1 Xi places urgent emphasis in ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ indoctrination
April 3
1. Xi Jinping attended a “thematic education” work conference on “learning and implementing” Xi Jinping’s political theory (“Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”) in Beijing and delivered a speech.
Xi made the following notable comments:
- The “in-depth” political education of “Xi Jinping Thought” (focusing on officials at the county level and above) holds “special significance” for “unifying the thinking of the whole Party,” “resolving prominent problems within the Party,” always maintaining “flesh and blood ties between the people and the Party,” and promoting regime development.
- The current round of political education is meant to “educate and guide” Party members and cadres in supporting Xi’s political ideas.
- Party members and cadres are required to “read the original works and learn the original texts to understand the principles” of Xi’s political thought.
- Party Central and the state government will carry out “education and rectification” of cadres through political education.
- The current round of political education is a “major matter that concerns the overall situation,” with “the time being tight, the task being heavy, and the demands are high” (時間緊、任務重、要求高).
Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi delivered concluding remarks to the work conference in his capacity as head of Party Central’s leading group on learning and implementing “Xi Jinping Thought.”
The work conference was attended in person by national leaders from the various Party and state institutions. Leading cadres from the provincial and sub-provincial level administrations, various government departments, and the central “Xi Jinping Thought” thematic education leading group, as well as the heads of various steering groups, joined the meeting via video conference.
2. State media reported that the first two volumes of selected works of Xi Jinping (習近平著作選讀) were published on April 3. The selected works contain 146 items from important works by Xi from November 2012 to October 2022, including reports, speeches, conversations, remarks, and directives.
State media added that the publication of the selected works is a “major event in the political life of the Party and the country” and is of “immense and far-reaching significance.”
Backdrop
A Politburo meeting on March 30 decided that the entire Party will carry out study sessions to “learn and implement” Xi’s political theory from April 2023, with the aim of unifying the “thought, will, and actions [of officials] with the Party’s innovative theory.”
Big picture
Xi’s political indoctrination push comes amid mounting internal and external crises for the CCP regime, as well as growing economic and financial problems in the United States and Western countries. Media outlets and commentators are also talking about “de-dollarization” as countries attempt to move away from the U.S. dollar in carrying out trade and financial transactions; the PRC and Brazil reportedly reached a deal on March 31 to trade in their own currencies instead of using the dollar as an intermediary.
Our take
1. We previously analyzed why Xi Jinping is strengthening efforts to politically indoctrinate officials at this time.
Xi’s emphasis on indoctrinating (“political education”) the whole Party in his political theories (“Xi Jinping Thought” and various slogans) and publication of his selected works are reminiscent of Mao Zedong’s “thought reform” (思想改造) during the Yan’an Rectification Movement and after the establishment of the PRC. At the time, Mao was looking to consolidate power, grow his “quan wei” (authority and prestige), and ensure that Party members and cadres highly comply with his leadership and paramount position in the CCP.
Xi’s version of “thought reform” will likely result in the creation of a high-pressure political environment in the regime where all CCP members and cadres are required to “get in line” with being loyal to Xi and properly implementing Xi’s decisions and deployments. Such a political environment makes it very difficult for Party members and cadres to publicly voice opposition to Xi and his policies, and makes it much harder for Xi’s lingering factional rivals to mobilize politically against him when differentiating between friend and foe becomes a challenge.
Xi is likely looking to channel Mao because he still has some ways to go in establishing his “quan wei” and paramount position in the CCP despite having centralized power to a high degree after the 20th Party Congress and the 2023 Two Sessions. Mao himself also promoted “thought reform” during periods when he was struggling to assert his authority, such as at Yan’an and at various junctures after the CCP seized power in mainland China. The current internal and external crises facing the CCP regime have likely heightened Xi’s sense of insecurity and paranoia, leaving him with an urgent need to “unify the thinking of the whole Party,” boost his “quan wei,” and realize his political agendas.
