Analyzing the 20th Central Committee’s Fourth Plenum communiqué; PRC gov’t, military rush to undertake political indoctrination post-plenum

  1   Analyzing the communiqué of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee

On Oct. 23, the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee concluded and issued a communiqué of the session. Below is a summary of the main points of the communiqué:

Main agenda and outcomes

• The session heard and discussed the work report delivered by Xi Jinping on behalf of the Politburo, and reviewed and adopted “The CCP Central Committee’s Proposals for Formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development.”
• The session fully affirmed the work of the Politburo since the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, and summarized the major achievements of the 14th Five-Year Plan period. It stated that the economy continues to recover and improve, and that the main goals and tasks of the 14th Five-Year Plan are about to be successfully completed. The session also emphasized commemorating the 80th anniversary of the victory of the “Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War” as a way to greatly inspire the “national spirit” and “patriotic enthusiasm.”
• The session proposed the guiding ideology, principles, and goals for economic and social development during the 15th Five-Year Plan period.

Review of the 14th Five-Year Plan achievements

• The session described the 14th Five-Year Plan period as “extraordinary and remarkable.” In the face of a “complex and volatile international environment” and “arduous domestic reform, development, and stability tasks,” Party Central united and led the nation in “responding to the pandemic, defusing risks, and promoting major advances in the economy, science and technology, national defense, and overall national strength,” marking new progress in “Chinese-style modernization.”

Key points of the 15th Five-Year Plan

• Positioning and importance: The 15th Five-Year Plan period is defined as a “critical stage” for “consolidating the foundation of socialist modernization.” It will face an environment in which “strategic opportunities and risks coexist, and uncertain and unpredictable factors are increasing.” The entire Party must deeply understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” strengthen the “Four Consciousnesses,” adhere to the “Four Confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards.” The entire Party must also maintain strategic resolve, build confidence in victory, actively recognize and respond to changes, dare to struggle, be adept at struggling, and face “perilous situations” (驚濤駭浪) with a proactive historical spirit — overcoming difficulties, confronting risks, and meeting challenges while focusing on doing its own work well.
• Guiding ideology: Uphold Marxism and fully implement “Xi Jinping Thought,” advance the “Five-Sphere Integrated Plan” (economic, political, cultural, social, and ecological development) and the “Four-Pronged Comprehensive Strategy” (comprehensively building a modern socialist country, deepening reform, governing according to the law, and governing the Party strictly). Take high-quality development as the central theme, reform and innovation as the driving force, the people’s well-being as the goal, and strict Party governance as the fundamental guarantee.
• Principles to follow: Uphold the Party’s overall leadership, put the people first, pursue high-quality development, deepen reform in all areas, combine an effective market with a capable government, and coordinate development and security.
• Main objectives: Achieve notable results in high-quality development; significantly enhance technological self-reliance; make new breakthroughs in deepening reform; raise social civility and progress; continuously improve the people’s livelihoods; make major progress in building a “Beautiful China”; and strengthen national security. By 2035, China aims to achieve a major leap in its economic, technological, and defense strength — as well as its overall national power and international influence — with per capita GDP reaching the level of moderately developed countries.

Specific tasks and measures of the 15th Five-Year Plan

• Industrial development: Build a modern industrial system, consolidate the real economy, advance intelligent, green, and integrated development, maintain a reasonable share of manufacturing, and develop advanced manufacturing industries.
• Technological innovation: Accelerate scientific and technological self-reliance and self-strengthening, develop new quality productive forces, and strengthen original innovation and breakthroughs in key core technologies.
• Domestic market: Expand domestic demand, remove barriers to a unified national market, and promote positive interaction between consumption and investment.
• Market economy: Improve the socialist market economy system, stimulate the vitality of market entities, and enhance the effectiveness of macroeconomic governance.
• Opening-up: Promote high-level opening-up, advance the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative, and foster global cooperation.
• Rural revitalization: Advance agricultural and rural modernization, consolidate achievements in poverty alleviation, and build an agricultural powerhouse.
• Regional development: Optimize the regional economic layout, promote coordinated development, and push forward new-type urbanization.
• Cultural development: Prosper socialist culture, promote socialist core values, and enhance the influence of Chinese civilization.
• Social welfare: Improve employment, education, healthcare, and housing, and advance common prosperity.
• Green transformation: Promote carbon peaking and carbon neutrality, and build a “Beautiful China.”
• National security: Advance the modernization of the national security system and pursue a path of socialist governance with Chinese characteristics.
• National defense: Achieve the goal of building a strong military by the centenary of the PLA, advance military modernization, implement Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military, uphold the Party’s absolute leadership over the armed forces, and adhere to the Central Military Commission Chairman Responsibility System. Promote political strengthening of the military, follow the principle of “simultaneously struggling, preparing for war, and building” (邊鬥爭、邊備戰、邊建設), accelerate the integration of mechanization, informatization, and intelligentization, and strengthen the development of advanced combat capabilities.

