1 US, EU warns China over arming Russia
Several United States officials and the top European Union diplomat recently cautioned the PRC against offering “lethal support” to Russia. Meanwhile, the CCP’s senior diplomats obliquely slammed U.S. “hegemony” for damaging “global peace” and urged countries to “stop fueling the flames.”
Feb. 18
1. Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with CCP Central Foreign Affairs Office director Wang Yi on the sidelines of the 2023 Munich Security Conference.
According to the State Department readout, Blinken “warned about the implications and consequences if China provides material support to Russia or assistance with systemic sanctions evasion.”
According to the PRC foreign ministry readout, Wang said that the CCP regime “does not accept the U.S.’s finger-pointing or even coercion targeting of China-Russia relations. The U.S., as a major country, has every reason to work for a political settlement of the crisis instead of fanning the flames or profiting from it.”
2. In a speech at the Munich Security Conference, Wang Yi said that “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries must be respected.”
“Power politics and hegemony are a recipe for global instability, and do the biggest damage to global peace. Interference in other countries’ internal affairs, in whatever name, disregards and defies the basic norms governing international relations … Disagreements and frictions do exist between countries, yet handling them with pressuring, smear campaigns or unilateral sanctions is often counterproductive, and may even entail endless trouble,” he added.
On Ukraine, Wang said, “China’s position boils down to promoting peace talks. China will publish its proposition on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, and stay firm on the side of peace and dialogue.”
Feb. 19
1. In an interview with CBS, Secretary Blinken said that Chinese companies have been providing “non-lethal support to Russia for use in Ukraine.” He added, “The concern that we have now is based on information we have that they’re considering providing lethal support, and we’ve made very clear to them that that would cause a serious problem for us and in our relationship.”
When asked to clarify what he meant by “lethal support,” Blinken said, “everything from ammunition to the weapons themselves.”
2. Linda Thomas-Greenfield, the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, told CNN that it is “unacceptable” for the PRC and others to “provide lethal support to the Russians in their brutal attack against Ukraine.”
“That would be a red line,” she said.
Feb. 20
1. Josep Borrell, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, told reporters that in his meeting with PRC top diplomat Wang Yi, “I expressed our strong concern about China providing arms to Russia. I asked him not to do that, and expressing not only our concern, but the fact that for us, it would be a red line in our relationship.”
Borrell added, “(Wang) told me that they’re not going to do it, that they don’t plan to do it. But we will remain vigilant.”
The foreign ministers of Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Finland, Lithuania, and Estonia issued similar warnings. Estonian foreign minister Urmas Reinsalu said that Beijing’s “hands [is] covered with blood” if it did arm Russia.
2. Ukraine president Volodymyr Zelensky told Italian media, “I personally have appealed to the Chinese leadership through direct channels and publicly not to offer any support to the Russians in this war. My hope is that Beijing will maintain a pragmatic attitude, because otherwise we are risking World War III, I think they are well aware of that.”
He added, “Our relationship with China has always been excellent, we have had intense economic relations for many years, and it is in everyone’s interest that they do not change.”
Feb. 21
PRC foreign minister Qin Gang said during a keynote speech at the Lanting Forum in Beijing, “China is deeply worried that the Ukraine conflict will continue to escalate or even spiral out of control.”
He added, “China will continue to promote peace talks, contribute ideas for a political settlement of the crisis and join the international community to promote dialogue and consultation … We urge certain countries to immediately stop fueling the fire. Stop shifting blame to China and stop touting ‘Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.’”
Press coverage of PRC aid to Russia
On Feb. 18, or a day before Blinken and Thomas-Greenfield warned the PRC over providing “lethal assistance” to Russia, four unnamed U.S. officials told NBC that the PRC may be providing “nonlethal military assistance” to Russia, including “gear for the spring offensive, such as uniforms or even body armor.”
Meanwhile, The Wall Street Journal had published several exclusive articles on PRC aid to Russia since early February, including:
- A Feb. 4 piece on the technology that Chinese state-owned defense companies were sending to Russia, including shipping navigation equipment, jamming technology, and jet-fighter parts. Russia had imported tens of thousands of such dual-use products (goods with both military and commercial applications) from China since its invasion in early 2022.
- A Feb. 18 piece on the export of Chinese drones to Russia and their deployment on the Ukrainian battlefield, citing Western officials, security analysts, and customs data. Some of the commercial drones were supplied by Da-Jiang Innovations Science & Technology Co. (DJI) through Russian distributors while others were sent through the United Arab Emirates. The Pentagon is concerned that the drones “aren’t only fueling Russia’s war effort” and are also allowing “China to gather crucial battlefield intelligence that might enhance Beijing’s war readiness.”
