1 Xi’s SCO speech hints at the CCP’s strategies for external domination
A Shanghai Cooperation Organization Plus (“SCO Plus”) meeting was held at the Meijiang Convention and Exhibition Center in Tianjin on Sept. 1. Xi Jinping presided over the meeting and delivered a speech titled “Pooling the Strength of the SCO to Improve Global Governance” (凝聚上合力量, 完善全球治理).
Noteworthy points in Xi’s speech include:
- Under the pretext of “commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the World Anti-Fascist War and the founding of the United Nations,” Xi argued that the world has “entered a period of turbulence and transformation, facing challenges such as Cold War mentality and hegemonism.” He then called for reform of the global governance system and the building of a “community with a shared future for mankind.”
- Xi put forward five global governance initiatives:
- Adherence to sovereign equality.
- Abide by the international rule of law.
- Practice multilateralism.
- Advocate a people-centered development.
- Focus on taking real actions.
- Xi stressed that the SCO, upholding the “Shanghai Spirit” (mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, consultation, respect for diversity of civilizations, and pursuit of common development), has become a positive force in the construction and reform of the global governance system. Facing the rapidly evolving “great changes unseen in a century,” the SCO should play a “leading role” and promote global openness and cooperation, “tearing down walls rather than building them, integrating rather than decoupling,” while jointly advancing the Belt and Road Initiative.
- Xi proposed several economic and technological cooperation initiatives:
- Share the opportunities of China’s vast market.
- Implement a high-quality development action plan for economic and trade cooperation.
- Establish three major cooperation platforms: Energy, green industry, and the digital economy.
- Establish three cooperation centers: Scientific and technological innovation, higher education, and vocational technical education.
- Increase the installed capacity of photovoltaic and wind power each by 10 million kilowatts in the next five years.
- Build an artificial intelligence application cooperation center with all sides to share the dividends of progress in AI.
- Welcome all parties to use the Beidou Satellite Navigation System.
- Invite countries with relevant capacities to take part in the International Lunar Research Station project.
- Additional initiatives:
- China will host SCO forums on political parties, green and sustainable development, and traditional medicine.
- Over the next five years, China will treat 500 children with congenital heart disease, perform 5,000 cataract surgeries, and carry out 10,000 cancer screenings for other SCO countries.
- Xi said that SCO should “continue to unequivocally oppose hegemonism and power politics, practice true multilateralism, and stand as a pillar in promoting a multipolar world and greater democracy in international relations.”
Backdrop
1. The CCP regime currently faces severe internal and external risks and challenges. Externally, the PRC has to contend with a trade war with the U.S. and related trade tensions with other countries, a technology war and financial war with the U.S., as well as “containment” by the U.S. and its allies. Internally, the Chinese economy struggles with persistent deflationary pressures, the bursting of the property bubble, and other economic and financial problems.
Xi Jinping and the CCP also see rising levels of political risk as successive governance failures breed widespread discontent. Xi’s growing unpopularity appears to be fueling unfounded rumors and speculation that he is “losing power.”
2. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization was founded in June 2001 and now consists of 10 countries, including India, Russia, and Iran. It is the world’s largest regional grouping in terms of population (about 42 percent of the world’s population) and geographic scope (about 24 percent of Earth’s total area). The combined nominal GDP of SCO countries was around 23 percent in 2024.
Our take
Xi Jinping’s speech at the “SCO Plus” meeting in Tianjin hints at the various strategies that the CCP plans to pursue over the next five to 10 years to better compete with the United States and its allies, as well as advance its external domination agenda. While Xi and the CCP seek to avoid direct military confrontation, they also look to gradually erode America’s influence over the global order through economic leverage and soft power.