Governance and Party-building

• Emphasize comprehensive and strict Party governance, strengthen Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership, and carry out “self-revolution.”
• Promote stability in Hong Kong and Macau, peaceful cross-strait development, and the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.

Current tasks

• Studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenum is a major political task for the entire Party and nation in the present and future period.
• Achieve the annual economic targets, continue to precisely implement Party Central’s decisions and deployments, and focus on stabilizing employment, enterprises, markets, and expectations to maintain the economic foundation.
• Strengthen livelihood protection, stabilize employment, and address wage arrears.
• Prevent and curb major and severe accidents.
• Enhance overall public security management.
• Strengthen public opinion guidance, and effectively prevent and resolve ideological risks.

Personnel and discipline matters

• Zhang Shengmin, head of the CMC discipline inspection commission, was appointed CMC vice chairman.
• Eleven alternate members were appointed to fill vacant Central Committee positions.
• Confirmed disciplinary decisions to investigate and expel 14 Central Committee and alternate members from the Party.

Call to action

• The entire Party, the military, and the people of the nation are called upon to unite closely around Party Central and strive to realize the goals of the 15th Five-Year Plan and Chinese-style modernization.

  Backdrop

Overseas Chinese media outlets and commentators engaged in intense speculation before the Fourth Plenum on topics such as Xi potentially being ousted at the session and mass personnel reshuffles (to the detriment of Xi’s grip on power).

  Our take

The Fourth Plenum communiqué affirms several of our earlier analyses — the CCP top leadership deliberated the 15th Five-Year Plan; Xi Jinping’s political situation remains largely unchanged; and personnel reshuffles at the plenum were nothing out of the ordinary, but hint at future political and military “rectifications.

1. Details of the 15th Five-Year Plan from the communiqué indicate that Beijing’s economic blueprint for the 2026 to 2030 period is essentially a rehash of policies implemented since the 20th Party Congress, albeit with grander promises or slogans. The “old wine in new bottles” approach bodes ill for China’s economic prospects given that Beijing’s policies since the 20th Party Congress have proven to be lackluster in reversing China’s persistent deflation problems.

Below is a comparison of key differences between the 15th Five-Year Plan and the CCP authorities’ economic policies since the 20th Party Congress in 2020:

• Economic focus: Post-20th Party Congress policies were aimed at restoring the economy after the pandemic shock (e.g., 2023’s growth stabilization policies and 2024’s economic support measures). The 15th Five-Year Plan pivots towards “consolidating the foundation and advancing comprehensively,” emphasizing “gradual progression” and the seizing of “strategic opportunities amid risks.” Put another way, Beijing is subtly warning officials that the economic environment could become more severe going forward, and their primary focus should be stabilizing the existing economic foundation first, then gradually and cautiously pursuing economic development.
• Core theme and driving force: The post-20th Party Congress period centered on reform and innovation as the driver, with expanding domestic demand as the strategic basis (i.e., 2024 Central Economic Work Conference stressing consumption and investment). The 15th Five-Year Plan positions “new-quality productive forces” (technology-driven growth) as the central growth driver, and calls for upgrading reform and innovation into “deep integration.” This suggests that Beijing is looking to catalyze an “industrial revolution” of sorts (i.e., the integrated promotion of a “Digital China”).
• Industry and real economy: Earlier policies focused on “transformation,” such as optimizing traditional industries and nurturing strategic emerging sectors. The 15th Five-Year Plan calls for “maintaining a reasonable share of manufacturing” and “building a modern industrial system with advanced manufacturing as the backbone,” along with integrated development.
• Science and technology self-reliance: The post-20th Party Congress emphasis shifts from “enhancing innovation efficiency” and tackling key core technologies to the 15th Five-Year Plan’s setting of measurable targets in “significantly raising the level” and “seizing commanding heights.”
• Domestic demand and market structure: The 15th Five-Year Plan continues with the earlier emphasis on building a unified national market. But on expanding domestic demand, the Plan moves from “organically integrating with deepening supply-side structural reform” to “closely combining improving the people’s livelihoods and promoting consumption with investing in physical assets and investing in human capital.”
• Opening-up and international cooperation: The 15th Five-Year Plan moves from the earlier “steady institutional opening-up” to “proactive and independent opening-up,” “promoting reform through openness,” and the need to respond more assertively to external challenges.
• Risk management and security coordination: Post-20th Party Congress policies urged officials to address major risks (i.e., resolving debt risks in 2024). The 15th Five-Year Plan calls on officials to “overcome difficulties and combat risks amid turbulent conditions,” have “the courage to struggle and skill in adapting,” and have “historical initiative.”

