership’s definition of “multilateralism” and “greater democracy” was articulated in a lengthy essay by Institute of Party History and Literature president Qu Qingshan laying out the importance of Xi Jinping’s “Two Establishes” that was published in July 2022. Qu noted that there were “great changes in the world unseen in a century” and that “the democratization of international relations has become an unstoppable trend of the times” (i.e. U.S. hegemony making way for CCP-dominated “multipolarism”).
In adapting from the Marxist dialectic, Qu further observed that “reverse variables” such as “hegemonism and power politics, unilateralism, trade protectionism, anti-globalization thinking, and other trends” are clashing with “positive variables” such as the “democratization of international relations, multipolarization, and economic globalization.” Qu posited that this clash constitutes the “main contradiction” in the “great changes unseen in the world in a century,” and is “profoundly affecting the development dynamic” of the globe.
Based on what Qu wrote, countries and governments must be aware that the Xi leadership is approaching “multilateralism” and “greater democracy in international relations” from a strictly ideological standpoint. Beijing is not offering countries true multilateralism, non-alignment, and optionality (as opposed to the Biden administration’s “democracy versus authoritarianism”), but is instead looking to co-opt countries in a global “united front” led by the CCP against the U.S. and its allies. In other words, countries that support the PRC’s version of “multilateralism” and “greater democracy” are unwittingly subscribing to the CCP’s Marxist-Leninist worldview and obliquely condoning its world domination agenda.
2. Ignorance of the CCP’s ideologically-steeped diplomatic rhetoric aside, countries could be now more inclined to side with the PRC or at least step up engagement with Communist China because they are wary of the United States and escalating geopolitical conflicts and want to hedge their bets. Not all countries (especially some Southeast Asian states) embrace the Biden administration’s view of a world divided into democratic and authoritarian states, while some countries could be offended (especially Islamic nations in the Middle East) by the administration’s attempt to export certain ideologies (LGBTQ+, liberal democracy, etc.). Other countries could be concerned about the banking crisis in the U.S. and other issues, leading them to consider improving relations with the PRC to spread out their risks.
Countries, governments, businesses, and investors, however, should be warned against viewing the CCP as the “lesser of two evils” during a time of global turbulence. China only appears to be in less trouble than the U.S., particularly economically and financially, due to the CCP’s strict censorship of information and greater media freedom in the West. Long-time readers of our articles and newsletters will also know that the CCP sometimes drops subtle hints about its problems and close scrutiny of official figures can reveal serious issues with the Chinese economy. Also, the PRC’s problems are usually very severe when it is more forthcoming about them; for instance, vice trade minister Wang Shouwen said in an April 4 press conference that China’s “foreign trade situation is severe and complicated this year,” citing a survey of 15,000 companies at the Canton Fair who noted that the drop in overseas demand and orders represents a major challenge. Wang further claimed that the global overall economic recovery is “not strong enough” after observing that the General Administration of Customs foreign trade data for January and February showed a “downward trend” (down 6.8 percent year-on-year).
Countries, governments, businesses, and investors should also be aware that the CCP poses a serious ideological, intelligence, propaganda, and military threat even if the regime is struggling economically and financially. Supporting the PRC will only embolden the CCP and supply it the rope with which it will “hang” the capitalists (i.e. other countries and multinational corporations), to paraphrase a quote attributed to Lenin. Those who shudder at the horrors of concentration camps in Xinjiang and the dystopian “zero-COVID” lockdowns in China should think twice before enabling the regime to spread its techno-totalitarian models beyond the PRC’s borders and drag the world into the CCP’s revisionist global order.
To more effectively build coalitions against the CCP and counter Communist China, the U.S. can consider doing more to expose the Party’s pernicious ideology, malicious behavior, gross human rights abuses, aggressive ambitions, and deceptive propaganda. Washington can also be better served by moving away from the “democracy versus authoritarian” framework and not championing non-traditional American values and ideologies abroad, which the CCP can exploit to drive a wedge between the U.S., its allies, prospective allies, and partner nations.
What’s next
Sino-U.S. tensions can be expected to rise if both Washington and Beijing stay the course. The Xi leadership may not wish to provoke the U.S. and worsen its current crises, but the same cannot be said of the Biden administration if domestic troubles mount and the war in Ukraine trends towards the Russian side.
