1 PLA Daily lays groundwork for purge of ‘residue toxins’ from the Jiang era
PLA Daily runs commentary series on political work
Nov. 11 to Nov. 27
PLA Daily, the official newspaper of the People’s Liberation Army, published eight commentaries under the series, “Continuously Deepening Political Rectification and Advancing Discipline and Anti-Corruption Work in Depth” (持續深化政治整訓、縱深推進正風反腐系列談). The commentaries, which were written either by PLA Daily reporters or local military units, were placed either on the front page or in major news sections.
Below are the titles of the commentaries and key messages in them:
1. “Stricter and Higher Than Local Standards, Leading the Whole Party”
The commentary argues that the PLA must advance the anti-corruption struggle with higher standards and stricter requirements than local governments to set an example for the entire CCP. The goal is to maintain the military’s “purity” and combat effectiveness, and ensure that it remains a trusted pillar of the Party and the people so that it can safeguard the permanence of the “red regime” (鞏固紅色江山永不變色).
2. “The More Thorough the Anti-Corruption Fight, the Firmer the Foundation for Achieving the Centenary Goal”
The commentary argues that the more thoroughly the anti-corruption struggle is carried out, the more solid the foundation becomes for achieving the goal of building a world-class military by the PLA’s centenary. The commentary adds that through deepening political rectification, strengthening discipline, and fighting corruption, the CCP’s leadership is reinforced, combat capability is enhanced, and hidden dangers are removed, ensuring success in strengthening the military.
The commentary stresses that the investigation and punishment of major corruption cases involving He Weidong, Miao Hua, and others are part of a resolute struggle to defend the Party’s absolute leadership over the military.
3. “Eliminating Blind Optimism and the ‘Quick Victory’ Mindset”
The commentary argues that the anti-corruption struggle is a protracted war, and the PLA must abandon any blind optimism or belief in a quick, decisive victory. It calls for constant vigilance and sustained effort to advance anti-corruption work in the military, ensuring it remains a perpetually ongoing process (確保永遠在路上).
The commentary adds that anti-corruption is a “must-answer” question in the Party’s overall strict governance, a major political struggle that cannot be lost, and a task that has only a “progressing” state, not a “finished” one.
4. “Breaking the Passive and Pessimistic ‘No Hope Theory’”
The commentary argues that although the anti-corruption struggle has entered “deep water territory” and some negative “no-hope” sentiments (無望論) have emerged, this is a misinterpretation of the achievements already made. Military personnel must clearly recognize the “bright prospects, build firm confidence, maintain perseverance and determination.” By drawing strength from the results of the intensified struggle and the sense of gain felt by officers and soldiers, pessimism can be overcome, allowing continued, in-depth advancement of Party conduct improvement and combating corruption so as to ultimately win this major political battle.
5. “Breaking the Misguided ‘Harm Theory’”
The commentary argues that anti-corruption is a necessary measure to cleanse filth and eliminate entrenched bad practices (蕩滌污泥濁水、革除陳規陋弊的必要措施). Not only does anti-corruption work not harm development, it also injects lasting momentum into strengthening and revitalizing the military, creating a clean and upright environment. Only by breaking the so-called “harm theory” and firmly advancing the anti-corruption effort can morale be boosted and combat effectiveness improved.
The commentary adds that the “harm theory” is biased and blurs the boundary between right and wrong. It reverses proper values by portraying anti-corruption as conflicting with or hindering capable governance. At its essence, it reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of “for whom and on whom” the Party relies. Those who cling on to the theory either fail to understand the serious danger and severe situation posed by corruption, or are attempting to excuse corrupt behavior and avoid responsibility for not acting or not struggling.
6. “Calculating the Political Account and the Account of Winning People’s Hearts”
The commentary argues that the anti-corruption struggle is the Party’s and the military’s “political account” (政治賬) and “account of winning people’s hearts” (人心向背賬). One must calculate these accounts clearly to win popular support, consolidate the foundation of governance, and preserve the nature of the military. Corruption can cause loss of public support and even lead to defeat in war. Therefore, advancing the cause of the “strong military in the new era” requires clarity on these political stakes.
