We see at least two possible and overlapping reasons for the persistence of the “Xi losing power” narrative.
Shortly after the conclusion of the Chinese Communist Party’s Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in July 2024, some overseas Chinese observers began spotting “signs” that Party leader Xi Jinping has “lost power.” The rumor and speculation mill began to pick up in December when the People’s Liberation Army Daily ran articles praising the “collective leadership,” which observers argued was a direct challenge to Xi’s one-man rule.
This year, observers point to a supposed reduction in mentions of Xi in official media and documents, as well as a 14-day stretch between May 20 and June 3 where he dropped out of public view to substantiate their case that Xi’s power is waning, or that he has already been effectively sidelined and will soon be replaced.
However, much of the speculation about Xi’s political misfortunes relies on unsubstantiated rumors or glaring ignorance of context. In some cases, a cursory look at the so-called “signs” reveals them to be entirely normal occurrences. In other cases, there are simpler and more convincing explanations for developments regarded as unusual. This article addresses some of the oft-repeated and less speculative arguments and evidence brought up by those who buy into the Xi “losing power” narrative.
There are plenty of explanations for why the rumor mill about “Xi losing power” is picking up at this time. Mounting resentment towards Xi’s policies (such as the three years of draconian zero-COVID lockdowns), the CCP’s intensifying authoritarian control, and factional struggle in the Party itself could all be contributing to the often-wishful interpretations of the black box that is elite Chinese politics. However, uncritical acceptance of such readings runs the risk of deeply misunderstanding the actual situation in Communist China — something that in the worst case could actually benefit the CCP’s propaganda narratives by discrediting the overseas Chinese dissident community and misleading uninformed observers.
Upholding the ‘collective leadership’?
Overseas Chinese commentators frequently cite a PLA Daily piece lauding the “collective leadership” as a sign that Xi is “losing power.” The PLA Daily did run a commentary article on Dec. 9, 2024 on page eight of its print edition titled, “Taking the Lead in Upholding Collective Leadership” by the Luohe Military Subdistrict in Henan Province. The piece was part of a quartet of commentary pieces by various military and paramilitary units on the topic of “consciously setting an example in adhering to democratic centralism.”
Democratic centralism is not democracy or a check on authoritarianism, but a Leninist organizational system emphasizing the unified central leadership of the Party, and a tool that the CCP has also used to curb internal corruption. After serious corruption in the PLA was disclosed in 2023, the Xi leadership began requiring Party Committees at all levels in the military to “adhere to democratic centralism.” On June 27, 2024, the PLA Daily reported that the CMC Political Work Department had compiled and distributed a handbook on “democratic centralism” to the entire military.
Given the Xi leadership’s efforts to promote “democratic centralism,” the four commentary articles on “adhering to democratic centralism” published in the PLA Daily in December 2024 represent the military’s compliance with Xi Jinping, rather than a challenge to his authority. Moreover, the commentary section on page eight of the PLA Daily is designated for grassroots military units, and the units that submitted the articles were simply reporting on insights gained from the Xi leadership’s “adhering to democratic centralism” campaign.
Since the PLA Daily commentary on “upholding collective leadership” was part of a political campaign initiated by the Xi leadership, the conclusion that should be drawn from the piece is that Xi’s power and authority are fully intact, not diminished or in dispute.
Official media and documents cut mentions of Xi?
Overseas Chinese commentators have observed that there seem to be fewer mentions of Xi Jinping in official media and documents, and that this indicates a waning of his power. In particular, commentators have called attention to a State Council oath-taking ceremony on June 11 where officials customarily pledge allegiance to the state constitution. They noted that People’s Republic of China (PRC) premier Li Qiang did not reference Xi’s political theories like the “Two Establishes” and “Two Safeguards” in his speech at the ceremony, as opposed to past years.
Li, however, did urge officials to “forge unwavering loyalty, deeply study and comprehend Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and fully implement the decisions and deployments of Party Central.” Li also urged officials to “work diligently and forge ahead under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” All those statements uphold Xi’s paramount position in the CCP and are unambiguous calls by Li for Chinese officials to be loyal to Xi.
An examination of the context behind references to Xi’s political theories and slogans since he came to power shows that the reduced mentions of them now does not indicate that his power has been eroded. After Xi centralized power to a significant degree in 2016, his leadership introduced several political theories and slogans centered on promoting Xi as the Party’s “core” and emphasizing his “quan wei” (authority and prestige). The mentioning of even some of these political theories and slogans in official media and documents is enough to embellish his paramount position in the regime. For instance, the revised Party Constitution introduced at the 20th Party Congress did not include the “Two Establishes,” but added political theories associated with Xi such as the “Two Safeguards,” “Four Consciousnesses,” and “Four Confidences.” By the standards of overseas Chinese observers who argue that Xi is “losing power,” the non-inclusion of the “Two Establishes” should be viewed as a sign of power loss. But Xi’s power was arguably at its peak at the 20th Party Congress in 2022 when he took a third term as CCP General Secretary and stacked his leadership with political allies and loyalists.