1. At a glance, Xi appears to be advocating values embraced by the liberal, multipolar post-Cold War world order in his SCO speech. But Xi was rehashing oft-used rhetoric in the CCP’s diplomatic and geopolitical vernacular, and effectively engaging in Party doublespeak. Notably, the “multipolarism” and “multilateralism” that Xi is championing are more akin to the co-opting of countries in a global “united front” led by the CCP against the U.S. and its allies. Meanwhile, the seemingly innocuous “community with a shared future for mankind” is shorthand for a new global order dominated by the CCP, with many countries adhering to the CCP’s methods of governance.
Xi also makes several jibes at the U.S. in his speech. By positioning the SCO as a bulwark against “Cold War mentality,” “hegemonism,” “protectionism,” and “power politics,” Xi is making a veiled attack on U.S. tariffs, sanctions, alliances, and efforts to “contain” the PRC.
2. Xi’s speech reveals that the CCP is attempting to use economic leverage to strengthen its influence over the SCO and expand its sphere of influence.
Many SCO member states are resource-rich but less technologically advanced. In comparison, China has significant economic advantages over them, including the size of its economy and markets, a fully integrated manufacturing supply chain, and preeminence in renewable energy and digital technology sectors. China currently sits at 12th place in the global energy transition index, and is the foremost investor in renewable energy worldwide. Its green finance ecosystem is flourishing, marked by robust loan growth, bolstered by substantial government subsidies for solar power, electric vehicles and battery technologies. Concurrently, China’s digital economy, valued at over $9.7 trillion in 2024, ranks second globally, underpinned by a computing power infrastructure that also holds the second spot worldwide.
The PRC’s strategic outreach to less developed SCO member states appears to center on deploying its financial muscle and technological advancements to foster development in manufacturing, industrial capacity, and critical infrastructure, including electricity grids and smart urban management systems. By channeling funds and exporting renewable energy technologies (such as solar panels and wind turbines) and digital innovations (like AI and 5G networks), China addresses the infrastructural and energy demands of these often resource-rich but industrially nascent countries. This initiative serves a dual purpose: it absorbs China’s domestic overcapacity, particularly in photovoltaics, where 2024 saw a staggering 277 GW of new installations, far exceeding domestic needs. Xi Jinping’s pledge to “increase the installed capacity of photovoltaic and wind power each by 10 million kilowatts in the next five years” aligns with this strategy, channeling surplus production into SCO markets to sustain China’s manufacturing dominance.
Beyond economic aid, the PRC’s export of AI and BeiDou navigation systems to manage renewable energy infrastructure introduces a subtler dimension of influence. By embedding proprietary technologies into critical systems — such as smart grids or energy management platforms — China gains the ability to monitor and potentially control the operational lifelines of these nations. This technological tethering, often presented as developmental assistance, embeds surveillance capabilities, granting Beijing leverage over strategic infrastructure. Such control mirrors the CCP’s broader ambitions to set global technological standards, ensuring that recipient nations’ energy and digital ecosystems align with PRC protocols, thereby deepening dependency.
In return, the PRC secures access to stable supplies of energy resources and critical minerals — vital for its industrial and green technology sectors — from SCO member states. Simultaneously, the financial architecture of these engagements — often structured as loans — would leave SCO members collectively indebted to the PRC (SCO members currently owe China over $840 billion). This debt dependency transforms these nations into economic satellites, reliant on Chinese capital and goodwill for debt restructuring or continued investment, thereby amplifying Beijing’s geopolitical sway without the need for military posturing, in stark contrast to U.S. strategies rooted in military-backed hegemony.
The expansion of renewable energy and digital technology exports to SCO and other emerging markets serves a broader strategic pivot: reducing the PRC’s reliance on traditional export markets, particularly the United States, amid escalating trade tensions. By cultivating demand in developing nations, China sustains its export-driven economic model — a cornerstone of its growth — while diversifying away from Western markets vulnerable to tariffs and sanctions. This reorientation not only mitigates risks from U.S.-led decoupling but also positions the PRC as an economic linchpin for the Global South, fostering a network of interdependent economies aligned with Beijing’s vision of a multipolar world order.
