◎ Both the PRC and the U.S. likely recognized at the Hawaii meeting that there is no off-ramp from the “new cold war.”
On June 17, United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Yang Jiechi met at the Hickam Air Force Base in Hawaii. According to open source information, the meeting, which was reportedly requested by the Chinese side, lasted nearly seven hours. Both sides discussed a range of issues, including the “phase one” trade deal, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Xinjiang. Statements issued after the Hawaii meeting by both sides were scant in detail on what Yang and Pompeo discussed.
An examination of geopolitical developments in the lead up to the Hawaii meeting, official statements about the meeting, and developments after the meeting indicate that the Hawaii meeting is another significant episode in the Sino-U.S. “new cold war.”
Why the CCP wanted to meet
There are two likely reasons why the CCP decided to arrange an in-person diplomatic meeting with the United States. First, the CCP needed to seek clarification from the Trump administration about what the U.S. attitude towards the People’s Republic of China really is. Second, the CCP needed to “clarify” its own stance and dissuade the U.S. from escalating Sino-U.S. “new cold war.”
In analyzing PRC statements and official media commentary over the past three years, it appears that the CCP has been misreading the critical shift in U.S. policy on China (from “engagement” to “strategic competition”) from when the trade war broke out in 2018 until at least April 2020. The CCP likely believed that President Donald Trump could be satisfied with promises of more purchases and that the shift in U.S. policy on China was more style than substance. Thus, alarm bells were almost certainly raised in Beijing when the White House released the “United States Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China” on May 20, when President Donald Trump announced tough actions against China over the PRC’s planned Hong Kong national security law on May 29, and when the Trump administration made the promotion of international religious freedom a top priority on June 2. From the CCP’s perspective, Trump’s announcement and the White House document indicated that the U.S. views the PRC as the Soviet Union or Nazi Germany, and is serious about waging a zero-sum “new cold war” against the CCP regime. Given how dire the situation seemed from the CCP’s standpoint, it makes sense for the regime to take the initiative in touching bases with the U.S. and steer the latter away from pursuing objectives that would crystalize the “new cold war.”
A review of geopolitical incidents in the lead up to the Hawaii meeting suggests that the CCP was creating leverage through external conflicts to compel the U.S. to reconsider its increasingly confrontational approach to the PRC. Several news outlets reported on June 13 that Politburo member Yang Jiechi and Secretary Mike Pompeo were going to meet in Hawaii. The following developments then occurred between June 13 and the meeting on June 17:
- On June 16, People’s Liberation Army troops and Indian soldiers clashed in the Galvan Valley of eastern Ladakh in what appears to be a PLA ambush. At least 20 Indian soldiers were killed in the clash. Mainland Chinese media outlets also reported that troops from Pakistan and Nepal were also involved in skirmishes with Indian soldiers on June 16. Pakistan and Nepal are allies of the PRC.
- On June 16, North Korea blew up the Inter-Korean Liaison Office in its western border town of Kaesong. The following day, the North Korean military announced that it would carry out other military maneuvers.
- On June 16, Taiwan’s defense ministry announced that it had scrambled jets to drive away a PRC fighter plane that had briefly intruded into Taiwan’s air defence identification zone.
- Between June 13 and June 17, Chinese language news outlets reported that the PRC was accelerating plans to enact the proposed Hong Kong national security law, possibly as soon as the end of June. However, the national security law was not listed as an item for discussion by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress during its three-day meeting on June 18 when the meeting agenda was published on June 9.
It is not beyond the CCP to create “crises” near its borders ahead of the Hawaii meeting to extract concessions and compromises from the U.S. in exchange for PRC “commitments” (not necessarily backed up by actions) to preserve “peace and stability” in the Indo-Pacific region. The CCP would also be hoping that the U.S. could be pressured into walking away from the “new cold war” and instead focus on working with the PRC on issues like “fighting COVID-19,” “climate change,” and building a “community of shared future for mankind.”
On one level, it seems self-defeating and counterintuitive for the CCP to engineer crises to de-escalate a “new cold war” with the United States precisely when the Trump administration has clearly signaled that the PRC is being put on notice. The CCP’s actions, however, are driven by domestic concerns, ideology, and its need to simultaneously survive and dominate. By sparking “controllable” external conflicts, the CCP is at once engaging in a variant of “attacking as a means of defense” (以攻爲守) in a bid to get the U.S. to retreat from its “competitive approach” to the PRC (survival) while making the PRC’s presence felt in the Indo-Pacific region (dominate). Meanwhile, external conflicts help to distract the Chinese people from the many problems in mainland China, including those stemming from the coronavirus pandemic and a rapidly declining economy. Finally, with most of his policies failing, Xi Jinping badly needs to build consensus in the Party and rally cadres to support his leadership instead of working against it. Popular external actions like intimidating Taiwan help Xi safeguard his position and temporarily avoid escalations in the CCP factional struggle.
Red lines drawn
Official statements about the Hawaii meeting from both sides and post-meeting developments indicate that the CCP was unsuccessful in persuading the U.S. to abandon the “new cold war.” Both sides also drew clear red lines concerning their respective interests.
PRC
1. On June 18, PRC foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Lijian said that Yang Jiechi had “expounded” on the PRC’s “basic attitude towards developing China-US relations and its positions on important and sensitive issues concerning Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang” in his meeting with Secretary Pompeo. Zhao proceeded to list what Yang had said on the aforementioned issues, which did not deviate from official PRC policy and propaganda.
