1 ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ study campaign gains steam
April 4 to April 7
State mouthpiece Xinhua published four editorials urging Party members and officials to “solidly grasp” the learning and implementation of “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”
The titles of the editorials are:
- “Deeply Understand the Significance of Why Thematic Education is Being Carried Out” (深刻認識開展主題教育的重大意義)
- “Firmly Grasp the Thematic Education’s General Requirements” (牢牢把握主題教育的總要求)
- “Seize the Fundamental Task and Strive to Achieve Practical Results” (抓住根本任務, 務求取得實效)
- “Solidly Carry Out Thematic Education in Organic Integration and Integrated Promotion” (在有機融合、一體推進中紮實開展主題教育)
April 4
The CCP Central Steering Group held a training session on the thematic education of “Xi Jinping Thought” in Beijing. Li Ganjie, the executive deputy head of the “Xi Jinping Thought” thematic education leading group, attended the meeting and delivered a speech. Liu Jinguo, the deputy head of the “Xi Jinping Thought” thematic education leading group, presided over the meeting.
April 6
Party Central issued a notice on the printing and distribution of an outline for studying “Xi Jinping Thought.”
The notice made the following requirements:
- Party Committees at all levels must use “Xi Jinping Thought” in “unifying thinking, will, and action.”
- All Party members are to conscientiously “read the original works, learn the original text, and understand the principles.”
- Learning and training should be “multi-form, hierarchical, and full-coverage.”
- Party members are required to achieve “deep study and believe” in “Xi Jinping Thought,” as well as continuously increase their political, ideological, theoretical, and emotional “identification” with Xi’s political theories.
April 7
The Central Propaganda Department held an education and mobilization meeting on the thematic study of “Xi Jinping Thought.” Central Propaganda Department head Li Shulei and 19th Central Steering Group head Bayanqolu both attended the meeting and delivered a speech. The meeting was attended by relevant members of the Central Steering Group, Party members and leading cadres of the Central Propaganda Department and its directly affiliated units, as well as retired Party branch members.
April 9
The Central Institute of Party History and Literature, the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the National Supervisory Commission, the Central Organization Department, and the office of the Central Leading Group for the Learning and Implementation of “Xi Jinping Thought” Thematic Education jointly released and distributed throughout the country three texts that will serve as study material for “Xi Jinping Thought.”
The three texts are Xi Jinping’s “On the Party’s Self-revolution,” “Thematic Excerpts from the Worldview and Methodology of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” and “Excerpts from Xi Jinping’s Discourse on Investigation and Research.”
April 10
The People’s Liberation Army held a thematic education work conference in Beijing on learning and implementing “Xi Jinping Thought,” as well as expanding the study campaign to the entire military. Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia presided over the conference and delivered a speech, while CMC vice chairman He Weidong went over study campaign mobilization arrangements.
Background
Xi Jinping launched the study campaign to “learn and implement” his political theories during a Politburo meeting on March 30. He later delivered a speech on the topic during a thematic education work conference in Beijing on April 3.
In tallying from mainland media reports, there were at least 57 central guidance groups overseeing the “Xi Jinping Thought” thematic education study campaign as of April 7.
Our take
We previously analyzed why Xi Jinping is undertaking the current campaign to indoctrinate Party members and cadres in his political theories (see here and here).
The current expansion of the study campaign is also in line with our assessment that Xi will “advance the political indoctrination effort and broader ‘self-rectification’ campaign with speed and intensity.” To briefly recap, we explained that Xi likely intends to carry out the study campaign and “self-rectification” as quickly as possible to get the CCP regime ready to tackle the serious internal and external crises facing the PRC, as well as unify the regime around his leadership in order to “better wage the escalating ‘new cold war’ against the West and take advantage of ‘great changes unseen in a century’ further down the road.” Xi is also moving at pace because he likely believes that the CCP does not have much time to get its act together, seeing how “the time [is] tight, the task [is] heavy, and the demands are high.”