2. Xi again hinted that he is working towards undoing the political legacies of his predecessors and criticizing certain former leaders like Jiang Zemin in his speech at the work conference on promoting “political education” in his political theory. For instance, Xi talked about “resolving prominent problems within the Party” through the “political education” drive, which echoes his 20th Party Congress observation that “a number of prominent issues and problems — some of which had been building for years and others which were just emerging” had occurred under his predecessors and “demand urgent action.”
If Xi is determined to purge the remnant Jiang faction and lingering political opposition in the regime, then his remark about how the “political education” effort is a “major matter that concerns the overall situation” could be interpreted as him paving the way to publicly denounce Jiang Zemin and his “incorrect political line” further down the road. The more Xi finds himself being blamed for all of the CCP’s ills at home and abroad, the more likely he will look to hold the Jiang faction accountable instead and absolve himself of his and the Party’s failures.
The “major matter that concerns the overall situation” remark also suggests that Xi could be looking to eventually repudiate the political theories of all his predecessors, set himself up as the sole paramount authority (定於一尊) in the regime, and effectively become Party Chairman or “Red Emperor” all but in name.
3. Xi’s “the time being tight, the task being heavy, and the demands are high” remark suggests that he plans to advance the political indoctrination effort and broader “self-rectification” campaign with speed and intensity. Xi’s urgency could in part be driven by a need to quickly fix governance issues and address the mounting “anti-Xi” and “anti-CCP” sentiment within the populace that led to protests over the past six months (for examples, see here, here, and here). Xi could also be looking to swiftly “rectify” and “unite” the regime now so as to better wage the escalating “new cold war” against the West and take advantage of “great changes unseen in a century” further down the road.
4. We believe that Xi Jinping will ultimately be unsuccessful in his attempt to use CCP methods to improve his governing ability and rescue the regime amid worsening crises. If anything, Xi’s growing authoritarianism will likely result in greater crises for himself and the regime. Xi could see success with his “self-rectification” campaign, but gains there would amount to a Pyrrhic victory as the CCP essentially devours and discredits itself by exposing and punishing corruption.
2 Financial sector, sports sector see mass purges; Jiang faction ex-official allegedly commits suicide
The anti-corruption campaign appears to have intensified this year following the appointment of Xi Jinping ally Li Xi as head of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and the Xi leadership requiring the State Council and its departments to “promote the trend of research and investigation” (大興調查研究之風). Notably, the financial sector and the sports system saw a wave of purges after the Two Sessions period.
Meanwhile, rumors have emerged that some recently deceased former officials with Jiang faction association had in fact committed suicide.
Public security ‘research and investigation’ and personnel adjustments
March 26
1. Xu Datong (age 53), director of the Shanxi Provincial Public Security Bureau, was promoted to vice minister of the Ministry of Public Security and a member of the MPS Party Committee.
Xu spent his formative years as an official in Tianjin City and eventually became a district Party secretary. He had no experience working in the political and legal affairs apparatus while in Tianjin. In July 2019, Xu was transferred to Shaanxi Province to serve as vice governor and was appointed director of the Shaanxi Provincial Public Security Bureau in January 2021.
Hu Minglang, Xu Datong’s immediate predecessor at the Shaanxi Public Security Bureau, was transferred to Chongqing to head the municipal public security bureau in September 2020 following the downfall of Jiang faction associate Deng Huilin three months prior.
2. Ling Zhifeng (55), director of the Guangxi Provincial Public Security Bureau, was promoted to director of the MPS political department and a member of the MPS Party Committee.
Ling is a native of Zhejiang and served in various positions at different levels of government in the province. He was once the Party secretary of the Chuan’an County Political and Legal Affairs Commission, as well as a county magistrate and county Party secretary. Ling also served as director of the Shaoxing City Public Security Bureau, as well as Party secretary of the Shaoxing Political and Legal Affairs Commission.