The commentary then quotes Xi Jinping as saying that “offending a few thousand people is better than letting down 1.4 billion people … this is the clearest political account and account of winning people’s hearts.”
7. “Thoroughly Excising Tumors, Eliminating Sources of Poison, and Cleansing Residual Toxins”
The commentary argues that corruption is a malignant tumor requiring systematic treatment. “Cutting out tumors” addresses symptoms, “eliminating poison sources” addresses root causes, and “cleansing residual toxins” consolidates results. All three are indispensable for eradicating corruption, solidifying gains, ensuring the Party and military remain healthy, and winning the people’s trust.
The commentary stresses the need to “always maintain the courage to face problems and the resolve to turn the blade inward,” as well as “resolutely cut out tumors, eliminate poison sources, and cleanse residual toxins to ensure the Party never changes its nature and the red regime never changes its color.”
The commentary notes that the cases of He Weidong and Miao Hua show they were deeply influenced by the “residual toxins” left by Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou. The commentary added that He and Miao mirrored and sometimes surpassed (甚至有過之無不及) the style and behavior of Guo and Xu. The article argues that “residual toxins,” if not fully cleared, can re-emerge, mutate, or be passed across generations under certain conditions. Thus, “cleansing residual toxins” is a soul-touching act of “self-revolution.”
8. “The Greatest Enemy of Integrity and Self-discipline is the Mentality of Privilege”
The commentary argues that having a “privilege mentality” is the primary enemy of integrity and self-discipline. The “privilege mentality” must be eliminated at the ideological root to maintain the Party’s support among the people, safeguard its governance foundation, and ensure that power is exercised for the people. Only in this way can corruption and privilege be prevented from taking root.
The commentary emphasizes that thorough investigations into corrupt officials prove with undeniable facts that no matter how high an official’s rank or how great their power, all are equal before Party discipline and state law. Anyone engaging in corruption will not be tolerated, and there are no “red books and iron coupons” (丹書鐵券, i.e. no “get-out-of-jail-free” card) and no “iron-cap princes” (鐵帽子王, or those who are above the law).
Our take
The series of commentaries run by the PLA Daily on political rectification and anti-corruption adheres to the Xi Jinping leadership’s call to carry out “deep political rectification” within the military (see here and here) in the wake of a massive purge in the upper echelons of the PLA.
The language used in the commentaries offers several clues about the state of corruption in the PLA and the factional struggle in the CCP elite.
1. The commentaries’ reference to the military’s role in safeguarding and ensuring the permanence of the “red regime” suggests that the Xi leadership believes the scale of corruption in the PLA at present is so severe that it has the potential to endanger the Party and the PRC. The Xi leadership also views anti-corruption work as crucial for achieving its “centennial goal” of building a “strong military” by the mid-21st century, and therefore emphasizes in the commentaries that the anti-corruption struggle in the PLA is a “major political struggle that cannot be lost.”
The commentaries also indicate that there has been extensive anti-corruption progress in the military to date and this has led to resentment in some quarters. This is hinted at in the commentary on the “no-hope theory,” which observes that “some negative ‘no-hope’ sentiments have emerged” as the anti-corruption struggle enters “deep water territory.” In response to those “sentiments,” the Xi leadership is urging military personnel to take anti-corruption probes in their stride and accept that their situation will improve upon the completion of the rectification campaign. The Xi leadership’s urging, however, is unlikely to shake the PLA out of “passivity and pessimism,” particularly when there is no clearly stated end-date to the military rectification and since the Xi leadership has noted in other propaganda that the “self-revolution” (anti-corruption) project is a continuous, never-ending process (“always on the road”).