Xi’s urgency in pushing the study campaign further affirms our assessment that his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) is mostly established on propaganda. This means that even though Xi has consolidated power to a greater degree at the 20th Party Congress and 2023 Two Sessions, he needs to ramp up propaganda and indoctrination efforts even more to deal with higher levels of personal political risks. Otherwise, Xi’s “quan wei” and political position are perpetually in danger of being undermined by his various policy failures in recent years, notably “zero-COVID” and China’s rapid economic decline. To make it harder for those inside the Party to challenge his rule, Xi has to compel them to accept his political theories and force them to at least publicly display loyalty to his leadership.
What’s next
Xi’s “self-rectification” effort will claim more scalps the more deeply and broadly the “Xi Jinping Thought” study campaign is promoted in the regime. Many active and retired officials, and especially those with Jiang faction associations, are in danger of being purged for corruption and lacking insufficient “political correctness” in Xi’s “new era.”
As crises worsen for the PRC and the study campaign kicks into high gear, the odds of Xi denouncing Jiang Zemin and his “incorrect political line” will steadily rise.
2 Analyzing rumored Organization Department and Social Work Department head appointments
April 4
Ming Pao, a Hong Kong broadsheet with pro-Beijing leanings, reported that the Politburo decided on a number of personnel appointments during a meeting on March 30, including:
- Wu Hansheng (age 59, ministerial rank), the former executive deputy Party secretary of the central and state department working committees (黨和國家機關工作委員會), was reportedly picked as head of the new Central Social Work Department.
- Li Ganjie (58), a Politburo member and secretary of the Central Secretariat, would reportedly take over Chen Xi (69) as head of the Central Organization Department.
2. The leadership column on the official website of the central and state department working committees showed that Guo Wenqi (59) had replaced Wu Hansheng as executive deputy Party secretary in charge of daily work. Guo was formerly head of the disciplinary inspection and supervisory team in the Central Organization Department.
April 7
The CCP Central Party School’s official WeChat account wrote in a post that Chen Xi attended a Central Party School thematic education mobilization meeting on “learning and implementing Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era” as the School’s president.
Chen previously attended a national conference of Party School principals in Beijing on March 19 as head of the Central Organization Department and Central Party School president.
Our take
1. The Central Party School’s official WeChat not identifying Xi Jinping ally Chen Xi as Central Organization Department head in its April 7 post suggests that Ming Pao’s report about Li Ganjie succeeding Chen in the position could be accurate even though the personnel appointment is not yet official. Li can be expected to also replace Chen as Central Party School president if personnel reshuffle norms are followed.
Chen Xi is past retirement age and was supposed to retire after the 20th Party Congress. However, Ming Pao reported on Feb. 23 that Chen was the “main operator” behind the Party and state institutional reforms that were introduced during and after the 2023 Two Sessions. Chen having a crucial role to play in rolling out the reforms would explain why Xi kept him as Central Organization Department head for five more months after Chen was supposed to have stepped down.
2. If Wu Hansheng is officially appointed as head of the Central Social Work Department, then this would correspond to the last of three personnel appointment scenarios that we previously outlined, namely, that a “ministerial-level official who is ranked lower than both Li Ganjie and Wang Xiaohong” would be given the position.
The appointment of a ministerial-rank official to head the Central Social Work Department instead of a secretary of the Central Secretariat affirms our earlier analysis that Xi Jinping is not looking to revive a secret police and intelligence apparatus as some observers have claimed, but rather intends for the Department to carry out “stability maintenance” operations through subtler means.
3. We previously analyzed that the Central Social Work Department could operate like a hybrid of the Organization Department and the United Work Front Department and use “non-violent stability maintenance organization that strengthens Party Central’s grip over society through the control of CCP and social organizations.” Non-violent stability maintenance includes “guiding” the Chinese people through united front work and other “soft” stability maintenance means to not challenge the regime and safeguard their interests. For instance, most people in China will belong to some form of economic or social organization, and the CCP will see to it that those in organizations who go along with the regime are allowed to thrive (promotions, etc.) while troublemakers are pressured in various ways (pay cuts, firing, etc.) to toe the line.