2 PRC, US show ‘restraint’ during Tsai’s California transit
On April 5, Taiwan leader Tsai Ing-wen and House Speaker Kevin McCarthy held a two-hour meeting at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library outside Los Angeles. McCarthy was the highest-level U.S. official to meet a Taiwanese leader since the beginning of transit visits.
Tsai was in California while transiting back to Taiwan from visiting diplomatic partners in Central America. McCarthy was accompanied by 18 members of Congress from both parties, including Mike Gallagher, the Republican chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party.
Congress members said that the meeting’s discussions revolved around ensuring the sale and delivery of weapons to Taiwan, boosting bilateral trade and investment, and the promotion of democracy and other shared values.
McCarthy said after the meeting that bonds between the United States and Taiwan are “stronger than at any time or point in my life.” Tsai said, “We are stronger when we are together,” and added that the meeting would “reassure the people of Taiwan that we are not isolated and we are not alone.” Neither mentioned China in their brief remarks.
On the same day, House Foreign Affairs Committee chairman Michael McCaul announced that he had led a bipartisan delegation to Taiwan to meet with Taiwanese business leaders and senior officials. On April 7, McCaul said that the U.S. is doing “everything in our power” to expedite the delivery of weapons to Taiwan, including reprioritizing weapons sales and third-party sales. “We want to do everything possible to deter a very aggressive nation, Communist China, from ever thinking about landing on the shores of this beautiful island, because that would be a serious mistake for everybody,” he said.
On April 4, The Wall Street Journal reported that Tsai Ing-wen had earlier met with a bipartisan group of lawmakers when she was transiting through New York, including senators Dan Sullivan, Joni Ernst, and Mark Kelly, as well as House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries.
CCP response
Several PRC government agencies issued statements denouncing the Tsai-McCarthy meeting, including the foreign affairs ministry, the national defense ministry, the National People’s Congress foreign affairs committee, the Taiwan Affairs Office, and the PRC embassy in the United States.
A PRC foreign ministry spokesperson statement published on April 6 accused U.S. lawmakers and officials of providing Tsai Ing-wen with a “platform for her separatist rhetoric for ‘Taiwan independence,’” as well as attempting to “upgrade the substantive relations with Taiwan” by framing it as a “transit.” The statement added that the “Taiwan question is at the core of China’s core interests and the first red line that must not be crossed in China-U.S. relations” and that “‘Taiwan independence’ and cross-Strait peace and stability are as irreconcilable as fire and water” and will “lead nowhere.”
The statement also said that the PRC would take “strong and resolute measures” to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and urged the U.S. to “stop at once any form of official exchanges with Taiwan, stop upgrading substantive relations with Taiwan, stop creating factors that could cause tensions in the Taiwan Strait, stop containing China by exploiting the Taiwan question, and not go further down the wrong and dangerous path.”
On April 6, Xi Jinping said in remarks to European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen that the Taiwan issue “is the core of China’s core interests” and that “anyone who expects China to compromise on the Taiwan issue is [engaging in] wishful thinking and will only shoot himself in the foot.”
***
Taiwanese media reported that there were less than 100 pro-CCP protesters and about 200 pro-ROC supporters outside the Reagan Library during the Tsai-McCarthy meeting. The pro-CCP protesters reportedly used violence against the pro-ROC crowd, resulting in fierce scuffles. Taiwanese media also reported that the PRC consulate general in Los Angeles had earlier attempted to mobilize at least a thousand protesters for the meeting by promising a pay out of $400 per person per day.
On April 7, the CCP’s Taiwan Affairs Office announced new sanctions against Bi-khim Hsiao, the ROC representative to the United States, that banned her and her family members from traveling to mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. The Taiwan Affairs Office also issued similar sanctions against two Taiwanese organizations (The Prospect Foundation and the Council of Asian Liberals and Democrats) for allegedly promoting “Taiwan independence.”
Meanwhile, the PRC foreign ministry announced sanctions against the Hudson Institute and the Reagan Library, including restricting Chinese institutions, organizations, and individuals from engaging with those U.S. institutions and their leaders, as well as banning the leaders of the U.S. institutions from entering China and freezing any property they have on the mainland.
***
The PRC made relatively few military maneuvers around the period of the Tsai-McCarthy meeting.
On April 2, the People’s Liberation Army’s Eastern Theater Command announced that three warships had “recently” conducted live-fire drills in the East China Sea.
