1 Wang Yi maintains CCP’s hawkish stance amid reports of Trump-Xi summit
Wang Yi press conference
On March 7, PRC foreign minister Wang Yi held a press conference on the sidelines of the third session of the 14th National People’s Congress. In addressing questions from Chinese and foreign journalists, Wang went over Xi Jinping’s diplomatic achievements in 2024 and the planned diplomatic activities for 2025, as well as key foreign affairs concerns like the impact of Russia-U.S. dialogue on China-Russia relations and Sino-U.S. relations.
Wang’s noteworthy responses to the press include:
- “… no matter how the international landscape evolves, the historical logic of China-Russia friendship will not change and its internal driving force will not diminish.”
- “A mature, resilient and stable China-Russia relationship will not be swayed by any turn of events, let alone be subject to interference by any third party. It is a constant in a turbulent world rather than a variable in geopolitical games.”
- “We will uphold true multilateralism …”
- “There are more than 190 countries in the world. Should everyone stress ‘my country first’ and obsess over a position of strength, the law of the jungle would reign the world again. Smaller and weaker countries would bear the brunt first, and international norms and order would take a body blow.”
- “A big country should honor its international obligations and fulfill its due responsibilities. It should not put selfish interests before principles, still less wield its power to bully the weak.”
- “With a keen understanding of the trend of history and our times, President Xi Jinping has proposed building a community with a shared future for mankind, and called on all countries to transcend disagreements and differences, jointly protect our only planet, and together develop the global village as our common home.”
- “China is naturally a member of the Global South, because we have fought colonialism and hegemonism together in history and we are committed to the common goal of development and revitalization. No matter how the world changes, our heart will always be with the Global South, and our roots will grow deeper in the Global South. China will work with all Global South countries to add a new chapter to the annals of the history of the world.”
- “All parties should learn something from the (Ukraine) crisis. Among many others, security should be mutual and equal, and no country should build its security on the insecurity of another.”
- “Be it space science or chip making, unjustified external suppression has never stopped. But where there is blockade, there is breakthrough; where there is suppression, there is innovation … ‘small yard, high fence’ cannot suppress the spirit of innovation, and decoupling and supply chain disruption will only lead to self-isolation.”
- “No country should fantasize that it can suppress China and maintain good relations with China at the same time. Such two-faced acts are not good for the stability of bilateral relations, or for building mutual trust.”
- “The abuse of fentanyl in the United States is a problem that must be confronted and resolved by the U.S. itself. China has been assisting the U.S. in various ways on humanitarian grounds. The U.S. should not return good with evil, or even impose arbitrary tariffs. No responsible major country should do that.”
- “The United States should go over what has actually happened: What has it achieved from tariff and trade wars these years? Has its trade deficit widened or narrowed? Has its manufacturing become more competitive or less competitive? Has U.S. inflation gone up or down? Has the life of its people got better or worse? China-U.S. business relations are based on two-way and reciprocal interactions. Cooperation will bring about mutual benefit and win-win, and China will definitely take countermeasures in response to arbitrary pressure.”
- “Given the extensive common interests and broad space for cooperation, it is possible for China and the United States to become partners helping each other succeed and prosper together.”
- “China is a founder and beneficiary of the post-WWII international order. Naturally, we are an advocate and builder of it as well. We have no intention to start all over again, nor do we support any country’s attempt to overturn the current order.”
- “China is well aware of its international responsibility as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. It will firmly safeguard the central role of the U.N., come forward to be a pillar of the multilateral system, and speak up for justice for the Global South.”
- “China is firmly opposed to such an attempt (by the U.S. to deploy mid-range capability missile system in the region), and it is not welcomed by regional countries either. Years have passed since the United States released its ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy,’ but what has it done for regional countries? Nothing, except for stirring up troubles and creating disputes. It has proved to be more of a disruptive factor than a constructive contributor.”
Potential Trump-Xi summit?
March 10
1. The South China Morning Post reported that President Donald Trump could visit China as early as April, citing multiple diplomatic sources.
A U.S. source told the Post that Trump could travel to China in April or May, and “telling signs” of Trump’s next move on China could come out “very soon.”
The source added, “Now Trump’s team is quiet on China because they have less people – only half compared to his first term. Now they are concentrating on Ukraine as Trump thinks he could finish the Ukraine business soon, and Ukraine is also much less complicated compared to China.” The source said that all attention “would be turned towards China” once the Ukraine issue was resolved.