While the CCP authorities appear to still be in the midst of setting up the Central Social Work Department, there are signs in the localities that it will function just as we described. A government notice issued by a district in Xi’an City dated March 21, 2023 on mapping freelance workers in the local community that was recently circulated on the Chinese internet called for the targeting of non-Party members with united front work. Among the various occupations targeted include freelance writers, internet writers, screenwriters, and other writers; freelance calligraphers and painters, craft artists, performers, and other arts and culture creators; freelance planners, designers, trainers, and other knowledge-based market service personnel; and freelance machine builders, software programmers, internet marketers, and other skilled marketers.
The CCP authorities have had freelancers on its radar since at least the mid-2000s. More recently, the Guangzhou Daily (the official newspaper of the Guangzhou Municipal Party Committee) reported in April 2022 that the local “freelance united front research group” had estimated in a 2021 report that there were about 300,000 freelancers in Guangzhou.
Freelancers represent a threat to the CCP because they usually do not belong to economic or social organizations and are harder to control using non-violent stability maintenance measures. From the CCP’s perspective, freelancers involved in writing, education, and technology, as well as those who were educated in Western countries, could have a liberal bent and are potentially influential protesters. For example, the Sitong Bridge protester was reportedly a freelance tech worker and freelancers were known to have participated in the “blank paper revolution” in late 2022.
3 Xi leadership advances anti-corruption effort targeting SOEs
Anti-corruption authorities put SOEs on notice
April 6
The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission published an article on their official website titled, “Implementing the Spirit of the Plenum | Deepening the Comprehensive Strict Governance of Central-owned Enterprises” (落實全會精神機關篇丨深入推進國資央企全面從嚴治黨).
Noteworthy points in the article include:
- The anti-corruption authorities will continue to “increase efforts to investigate and handle cases” in deepening the rectification of corruption in financial and state-owned enterprises. The authorities will also “seriously investigate and deal with a number of typical cases.”
- The anti-corruption authorities will improve its “penetrating verification capabilities” (穿透性核查能力), identify “white gloves” (白手套), tear down “firewalls” (防火墙), uncover the “legal veneer” (合法外衣) of shadow companies and shadow shareholders, as well as severely punish persistent problems such as related party transactions, rent-seeking, and profit transfers.
- The anti-corruption authorities will “resolutely eliminate” corrupt elements who embezzle state-owned assets and dig deeper into the corruption behind the major losses of state-owned assets.
- The anti-corruption authorities will thoroughly carry out supervision of central-owned enterprises involved in the financial sector, as well as comprehensively examine the current status of integrity risks and regulatory oversight of those enterprises.
- The anti-corruption authorities will “resolutely investigate and deal” with the corruption of spouses, as well as the children and their spouses, of the leaders of SOEs and COEs who use their influence for personal gain and corruption. The authorities will also “consolidate and deepen the high-pressure situation of punishing corruption.”
April 9
The CCDI announced that 15 inspection teams had been stationed in 30 SOEs involved in nuclear, aerospace, national defense, asset management, and food and energy, as well as in five financial institutions and the General Administration of Sport.
SOE personnel reshuffles
April 6
Hu Jianhua (age 60), director and general manager of China Merchants Group, left his post upon reaching retirement age.
April 7
Chi Jingtao (60), director, general manager, and Party group deputy secretary of China Grain Reserves Corporation Group Limited (Sinograin), left his post upon reaching retirement age.
April 9
Liu Xiangmin (60), director, general manager, and Party group deputy secretary of the Aluminium Corporation of China, left his post upon reaching retirement age.
SOE corruption
April 7
Shen Rui, former vice president of the Yunnan branch of the Agricultural Bank of China, was investigated.
