Updated on April 20, 2023.
1 Analyzing news on upcoming Party and state institutional reforms
The CCP Politburo announced a plan to further reform Party and state institutions at the upcoming Two Sessions, as well as more leadership reshuffles. Since then, media outlets have reported some details of the coming reform and personnel adjustments.
Feb. 23
1. Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao reported that the coming round of Party and state institutional reforms will be “very extensive,” with some of the restructuring being more “explosive” than those in 2018.
Details include:
- Chen Xi, head of the Central Organization Department, is the main operator behind the upcoming round of Party and state institutional reforms. Ming Pao analyzed that this is why Chen has not yet stepped down as Organization Department after the 20th Party Congress as he is due to retire.
- The Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of State Security will reportedly be removed from State Council control and placed under the jurisdiction of a new Central Internal Affairs Commission (中央內部委員會) that is directly subordinated to Party Central and will be led by public security minister Wang Xiaohong. The Internal Affairs Commission borrows its name from the PRC’s former Ministry of Internal Affairs and borrows the functional framework of the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Internal Affairs.
- The “supra-authority” Internal Affairs Commission will also coordinate the functions of public security, immigration, household registration, transportation, counter-terrorism, counter-espionage, and the Ministry of Civil Affairs’ social organization management.
- It is unclear what the relationship will be between the Central Internal Affairs Commission and the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. It is also unclear whether the foreign intelligence function of the Ministry of State Security will be merged into the Internal Affairs Commission.
- The upcoming reforms could see the merging of the Ministry of Science and Technology and the Ministry of Education into a new Ministry of Science and Education or Science and Education Commission. This new ministry or commission could also take over the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security’s talent management function.
- The employment guidance and social security functions of the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security could be merged into the Ministry of Civil Affairs.
- The National Radio and Television Administration and the Cyberspace Administration of China could be folded into the Central Propaganda Department, or be incorporated together with the General Administration of Sport under the Ministry of Culture and Tourism.
- The Financial Stability and Development Committee could be “substantiated,” including by incorporating the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission into the entity, to “strengthen the coordination of financial supervision, and prevent and resolve risks.”
2. The Wall Street Journal reported that Zhu Hexin, chairman of the Chinese financial conglomerate Citic Group, is the leading candidate to replace Yi Gang as People’s Bank of China governor, citing people familiar with discussions. The people said that the decision is not final. Meanwhile, Xi ally He Lifeng could be appointed a vice premier overseeing economic, financial, and industrial affairs and concurrently serve as the PBoC’s Party secretary.
The people said that the CCP is also planning to revive the Central Financial Work Commission, a policy-setting body that existed between 1998 to 2003. The commission, if restored, will serve a comparable function of consolidating all financial regulatory matters under a single authority. Ding Xuexiang, a Xi ally and new Politburo Standing Committee member, as well as premier-in-waiting Li Qiang, are potential candidates to oversee the commission’s operations.
Our take
1. The above information, if confirmed, will affirm some of our previous analyses.
We have noted in multiple newsletters and articles that Xi Jinping has long sought to “rectify” apparatuses and sectors of the regime that were previously under the sway of the Jiang Zemin faction, including the political and legal affairs apparatus, the intelligence apparatus, and the financial sector. This is part of Xi’s long-term plan to “coup-proof” his rule after the Jiang faction used its influence in the aforementioned sectors and apparatuses to undermine Xi just before he took office and during his first term.
The various reforms as reported by media outlets will enhance the Xi leadership’s control over political and legal affairs, intelligence, and financial matters, as well as allow Beijing to more thoroughly “rectify” them. We noted previously that Xi will continue to mop up lingering opposition to his rule even after consolidating power more completely at the 20th Party Congress.
The implementation of the reported reforms will also strengthen Party Central’s “centralized and unified leadership” over the Party and state apparatuses while further weakening the State Council’s influence.