In recent years, Ling served as Party secretary and director of the Zhejiang Emergency Management Bureau (October 2018 to October 2021) and Party secretary of the Jinhua Municipal Party Committee in Zhejiang (October 2021 to July 2022). During the 20th Party Congress personnel reshuffle, Ling was transferred to Guangxi to head the provincial public security bureau.
April 2
The MPS issued a work plan for public security organs across the country to carry out “research and investigation” (關於在全國公安機關大興調查研究的工作方案) in accordance with Party Central’s requirements.
The MPS’s work plan urged public security officials to “focus on upholding the Party’s absolute leadership over public security work” and “resolutely defend national security, especially political security.” The work plan also instructed officials to “conscientiously purge poisons,” with a focus on “deeply absorbing the lessons from the serious violations of discipline and law by the Sun Lijun political gang” and “putting in the first place strict political discipline and political rules.”
Financial sector investigations
Officials from the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission and the CCDI summoned top executives from at least six big state-owned banks to discuss the probe of former Bank of China chairman Liu Liange, according to an April 3 Bloomberg report citing people familiar with the matter. The anti-corruption authorities announced an investigation into Liu on March 31.
The people with knowledge of the matter added that the CCDI and the CBIRC said they would deepen the crackdown on corruption in the financial industry and that bankers should draw lessons from the Liu probe. Banking staff, and especially senior executives, must comply with laws and regulations, as well as strengthen self-discipline, the people added.
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Financial system officials investigated around the Two Sessions period and after include:
- March 10: Pu Hao (50), senior expert at the Henan branch of China Development Bank.
- March 15: Wang Jianhong (61), former Party secretary and president of the Beijing branch of the Bank of China.
- March 16: Wang Weijun, former Party secretary and president of the Henan Branch of China Development Bank.
- March 18: Wu Jinpeng (49), Party Committee member and deputy director of the Henan Rural Credit Union.
- March 19: Wang Shuoping (63), former Party secretary of the Guangdong Rural Credit Union.
- March 21: Liu Yanzhong, inspector of the Agricultural Bank of China’s international finance department.
- March 22: Dong Guobin, former assistant inspector of the Harbin central branch of the People’s Bank of China.
- March 23: Wang Guizhi (63), former Party Committee member and chairman of the China Guangfa Bank supervisory board.
- March 23: Wang Shibin, deputy general manager of the Bank of China Anhui branch’s financial markets department.
- March 23: Zhao Zhiran, senior commissioner of the Shenzhen branch of China Construction Bank.
- March 24: Yi Jingan, former deputy Party secretary and vice president of the Shenzhen branch of China Construction Bank.
- March 24: Gao Zongsheng, former Party Committee member and vice president of the Inner Mongolia branch of the Bank of China.
- March 31: Liu Liange (62), former Party secretary and chairman of the Bank of China.
- April 3: Huang Xianhui (60), former Party secretary and general manager of the Beijing branch of China Huarong Asset Management.
- April 4: Li Xiaopeng (63), former Party secretary and chairman of China Everbright Group.
Sports sector investigations
Several senior soccer officials have been investigated since late 2022, including:
- Nov. 26, 2022: Li Tie, former head coach of the PRC men’s national soccer team.
- Jan. 19, 2023: Chen Yongliang, executive deputy secretary general of the Chinese Football Association and head of the General Administration of Sport.
- Jan. 19, 2023: Liu Yi, former secretary general of the Chinese Football Association.
- Feb. 14, 2023: Chen Xuyan, chairman and deputy Party secretary of the Chinese Football Association.
- March 24: Wang Xiaoping, director of the Chinese Football Association disciplinary committee.
- March 24: Huang Song, director of the Chinese Football Association’s competition department.
- March 29: Dong Zheng (44), former general manager of the Chinese Super League.
Other senior officials in the sports sector who were investigated after the Two Sessions include:
- March 29: Yu Hongchen, chairman of the Chinese Athletics Association.
- April 1: Du Zhao, Party group member and deputy director of the General Administration of Sport.