On April 5, a PLA fleet led by the Shandong aircraft carrier passed through the Bashi Channel. Separately, the Fujian maritime safety administration announced a three-day special joint patrol and inspection operation in the central and northern parts of the Taiwan Strait that would include ship boarding. Taiwan transport ministry’s Maritime and Ports Bureau later issued a statement saying that it strongly protested the move and that Taiwnese shipping operators should refuse inspection requests from the PRC and immediately notify Taiwan’s coast guard for assistance.
On April 6, ROC defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told a press conference that the Shandong was about 200 nautical miles off Taiwan’s east coast while the USS Nimitz aircraft carrier was about 400 nautical miles away. Chiu added that the PLA had been harassing Taiwan with about 10 to 20 jet sorties per day, as well as deploying an average of five warships around Taiwan and about 20 to 30 in the East China Sea and the South China Sea.
On April 7, the Fujian provincial maritime administration announced that the PLA would hold a live-firing exercise in the Taiwan Strait off Pingtan County on April 10.
On April 8, the Taiwan defense ministry said that it spotted 71 PLA aircraft crossing the median line in the Taiwan Strait. A senior Taiwan official told Reuters that the aircraft only went over the median line briefly.
On April 9, the Taiwan defense ministry said that it detected 70 PLA aircraft and 11 naval vessels around Taiwan. Half of the aircraft crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait. Meanwhile, PRC state media said that the PLA “carried out simulated joint precision strikes on key targets on Taiwan island and the surrounding sea areas, and continue to maintain an offensive posture around the island.”
Big picture
Taiwan has become an especially sensitive issue in Sino-U.S. relations since Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August 2022 when she was House Speaker (see here and here). Hence, Tsai Ing-wen’s recent transits through the United States, and particularly her meeting with current House Speaker Kevin McCarthy, were closely watched to see if they would become a new flashpoint between Washington and Beijing.
Our take
1. Despite international concerns, the CCP’s response to Tsai’s meeting with McCarthy and U.S. transits has been mostly rhetorical and symbolic, at least at the time of writing. The PLA’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait was also in line with the CCP’s typical intimidation tactics and does not appear to signal a meaningful escalation.
Beijing’s “restraint” corresponds with our assessment in early October 2022 that the CCP would tone down its belligerence towards Taiwan and dial back its “wolf warrior” diplomacy after the 20th Party Congress as Xi Jinping looks to “rehabilitate” his image and address the many crises facing the PRC. The “restraint” shown is also in line with our analysis in January and November 2022 that Xi is sticking to “peaceful reunification” where possible, especially before the 2024 Taiwanese presidential election. Finally, Beijing was “restrained” in responding to the Tsai-McCarthy meeting because it does not want to escalate tensions with the U.S. while it currently has serious crises to resolve and before the conditions are ripe for the CCP to push hard for “reunification.”
Xi’s strategic goals for Taiwan and the CCP’s broader diplomatic effort aside, there appeared to have been at least two circumstantial factors that aided the CCP’s ability to show “restraint.” The first is House Speaker McCarthy choosing to meet with Tsai in the U.S. instead of making the more provocative move of traveling to Taipei like his predecessor. The second factor is Tsai’s transit being relatively low-key despite it being somewhat hyped up in the media, including her quiet meetings with other U.S. lawmakers and an award ceremony hosted by the Hudson Institute being held as a private event.
2. We see several plausible reasons why Washington demonstrated “restraint” in handling Tsai Ing-wen’s transit through the United States.
First, the U.S. government is likely aware that Taiwan is a hard “red line” issue for the CCP. This means that Washington has little wriggle room to use Tsai’s transit to pressure Beijing, unlike with the PRC spy balloon incident.
Second, the U.S. could still be assessing the impact of Xi Jinping’s power consolidation at the 2023 Two Sessions on the PRC’s policies, including Beijing’s support for Russia and stance on the Ukraine conflict. Washington will have future opportunities to play the Taiwan card should it determine that the Xi leadership is wholly unwilling to cooperate with the West on Ukraine and shift the PRC’s “revisionist” attitude.
Third, Washington could believe that both the U.S. and Taiwan are not ready to ward off a PLA invasion if it decides to be overly provocative on the Taiwan issue at this time.
Fourth, the U.S. could currently be focused on resolving pressing domestic problems like the banking crisis has given lower priority to competition with China. The lower priority now, however, does not mean that Washington will not step up efforts to counter the PRC later.