- A Feb. 20 piece on the Xi leadership’s thinking about how increased Western military support for Ukraine could greatly weaken Russia and the impact that would have on the PRC. People close to PRC decision-making told the Journal that Beijing is “more inclined to push for a cease-fire to prevent further Russian setbacks—or even a larger-scale defeat.” Beijing’s reconsideration has also prompted it to further expand its economic ties with Moscow, including stepping up energy imports and Chinese investments in Russian railways and ports. Meanwhile, some foreign policy strategists in Beijing have floated the question of whether the PRC should provide military support to Russia for defensive purposes, a move which could give China “some leverage in proposing options to end the conflict” but would simultaneously “stir up greater resentment against President Xi Jinping’s leadership in the West.” The Journal added that it could not be determined whether the idea of military support for Russia is “gaining traction in the top leadership.”
Backdrop
The U.S. and its allies have been steadily increasing pressure on the PRC since the start of the year through technology sanctions, support for Taiwan, forging closer alliances to counter Beijing, and spotlighting the CCP’s spy balloon program.
Our take
1. In analyzing the PRC spy balloon incident, we noted that the Biden administration could have played it up to “compel the Xi leadership to reduce or cut off support for Russia ahead of an expected escalation in the Russia-Ukraine war in the coming months.” The recent U.S. warning to the PRC over providing “lethal assistance” to Russia and calling out its “non-lethal assistance” lends weight to our analysis.
2. From the perspective of the CCP’s interests, supporting Russia is a no-brainer.
The PRC still needs allies as it navigates “great power” struggle against the West. The possible collapse of Vladimir Putin’s regime following an outright Russian defeat in Ukraine would significantly set back the CCP’s hegemonic ambitions, and is an outcome that Beijing will be looking to avoid. Yet the PRC does not wish to see Moscow secure a massive victory in Ukraine, as China and Russia are long-term geopolitical rivals.
The PRC also benefits economically by backing Russia. China’s exports are boosted by the sale of drones and other dual-use equipment to Russia, and imports of Russian oil, gas, and farm goods help to sustain the CCP regime.
In the CCP’s best-case scenario, the Russia-Ukraine war would bog down and wear out both Moscow as well as the U.S. and its allies. Meanwhile, Beijing will keep talking about the need for a ceasefire plan and offer its services as a peacemaker. Should peace finally arrive, the PRC will profit from helping to rebuild Ukraine. A weakened Russia will become more reliant upon and less dangerous to the PRC. A weakened U.S. would be less able to stop the CCP from advancing its domination agenda, including invading Taiwan to accomplish “reunification” if the situation demands it. However, current developments suggest that the CCP is highly unlikely to get its base-case scenario.
3. Wang Yi’s remarks referencing U.S. hegemony and Taiwan at the Munich Security Conference are actually par for the course and not a fresh baring of “wolf warrior” fangs. If anything, Wang was actually quite tempered in his comments, which come across as the CCP’s idea of warning the West not to mess with its regime security and sovereignty rather than signaling belligerence. This message is also conveyed in Qin Gang’s call for the U.S. and its allies to “stop fueling the flames” and “stop touting ‘Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.’” Put another way, the CCP is feeling the pressure of being targeted by the U.S. and its allies, and is “barking” loudly now in the hopes of keeping the latter at bay because it cannot afford to “bite” given the serious crises plaguing the regime.
However, Wang’s Western audience is unlikely to interpret his remarks so charitably. The U.S. and its allies could take those statements as further evidence that Xi and the CCP will not waver in their “revisionist” stance on Taiwan and the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and become even more determined to take action to have the PRC abandon its “revisionism.”
What’s next
The U.S. and its allies will likely keep piling pressure on the PRC to get the latter to drastically cut back or cease providing assistance of any kind to Russia. Xi Jinping and the CCP could make some concessions on that front, but are unlikely to give the U.S. and its allies the bulk of what they want given the stakes of “great power” competition and other considerations of regime security. This could in turn see the U.S. and its allies get even tougher on China, including imposing sanctions over the Russia issue, technology, and human rights, as well as limiting American companies from investing in China.
2 CCP rolls out ‘Global Security Initiative’
The PRC foreign affairs ministry introduced its “Global Security Initiative Concept Paper” (全球安全倡議概念文件) at its Lanting Forum in Beijing on Feb. 21.
