1 Analyzing PLA Day articles and political dynamics in the CCP elite
On PLA Day (Aug. 1), the CCP military’s holiday, the People’s Liberation Army Daily published the following articles on its front and second pages:
“Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping Signs Order”
- Xi Jinping, in his capacity as chairman of the CMC, signed an order issuing the flag designs for the military aerospace forces, cyberspace forces, information support forces, and joint logistics support forces. The branch flags will take effect from Aug. 1, 2025. The report stated that the issuance of these branch flags fully demonstrates the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, as well as reflects the PLA’s consistent high level of centralization, unity, and coordinated progress.
- Xi Jinping also extended festive greetings to all PLA commanders and fighters, armed police officers, civilian military personnel, reservists, and militia members.
“Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xi Jinping Signs a General Order”
- Xi recently signed a general order awarding commendations to two units and five individuals.
Editorial: “Forge Strong Political Loyalty Through Revolutionary Tempering – Go All Out to Win the Tough Battle Toward the PLA’s Centenary Goal”
- The article, centered on “forging political loyalty and winning the centennial battle for army building,” emphasizes the Party’s absolute leadership over the military, the guiding role of Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, and the military’s determination and actions to advance national defense and army modernization in the new era.
- The article highly praises Xi Jinping’s contributions to military development:
- Since the 18th Party Congress, Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core has proposed the goal of strengthening the military in the new era, formulated a new “three-step” strategy, and promoted political army building, reform-driven military strengthening, technology-driven military strengthening, talent-driven military strengthening, and rule-of-law governance.
- Guided by Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, the entire military has deepened political army building, accelerated the “four modernizations” (military theory, organizational structure, personnel, and weaponry), promoted the integrated development of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization, and safeguarded national sovereignty, security, and development interests.
- The “Two Establishes” are the decisive factors in the historic achievements of the Party and the nation, providing the greatest guarantee for the cause of military strengthening.
- The article stressed the need to achieve and implement Xi’s centennial goal for army building on schedule, aiming to comprehensively build a world-class military.
- The article calls on the entire military to firmly establish the authority of political work and continuously enhance the political advantages of the PLA.
- The article concludes by urging the entire military:
- To unite more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core.
- To adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as guidance, and fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenums of the 20th Central Committee.
- To thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, strengthen the “four consciousnesses,” uphold the “four confidences,” achieve the “two safeguards,” and implement the CMC chairman responsibility system.
“Ministry of National Defense Hosts Grand Reception to Celebrate the 98th Anniversary of the Founding of the PLA”
- On July 31, the PRC Ministry of National Defense held a reception at the Great Hall of the People to celebrate the 98th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. CMC member and chief of the joint staff department Liu Zhenli, along with CMC member and secretary of the CMC discipline inspection commission Zhang Shengmin, attended the reception. Defense minister Dong Jun also attended the reception and delivered a speech.
- In his speech, Dong said:
- The PLA will unite more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, be guided by Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, steadfastly advancing political army building, comprehensively strengthening combat training and preparedness, and effectively fulfilling the mission and tasks of the PLA in the new era.
- The PLA will never allow any “Taiwan independence” separatist schemes to succeed and stands ready to thwart any external military interference at any time. The PLA is “always prepared” for the complete reunification of the motherland.
- The PLA is willing to work with the armed forces of other countries to practice the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind and the three global initiatives, as well as jointly address risks and challenges.
The PLA Daily also published two commentary articles related to military flags and emphasizing adherence to Xi Jinping’s military thought on its second page. The titles of the articles are:
- “Resolutely Follow the Party’s Command, Strive on the Journey to Strengthen the Military, and Add New Glory to the Military Flag.”
- “Raising the Military Flag and Marching Forward — Interpreting the Military Flag System of the PLA in the New Era.”
Backdrop
1. The Politburo announced the agenda items for the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, which is scheduled to be held some time in October 2025.
2. Rumors and speculation about Xi Jinping allegedly “losing power” continue to circulate in overseas Chinese-speaking circles. Recent speculation includes Xi allegedly stepping down at the Fourth Plenum and CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia allegedly joining a nine-member transitional Politburo Standing Committee. We previously analyzed and warned about the “Xi losing power” narrative on several occasions (for e.g., see here, here, and here).
Our take
1. The PLA Daily’s promotion of Xi Jinping’s political theory for the military, adherence to his “core” leadership, and his contributions to military development on PLA Day are clear signs that Xi is firmly in control of the PLA, propaganda, and the regime.
The PLA Daily’s upholding of Xi’s “quan wei” (authority and prestige) also debunks the rumors that Xi is no longer in charge of the military or has been quietly sidelined.
