◎ The CCP would want a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis to both intimidate Taiwan and boost nationalistic sentiments at home.
Recently, things appear to be heating up between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China. While both sides have been engaging in “mask diplomacy” amid the coronavirus pandemic, Taiwan’s moves somehow “risks angering Beijing,” in the view of mainstream news outlets. Also, the United States has been ramping up its support for Taiwan through passing key legislation and other high-profile gestures, moves that the PRC has roundly criticized.
Rising PRC-ROC tensions have led some observers to speculate if a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis could be just around the corner.
The backdrop:
March 16
More than 10 Chinese speedboats attacked a Taiwanese coast guard patrol cutter in the Taiwan Strait. Rocks and bottles were hurled from the Chinese speedboats at the Taiwanese cutter, and one of the speedboats even rammed the cutter from behind.
March 18
American Institute in Taiwan Director Brent Christensen and Taiwanese foreign minister Joseph Wu signed a U.S.-Taiwan Joint Statement “to further strengthen U.S.-Taiwan consultation and cooperation on combating the COVID-19 virus.” The statement added that “both sides will seek to share best practices and cooperate on a range of activities under a partnership.”
March 23
Czech news site Expats.cz reported that 80 percent of the 150,000 COVID-19 rapid test kits sent by the PRC to the Czech Republic were faulty. The report noted that while PRC state media tried to give the impression that the test kits were “donated,” they were in fact paid for by the Czech health and interior ministries.
March 24
PRC Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Zhu Fenglian accused Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party of using the U.S.-Taiwan Joint Statement to “take advantage of the epidemic to push for Taiwan independence.” Zhu also accused the DPP of “binding the health of the Taiwanese people together with the foreigner” as it goes down a path of confrontation with the “fatherland” China.
March 26
U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act with strong bipartisan support. The TAIPEI Act requires the U.S. to “alter” engagement with countries that undermine Taiwan’s security or prosperity, and also requires the U.S. Department of State to report to Congress on steps taken to strengthen Taiwan’s diplomatic relations.
March 27
When asked about the TAIPEI Act, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang said that the PRC “deplores and rejects it.” He also called the logic of the Act “flagrant hegemonism.”
“We strongly urge the U.S. to correct its mistake, refrain from implementing this act and obstructing other countries’ pursuit of relations with China, otherwise, it will be met with resolute countermeasures from the Chinese side,” Geng said.
March 30
In a report on how countries like Spain, Turkey, and the Netherlands were rejecting faulty Chinese-made medical supplies, the BBC noted that “allegations of defective equipment come after critics warned China could be using the coronavirus outbreak to further its influence.”
April 1
ROC (Taiwan) president Tsai Ing-wen announced plans to donate 10 million masks to countries that have been most badly impacted by the coronavirus, including 7 million to Europe and 2 million to the United States.
When asked about Taiwan’s mask donations, PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said that “if anyone in Taiwan seeks to politicize the pandemic, I would advise them to think twice and act prudently.”
On the same day, Ursula von der Leyen, president of the EU Commission, tweeted: “The European Union thanks Taiwan for its donation of 5.6 million masks to help fight the coronavirus. We really appreciate this gesture of solidarity. This global virus outbreak requires international solidarity & cooperation. Acts like this show that we are Stronger Together.”
April 2
The U.S. State Department said in a statement that high-level officials from the AIT, the State Department, the Taiwan Economic and Cultural Representative Office, and the Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs had convened a virtual forum on expanding Taiwan’s participation on the global stage on March 31. The discussions focused on “creating forums to share the successful and internationally lauded Taiwan Model on fighting COVID-19 with countries around the world,” ongoing efforts to “reinstate Taiwan’s observer status at the World Health Assembly,” and “other avenues for closer coordination between Taiwan and the World Health Organization.”
April 3
When asked about Taiwan and the U.S. holding talks about allowing Taiwan greater access to the WHO and if the PRC would allow Taiwan to participate as an observer at the World Health Assembly this year, PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said the PRC hopes that Taiwan and the U.S. “will not attempt to use this epidemic to engage in political manipulation.”
Our take:
1. In our China 2020 outlook, we wrote: “Taiwan’s international standing will continue to improve amid growing Sino-U.S. rivalry. Taiwan could see unprecedented opportunities to gain diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence support and cooperation.”
The recent U.S. moves in support of Taiwan and the EU’s appreciation of Taiwan’s mask donations have verified part of our prediction. We believe that our prediction is well on track to being fully verified this year.
2. The CCP is being rhetorical in displaying “anger” over Taiwan’s “mask diplomacy.” Similarly, its criticism of closer Taiwan-U.S. ties is nothing out of the ordinary. It is unlikely that the CCP will attempt to blow up either issue or use them as pretext to launch a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.
The Chinese speedboats attack on a Taiwanese patrol cutter, however, is a move that is consistent with developments which we earlier identified as the CCP laying the groundwork to spark a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis.
3. The CCP would want a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis to both intimidate Taiwan and boost nationalistic sentiments at home. The CCP would also want to first get its domestic agenda for the year sorted out before turning its attention to Taiwan. Thus, the CCP would likely attempt a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis after it holds the Two Sessions (possibly between mid-April to early May) and in the period around Tsai Ing-wen’s second-term inauguration on May 20.
In considering the state of the CCP factional struggle, Xi Jinping also has an incentive to spark a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis during the time period that we identified above. Xi’s political rivals have exploited one crisis after the other (worsening economy, escalating Sino-U.S. tensions, the coronavirus outbreak, etc.) for the regime to undermine the Xi leadership. And Xi, perhaps not wishing to shatter the fragile inner Party unity through heavy-handed countermeasures, has thus far attempted to deal with his rivals using a “compromise and consensus” approach (see here and here) while finding ways to boost his “quan wei” (權威). In February, we wrote that Xi “could have sold the other CCP elites a way to transform the regime’s unprecedented risks into unprecedented opportunity to advance the Party’s domination agenda” through exploiting a pandemic situation, thus buying himself some “breathing space” in the factional struggle. The CCP’s strategy, however, has since been found out, and countries have begun resisting its “mask diplomacy.” While it is still too early to conclude that the CCP’s “mask diplomacy” has failed, Xi does need to keep rolling out schemes to keep the Party’s elite in “consensus” in dealing with an external enemy to safeguard his position. Launching a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis is one such scheme.
Because the purpose of launching a Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis is domestic and not geopolitical, the CCP will likely go ahead with it no matter what the U.S. does in the interim to show that it is establishing closer ties with Taiwan. And because influencing sentiment is the main reason for causing a provocation in the Taiwan Strait, we continue to believe that “the chances of a war breaking out are extremely low” even though the crisis could see “minor or ‘near miss’ military incidents (擦槍走火).”