The Concept Paper noted that “our times and history are changing in ways like never before, and the international community is confronted with multiple risks and challenges rarely seen before.” Also, “the world is once again at a crossroads in history.”
The Concept Paper also proposed six core concepts and principles:
- Stay committed to the vision of common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security.
- Stay committed to respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries.
- Stay committed to abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.
- Stay committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously.
- Stay committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation.
- Stay committed to maintaining security in both traditional and non-traditional domains, including “regional disputes and global challenges such as terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, and biosecurity.”
The Concept Paper further proposed 20 “priorities of cooperation,” including:
- “Actively participate in formulating a New Agenda for Peace and other proposals put forth in Our Common Agenda by the UN Secretary-General.”
- “Promote coordination and sound interaction among major countries and build a major country relationship featuring peaceful coexistence, overall stability and balanced development.”
- “Firmly uphold the consensus that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
- “Promote complete prohibition and thorough destruction of weapons of mass destruction, and build up the capacity of all countries in areas including nonproliferation export control, biosecurity and protection against chemical weapons.
- “Support the World Health Organization in playing a leading role in global governance in public health, and effectively coordinate and mobilize global resources to jointly respond to COVID-19 and other major global infectious diseases.
- “Support the cooperation among countries in addressing climate change and maintaining stable and smooth supply and industrial chains, and speed up the implementation of the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development in order to promote sustainable security through sustainable development.”
Finally, the Concept Paper called for the building of “more international platforms and mechanisms for exchange and cooperation on addressing security challenges.”
Background
The CCP faces mounting international pressure (see item one in this newsletter) over its support for Russia, an unwillingness to rule out a military “reunification” of Taiwan, and other “revisionist” behavior.
Our take
1. Through the “Global Security Initiative,” the CCP is trying to seize the moral high ground in international relations by pretending to be a defender of peace and a victim of American hegemony. Also, the CCP is attempting to redirect the international community’s focus away from its actions and towards U.S. “misbehavior.” This is consistent with the CCP’s “survival-dominance” dynamic.
2. The GSI Concept Paper’s 20 “priorities of cooperation” seem reasonable and well-intentioned, but can also be read as veiled threats. By mentioning nuclear war, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, climate change, cybersecurity, biosecurity, supply chains, etc., the CCP is warning the U.S. and its allies that the PRC will not work with them to resolve those issues unless they cease pressuring China. Worse, the CCP could be “part of the problem” and allow those issues to become serious disasters for the world.
3. The U.S. and the international community can deny the high ground to the CCP by staying focused on exposing its pernicious ideology (communism and the Party’s brand of Marxism-Leninism), debunking its propaganda, targeting its gross human rights abuses, and calling out the PRC’s militarism.
In particular, constantly shining a bright spotlight on the CCP’s various human rights abuses (including imposing sanctions) puts the regime in a very awkward position from a propaganda and image standpoint. Spotlighting the regime’s horrendous human rights record also denies it any excuses to retaliate with forceful and extreme measures.
3 CCP plans more Party and state institutional reforms
A CCP Politburo meeting on Feb. 21 decided that the Second Plenum of the 20th Central Committee would be held in Beijing from Feb. 26 to Feb. 28. State media reports indicated that the meeting led off with the usual praises of Xi Jinping’s political achievements since he came to office and stressed the importance of his political thought to the regime’s development.
The meeting discussed a draft of a plan to further reform Party and state institutions (黨和國家機構改革方案) that would be reviewed and passed at the Second Plenum. The meeting noted that “important arrangements for deepening institutional reform” were made at the 20th Party Congress, including “coordinating” Party Central organizations, the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference, as well as central and local governments. These Party and state institutions are to be reformed further to advance the CCP’s leading role in “modernization and construction of socialism” (社會主義現代化建設), make them more “scientific,” “optimize” their functional configurations, make them “better” institutions, and ensure more “efficient” management.
The meeting also discussed recommendations for candidates to join the leadership ranks of the new NPC and National Committee of the CPPCC at Two Sessions, as well as the State Council’s government work report that would be submitted at that key conclave.
Background
The CCP typically uses the Second Plenary Session of a new Central Committee to discuss issues related to system reform starting from the 14th Party Congress in 1992. An exception to this was the Second Plenum of the 19th Central Committee where constitutional amendments (scrapping term limits for the PRC president and vice president and adding “Xi Jinping Thought” to the state constitution) were discussed instead; system reforms were instead deliberated at the Third Plenum.
The Xi leadership previously rolled out sweeping Party and state institutional reforms at the 2018 Two Seasons. Some notable reforms at the time include:
- The Party’s leadership over the state government was strengthened and the State Council was weakened.