Other noteworthy differences between the 14th Five-Year Plan and the 15th Five-Year Plan include:

• The 14th Five-Year Plan described the period of the plan (2021 to 2025) as a “significant strategic opportunity” for China. In contrast, the 15th Five-Year Plan characterizes its period (2026 to 2030) as a time when “strategic opportunities coexist with risks and challenges, and uncertainty and unpredictability have increased.” It also does not mention the phrase “great changes unseen in a century,” nor claim that “time and momentum” are on China’s side. This suggests that the CCP leadership believes that the domestic and international environment has become riskier and even more severe.
• In addressing risks, the 14th Five-Year Plan called for “carrying forward the spirit of struggle and establishing bottom-line thinking.” The 15th Five-Year Plan expresses this even more forcefully, urging officials to “dare to struggle, be adept at struggling, and have the courage to face major tests of turbulent seas and even stormy waves” in addressing risks.
• The 15th Five-Year Plan adds the new regime goal of “significantly enhancing China’s overall national strength and international influence.”
• The 15th Five-Year Plan repeats the phrase from the 20th Party Congress work report about “simultaneously struggling, preparing for war, and building.”

We previously noted in the July 31, 2025 newsletter that “even if the 15th Five-Year Plan turns out to be a rehash of existing policies rather than a proposal offering new ideas and breakthroughs, the CCP authorities will use what was rolled out at the Fourth Plenum to further its propaganda and paper over economic setbacks.”

2. The Fourth Plenum communiqué continues to uphold Xi Jinping’s paramount position in the CCP regime:

• The communiqué wrote that “All of us in the Party must acquire a deep understanding of the decisive significance of establishing Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position in Party Central and in the Party as a whole and of establishing the guiding role of Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”
• The communiqué emphasizes the “extraordinary and remarkable” achievements of the 14th Five-Year Plan under Xi’s leadership.
• The communiqué calls on the military to uphold Xi Jinping’s Thought on Strengthening the Military and implement the CMC Chairman Responsibility System.
• The communiqué calls for comprehensive and strict Party governance, strengthening Party Central’s centralized and unified leadership, and carrying out “self-revolution.”
• The communiqué stresses that studying and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenum is a “major political task for the whole Party and the entire nation.” On the evening of Oct. 23, the Central Propaganda Department convened a teleconference on studying, publicizing, and implementing the spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee. The teleconference called for the rapid launch of a nationwide campaign to learn and carry out the spirit of the Fourth Plenum.

The CCP authorities’ maintaining of Xi’s paramount status is a clear indication Xi remains firmly in charge, contrary to the intense speculation about “Xi losing power” in overseas Chinese-speaking circles.

3. The participation rate of full and alternate members of the Central Committee at the Fourth Plenum was the lowest on record since at least the 1970s. This suggests that the current round of political purges is not yet over and could continue until the government reshuffle in the second half of 2026.

i) A total of 168 Central Committee members and 147 nonvoting alternates attended the Fourth Plenum — an absentee rate of over 16 percent given that the Central Committee had 205 full members and 171 alternates when its term started in 2022.

In addition to the 18 full members and seven alternates who were removed from their post, probed, resigned, or passed away, 36 others were absent. Health issues aside, a likely reason for the absences is that some of those officials are currently under investigation.

ii) The elevation of CMC discipline inspection commission secretary Zhang Shengmin to CMC vice chairman affirms our analysis from back in August. Zhang, however, was not added to the Politburo to replace the spot vacated by the purged ex-CMC vice chair He Weidong. Yet this is within the normal range of CCP political operations — no replacements were added to the Politburo when vacancies came up after one Politburo member died and five others were investigated during the period from the 14th Party Congress to the 18th Party Congress.

Xi Jinping likely saw the need to fill the CMC vice chairman spot vacated by He Weidong to counterbalance Zhang Youxia’s influence in the military. Leaving Zhang in charge of day-to-day CMC operations for an extended period presents him with opportunities to expand and entrench his influence and potentially become a political risk to the Xi leadership. The risk of a single CMC vice chairman accruing too much influence is mitigated with the appointment of another CMC vice chairman to keep both in check.