3. Xi Jinping’s recent remarks also suggest that the CCP is attempting to leverage soft power through education and innovation initiatives to deepen the reliance of other SCO member states on China. This approach, rooted in cultivating long-term dependencies, underscores Beijing’s ambition to project the so-called “Chinese model” as a viable developmental paradigm for the Global South, fostering alignment without the coercive footprint of militarized expansion.
Xi’s proposal to establish cooperative centers focused on scientific innovation, higher education, and vocational training represents a deliberate soft power gambit. These initiatives aim to shape the intellectual and technical elites of SCO nations and broader Global South countries, orienting them toward CCP governance philosophies, technological standards, and economic frameworks. By embedding CCP-centric education and training ecosystems, Beijing cultivates a cadre of professionals predisposed to its systems, ensuring sustained influence over these nations’ developmental trajectories.
A quintessential manifestation of this strategy is the “Luban Workshop” program, initiated in 2016 and now operational across 85 countries. These workshops deliver vocational training in Chinese automation technologies, green energy solutions, and industrial standards, effectively disseminating the PRC’s technical protocols. For instance, training programs in solar panel installation, electric vehicle maintenance, or smart manufacturing align local workforces with Chinese equipment and methodologies, fostering market penetration for Chinese firms like Huawei or BYD. In resource-constrained nations, where access to advanced training is scarce, participants in Luban Workshops — projected to train 20,000 individuals across 16 African centers by 2025 — develop an affinity for Chinese systems. As these trainees ascend to pivotal roles within their societies, they naturally gravitate toward Chinese technologies, standards, and governance models, embedding a structural preference for Beijing’s offerings. At the SCO meeting, Xi said that the PRC will launch 10 additional “Luban Workshops” in member countries over the next five years, offering training slots for 10,000 individuals.
4. It is highly probable that the CCP will embed key investments in green industries (including renewable and environmental technologies), digital technologies (including AI and digital infrastructure), and comprehensive talent training programs into its 15th Five-Year Plan (2026 to 2030). This incorporation serves as a “delay and wait for change” tactic in the face of the escalating U.S.-China trade war; by channeling resources into self-reliant sectors less immediately susceptible to U.S. sanctions — such as domestic AI ecosystems and renewable energy supply chains — the CCP buys itself time for diplomatic maneuvering or awaiting potential shifts in U.S. policy post-2028 elections.
Moreover, Xi will likely leverage the imperative of personally overseeing this multifaceted strategy — spanning technological self-sufficiency, ecological transformation, and human capital development — as a compelling pretext to justify and secure a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. As Xi will be 74 by then, he faces potential intra-Party pressures on succession. Yet in portraying the 15th Five-Year Plan as a critical juncture in China’s “rejuvenation,” Xi can emphasize continuity and his indispensable role in navigating U.S. containment efforts and domestic reforms. This narrative, amplified through Party propaganda and study sessions on Xi Jinping Thought, would frame any leadership transition as premature or risky, thereby paving the way for Xi to extend his tenure.
5. It remains to be seen whether the CCP can successfully implement the strategies we outlined above. Historically, the CCP has made multiple “Great Leap Forward”-style investments (semiconductor investments, EV subsidies, etc.), resulting in wasted resources, corruption, and overcapacity. Xi’s plan for SCO member states faces similar systemic risks, including destructive competition and financial abuse.
The implementation of the CCP’s SCO initiatives could appear to yield early “successes” as China and other member states announce new “prosperity.” But many of the initiatives could collapse overnight once the central subsidies and funding run dry, leaving behind a huge mess for Xi and the CCP.
2 Analyzing the 2025 Beijing military parade
Beijing parade and Xi’s ‘hot mic’ moment
The CCP held a military day to mark the 80th anniversary of the “victory of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japan and the World Anti-Facist War” in Beijing on Sept. 3. Twenty-six foreign heads of state or government attended the event, including Russia’s Vladimir Putin, North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, Iran’s Masoud Pezeshkian, Serbia’s Aleksandar Vucic, Slovakia’s Robert Fico, and Cuba’s Miguel Diaz-Canel. No Western leader was present.