2. Neither CMC chairman Xi Jinping nor CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia attended the Ministry of National Defense’s reception to mark the 98th anniversary of the founding of the PLA. This is consistent with precedent; typically, the senior leadership (including the CCP General Secretary or other Politburo Standing Committee members, and the CMC vice chairmen) only attends such receptions in major milestone years (90th anniversary, 95th anniversary, etc.). Otherwise, the senior-most leaders present are the defense minister and CMC members.
3. It is noteworthy that Xi Jinping did not promote any officers to the rank of general in the lead up to this year’s Army Day. With the exception of 2018 and this year, Xi has promoted officers to the general rank annually some time in July before Army Day since he took office in 2012.
Currently, officers in key PLA positions who are eligible for promotion to the general rank include the chief of the CMC joint staff department, the director of the CMC political work department, theater commanders, and CMC members. If Xi has not promoted anyone to full general rank by December 2025, then it is possible that he lacks confidence in the current crop of senior military officers and intends to thoroughly purge the military before making personnel adjustments. In late July 2025, the CMC and PLA Daily indicated that the CCP was looking to “vigorously promote fine traditions” and “thoroughly eliminate pernicious influences” in the military, as well as “reshape the image and authority of political work cadres.”
Should Xi delay making senior military appointments until around the 21st Party Congress, this indicates that the corruption situation in the PLA is much more severe than can be discerned from publicly available information. Xi could also be waiting for an even younger crop of officers, who theoretically would be more loyal to him (these officers owe their career progression to Xi and not the Jiang Zemin faction, and have been indoctrinated in Xi’s political theories far longer than the current generation of senior officers), to reach the lieutenant general rank before promoting more full generals.
2 Probe of Shaolin abbot hints at CCP rectification of religious sector
Shaolin Temple abbot investigated
July 26
Rumors surfaced online that Shaolin Temple abbot Shi Yongxin had been investigated by the CCP authorities. The rumors also circulated fake arrest warrants claiming that Shi had fled to the U.S. with a mistress, among other dubious information.
July 27
1. The Shaolin Temple released an official statement stating that Shi Yongxin was suspected of criminal offenses and is currently subject to a joint investigation by religious, public security, and disciplinary authorities.
2. Mainland media Caixin reported that Shi Yongxin was restricted from leaving the country upon his return from an overseas visit during the Chinese New Year and was subjected to interviews by the relevant authorities, citing sources close to the Shaolin Temple. The sources added that Shi was then still allowed to move freely within China.
The sources noted that around May, local authorities permanently stationed personnel at the Shaolin Temple in a “Shaolin Temple Management Office.” The personnel were primarily drawn from the religious affairs bureaus and the united front work departments of Zhengzhou and Dengfeng cities in Henan Province.
July 28
The Buddhist Association of China (government organ) announced the revocation of Shi Yongxin’s monastic certificate (equivalent to an expulsion from monkhood) and added that his actions were “extremely egregious, severely damaging the reputation of Buddhism.”
Shi Yongxin: Background and scandals
Background
Shi Yongxin (secular name Liu Yingcheng), 60 years old, joined the Shaolin Temple in 1981, was ordained as a monk in 1984, and became abbot in 1999. Shi was later dubbed the “Shaolin CEO” or “CEO Monk” for transforming the Shaolin Temple from a traditional Buddhist monastery into a global commercial brand. Under Shi, the Shaolin Temple would establish overseas martial arts schools and kung fu performance troupes, engage in product licensing (for films, games, pharmaceuticals, etc.), as well as control multiple companies. Today, the Shaolin Temple operates over 50 cultural centers worldwide and claims to have more than 3 million disciples internationally.
Shi Yongxin is a participant in the CCP’s overseas united front efforts. He engaged in united front work in the form of international religious and cultural exchanges as vice president of the Buddhist Association of China (September 2003 to July 2025), a member of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (March 1993 to February 2018), and a deputy of the National People’s Congress (March 1998 to February 2018) for over two decades. However, Shi lost his CPPCC and NPC positions near the end of Xi Jinping’s first term.
Scandals
In July 2015, Shi Yongxin was accused by a whistleblower going by the pseudonym “Shi Zhengyi” of holding dual household registrations, fathering an illegitimate child, keeping a mistress, and embezzling funds. The accusations sparked widespread public debate at the time and led the Henan provincial religious, public security, and disciplinary authorities to form a joint investigation team to look into the matter.
The joint Henan provincial investigation team later published preliminary findings in Henan Daily and other official media on Nov. 28, 2015. One of the findings was that Shi was infertile. The People’s Daily official social media account would later repost the findings. In February 2016, the National Religious Affairs Bureau concluded the case, declaring the allegations against Shi Yongxin “unsubstantiated” or “lacking evidence.” The investigation primarily refuted claims of Shi having an illegitimate child and dual household registration. As for Shi’s finances, the religious authorities claimed that “no illegal activities found” or were “still under investigation.” The authorities’ findings failed to dispel public talk of Shi’s impropriety.