- The National Supervisory Commission and Safe China Construction Leading Group (平安中國建設協調小組) were established.
- Command over the People’s Armed Police and military reserves was returned to the Central Military Commission.
- Xi Jinping’s supra-authority national security apparatus was expanded to the localities.
- The “610 Office,” Jiang Zemin’s supra-authority apparatus, and other Jiang-era “stability maintenance” (Central Public Security Comprehensive Management Commission and Central Stability Maintenance Work Leading Group) agencies were scrapped.
Why it matters
Since taking office, Xi Jinping has rolled out various reforms to centralize power and purge factional rivals. The upcoming round of Party and state institutional reforms will reflect the degree to which Xi has consolidated power.
Our take
1. The top leadership of the State Council will be completely reshuffled at the upcoming Two Sessions in March, including premier Li Keqiang, the four vice premiers (Han Zheng, Sun Chunlan, Hu Chunhua, Liu He), and the five State Councilors (Wei Fenghe, Wang Yi, Wang Yong, Xiao Jie, Zhao Kezhi). The senior leadership of other State Council ministries and commissions will also see a major shake-up. One appointment that has already happened is former foreign minister Wang Yi assuming the role of director of the Office of the CCP Central Foreign Affairs Commission in January.
Based on public information available at the time of writing, we believe that the following personnel reshuffles could take place at the Two Sessions:
- Han Zheng (age 69), a former Politburo Standing Committee member and current first-rank vice premier, could become PRC vice president. We made this prediction partly because Han is the only one of three members of the 19th Politburo Standing Committee who did not make it into the 20th Politburo Standing Committee but was appointed a delegate to a provincial People’s Congress (in this case, the Shandong People’s Congress) after provincial Two Sessions were held in January. Han’s age is not a problem given the Wang Qishan precedent and Xi Jinping not wanting a potential heir in the vice president position. If Han Zheng does replace Wang as vice president, it would likely be a compromise “exchange” between the Xi camp and the Jiang faction over Xi having the bulk of his key personnel picks at the 20th Party Congress.
- Current third-rank vice premier Hu Chunhua (60) and State Councilor Wang Yong (68) could join the new National Committee of the CPPCC as vice chairmen (we previously made the prediction regarding Hu in October 2022).
- Xiao Jie (65), State Councilor, became a delegate to the Hubei provincial People’s Congress in January. This means that Xiao could later be appointed a vice chairman of the NPC.
- Other State Council leaders will retire.
The top leadership reshuffle for the new State Council could be as follows:
- Li Qiang (64), PRC premier.
- Liu Guozhong (61), first-rank vice premier.
- Li Hongzhong (67), second-rank vice premier.
- He Lifeng (58), third-rank vice premier.
- Zhang Guoqing (59), fourth-rank vice premier.
- Li Shangfu (65), State Councilor and defense minister.
- Chen Yiqin (64), State Councilor.
- Qin Gang (57), State Councilor and foreign minister (current).
- Wu Zhenglong (59), State Councilor and State Council secretary-general.
- Wang Xiaohong (66), State Councilor and public security minister (current).
2. The Politburo meeting’s call to “coordinate” the various Party and state institutions suggests that the upcoming round of reform will focus on strengthening Party Central’s “centralized and unified leadership” over the Party and state apparatuses. That is, Xi Jinping is looking to enhance his control over the regime to improve his governing ability (whether he will succeed through reforms alone is another matter) and have the leadership of all governing institutions be loyal to him personally.
We believe that Xi is looking to further restructure Party and state institutions to actualize his reform goals set out in the Third Plenum of the 18th Central Committee and rescue the regime from its many crises. We noted on numerous occasions that Xi had been unable to pursue those reform goals because he faced great resistance from the Jiang faction and other interest groups. To overcome those hurdles, Xi sought to “rectify” the regime through the anti-corruption campaign and consolidate power to a high degree. However, Xi is still encountering governing resistance despite his intense effort to centralize power over the past decade; we laid this out in analyzing the “unified national market” opinion issued in April 2022.
Xi could take advantage of the latest round of reforms to do the following:
- Strengthen the central government’s ability to intervene in local economics, including breaking up local protectionism, establishing a unified national market, coordinating the development of regional economies and industries (especially technology), etc.
- Strengthen the central government’s control over local finances, including controlling local debt and taxation.
- Set up institutions to promote pro-natalist policies.
- Reform the political and legal affairs apparatus, as well as the intelligence system (details may not be made public due to the CCP’s national security considerations).