The Xi leadership did begin to adjust how it references Xi Jinping’s political theories and slogans after the 20th Party Congress. Instead of merely listing them, official documents and media have come up with new formulaic phrasing calling for adherence to Xi’s policies and key meetings. For example, the communiqué of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee framed Xi’s leadership consolidation and strengthening of Party control as the “further comprehensive deepening of reform and advancement of Chinese-style modernization.” Another recent formulation is the “full implementation of the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the Second and Third Plenary Sessions of the 20th Central Committee.” As the person overseeing those meetings and policies is Xi and his policies are based on his political theories, the formulaic phrases indirectly uphold Xi as the Party’s “core” even without specifically mentioning his usual slogans and theories.
There are several practical reasons why the Xi leadership adjusted its references to Xi’s political theories and slogans in official media and documents. For one, the primary stated rationale behind Xi Jinping’s power consolidation is improved governance. With Xi now firmly in charge, it makes more sense to urge officials to follow his decisions and deployments made in key meetings rather than be constantly told to just uphold his leadership. Another reason for the seemingly “reduced” mentioning of Xi in official documents and media could be that China has not been doing well in recent years, and Xi wants officials and the public to focus more on implementing his “solutions” to current crises rather than his cult of personality. Finally, the Xi leadership could be intentionally adjusting its propaganda messaging to promote the Xi cult of personality while making it more palatable and effective for indoctrination.
Why Xi went ‘missing’ for an extended period
Overseas Chinese commentators speculated breathlessly that Xi Jinping had truly “lost power” when he dropped out of public view for a 14-day stretch from late May to early June. However, Xi had previously gone many days without making any public appearance on at least three occasions since taking office, including for 19 days in August 2018. Meanwhile, the CCP continued to uphold Xi’s authority during his recent “disappearance,” notably with the 20th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection Standing Committee’s expanded study session on the theme of “deeply studying and understanding General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important discourses on strengthening Party conduct” on May 26, as well as constant references to Xi and his policies in official media and documents. The CCDI is the Party’s anti-corruption agency.
Xi’s diplomatic schedule during his “disappearance” and after “re-emerging” also shows no irregularities, indicating that his power is intact. State media reported that Xi held phone calls with the leaders of France (May 21), Germany (May 23), and South Korea (June 4) during the period that he was “missing” from public view. Later, Xi met with Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko in Beijing on June 4, traveled to Kazakhstan in mid-June to attend the second China–Central Asia Summit, and met with New Zealand prime minister Christopher Luxon in Beijing on June 20.
We believe that there are more plausible reasons for why Xi did not make a public appearance recently. First, Xi could have been huddling with his trade negotiators to work out how to deal with the United States during the 90-day tariff truce and proceed with trade talks. Incidentally, Xi’s 19-day “non-appearance” in August 2018 also came around the period of heightened Sino-U.S. trade tensions.
Second, Xi and his officials could have been cloistered away to deal with rapidly worsening crises in the regime, including a range of economic and social problems. Notably since Xi’s “re-emergence,” the CCP Central Committee ideological journal Qiushi has published an article with Xi in the byline on “medium- and long-term planning” and the Xinhua News Agency Research Institute published an 18,000-character report on Xi’s “path of financial development with Chinese characteristics,” or content that underscores Xi’s leading role in directing policy in the CCP and his deep involvement in the regime’s future plans. Third, Xi could have fallen ill and took time off to recuperate, hence his lack of public appearances.
Beware the ‘Xi losing power’ narrative
Rumors about CCP elite politics and factional struggle have long been circulating in overseas Chinese-speaking circles. However, most of the rumors are short-lived and quickly make way for new ones. The staying power of the Xi Jinping “losing power” narrative is unusual and suggests something greater is afoot.
We see at least two possible and overlapping reasons for the persistence of the “Xi losing power” narrative. First, narratives promoting the idea that Xi is being ousted would naturally gain traction given that he is hugely unpopular among overseas Chinese. Over time, a self-affirming and self-perpetuating narrative — even one that is based on incorrect understandings and assumptions of CCP elite politics and factional dynamics — is formed. Second, “anti-Xi” forces inside and outside China could be involved in prolonging the Xi “losing power” narrative beyond the usual lifespan of such rumors. This includes getting “Party insiders” and other “sources” to regularly “leak” information or issue commentary that “validates” the narrative, influencing prominent overseas media outlets or commentators to keep the narrative alive, and infiltrating overseas channels of information distribution (media outlets, self-media personalities, think tanks, etc.).
The persistence of the Xi “losing power” narrative has several negative impacts.
First, increased attention on just Xi Jinping risks downplaying the overall CCP threat, something that we warned about in analyzing an “anti-Xi, not anti-CCP” strategy issued by a prominent think-tank.
Second, businesses, investors, and governments who believe that Xi is on the verge of being ousted and that “reformers” could be taking over would lower their guard about the CCP threat and correspondingly increase their political risks. Governments that assume that Xi is on his way out could also end up making incorrect decisions on how to deal with China, with dire consequences.
Third, the international community could become less vigilant about Taiwan if they believe that the CCP will not use military force to achieve “reunification” with “Taiwan hawk” Xi seemingly on his way out. Since the founding of the PRC, the CCP has never renounced its intention to take Taiwan. As long as the CCP is in charge, Party leaders after Xi will keep insisting that Taiwan be “reunified” with Communist China, by force if necessary.
Finally, the Xi leadership could tighten surveillance and censorship in mainland China and Hong Kong in attempting to snuff out negative rumors about their boss, and potentially clamp down harder on dissident groups in China with links to media outlets and commentators who promote the narrative of Xi “losing power.”