On Aug. 8, 2015, Caixin published an article titled “Shi Yongxin: The Path to Buddhist Ascendancy Amid Controversy” that contained “insider” details about his rise at Shaolin Temple. The article noted that Shi had gained the support of Li Changchun in the 1990s despite being allegedly expelled from the Temple for misconduct.
Li Changchun, a Jiang Zemin faction member, was then Henan provincial Party secretary. Li eventually joined the Politburo in the late 1990s and became Guangdong Party boss. After Jiang initiated the crackdown on Falun Gong in 1999 and following Li’s implementation of the persecution campaign in Guangdong, Li would be promoted to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2002 and was placed in charge of overseeing propaganda for the next decade. When Li was the top propaganda overseer, Shi Yongxin aligned his propaganda messaging with Party Central and publicly attacked Falun Gong on various occasions.
After the probe into Shi Yongxin became public in July 2025, there was widespread speculation that his investigation could have been linked to his visit to the Vatican on Feb. 1, 2025 (during the Chinese New Year). At the time, Shi led a delegation to the Vatican under the guise of a “cultural exchange” and met with then-pontiff Pope Francis (Pope Francis passed away in April 2025).
One of the rumors circulating on Chinese social media claims that the Henan religious authorities recommended that Xi Jinping visit Shaolin Temple during his inspection tour in May 2025. However, Xi reportedly criticized the suggestion, slamming Shi Yongxin as a “demonic monk” who had ruined Shaolin.
Background on new Shaolin Temple abbot
On July 29, the Shaolin Temple announced that Shi Yinle, the abbot of Baima Temple in Luoyang City, would replace Shi Yongxin as Shaolin abbot.
Baima Temple was established in 68 CE during the Eastern Han Dynasty and is one of China’s earliest Buddhist temples.
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Shi Yinle (secular name Yin Qingquan), 59, is a Han Chinese Buddhist monk. Shi currently serves as deputy secretary-general of the 10th Chinese Buddhist Association, vice president of the Henan Buddhist Association, president of the Luoyang Buddhist Association, and a deputy to the 14th National People’s Congress. Publicly, Shi Yinle is known for his ascetic lifestyle, opposition to the commercialization of Buddhism, and advocacy of so-called “combining agriculture and Zen.”
Shi Yinle was an overseer of Baima Temple in October 2003 and officially appointed as the temple’s abbot on Nov. 1, 2005. According to publicly available information, Shi led the temple’s monks in self-sufficient farming during his tenure there, growing sweet potatoes and vegetables to help the temple gain economic independence. Baima Temple also provides free vegetarian meals to devotees on the first and fifteenth of each lunar month and earned widespread praise for the move.
***
Official mainland media previously reported that Shi Yinle accompanied Xi Jinping during an inspection of Baima Temple on May 19, 2025.
Backdrop
1. Two directors of the National Religious Affairs Administration (NRAA) were investigated or rumored to be under investigation after the 20th Party Congress:
- On March 18, 2023, then-NRAA director Cui Maohu was formally placed under investigation.
- On May 20, 2024, Gou Zhongwen, a member of the Standing Committee of the 14th National Committee of the CPPCC and deputy director of the CPPCC’s ethnic and religious affairs committee, was officially investigated.
- In June 2025, rumors circulating on the Chinese internet claimed that Wang Zuo’an, the former director of the NRAA who retired in June 2022, was being probed.
2. On July 25, the PRC finance ministry announced that China’s fiscal revenue declined in the first half of 2025, with the full-caliber fiscal deficit increasing 45 percent year-on-year to reach 5.2 trillion yuan.
3. On Aug. 1, the White House announced the implementation of reciprocal tariffs on multiple countries. We previously analyzed that U.S. tariff rates for some major countries are lower than those currently imposed on China, creating a 34 percent to 44 percent tariff differential that disadvantages the competitiveness of Chinese goods.
Our take
1. It is unlikely that Shi Yongxin was investigated over his visit to the Vatican earlier in the year as rumored. As a “political monk” who has long been involved in the CCP-led religious sector in China, Shi is almost certainly aware of the various political red lines and is unlikely to have crossed them during his Vatican trip. Additionally, the CCP often uses “cultural exchanges” like Shi’s Vatican visit as a cover to conduct overseas united front activities, and what Shi did was par for the course.