2. The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. and the PRC are discussing a possible Xi-Trump “birthday summit” in the United States in June, citing people familiar with the matter. The discussions are in the early stages, with nothing concrete at present. Trump was born on June 14, 1946 and Xi was born on June 15, 1953.
US-China talks stuck at lower levels
March 10
Bloomberg News reported that U.S.-China talks on trade and other issues have not progressed beyond the lower levels as both sides talk past each other and do not have agreement on the best way forward.
Officials in Beijing claim that the U.S. has not outlined detailed steps that they expect China to take on fentanyl to have tariffs lifted, citing people familiar with the matter. Meanwhile, Trump officials said they made clear demands to China through PRC diplomats in Washington, including ambassador Xie Feng. The demands include having China stop sending fentanyl to Mexico, imposing the death penalty for smugglers, and having the People’s Daily run a front-page article condemning the fentanyl trade.
Bloomberg also cited a person as saying that the U.S. wants to address five main areas in talks with China, including:
- Fentanyl.
- Beijing’s implementation of the Sino-U.S. trade deal made in Trump’s first term.
- China’s help in creating jobs in the American heartland.
- Ensuring the centrality of the U.S. dollar in global trade.
- Xi’s backing in ending the war in Ukraine.
The person also said that China will need to show Trump what it is willing to offer, including pledging to increase purchases of American goods (including energy and agriculture), and pledging to invest in American manufacturing and open up its services industry for U.S. investment.
Backdrop
Since returning to the White House in January, President Donald Trump has imposed 20 percent of additional tariffs on Chinese products. In response, the PRC has levied additional tariffs of up to 15 percent on U.S. agricultural products.
The PRC has also sent several delegations to the U.S. since November to discuss potential deals with the Trump administration and head off tariffs, but has thus far been unsuccessful in the latter endeavor.
Our take
1. Wang Yi repeats several of the CCP’s standard diplomatic propaganda at his presser on the sidelines of the Two Sessions. Beneath the “wolf warrior” bravado and indirect sniping at the U.S., the propaganda exposes the CCP’s current view of international relations and some of its deepest concerns.
i) Wang insists that China-Russia relations are “stable” and the bilateral “friendship” will not be altered. While this might be the case at present, the CCP is also projecting its hope that good China-Russia relations will remain constant and “survive” President Trump’s effort to rebuild U.S.-Russia relations with an eye to possibly pulling off a “reverse Nixon” in the future.
ii) Wang’s promotion of “true multilateralism” (we explained what the CCP means by “multilateralism” here and here), “community with a shared future for mankind” (i.e. a disguised form of international communism) the PRC’s willingness to work with the Global South (or more accurately, exploit and co-opt into the PRC’s sphere of influence), and other internationalist sentiments are part of the CCP’s long-term agenda of displacing the U.S. as the global hegemon.
Wang also indirectly hints that the CCP is aware that President Trump’s policies and reforms amount to an effort to fundamentally change the post-WWII international order. Having spent decades hijacking that international order with some success, the CCP now has “no intention to start all over again” and therefore rejects “any country’s attempt to overturn the current order.”
iii) Wang indirectly accuses the U.S. of “bullying” and “containing” the PRC through tariffs and technology restrictions. Playing the victim has long been a CCP tactic to gain sympathy and sidestep accusations of wrongdoing. This tactic, however, is likely to be much less effective now as the international community increasingly acknowledges the CCP threat and has become more watchful of potential aggressor states in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Despite the “wolf warrior” rhetoric, Wang and the CCP have left the door open to working with the United States. On the one hand, Wang implies that the U.S. should not “fantasize that it can suppress China and maintain good relations with China at the same time” because “such two-faced acts are not good for the stability of bilateral relations, or for building mutual trust.” On the other hand, Wang says that the U.S. and China have “extensive common interests and broad space for cooperation” and should “become partners helping each other succeed and prosper together.” In considering the totality of Wang’s remarks, the CCP is simultaneously cautioning the Trump administration against putting too much pressure on the PRC while indicating that Beijing is open to making some concessions and cooperating with the United States in exchange for the lifting of pressures.