Before reviewing the troops, Xi delivered a short speech. Noteworthy points in the speech include:
- Xi emphasized that commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance is meant to remember history, honor martyrs, cherish peace, and build the future.
- Xi said China’s War of Resistance was a “great and arduous struggle,” crediting the CCP-led “united front.” He framed it as an important part of the global anti-fascist war.
- Xi warned of historical lessons, stressing the need to prevent tragedies from repeating.
- Xi emphasized that the Chinese nation is a great nation that “fears no oppression” and strives for “self-reliance and self-strengthening.” In the past, it fought for national survival and ethnic rejuvenation. Today, humanity faces the choice between peace and war. Xi added that the Chinese people “firmly stand on the right side of history, joining hands with people of all nations to build a community with a shared future for mankind.”
- Xi praised the PLA as a “trustworthy heroic force” and called for accelerating the building of a world-class military to safeguard sovereignty, unity, and territorial integrity.
- Xi emphasized that all ethnic groups across the nation — under the leadership of the CCP and guided by Marxism-Leninism and socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a new era — are advancing “Chinese-style modernization and national rejuvenation.”
- Xi concluded that China’s national rejuvenation is “unstoppable” and the cause of human peace and development will prevail.
Official footage of the parade showed that Han Shengyan, commander of the Central Theater Command Air Force, was parade commander. Typically, the commander of the whole Central Theater Command serves as parade commander for such events. That position, however, appears to be vacant since August 2024 after former commander Huang Ming was transferred to the Northern Theater Command.
The parade debuted units and weapons from the People’s Liberation Army’s Aerospace Force Formation, Cyberspace Force Formation, and Unmanned Equipment Combat Formation. Per state media reporting, on display were new nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles, new land-based missiles equipped with hypersonic weapons, new laser weapons, unmanned ground combat platforms, (“robot wolves”), new drones, new main battle aircraft, new tanks and armored vehicles, hypersonic weapons, and air defense and missile defense equipment.
On the same day, Xi Jinping signed an order commending all participants in the parade.
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All members of the current CCP leadership attended the parade. Retired leaders attending the event included Li Ruihuan, Wen Jiabao, Jia Qinglin, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Li Zhanshu, Wang Yang, Li Lanqing, Zeng Qinghong, Wu Guanzheng, Li Changchun, He Guoqiang, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan, and Zhang Gaoli. Notably absent were Hu Jintao, Zhu Rongji, Song Ping, and Luo Gan.
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Per live footage of Xi Jinping and foreign leaders walking to the viewing platform of the military parade, Xi and Putin were caught on hot mic discussing organ transplants and “immortality.”
Speaking through translators, Xi said that in the past, “people rarely lived to be over 70, but these days, at 70, you are still a child.”
Putin responded, “Biotechnology is making advances. There’ll be constant transplants of human organs, and maybe even people will grow younger as they age — even achieving immortality.”
Xi replied, “It could be that in this century humans might be able to live to 150 years old.”
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un appeared to be listening to the pair via a translator.
The conversation between Xi and Putin was widely reported in international media. On social media, there were heated discussions about the CCP’s forced organ harvesting practices and how the Party’s elite treat regular Chinese citizens as “spare parts.”
Several U.S. lawmakers and human rights activists expressed concern about the subject of Putin and Xi’s conversation. When asked about the exchange:
- House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.) said, “I will tell you that we’ve heard some horrific stories of these organ transplants and all of this in China, that they take it from unwilling donors … to put it mildly. The fact that they were caught in a hot mic … is very telling. It tells you where their worldview is, in contrast to ours.”
- Nina Shea, Center for Religious Freedom at Hudson Institute director and a seven-term commissioner on the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, said that Xi-Putin conversation “lends credence to our concerns that they are creating a real-life science fiction dystopia by forced organ harvesting from those they see as political enemies.”