2. The commentary on “cleansing residue toxins” argues that He Weidong and Miao Hua were influenced by Xu Caihou and Guo Boxiong — the CMC vice chairs from the Jiang Zemin era who were later purged in Xi’s first term — and that the former were even worse than the latter in some respects. This suggests that the culture of corruption in the military that was cultivated during the Jiang-Hu era is still deeply entrenched in the PLA and even worsened in areas such as political work. In particular, both Miao Hua and He Weidong were responsible for political vetting, as was Xu Caihou, meaning that the officers they promoted were likely involved to varying degrees in corruption and forming factions. The fact that no senior officer has been promoted to full general yet this year reflects the severity of the senior personnel problem in the PLA and suggests that Xi Jinping believes there is virtually no one at the senior level in the military that he trusts or can rely on.
The commentary on “cleansing residue toxins” is likely intended partly to “absolve” Xi of the blame for poor personnel selection at the 20th Party Congress and shield him from intra-Party criticism. However, the commentary is also partly an unintended “indictment” of the Xi leadership — despite having declared “overwhelming victory” in anti-corruption work, Xi’s sweeping military reforms and purge of large numbers of senior officers over the past dozen years appears to have barely scratched the surface and break the back of the culture of corruption in the PLA.
3. The commentary on the “privilege mentality” includes phrases which suggest that the corruption that was “uncovered” in the PLA in recent years is linked to prominent factional elements who oppose Xi. Notably, the commentary calls for no “red books and iron coupons” and no “iron-cap princes,” or phrases that have long been linked to Jiang Zemin’s former political enabler and the current de facto Jiang faction “leader” Zeng Qinghong.
Given the lack of publicly available details, it is unclear how specifically Zeng or the Jiang faction is involved in the exposed corruption problems in the PLA involving the Rocket Force, the equipment department, and the military’s political work apparatus. The Xi leadership could also be making a broader point about how seriously it views the ongoing anti-corruption effort instead of targeting Zeng and the Jiang faction with the commentary’s reference to “iron-cap princes.” Regardless, the commentary’s statement that “no matter how high an official’s rank or how great their power, all are equal before Party discipline and state law” and the Xi quote in another commentary in the series about “offending a few thousand people is better than letting down 1.4 billion people” will likely have a chilling effect on Zeng Qinghong and the remnant Jiang faction. This is so as the Xi leadership is indicating that it will target high-ranking officers in the military who are connected with Zeng or the Jiang faction, and potentially even the Zeng and other “anti-Xi” elements in the Party elite, if Xi believes that doing so is necessary to secure himself politically and maintain legitimacy in the PRC (settling the “political account” and “account of winning people’s hearts”).
We assess that the Xi leadership’s “rectification” of the PLA will likely maintain its momentum until at least the CCP undertakes the customary pre-Party Congress year leadership and personnel reshuffle in the second half of 2026.
4. Xi Jinping’s effort to eradicate corruption in the PLA is a Sisyphean task that can never be resolved fundamentally as long as the Party system remains in place. Meanwhile, Xi’s nonstop moves to centralize power and grow a personality cult will only entrench the problem of factionalism in the CCP as insecure officials and elite factions naturally bond together for self-preservation. The proliferation of “anti-Xi” elements in the regime will inevitably heighten Xi’s sense of insecurity, prompting further purges.
In time, Xi’s moves to reduce political risk through emphasizing the primacy of the Party in the regime, greater power consolidation, and the marginalization of the “collective leadership” will see increasingly diminishing returns and eventually become counterproductive.
2 Analyzing the CCP’s white paper on arms control
On Nov. 27, the PRC’s State Council Information Office released a white paper titled, “China’s Arms Control, Disarmament, and Non-Proliferation in the New Era” (新時代中國的軍控、裁軍與防擴散).
Key content in the white paper includes:
Analysis of the ‘complex and severe international security and arms control situation’
- Global power structures are shifting and multilateralism is on the rise. But hegemonism and unilateralism are disrupting the international order.
- Great power competition is intensifying the arms race, especially in the Asia-Pacific region.
- Adjustments to nuclear policies threaten strategic stability.