2. Xi Jinping could be looking to further centralize power and control through the upcoming round of institutional reforms to better guide the regime through the many serious internal and external crises plaguing the regime. “Stability maintenance” will be a priority for Beijing as social conditions deteriorate and tensions escalate (“blank paper revolution,” “white-haired revolution,” etc.), so it makes sense that the Xi leadership will want Party Central to have a more direct role in overseeing political and legal affairs operations through a Central Internal Affairs Commission. Resurrecting the Central Financial Work Commission will allow Beijing to better direct financial regulation as economic conditions worsen for the regime. Meanwhile, consolidating ministries will help the regime cut some expenses and redundancies as local governments report fiscal shortfalls.
The Xi leadership could also be making institutional reforms with an eye to getting prepared for the worst-case scenario. Should the PRC become a pariah state following an irrevocable breakdown of Sino-U.S. relations, a PLA invasion of Taiwan, or a global war, the CCP authorities will need a way to keep social order in check as it reverts China to a closed country. Having an Internal Affairs Commission and a Financial Work Commission would, at least on paper, allow the Party to keep a firm hand on the ship’s wheel, coordinate emergency measures, and navigate the regime through troubled times. By establishing agencies that would enable the regime to transition to a full police state, the Xi leadership would be better positioned to mercilessly crush any political opposition and suppress protests.
3. The appointment of Wang Xiaohong as a secretary of the CCP Secretariat at the 20th Party Congress and his prior appointment as public security minister set him up perfectly to run the Central Internal Affairs Commission as described in news reports.
It is too early to say anything definitive about the Central Internal Affairs Commission until it is confirmed and more details about its functions and structure are released. However, we can make some basic assessments based on the information currently available.
The Central Internal Affairs Commission will likely outstrip the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission in importance if the Ministry of State Security is partly or wholly brought under its oversight. The combination of intelligence functions and a broad scope of internal security work could mean that the Central Internal Affairs Commission will resemble an expanded version of the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). The arrangement could also be intended by Xi Jinping to further marginalize the political and legal affairs apparatus and the lingering Jiang faction influence in the regime.
The establishment of the Central Internal Affairs Commission could eventually pave the way for the further weakening of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission. In the interim, the CCP’s domestic security and intelligence situation could be vaguely similar to that of the Ming Dynasty. The Ming rulers started to distrust their Embroidered Uniform Guard (Jinyiwei) secret police and domestic security organization after it abused authority and appeared to be beyond the imperial court’s control at times. The Ming court eventually created separate spy and secret police agencies, the notorious Eastern (Yongle Emperor) and Western Depots (Chenghua Emperor), to carry out its agenda of investigating dissidents and suppressing opposition. These internal security organizations would end up supervising and competing with each other, and the Embroidered Uniform Guard would even come under the Eastern Depot’s control for a period. Taking things back to modern times, the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission is akin to the Embroidered Uniform Guard that (Red Emperor) Xi Jinping cannot quite control, while the CCDI and the new Central Internal Affairs Commission (if it is indeed established) headed by Xi allies Li Xi and Wang Xiaohong respectively can be likened to the Eastern and Western Depots that Xi favors to implement his internal security agenda.
How Jiang Zemin’s political legacy is handled after the upcoming restructuring of the domestic security and intelligence apparatuses is worth close attention. As we previously noted, the 2018 Party and state institutional reforms saw the abolishing of the Central Leading Group on Preventing and Dealing with Heretical Religions and its administrative office (the “610 Office”), which coordinated Jiang’s persecution campaign against Falun Gong. Meanwhile, the functions of the anti-Falun Gong leading group and its office were divided between the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission and the Ministry of Public Security.
With the potential sidelining of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission, the Ministry of Public Security coming under the Central Internal Affairs Commission, and the consolidation of various ministries, it is unclear how the Xi leadership will decide to handle the awkward question of Jiang’s persecution campaign. If the Xi leadership puts the task of coordinating the campaign solely to the weakened Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission or a lower-level body, or further de-prioritizes the campaign as part of cost-cutting consolidations (this does not mean ending the persecution), then Xi Jinping is likely keeping the “Falun Gong card” in play against the remnant Jiang faction or for use in other contingencies. Alternatively, there could be no change or even an elevation of the persecution campaign after the upcoming institutional restructuring. Regardless, the longer the Falun Gong persecution campaign remains on the books after Jiang Zemin’s death, the more it will become (and be perceived as) a part of Xi’s own political legacy and leave more blood on his hands.