- April 4: Liu Aijie, former chairman of the Chinese Rowing Association and the Chinese Canoeing Association.
Rumored suicides
April 2
Mainland media published the obituaries of Luo Zhijun and Zhang Hongxing.
Luo Zhijun was a member of the Standing Committee of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, director of the CPPCC’s agriculture and rural affairs committee, and former Party secretary of Jiangsu Province. His obituary said that he “unfortunately passed away” on April 1 in Beijing at age 72 due to an illness. Rumors circulating on Chinese social media claimed that Luo had jumped to his death from a building, citing CCP insiders.
Zhang Hongxing was a Standing Committee member of the Chongqing Municipal Party Committee and secretary of the Party working committee of Liangjiang New District. His obituary also noted that he had “unfortunately passed away” from an illness at the age of 55 on April 1.
April 3
Pro-CCP Hong Kong media Sing Tao Daily reported that both Luo Zhijun and Zhang Hongxing had committed suicide due to depression. Both men were said to have leaped off a building to their death.
Our take
1. Xi Jinping appears to finally be pursuing the “rectification” of the financial sector in earnest after having reshuffled key personnel (notably having ally Li Xi replace Jiang associate Zhao Leji as CCDI head) and having consolidated power to an even greater degree at the 20th Party Congress and the Two Sessions.
Xi tackling corruption more thoroughly in the financial sector only a decade after coming to office hints at the degree of resistance he faced from the Jiang faction and other powerful interest groups during his first two terms. Xi focusing on financial corruption now also hints at the seriousness of China’s economic and financial risks, as well as Beijing’s desperation to “scrape poison from bone” and take on more political risks (purging the financial sector could lead to factional pushback) in rescuing the economy.
2. We see at least three reasons why senior officials in the sports sector, and especially those involved in soccer, are being purged now.
First, Xi Jinping could be looking to punish officials for their failure to bring success to one of his pet projects. Xi is known to love soccer and his leadership released a 50-point “reform and development” plan in 2015 to revitalize the sport in China. The CCP and corporations also invested huge sums in teams and facilities at home and abroad, as well as in naturalizing foreign players for the national team and domestic soccer teams. Deeply entrenched corruption and gambling culture, however, saw the development of Chinese soccer fall to the wayside like Xi’s semiconductor “great leap forward.” The men’s national team is currently in the middle tier of the international rankings, below smaller countries like Iraq and Iceland. Meanwhile, a scandal over blatant match-fixing in an under-15 boys’ soccer tournament in Guangdong in August 2022 exposed the grip of corruption and gambling over Chinese soccer.
Second, Xi could be looking to rehabilitate his image among the masses by fighting corruption in sports and promoting “common prosperity.” Targeting soccer appears to be a no-brainer for the Xi leadership given the underperformance of players who receive high salaries (this obliquely addresses the rich-poor divide problem), as well as the popularity of the sport and widespread knowledge of corruption in soccer. Xi can later claim that he listened to the grievances of the people and acted on their behalf by purging corrupt officials and strengthening the “flesh and blood ties between the people and the Party.”
Third, money is in short supply for the CCP authorities and corporations with the rapid deterioration of the Chinese economy. Anti-corruption investigations into Chinese soccer and the sports sector in general are likely intended to ensure that scarce funds are not being misappropriated or misused. Also, the ill-gotten gains of corrupt officials can be confiscated and used to refill the regime’s coffers.
3. The rumors that Luo Zhijun and Zhang Hongxing committed suicide appear to be credible.
For one, the official obituaries for Luo and Zhang both used the Chinese characters for “passed away” (離世) instead of “departed from this life” (逝世) to describe their death. In mainland media, “departed from this life” is typically used in the case of officials who die a natural death, while “passed away” indicates an unnatural death. For instance, the obituary of Tianjin mayor Liao Guoxun wrote that he had “passed away from a sudden illness after a failed rescue” on April 27, 2022. Moreover, the addition of the character “unfortunately” before “passed away” in both Luo and Zhang’s obituary underscores the unnaturalness of their death.