- The arms control system is being eroded, and double standards undermine non-proliferation efforts.
- Risks in emerging domains are becoming more prominent.
- The Global South is pushing for fairer global arms control.
The PRC’s positions on arms control policy
- The PRC is grounded in the traditional culture of peace, socialist national character, and strategy of peaceful development.
- The PRC promotes a “community of shared future for mankind” and the implementation of the Global Security Initiative.
- The PRC pursues a defensive national defense policy (peaceful development, no hegemony, no expansion, no spheres of influence), reasonable defense spending, and transparency.
- The PRC upholds principles of fairness, cooperation, balance, and effectiveness in arms control.
- The PRC actively participates in global governance and safeguards the authority of the United Nations.
Specific practices of the PRC’s participation in international arms control
- (1) Nuclear arms control
- Commit to no-first-use of nuclear weapons and a self-defensive nuclear strategy.
- Maintain a minimum level of nuclear capabilities and ensure nuclear safety management.
- Advance nuclear transparency and confidence-building measures.
- Promote cooperation among the five nuclear weapon states.
- Advocate nuclear disarmament and support the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).
- Oppose double standards.
- Support nuclear-weapon-free zones.
- Promote peaceful use of nuclear energy.
- (2) Missiles and missile defense
- Oppose missile-defense deployments that harm other countries’ interests.
- Moderate development of missile technology for self-defense purposes.
- (3) Biological security
- Implement the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC).
- Oppose proliferation and bioterrorism.
- Take a leading role in global governance.
- Provide international public goods such as codes of conduct for scientists and assistance to developing nations.
- (4) Chemical weapons
- Implement the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
- Promote the disposal of abandoned Japanese chemical weapons.
- Advance cooperation for peaceful uses of chemicals.
- (5) Conventional weapons
- Support global arms control mechanisms.
- Participate in the Arms Trade Treaty.
- Strengthen demining assistance.
The PRC’s positions on emerging domains
- (1) Outer space security
- Uphold the peaceful use of outer space.
- Oppose militarization and weaponization of outer space.
- Promote comprehensive governance and prevent an arms race in outer space.
- Carry out transparent space activities.
- (2) Cybersecurity
- Advocate for a community with a shared future in cyberspace.
- Support cyber sovereignty.
- Safeguard peace and security.
- Promote international cooperation.
- Provide data-security governance solutions.
- (3) Military applications of artificial intelligence
- Adhere to a people-centered approach and ensure AI is used for good.
- Establish an international AI governance framework.
- Manage and control AI risks.
PRC calls for cooperation
- (1) The PRC’s non-proliferation policies and practices
- Strictly fulfill obligations.
- Improve the export-control system.
- (2) Promote the building of a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory international non-proliferation order
- Support the UN’s central role.
- Participate in international mechanisms.
- (3) Firmly safeguard the legitimate rights to the peaceful use of technology
- Oppose the abuse of export controls.
- Promote resolutions on cooperation for peaceful use.
Our take
The CCP’s white paper on arms control was released amid growing concerns in the West about the PRC’s nuclear arsenal (see here, here, and here) over the past year and aggressive actions (friction with Japan, the Philippines, and India) in the Indo-Pacific region in recent years.
The white paper reflects Beijing’s concerns about what it perceives to be an increasingly hostile geopolitical environment for the PRC and its strategies for navigating such an environment.
1. The white paper pushes back against Western, and particularly United States, efforts to spotlight the PRC’s buildup of nuclear capabilities by implicitly recasting the U.S. as the real threat to global security. While the U.S. is never named in the entire document, the white paper resorts to various indirect methods to single out Washington for criticism:
- The white paper states that “hegemonism and unilateralism” — the CCP’s shorthand for U.S. hegemony and Trump’s “America First” approach — are “disrupting the international order.”
- The white paper claims that “great power competition” is “intensifying the arms race” in the Asia-Pacific region — likely an implicit reference to America’s “pivot to Asia” from the Obama years, the first Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy, the Biden administration’s AUKUS agreement, and increased U.S. focus on the Quad.