2. On June 18, official PRC media said that a draft of the Hong Kong national security law had been submitted to the meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress for review.
3. On June 18, the nationalistic Party media Global Times wrote in a commentary that “Sino-U.S. rhetoric has become increasingly impassioned in the past two years, and both sides are close to an ‘acrominous falling-out’ (‘撕破脸’).” In parsing Party-speak, we believe that the CCP has recognized that the U.S. and the PRC are already in a “new cold war,” but does not want to admit the reality in an obvious way.
4. On June 20, PRC state media disclosed some details of the proposed Hong Kong national security law, including the right for the NPC to interpret Hong Kong laws that are not in line with the proposed national security legislation and the establishment of a Office of the National Security Commissioner of the People’s Republic of China in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The Office will be empowered to “monitor, supervise, coordinate and support” the Hong Kong government in making security assessments, collecting and analyzing intelligence, as well as advising and supervising the Hong Kong government on national security matters.
United States
1. On June 17, U.S. State Department Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus said in a statement on the Hawaii meeting that Secretary Pompeo “stressed important American interests and the need for fully-reciprocal dealings between the two nations across commercial, security, and diplomatic interactions.”
Pompeo’s call for “fully-reciprocal dealings,” if meant to be taken literally, opens up plenty of space for the Trump administration to take action against the PRC. Meanwhile, we believe that Pompeo’s point about “important American interests” should be viewed in the context of the 2017 National Security Strategy and the “U.S. Strategic Approach to the People’s Republic of China.”
2. On June 17, President Donald Trump signed into law the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act of 2020.
3. On June 18, U.S. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs David Stilwell said in a teleconference with reporters that the PRC side was not “really forthcoming” during the Hawaii meeting. We believe that the following remarks by Stilwell indicate that the U.S. side clarified its stance on the PRC during the Hawaii meeting, did not succumb to CCP pressure, and will take action to address continued PRC provocations:
- “I will look at what comes up in the next couple of weeks: Do we see a reduction in aggressive behavior or not?”
- “As you know, the President is not pulling punches anymore.”
- “I talk about a constructive and results-oriented relationship that the words are fine but will be judged by the deeds. And if we have words of peace but we have aggressive actions, then we’re going to have to increase the pressure to manage that.”
- “I’m not saying there was agreement, but we made very clear our position, so we’ll see in the next week or two or however long it takes if they begin to live up to their commitments.”
4. On June 18, President Trump tweeted that “the U.S. certainly does maintain a policy option, under various conditions, of a complete decoupling from China.”
5. On June 19, Secretary Pompeo delivered a speech titled, “Europe and the China Challenge” at the Copenhagen Democracy Summit. Pompeo listed the CCP’s pernicious behavior with regard to the coronavirus pandemic, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Xinjiang, India, the South China Sea, and digital information control. He then noted a “fear in Europe that the United States wants you to choose between us and China.”
“But that’s simply not the case. It’s the Chinese Communist Party that’s forcing this choice. The choice isn’t between the United States; it’s between freedom and tyranny,” Pompeo said.
What’s next
1. Both the PRC and the U.S. likely recognized at the Hawaii meeting that there is no off-ramp from the “new cold war.” The Trump administration has signaled clearly that it is serious about curbing the CCP threat, and neither side is relenting on their position. This means that Sino-U.S. tensions and geopolitical risks will spiral up going forward. While the “new cold war” could see “near-miss” incidents (擦槍走火), neither the U.S. nor the PRC will be tempted to fight a “hot” war.
2. The graver China’s domestic problems, the harder it will get for the CCP to abandon its strategy of provoking external crises. The CCP will thus look to engineer “controllable” crises (because it does not want to fight a “hot” war) and walk a tightrope between escalation and de-escalation.
The CCP’s handling of the recent Sino-Indian border crisis offers a glimpse of how it balances external provocations with internal contradictions. On the one hand, the CCP continues to issue unapologetic and bellicose rhetoric over its border clash with India. On the other hand, the PRC-backed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank approved a loan of $750 million to India for its coronavirus response effort on June 17, a day after the deadly ambush at Ladakh.
For the CCP, provoking external crises in the climate of a “new cold war” is like riding a tiger, and one that is difficult to climb off (騎虎難下). The CCP is at real risk of being “eaten” by the tiger at a moment’s notice, especially with the U.S. having warned that it is closely scrutinizing the PRC for aggressive behavior (see Assistant Secretary Stilwell’s remarks above). The rest of the world could also join the U.S. in heaping pressure on the CCP should the communist regime continue with its belligerent behavior in a time of crisis (the coronavirus pandemic is still on-going) and allow countries to see the “China challenge” with clear eyes.
3. The CCP will attempt to handle the Hong Kong national security law issue with finesse to avoid greater pressure from the U.S. and international society. Events on the ground and the mainland situation, however, could upset the CCP’s plan to tread carefully on the Hong Kong issue.
4. The CCP will look to impede the formation of a global “anti-CCP bloc.” Thus, it will endeavor to buy out, bully, or menace U.S. allies and partner nations, as well as countries that are on the fence with regard to the U.S. and China. Already, the CCP is making an example of Australia, with official PRC media recently showing “anger” towards the latter for being a U.S. “proxy.” The PRC also appears to be behind a spate of cyberattacks in recent months targeting Australia’s government, political bodies, essential service providers, and operators of critical infrastructure.
5. The CCP will attempt to interfere in U.S. domestic politics in the lead up to the November presidential election, including playing the “racism” card.