- Rep. Chris Smith (R-N.J.) said in a press release, “The casual, almost anecdotal nature of Xi and Putin’s conversation about organ transplants underscores the need for the United States to act staunchly and swiftly to investigate and end the barbaric practice of forced organ harvesting once and for all.” He then referred to legislation that he introduced to allow the U.S. to severely punish organ harvesters and preemptively prevent forced organ extractions.
Trump accuses Putin and Kim of ‘conspiring against the US’
In a Truth Social post on Sept. 2, President Donald Trump wrote, “The big question to be answered is whether or not President Xi of China will mention the massive amount of support and ‘blood’ that the United States of America gave to China in order to help it to secure its freedom from a very unfriendly foreign invader. Many Americans died in China’s quest for victory and glory. I hope that they are rightfully honored and remembered for their bravery and sacrifice!”
Trump added, “May President Xi and the wonderful people of China have a great and lasting day of celebration. Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong Un, as you conspire against the United States of America.” When asked to comment, the Kremlin said that Russia and China were not conspiring and suggested the remarks were ironic.
Trump later told reporters at the Oval Office, “I thought it was a beautiful ceremony. I thought it was very, very impressive.” He continued, “I watched the speech last night. President Xi is a friend of mine, but I thought that the United States should have been mentioned last night during that speech, because we helped China very, very much.”
Our take
1. The live broadcast of the parade and various parade arrangements underscore Xi Jinping’s position in the CCP regime as the undisputed paramount.
Unlike in the 2015 military parade at Tiananmen Square, Xi was not flanked by his predecessors in the 2025 parade. At the time, the presence of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao gave the impression that they were “overseeing” him. Now, Xi was positioned as the central figure leading foreign dignitaries, with his remaining living predecessor (Hu Jintao) absent from the proceedings.
When Xi called out “Comrades, greetings!” during his solo inspection in a moving vehicle, the troops responded with “Chairman, greetings!” instead of “Leader, greetings!” The change in parade salutation was introduced during the Zhurihe Training Base parade on July 30, 2017, and appears to be an attempt by Xi to distinguish himself from earlier CCP leaders.
Meanwhile, state footage of the 2025 parade did not give individual screen time to various figures that proponents of the “Xi losing power” narrative are claiming have Xi under control or are tipped to replace Xi. These figures include Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia, Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference vice chairman Hu Chunhua, former CPPCC chairman Wang Yang, and Party elders Wen Jiabao and Li Ruihuan. Notably, Zhang Youxia only appeared briefly on the live broadcast at the edge of a shot showing seated retired leaders, while Hu Chunhua was seen seated in the back rows behind foreign leaders. Further, a lack of anomalies in the Party’s propaganda concerning him around the parade period indicates that Xi is fully in charge.
2. Xi Jinping’s speech at the 2025 military parade is notably shorter (under 950 characters) than the 2015 version (nearly 1,700 characters). This could be due to Xi needing the speech to be more neutral and offering less kindling for provocation in the current tense geopolitical environment. There is also a small possibility that the brevity of Xi’s speech is due to health considerations (see below).
While the 2025 parade was held ostensibly to mark the “War of Resistance against Japan,” Xi avoided mentions of “Japanese militarism” in his speech. Instead, he used the vague phrasing, “foreign enemy invasion.” Xi’s choice of words here likely reflects the CCP’s efforts to pull Japan into its orbit rather than push the latter closer to the United States.
Finally, Xi made no mention of the significant aid that the U.S. and allied nations provided to China during the Second World War, but instead attributed all credit to the CCP. This is in line with the CCP’s current framing of the U.S. as an adversary, and fits with the parade’s theme of using the commemoration event to rally the support of the Chinese people and countries close with the PRC against a new “foreign enemy” — the United States.