- The white paper’s claim that “adjustments to nuclear policies threaten strategic stability” and “double standards undermine non-proliferation efforts” is likely a reference to President Donald Trump’s statement that the U.S. will resume nuclear weapons testing in October 2025 after the U.S. struck three Iranian nuclear facilities earlier in the year to degrade the latter’s nuclear program.
2. The white paper seeks to cast the PRC and its nuclear policies as “defensive” and “peaceful” in nature, and the CCP regime as the upholder of the global order. However, the white paper’s claims are mostly propaganda:
i) The white paper’s claims that “global power structures are shifting” and “multilateralism is on the rise” are in line with the CCP’s efforts in recent years to bill the PRC as the leader of the “multilateral” international order (including the UN) that the U.S. is abandoning and the protector of the Global South.
Yet the CCP is not actually looking to uphold the global order or preserve “multilateralism,” but is instead looking to co-opt countries in a global “united front” that it will lead to challenge the U.S. and its allies (we expanded on what the CCP means by “multilateralism” in an earlier newsletter). And instead of “safeguarding the authority of the United Nations,” the CCP has in fact heavily penetrated and “hijacked” the UN and other global organizations over many years.
ii) The white paper attempts to cast the PRC as a “messenger of peace” by alluding to its ideology (“socialist national character”) and frequently trotted-out diplomatic slogan (“community of shared future for mankind”). However, this framing masks the expansionist nature of communism and the CCP’s quiet “export” of its techno-totalitarian governance model to other countries.
iii) The white paper bills the PRC as a “responsible” major power which pursues a “defensive” national defense policy and whose defense spending is “reasonable.” But the CCP is notorious for manipulating its official figures and is estimated by several think-tanks to have significantly understated its actual defense spending. Moreover, the PLA’s “gray zone” tactics, clashes with China’s neighbors, and efforts to intimidate Taiwan and other countries in the region clearly indicate that the CCP’s national defense policy is not purely “defensive” as claimed.
iv) The white paper’s account of the PRC’s participation in arms control efforts is incomplete and obscures details of what the CCP has done but does not wish to air:
- On nuclear arms control, the PRC is known to have supported the nuclear programs of North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan. The CCP is also known to back global terrorism and rogue regimes in building leverage for use in negotiations with the U.S. and its allies.
- On missiles and missile defense, the PRC has aggressively expanded its missile capabilities in recent years. For instance, the PLA’s hypersonic missiles are among the world’s fastest and it has ICBM capabilities comparable to the U.S. and Russia, while the PRC has massively expanded sites linked to missile production since 2020. But the PRC’s missile-defense system lags behind the U.S. and it opposes missile-defense deployments likely due to fears that Washington could utilize those systems to impede the PLA’s ability to take Taiwan by force.
- On chemical weapons, the white paper spotlights Imperial Japan’s use of chemical weapons during World War II, but naturally makes no mention of the CCP’s support of the flow of precursor chemicals used to manufacture illegal drugs fentanyl and methamphetamine into the United States.
v) The PRC’s positions on cybersecurity ring hollow as it is arguably the biggest threat to global security in that domain. In 2023, former FBI director Chris Wray noted that the PRC “already has a bigger hacking program than every other major nation combined.” PRC hackers are known to indiscriminately go after military, commercial, and even civilian infrastructure targets; such efforts are likely part of the CCP’s broader “unrestricted warfare” strategy to advance its broader domination agendas.
The PRC’s threats in AI and outer space are currently unclear, but are not any less worrisome. While China still has not been able to match the U.S. in terms of innovation and global influence in space, there are estimates that the former could overtake the latter in space technology over the next five to 10 years. Also, the CCP’s willingness to use AI to tighten its control domestically to preserve its techno-totalitarian regime suggests that it will have far fewer ethical boundaries when it comes to the military application of AI for future conflicts.