The death of Luo Zhijun and Zhang Hongxing also happens to coincide with the Xi leadership’s recent anti-corruption efforts. Ever since Xi Jinping launched the anti-corruption campaign in 2013, many officials fearing investigation each year have been known to commit suicide or were possibly killed and listed as having committed suicide. According to official reports, at least 16 officials committed suicide or died from a “sudden illness” over the past three years alone. These officials are:
2020
April
- Cheng Limin, a former inspector of the Anhui provincial government’s legislative affairs office, fell to his death from a building.
June
- Qian Feng, former deputy Party secretary and deputy director of the Huangshan City Public Security Bureau in Anhui Province, fell to his death.
July
- Liao Mingguo, a Standing Committee member of the Jingmen Municipal Party Committee and secretary general of the Jingmen Municipal Party Committee in Hubei Province, fell to his death.
- Qin Yufeng, Party group deputy secretary and director of the Jiaozhou civil affairs bureau in Shandong Province, fell to his death.
October
- Mao Hongtao, Party secretary of Chengdu University in Sichuan Province, committed suicide by drowning himself in a river.
2021
January
- Hu Qin, deputy Party secretary of Rencheng District in Shandong Province, fell to his death.
May
- Li Xiaoqiu (Mongolian), deputy director of the Inner Mongolia department of culture and tourism, hanged himself.
June
- Li Zuobi, Party secretary of Jingtai County in Gansu Province, committed suicide by jumping off a building.
- Zhang Zhijian, vice president of Harbin Engineering University in Heilongjiang Province, fell to his death.
August
- Chen Fenjian, the Party secretary and chairman of China Railway Construction Corporation Group fell to his death.
December
- Cong Zhihong, deputy Party secretary of the Chaoyang Municipal Political and Legal Affairs Commission in Liaoning Province, fell to his death.
2022
April
- Liao Guoxun, deputy Party secretary and mayor of Tianjin, died from a “sudden illness.”
July
- Liu Wenxi, vice governor of Hebei Province, as well as Party secretary and director of the Hebei Public Security Bureau, died from a “sudden illness.”
- Zhang Yuan, Party secretary and procurator of the Zhenjiang People’s Procuratorate in Jiangsu Province, died from a “sudden illness.”
- Zhou Wei, a Standing Committee member and secretary general of the Gansu provincial Party Committee, fell to his death.
- Zeng Bing, a Standing Committee member of the Dalian municipal Party Committee in Liaoning Province, Dalian vice mayor, and deputy general manager of Sinopharm, died from a “sudden illness.”
4. Luo Zhijun is a Jiang faction official. He and several other Jiang faction officials were replaced as provincial Party secretary by Xi allies or technocrats in 2016 after Xi Jinping consolidated his control over the military. If Luo had indeed committed suicide, then he must have caught wind that the Xi leadership was either investigating or opening an investigation into him.
If Luo was being investigated or about to be investigated, then it would affirm a number of our observations about the current state of factional struggle in the CCP elite, including:
- Xi’s “quan wei” was mostly established on propaganda over the past decade and he still lacked political strength. As a result, Xi had to frequently make political compromises with the Jiang faction and other Party interest groups on personnel arrangements and other matters during his first two terms in office. Xi appears to have only more or less come into his own after the 20th Party Congress and the 2023 Two Sessions.
- National People’s Congress chairman and former CCDI chief Zhao Leji appears to have “publicly complied but privately defied” Xi Jinping during his second term on anti-corruption matters. The anti-corruption campaign is now ramping up because Xi ally Li Xi has replaced Zhao as CCDI head and is duly following Xi’s orders.Xi is likely looking to purge the remnant Jiang faction in paving the way to denounce Jiang Zemin’s “incorrect political line,” shift the blame for the regime’s ills away from himself and onto the Jiang faction, and establish his “quan wei” on more solid grounds.