2. Xi Jinping and the CCP are likely scrambling to figure out what exactly is the Trump administration’s plan for China ahead of one or several potential Xi-Trump summits to ensure that Beijing does not get caught flat-footed in negotiations. Meanwhile, President Trump has incentive to keep things on an even keel with the PRC until he has sorted out peace in Ukraine and pressing domestic matters.
Barring unforeseen developments, both Xi and Trump currently have an incentive to touch base and have a meeting or two without shaking up the bilateral relationship too much. It is unlikely that either side will make concessions unless the other gives way first, and those concessions could be of a minor sort.
Sino-U.S. competition, however, is here to stay regardless of how potential upcoming meetings between Trump and Xi pan out. Xi is ideologically committed to the CCP’s agenda of global domination, while Trump’s “America First” agenda and his administration’s deeper understanding of the CCP threat compared with four years ago precludes Trump from going easy on the PRC regardless of how “friendly” he is with Xi on a personal level. Because the “new cold war” between the U.S. and the PRC is rooted in deep ideological and structural tensions, it is likely to endure well beyond the tenures of both Xi and Trump.
3. We believe that the Trump administration, in dealing with the PRC, will stick with the broader strategy of intensifying “containment” and countering measures even if it makes some tactical concessions and compromises (i.e. lowering or removing some tariffs, etc.) in making deals.
Meanwhile, the Chinese economy and the PRC’s diplomatic influence will likely be increasingly squeezed as the Trump administration’s various geopolitical initiatives and China-related measures take effect. Measures and initiatives include China tariffs and sanctions, policies that lead to the reshoring of manufacturing in America and relocation of manufacturing outside China, aligning America’s neighbors, allies, and partner nations with the Trump administration on China, peace efforts in Ukraine and the Middle East, and reorienting America’s focus to Asia and the Indo-Pacific.
2 Analyzing the potential political implications of Zhao Leji’s absence from key Two Sessions meetings
Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPCSC) and third-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, was absent from the third meeting and closing session of the 14th NPC in the afternoon of March 11, as well as the third meeting of the NPC presidium on the morning of March 11. His last public appearance was at the second meeting of the NPC presidium at the third session of the 14th NPC on March 8.
At the closing session, NPCSC vice chairman Li Hongzhong said Zhao had a respiratory infection and he was presiding over the meeting in Zhao’s place. The other six members of the Politburo Standing Committee attended the session.
On March 12, state broadcaster CCTV reported that Zhao Leji met with state media journalists who covered NPC sessions. CCTV said Zhao thanked the journalists for their coverage, including their highlighting the “important activities of General Secretary Xi Jinping.”
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Zhao Leji’s absence from the closing session of the NPC was the first time in nearly two decades that a Politburo Standing Committee member missed a key political meeting. The last time a Politburo Standing Committee member did not attend an NPC meeting at the Two Sessions was in 2006 when former vice premier Huang Ju was hospitalized due to illness. Huang, who was once the sixth-ranked member of the Politburo Standing Committee, passed away in 2007.
Our take
1. Zhao Leji’s non-attendance at the NPC closing ceremony is an unusual and very rare development. We see two possible reasons for his absence:
i) The official reason that Zhao is suffering from a respiratory infection is very plausible given that China is seeing an outbreak of viruses and/or a persisting pandemic. As senior CCP officials are afforded the best level of medical care and treatment, his condition is either so severe that he cannot attend the key meeting, or is less serious but the medical team is isolating him from other senior officials out of an abundance of caution (possibly because they do not know exactly what illness Zhao might be suffering from) to prevent transmission.
The latter scenario would explain why Zhao was able to host a session with state media journalists a day after the NPC closing ceremony and looked relatively healthy in the CCTV footage. Comparatively speaking, placing journalists at risk of being infected by Zhao at a press event is far less damaging politically than having him potentially infect Xi Jinping and the other top CCP leaders at a key political meeting.
In the scenario where Zhao is severely ill, it is possible that his meeting with state journalists on March 12 was pre-recorded at a time when he was healthier. The footage was then released later to quell both internal and external speculation that Zhao Leji is in political trouble following his absence from the NPC closing ceremony.