April 10
Han Wei, former assistant general manager of Capital Airport Holdings, was investigated.
April 11
Wang Zheng, former deputy general manager of the Beijing branch of China Life Insurance, was investigated.
Backdrop
After the 20th Party Congress and as of April 11, the CCDI had notified and investigated 23 cadres under central Organization Department management, 60 cadres in central Party and government agencies, SOEs, and financial units, and 217 cadres under provincial Organization Department management. Of the aforementioned cadres, 91 belonged to central-owned enterprises or SOEs.
Our take
1. The Xi leadership’s targeting of central and state-owned enterprises with the anti-corruption campaign affirms our earlier analysis that Xi Jinping will carry out a “Yan’an style” “self-revolution” campaign after the 20th Party Congress to “purge the Party ranks of lingering factional rivals, those with disloyal inclinations, and others opposed to his rule, and bring ‘unprecedented unity to the CCP.” We also noted that the Xi leadership would target areas where “power is concentrated, capital-intensive, and resource rich” like the financial sector, the state sector, problematic industries, and Jiang faction strongholds in the provinces or government organs.
Beijing’s continued anti-corruption efforts also challenge the theory floated by China watchers shortly after the 20th Party Congress that Xi could wind down the anti-corruption campaign because he had essentially eliminated all political enemies and is totally dominant in the regime. We maintain that Xi still has to contend with the remnant Jiang faction and other “anti-Xi” forces in the Party elite, and therefore needs to sustain or even intensify the anti-corruption campaign until the remaining viable political threats to his rule are dealt with.
2. Despite a now decade-long anti-corruption campaign, Xi Jinping is not done with purging the Jiang faction and getting rid of its influence in the central and local governments. This is because the Jiang faction had dominated the regime for nearly two decades (1997 to 2012) and had a strong sway over key apparatuses or sectors (political and legal affairs, propaganda, finance, etc.) through personnel appointments.
With regard to the central and state-owned sector, we previously explained that Jiang Zemin had issued a major SOE reform document in 1999 that allowed his leadership to arbitrarily appoint top executives at state and central-owned enterprises. After the rollout of the reform, Jiang’s son Jiang Mianheng and other Jiang faction cronies would soon find themselves heading SOEs involved in critical sectors like telecommunications and energy; a Jiang-Hu era joke had a man suggesting to his friend that he was paying “protection money” to Jiang Mianheng and Zhou Yongkang (i.e. he had powerful political connections) when he was really talking about paying his China Unicom bills (Jiang Mianheng was once China Unicom’s backroom operator) and pumping gas (Zhou formerly headed China National Petroleum Corporation). The Jiang faction’s “monopoly” over the SOEs would enrich its members at the expense of China’s economic development, as well as deeply entrenched corruption in the regime.
The Jiang faction’s sway over the regime meant that Xi Jinping was unable to do a thorough job of “rectifying” the central and state-owned enterprises during his first two terms. The Xi leadership also barely made headway in cleaning up the financial sector despite having announced investigation efforts at the start of Xi’s second term in late 2017.
The language used in the CCDI and NSC’s April 6 article on “deepening the comprehensive strict governance of central and state-owned enterprises” hint at the difficulties Xi experienced in tackling the corruption problems posed by his factional rivals. In particular, the article noted that intermediaries (“white gloves,” shadow companies, shadow shareholders) and pseudo-legal means (“firewalls,” “legal veneer”) were used to evade scrutiny, and that the anti-corruption authorities need to improve their “penetrating verification capabilities” to get to the root of the trouble. The anti-corruption authorities’ relative bluntness in calling out the tactics used to evade investigators and expressions of determination to resolve corruption in central and state-owned enterprises also suggests that Xi Jinping finally feels comfortable enough after a decade’s worth of power consolidation to more boldly purge the lingering Jiang faction and other opposition presence in the regime.