Since Xi Jinping took power in 2012, he has tightened control over the religious sector, mandated the “Sinicization” and secularization of religion in China, placed the Party above deities, and required religions to “follow the Party.” Shi Yongxin appears to be largely in line with the Xi leadership on matters concerning religion and the CCP’s direction of it, and is therefore not likely to be investigated over that.
The only way that Shi could be held accountable for his visit to the Vatican in early 2025 is if it was a personal initiative and not a Party arrangement. However, the probability of that happening is extremely low given Beijing’s tight surveillance over cadres and the highly sensitive nature of meeting the Pope.
2. It is plausible, but less likely, that Shi Yongxin was investigated purely over corruption (although corruption is likely to be the official charge). “Political monks” like Shi almost certainly engage in corruption to varying degrees, and do not run afoul of the CCP authorities as long as they have sufficient backing from elite cadres with whom they have a patron-client relationship. Also, local and central officials typically will not target politically well-connected monks like Shi even if they have conflicts of interest with him for fear of offending the high-ranking CCP officials or powerful factions who are behind him.
3. It is more plausible that Shi Yongxin was probed primarily due to political reasons. Shi gained prominence during the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era and was connected with at least one high-ranking Jiang faction official (former Politburo Standing Committee member Li Changchun per Caixin’s reporting). However, Shi’s political position appeared to weaken considerably in 2018 during Xi Jinping’s second term, or when Jiang faction influence was visibly eroding after the retirement of senior Jiang faction officials and Xi’s numerous personnel reshuffles favoring his camp.
By Xi’s third term, Shi Yongxin would have very few, if any, prominent political backers left in the senior leadership. This left him open to investigations after the Chinese New Year period (as Caixin reported). The probe into Shi could have escalated if Xi indeed criticized him as a “demonic monk” as rumored (which would have alarmed the Henan local authorities and central departments, and prompt them to step up investigations), if Shi had sought to flee the country (also likely if Xi’s “demonic monk” remark was true and Shi grew desperate), or if the Xi leadership is stepping up the rectification of the religious sector.
The recent investigations and rumored investigations of former NRAA directors suggest that Xi Jinping is now making the religious sector one of the focuses of the anti-corruption campaign. Xi likely did not target the religious sector earlier as other sectors, organs, and apparatuses crucial to his power consolidation (military, political and legal affairs, etc.) were of much higher priority. The Xi leadership also likely did not want to move against valuable united front workers who remained mostly loyal to the regime.
However, Xi’s consolidation of power over key sectors and changing circumstances in China mean that a rectification of the religious sector is no longer out of the question. As the Chinese economy rapidly deteriorates, corrupt “political monks” like Shi Yongxin start to look like appetizing targets that Beijing and local governments can confiscate their wealth from to offset fiscal deficits. Among China’s top ten revenue-generating religious temples (based on 2024 and 2025 estimates of ticket sales, incense donations, religious activities, cultural product sales, and tourism-related income), Shaolin Temple ranks third with an annual income of 320 million yuan. Chinese social media is also rife with videos and comments criticizing religious sector excesses, including so-called “playboy monks” (花和尚) wearing luxury brands, driving luxury cars, and cavorting with young women.
Separately, local governments have allegedly already resorted to borrowing from temples to cover fiscal shortages. Information circulating on overseas Chinese social media claims that the Tianjin Hebei District government borrowed hundreds of millions of yuan from Dabei Temple to pay salaries on Sept. 7, 2023. Meanwhile, the Shanghai municipal government was rumored to have borrowed 10 billion yuan from eight temples on July 3, 2024 (Jing’an Temple reportedly contributed the most [4.8 billion yuan] using incense donation revenue as short-term revolving debt) so that it could “fiscally balance” its accounts for the first half of 2024.
The targeting of “flower” or “political” monks like Shi Yongxin also allows the Xi leadership to boost flagging support for the CCP among the masses by showing that it is genuine about cracking down on corruption, addressing the wealth disparity, and redressing social injustices. The targeting of former heads of the religious authorities also achieves a similar effect. Going forward, more religious apparatus officials and “political” religious personnel could be targeted by the anti-corruption campaign.
4. Shi Yongxin gained and maintained prominence during the tenures of former NRAA directors and Jiang faction members Ye Xiaowen (May 19995 to September 2009) and Wang Zuo’an (September 2009 to June 2022). Both Ye and Wang had lengthy stints in the united front work and religious affairs apparatuses. If Wang is indeed being probed as rumored, then it is likely that he could be taken out in association with Shi Yongxin’s case.
Meanwhile, the investigations of former NRAA directors Cui Maohu and Gou Zhongwen appear to be unrelated to the Shi Yongxin case. Both officials only joined the religious apparatus briefly and are likely being probed for corruption in their prior roles.