If there was indeed an outbreak at the Two Sessions, then Zhao might not be the only one infected. It is possible that other senior leaders at Zhongnanhai and senior officials in the provinces as Two Sessions attendees could later be reported to be suffering from a “respiratory infection,” or senior officials at the central and local governments stop making public appearances shortly after the Two Sessions. The CCP authorities will have themselves to blame in the event of a hypothetical outbreak as they are likely covering the spread of diseases on the mainland (most likely to avoid the reinstituting of “zero-COVID” measures and more economic pain) and do not have the appropriate measures in place to prevent a pandemic. Also, a mass outbreak among senior officials would indicate that the pandemic situation on the mainland is very severe.
ii) It is also possible that Zhao Leji was suddenly placed under investigation and the official reason that he is suffering from a respiratory infection is an excuse. In this scenario, CCTV’s report of Zhao meeting state journalists a day after the NPC closing ceremony could be intended to minimize the political impact of his prior absence. CCTV’s footage of Zhao could be either pre-recorded or taken in live time.
However, we believe that an investigation is less likely due to its impact on political stability. The removal of a Politburo Standing Committee member out of the blue would signal unexpected and serious political turmoil at Zhongnanhai, and the CCP would struggle to preserve its image after taking such drastic action. Of course, it cannot be entirely ruled out that Xi Jinping believes that he can control the fallout of publicly taking out a current Politburo Standing Committee member and goes ahead with it.
In the event that Zhao has indeed been purged, the Xi leadership might not make the investigation public to minimize political destabilization. Instead, Beijing could use more discreet measures to deal with Zhao, including announcing that he succumbed to his “respiratory infection.”
iii) A third possibility is that Zhao Leji is neither ill nor being officially investigated, but Xi Jinping deliberately kept him out of the NPC closing ceremony on various pretexts to send a cautionary political message to his factional rivals. Zhao is aligned with the Jiang Zemin faction and previously displayed “two-faced” behavior when he was anti-corruption chief in Xi’s second term.
In this scenario, Xi believes that his factional enemies continue to be working to undermine his leadership and governance, and he needs to symbolically “kill the chickens to scare the monkey” by briefly “disappearing” Zhao at a consequential moment. Zhao’s former subordinates and allies could later be investigated for corruption, but Zhao himself could remain “safe.” By doing so, Xi could be sending a “last warning” to those who oppose him, with the unspoken understanding that senior cadres would be purged if they or their underlings persist in subversive behavior.
2. The Xi leadership could find itself faced with the issue of personnel change if Zhao Leji is suffering from an illness that leaves him sidelined for an extended period or results in his death while in office. The replacement of members in the CCP’s core leadership team due to factional struggle has been an extremely rare occurrence since the Third Plenum of the 11th Central Committee in 1978 when Hua Guofeng was sidelined. In modern times, the only Politburo Standing Committee member who had to be replaced was Huang Ju after he died from illness.
We believe that Xi Jinping might not line up a replacement for Zhao Leji in the Politburo Standing Committee if he has to step down prematurely. In considering the dynamics of factional struggle, Xi Jinping would become even more dominant in the regime as Zhao is a Jiang faction member. With Zhao removed, the makeup of the Politburo Standing Committee would be five to one in favor of the Xi camp.
Time will tell as to whether Zhao is temporarily incapacitated due to illness, or if his ailments are of the political variety. In the latter case, as a replacement for NPCSC chairman, Xi would likely pick someone from within the Politburo Standing Committee. In considering the current division of responsibilities and loyalty levels of those in the Politburo Standing Committee, Ding Xuexiang would be the most likely candidate to serve as NPCSC chairman. We previously noted that Ding could be a potential pick for NPCSC chairman in forecasting key personnel changes at the 20th Party Congress.
If Xi decides to completely break with CCP personnel reshuffle norms (a possibility given his paramount position in the regime and the weakening of the “collective leadership”), which accounts for seniority and rank, he could have NPCSC vice chairman Li Hongzhong (a former Jiang faction member turned Xi “loyalist”) replace Zhao Leji as NPCSC chairman in the event that the latter is indefinitely sidelined. This arrangement would have relatively little impact on the current division of responsibilities in the CCP leadership.
What’s next
What happened to Zhao Leji at the Two Sessions may or may not become clearer in the coming days. Public appearances or lack thereof by senior officials in the central and local governments could offer clues as to whether Zhao was ill or not. Likewise, the fate of Zhao’s allies and associates could shed light on whether his problem is political or otherwise.