2 CCDI signals coming purges ahead of Two Sessions
Feb. 23
1. State mouthpiece Xinhua published Central Commission for Discipline director Li Xi’s work report delivered at the 20th CCDI’s second plenary session on Jan. 9. The report ran over 13,000 characters and was titled, “Deeply Study and Implement the Party’s 20th Party Congress Spirit, Unswervingly Promote the Comprehensive and Strict Governance of the Party on the New Journey” (深入學習貫徹黨的二十大精神 在新征程上堅定不移推進全面從嚴治黨).
Li Xi said in the report that CCDI is to fully implement Xi Jinping’s political theory, deeply implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress, as well as research and deploy the inspection and supervision work for 2023.
Li’s report also repeated CCP propaganda about Xi’s political achievements (including safeguarding the “Two Establishes”) and the anti-corruption campaign. The report clearly stated that the CCDI’s “implementation” of “comprehensively and strictly governing the Party” (a “strategic deployment” of the 20th Party Congress) is meant to provide “strong guarantees” for Xi’s “new era and new journey.”
Li Xi’s report lists eight areas of CCDI work for 2023:
1) Strengthen political supervision
- Safeguard the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central. Ensure that the whole Party maintains a high degree of consistency with political position, direction, principles, and road of “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” Do not go soft on those who engage in political gangs, cliques, and interest groups. Resolutely eliminate “two-faced people” who have been alienated from the Party, “small gangs” who form factions for private gains, as well as “pseudo-loyalists” who “publicly comply but privately defy” (陽奉陰違). Eliminate hidden political dangers and safeguard political security.
- Political supervision must be concrete, precise, and normalized. Ensure that Party Central’s major decisions and deployments, as well as the important requirements of General Secretary Xi Jinping, are implemented without compromise.
- Resolutely correct outstanding issues. These include “the top has policies, but the bottom has countermeasures” (上有政策, 下有對策); “public compliance but private defiance”; “low-level red” (低級紅) and “advanced blackening” (高級黑); disregarding the overall situation (不顧大局) and engaging in departmental and local level protectionism; and not formulating measures that comport with actual conditions in dealing with specific issues.
2) Improve the “self-revolution” system
- Improve the system of Party regulations.
- Improve the Party and state supervision system.
- Implement a system where the Party Committee (Party group) leading cadre is the first person responsible.
3) Let political inspections take effect
4) Implement the “eight-point regulations” and rectify the “four winds” (formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism, and extravagance)
- Severely rectify the “winds” of hedonism and extravagance.
- Focus on rectifying formalism and bureaucratism. Rectify the empty shouting of slogans and making of statements without action; the approaches of “one-size-fits-all” and taking excessive policy steps; as well as data falsification, violation of financial discipline, and aggravating the burden of grassroots government.
5) Comprehensively strengthen the construction of Party discipline
6) Resolutely win the fight against corruption
- Strictly investigate key issues
- Resolutely investigate and deal with corruption where political and economic issues intertwine.
- Resolutely prevent leading cadres from becoming the spokesperson and agent of interest groups and power groups.
- Resolutely prevent political and business collusion, the infiltration of capital in politics, and other issues that damage the political ecology and economic development environment.
- Deepen the rectification of corruption in power-concentrated, capital-intensive, and resource-rich sectors such as finance, state-owned enterprises, political and legal affairs. Also deepen the rectification of industries involved in the purchase and sale of grain.
- Rectify various corruption problems that harm the interests of the masses
- Strictly investigate the corruption and “protective umbrellas” behind gang-related cases.
- Eliminate the breeding ground and conditions for corruption
- Focus on investigating and dealing with people who engage in repeated bribery, pay huge sums in bribes, pay bribes to multiple persons, and harm the political ecology.
- Build a mechanism for pursuing fugitives, preventing fugitives from escaping, and recovering stolen goods.
7) Deepen the reform of the discipline inspection and supervision system.
8) Forge a high-quality discipline inspection and supervision system.
2. The official website of the CCDI and the National Supervisory Commission published a 3,500-character article by the “13th review and investigation office” titled, “Resolutely Win the Protracted War and Struggle Against Corruption” (堅決打贏反腐敗鬥爭攻堅戰持久戰).