3. The composition of foreign heads of state or government attending the CCP’s “80th Anniversary of the Victory in the World Anti-Fascist War” reveals a deliberate geopolitical alignment, underscoring the event’s symbolic and strategic implications. The majority of represented nations did not participate in World War II as sovereign entities, having been colonies or constituent parts of the Soviet Union at the time. Iran and Nepal maintained neutrality, while Slovakia was an ally of the Axis powers. Excluding former Soviet republics, at least 13 attending countries lacked independent status during the war due to colonial subjugation, non-sovereignty, or neutral stances. Their participation in an event framed as a commemoration of the global anti-fascist struggle thus appears incongruous, lacking historical legitimacy and exposing the CCP’s selective curation of attendees to project a specific narrative.
This incongruity is not accidental but a calculated move to amplify the CCP’s leadership within a bloc of developing and authoritarian states, many of which align with Beijing’s vision of a “multipolar” world order challenging Western dominance. The absence of India and Turkey — both Shanghai Cooperation Organization members who attended the Tianjin summit but opted out of the parade — further highlights the event’s polarized framing. Their non-attendance suggests a strategic distancing from a ceremony perceived as an anti-Western statement, particularly amid heightened U.S.-China tensions. By convening leaders from nations with limited or no historical stake in the anti-fascist narrative, the CCP leverages the parade to consolidate alliances among Global South and non-aligned states, reinforcing Xi’s positioning as a counterweight to U.S. hegemony while sidestepping historical scrutiny of China’s wartime contributions. This selective guest list thus serves as a diplomatic tool, amplifying Beijing’s narrative of global leadership while exposing the underlying tensions in its anti-Western posturing. President Trump’s Truth Social post about Putin and Kim Jong Un “conspiring” with the PRC against the U.S. suggests that he is cognizant of the parade’s subtext.
Meanwhile, the parade’s display of troops and weapons, especially a new nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile and drones, is a deliberate signal of the PLA’s military modernization and readiness to counter and confront the U.S. and its allies if need be in an increasingly tense geopolitical landscape.
4. Apart from moments of lively conversation with Russia’s Vladimir Putin while ascending the parade viewing platform, Xi Jinping maintained a stern expression for most of the parade. Compared to the 2015 parade, Xi looked much more somber and appeared to be in a heavy mood. Xi’s seriousness, which could be partly due to the theme of the event, could also suggest that he has much more weighing down on him now given the PRC’s mounting problems on all fronts as compared to a decade ago.
5. Xi Jinping appeared to be in relatively good health for his age (72) from the live broadcast of the parade. However, there are small signs from the broadcast which suggest that he does have health concerns.
Beyond the typical absolute ruler’s desire for longevity, the discussion between Xi and Putin about organ transplants and “immortality” could reflect Xi’s worries about the state of his health now. A brief close-up shot of Xi during the live broadcast shows what appears to be subtle involuntary head movement, potentially indicative of myoclonus or early symptoms of age-related neurological conditions (Parkinson’s, etc.) While not diagnostic without medical confirmation, this observation, coupled with the discussion on biotechnological life extension, suggests Xi may be grappling with anxieties about his personal health. And if Xi has health concerns, he would be interested in advanced medical interventions to sustain his leadership tenure.
Xi’s talk of humans living up to 150 years could be a reference to the goal of a project that the CCP’s military doctors are currently working on. In 2019, Beijing’s 301 Hospital (the healthcare base for CCP leaders) published an advertisement claiming that its “981 Leader Healthcare Project” enables CCP leaders to live significantly longer than their Western counterparts, with the goal of extending their lifespans to 150 years.
What’s next
Xi Jinping’s military parade has intensified the schism and bloc-based tensions between the PRC and the United States, reinforcing our prior assessment that a comprehensive trade agreement between the two powers remains improbable. Should tensions escalate, this heightens the risk of retaliatory measures from the Trump administration, which may unpredictably impose secondary sanctions targeting Russia’s economic partners like China and India, who would be ensnared due to their SCO affiliations and trade relations with Moscow.
Global attention on Xi and Putin’s conversation about organ transplants and “immortality” could have greater ramifications for Sino-U.S. tensions down the road. In searching for leverage points to pressure the PRC, the U.S. could seek to spotlight forced organ harvesting and the bleak human rights situation in China under the CCP.