The article said that CCDI’s review and inspection department needs to focus on probing the financial sector, as well as central and state-owned enterprises, to “win the protracted war and struggle against corruption. In total, the article mentioned “financial [sector]” 16 times and “central-owned enterprises” eight times.
The article urged the review and inspection department to adhere to the “Two Establishes” and take the “Two Safeguards” as the primary responsibility in resolutely and thoroughly investigating violations of political discipline.
The article stressed that the review and inspection department must “examine things from the perspective of politics, and investigate from the perspective of politics” (從政治上看、從政治上查):
- Seriously investigate and deal with problems that undermine political discipline and political regulations.
- Seriously punish “two-faction people,” “two-faced people,” political gangs, cliques, and interest groups who are disloyal and dishonest to the Party, as well as “publicly comply, but privately defy.”
- Resolutely investigate and deal with corruption issues where political issues and economic issues intertwine.
- Resolutely prevent leading cadres from becoming the spokesperson and agent of interest groups and power groups.
- Resolutely prevent political and business collusion, the infiltration of capital in politics, and other issues that damage the political ecology and economic development environment.
- When investigating discipline problems in the financial sector and central-owned enterprises, be good at studying problems and making judgements from a political perspective. Also unearth deep-seated political roots hidden beneath the surface and the political harm it would bring.
- Seriously investigate and deal with the problems of disregard for the Party’s leadership over financial work and state-owned enterprises, as well as the lack of deep understanding, wavering stance, and shaky direction with regard to the political and people’s attributes of finance with Chinese characteristics and state-owned enterprises.
- Seriously investigate and deal with ineffective implementation of deployments regarding financial services and the real economy, as well as the prevention and defusing of risks. Also investigate and deal with those who abandon their supervisory duties and become financial risk makers instead of order maintainers.
The article noted that the corruption situation in the regime is “still serious and complicated,” and the task of “curbing increases and purging stock is still arduous.” Anti-corruption efforts should be combined with the specific responsibilities of financial institutions and central-owned enterprises to “resolutely cut off the link between power and capital,” as well as form a powerful deterrent to corruption in those institutions.
The article added that the review and investigation department should deepen its understanding of the manifestations and characteristics of the “four winds” in the financial sector and central-owned enterprises, resolutely discard “exceptionalism” (i.e. that some executives should be exempt from punishment) and other “wrong theories,” and dismiss “wrong theories” about “financial elites, only money matters, and alignment with the West.” The department should also “clamp down on hedonism and extravagance,” rectify “unspoken rules” in the industries, as well as eliminate the “broken window” effect, the “everyone breaks the law” mentality, and “race to the bottom” mentality (the last three idioms refer to the notion that people get away with wrongdoing and foster a criminal environment because everybody is engaging in criminality and protecting each other).
Feb. 24
The anti-corruption authorities held a national discipline inspection and supervision cadres education and rectification mobilization and deployment meeting in Beijing. CCDI head Li Xi attended the meeting and gave a speech.
Li stressed that discipline inspection and supervision organs at all levels must “resolutely implement” the work deployment of the 20th CCDI’s second plenary session. Those organs are to carry out the “education and rectification” of discipline inspection and supervision cadres, as well as resolutely investigate and deal with “two-faced people” and “darkness under the lamp” (燈下黑, or corruption in anti-corruption agencies) using the “most distinctive attitude, the most powerful measures, and the most decisive action.” Further, the organs should strive to forge an “iron army (鐵軍) of discipline inspection and supervision cadres” who are “loyal, honest and responsible, and dare to struggle and are good at struggling.”
Background
Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption campaign appeared to stagnate during his second term under Zhao Leji, a Jiang faction associate. In contrast to when Wang Qishan helmed the CCDI, very few “big tigers” were taken out under Zhao. Notably, the Xi leadership seemed to have made progress against the Jiang faction-linked “Sun Lijun political gang” only after Xi ally and current public security minister Wang Xiaohong was appointed to key positions in the public security system.
Our take
1. Li Xi’s work report, his speech to the “education and rectification” meeting, and the CCDI article on “protracted war and struggle against corruption” affirm a number of our observations about the Xi leadership and the CCP regime, especially those made after the 20th Party Congress.
First, the strong emphasis on anti-corruption work after a decade of the anti-corruption campaign indicates that Xi Jinping is neither “all-powerful” or “unrivaled” as many observers have assessed. Rather, Xi still has lingering factional enemies, including “two-faced people,” “two-faction people,” “pseudo-loyalists,” and other manners of opposition to deal with, as we have indicated on numerous occasions. Calls to rectify business-politics collusion, correct “low-level red” and “advanced blackening,” as well as eliminate “hidden political dangers” allude to efforts by Xi’s rivals to undermine his leadership and erode his “quan wei” (authority and prestige). Therefore, Xi ally Li Xi appears to have been tasked to pick up the pace after Jiang faction associate Zhao Leji’s relative “inactivity” (不作爲) over the past five years.
Second, Xi is looking to overcome his “orders not leaving Zhongnanhai” (政令不出中南海) problem by threatening to punish officials who dare to default to Party culture-derived behavior like “one-size-fits-all” approaches and “the top has policies, but the bottom has countermeasures.” We have long observed Xi’s effort to address governance issues stemming from Party culture through greater consolidation of power in his person and forcing officials to obey his will by virtue of his paramount position. However, we are also deeply skeptical of Xi’s ability to succeed in an area where his predecessors with far greater “quan wei” have long struggled with.
Third, our analysis that Xi is looking to step up efforts to “rectify” the regime after the 20th Party Congress despite having centralized power more fully appears to be on track for verification. We noted that Xi will “intensify his ‘self-revolution’ efforts and use the anti-corruption campaign to purge the regime of the lingering Jiang faction presence in the provinces, in government (political and legal affairs apparatus, intelligence apparatus, financial system, etc.), as well as the financial sector and other problematic industries.” We also anticipated the focus on the financial sector and state sector as indicated in the “protracted war and struggle” article.
The Xi leadership’s renewed prioritization of the anti-corruption campaign happens to coincide with the upcoming rollout of Party and state institutional reforms, including the rumored establishment (or rather, resurrection) of commissions overseeing finance and domestic security (see item one). It is likely that the anti-corruption effort is intended to complement the institutional restructuring, and serve the overall effect of tightening the Party’s control over society as internal and external crises worsen for the regime.
2. The CCP’s need to rescue China’s rapidly deteriorating economy is likely a key reason why Xi Jinping is focused on cleaning up corruption in the financial sector. Xi had been saddled with intractable economic and financial problems created during the Jiang-Hu era, and could not even begin to resolve them without first tackling serious corruption issues and the interest groups (including Xi’s factional rivals) responsible. As Xi indicated in his 20th Party Congress work report, “a number of prominent issues and problems — some of which had been building for years and others which were just emerging” had occurred under his predecessors, and those issues and problems “demand urgent action.”
In targeting the finance sector, Xi could also be looking to build a case against his predecessors and eventually blame the Jiang faction and corrupt officials for China’s current economic problems. By prominently pointing the finger at his enemies, Xi could be hoping to distract attention away from his own role in bringing down the Chinese economy, notably through the “zero-COVID” policy, the “three red lines” property policy, “wolf warrior” diplomacy, and to a degree, “common prosperity.”
What’s next
The new round of anti-corruption probes could kick off after the Two Sessions in March, and is likely to be more ruthless than the campaign during Xi’s second term. Intense anti-corruption efforts could back Xi’s rivals into a corner and force a showdown in the CCP factional struggle as early as this year.
3 US strengthens Taiwan support
Several developments last week suggested a deepening U.S. commitment to Taiwan:
Feb. 22
1. A Taiwanese delegation met with senior U.S. officials for talks at the Washington headquarters of the American Institute in Taiwan. The talks lasted for seven hours, according to Taiwanese media reports.
The Taiwanese delegation was led by ROC foreign minister Joseph Wu and ROC National Security Council secretary general Wellington Koo.
U.S. officials at the talks include National Security Council Coordinator for the Indo-Pacific Kurt Campbell, Deputy National Security Advisors Jon Finer and Laura Rosenberger, NSC China director Rush Doshi, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Chase, Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Kritenbrink, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan Rick Waters, AIT head James Moriaty, and AIT Taipei director Sandra Oudkirk.
2. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), head of the new House select committee on the CCP, told the Washington Post that Taiwanese officials whom he spoke to during a stealth trip to Taipei were concerned about a $19 billion arms backlog.
“Our best chance of preventing an invasion of Taiwan, and of essentially preventing World War III, is to put actual hard power on Taiwan … and, to paraphrase President Tsai, to ensure that every day, when she wakes up, we are increasing the cost of an invasion for [CCP General Secretary] Xi Jinping,” he said.
Gallagher added, “We need to be moving heaven and earth to arm Taiwan to the teeth to avoid a war. Nobody knows if and when Xi Jinping wakes up and decides to do this but all the more reason to put in place a denial posture as quickly as possible.”
Gallagher also said that he hopes to hold a select committee hearing in Taiwan before summer.
3. ROC leader Tsai Ing-wen will reportedly make a stopover in the U.S. on her way to visit Taiwan’s allies in Latin America or visit her alma mater Cornell University in May or June, according to Taiwanese media.
Feb. 23
1. The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. plans to send between 100 and 200 troops to Taiwan in the coming months, up from about 30 in 2022 and the largest deployment of forces by the U.S. in Taiwan in decades. U.S. troops in Taiwan have included special-operations forces and Marines. U.S. officials said that the additional troops in Taiwan will train the local forces on U.S. weapons systems and military maneuvers.
The U.S. is also expanding its training program for ROC troops as part of an American effort to help Taiwan thwart a possible PLA invasion. People familiar with matters told the Journal that the Michigan National Guard is training a Taiwanese military contingent. ROC defense minister Chiu Kuo-cheng told the Journal that advanced training would be conducted at the battalion level, “focusing on tactics such as staff operations and troop deployment.” A Taiwanese battalion can include up to 600 troops.
U.S. officials said that the expanded training had been in the works for months, or before the recent straining of U.S.-China relations over the PRC spy balloon.
Backdrop
Increased U.S. support for Taiwan comes amid worsening Sino-U.S. tensions, escalating conflict in Ukraine, and growing crisis for the CCP regime.
Our take
1. The strengthening U.S.-Taiwan relationship and Taiwan’s improving international standing are trends that we anticipated in 2020 and noted again in subsequent China outlooks, including the 2023 edition. The Russia-Ukraine conflict and the PRC’s show of force in the Taiwan Strait in 2022 after then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei have ensured that the trend will become more prominent going forward.
We also noted in our 2023 China Outlook, “Politicians from the U.S. and its allies could make more visits to Taiwan. Some of these politicians could even make actions that the CCP would find provocative, including on topics involving ‘Taiwan independence’ and defending Taiwan from CCP aggression.”
2. The crisis-hit CCP is currently limited in how it can respond to U.S. efforts to arm Taiwan, station additional troops on the island, and expand the training of ROC troops. The CCP could issue more sharp rhetoric on the Taiwan issue and make more military maneuvers in the Taiwan Strait in typical “loud thunder, but small raindrops” (雷聲大, 雨點小, i.e. “more bark than bite”) response, but will hesitate to truly menace the ROC for fear of interfering in its ongoing efforts to win over Taiwan and repair relations with the United States.
Tepid pushback from Beijing could embolden the U.S. and Taiwan to step up their cooperation, which will in turn expose the CCP as a “paper tiger” and further erode Xi Jinping’s “quan wei.”
3. While at present the CCP may be too bogged down by its many internal and external problems to give strong response to increased U.S. support for Taiwan, there are at least three “red lines” that could compel Beijing into launching an invasion regardless of whether the PLA is ready to do so:
- Taiwan declares independence.
- The U.S. surges its military forces in Taiwan, or publicly garrisons troops on the island, in the name of “defending Taiwan.”
- The U.S. arms the ROC with long-range weapons (i.e. missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and hitting Beijing).
The CCP will feel that it has no choice but to take Taiwan if any of the aforementioned scenarios play out because Beijing will view them as extreme acts of provocation on the part of the West and direct violations of the PRC’s sovereignty.