Meanwhile, the lack of new additions to the CMC indicates that military purges are still ongoing. We wrote in the Oct. 20, 2025 newsletter, “Should new members be added to the CMC at the Fourth Plenum, this would indicate that the phase of purging ‘big tigers’ in the military is concluding and there would be a new round of full general promotions between December 2025 and January 2026.”

iii) Eleven alternate members were promoted to full Central Committee members at the Fourth Plenum, but seven alternates were skipped. These seven skipped alternates are:

• Lieutenant General Wang Liyan, deputy commander of the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force.
• Lieutenant General Wang Kangping, commander of the PLA Joint Logistics Support Force.
• Wang Jiayi, vice minister of education.
• Lieutenant General Fang Yongxiang, director of the CMC General Office.
• Fang Hongwei, Standing Committee member of the Shaanxi Provincial Party Committee and Party secretary of Xi’an City.
• Shi Yugang, deputy Party secretary of the Yunnan Provincial Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.
• Lieutenant General Shi Zhenglu, commander of the PLA Northern Theater Ground Force.

Notably, several of the skipped alternates were from the military and none of the 11 alternates who were promoted to full member were from the PLA. This suggests that the skipped alternates from the military could be under investigation or review as part of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign targeting the PLA. The skipped civilian alternates could also be under investigation. Finally, it is likely that some full members from the military are currently under investigation and could be subsequently dismissed.

Given the shocking announcement of the purge of nine generals and just 18 Central Committee alternates from the military seemingly not being investigated (additionally, some of the 18 could be subjected to probe not yet made public), it is possible that the CCP authorities could attempt to obscure the scale of military purges and avoid inflicting greater political self-damage by scrapping public announcements of further anti-corruption moves involving the military. Instead, the authorities could handle military anti-corruption cases quietly and conduct a broader reshuffle at the 21st Party Congress.

iv) The Fourth Plenum skipping several military alternates and not adding new members to the CMC (the CMC has just four members, down from seven at the start of its term) shows that Xi Jinping presently harbors deep distrust towards the PLA.

Going forward, Xi will likely endeavor to groom a new batch of senior officers whose loyalties he can trust. Xi could also step up political study sessions in the military to indoctrinate the troops in loyalty towards the Party and himself, as well as occupy their time and energy so that rebellious elements in the PLA will have fewer opportunities to oppose him.

Over time, Xi’s efforts to ensure “absolute loyalty” to his person will leave him increasingly isolated and detached from reality as officials scramble to pay lip service and scrub out negative information in their reports. Xi will find himself with even fewer officials whom he can trust, and his paranoia is likely to deepen further. While Xi is preoccupied with “rectifying” the military and ensuring its loyalty to him, Beijing could step up non-military and “soft” power approaches to achieving “reunification” with Taiwan.

  2   PRC gov’t, military rush to undertake political indoctrination post-plenum

  Post-Fourth Plenum political mobilization begins

Within 24 hours after the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, Party Central and various government departments immediately launched a political campaign aimed at indoctrinating officials in the “spirit of the plenum.” The political campaign calls for “full-coverage training” and tiered indoctrination to “rapidly ignite” a “learning wave” across the entire CCP and Chinese society.

Oct. 23
The Central Propaganda Department held a televised teleconference in Beijing on the evening of the Fourth Plenum’s conclusion that focused on studying, propagandizing, and implementing the spirit of the plenum. Central Propaganda Department head Li Shulei attended the teleconference and delivered a speech.

The teleconference stated that the 15th Five-Year Plan adopted at the Fourth Plenum represents a “top-level design and strategic blueprint for the next five years of development.” The Plan demonstrates how “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” will lead the entire Party and nation to continue writing new chapters of the “two great miracles” — rapid economic development and long-term social stability. It emphasized that the Plan would have a significant and far-reaching impact on the development of the Party and the nation.

The teleconference also stressed the need to rapidly create a nationwide wave of studying and implementing the “spirit of the plenum” across the entire Party and Chinese society.

Oct. 24
1. PRC premier Li Qiang chaired a meeting of the State Council Party Leadership Group to study and implement the spirit of the Fourth Plenum. The meeting said that studying and implementing the “spirit of the plenum” is a major political task both now and in the future. Also, the State Council and its departments must unify their thinking and actions with General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important speeches and the plenum’s decisions, and steadily carry out the economic and social development tasks of the 15th Five-Year Plan period.

2. Li Qiang presided over a meeting of the State Council’s leadership group responsible for drafting the outline of the 15th Five-Year Plan. In a speech at the meeting, Li said that the State Council must thoroughly study and implement Xi Jinping’s important instructions and Party Central’s strategic deployments, and fully integrate them into the drafting of the plan’s outline.

Li added that it is necessary to strengthen holistic thinking, accurately grasp the historical position of the 15th Five-Year Plan, correctly understand the domestic and international situations, maintain strategic composure, fully anticipate potential external shocks, and make proper preparations to firmly maintain the initiative in development.

3. He Lifeng, director of the Office of the Central Financial Commission, attended a meeting on studying and implementing the “spirit of the Fourth Plenum” within the financial system. In a speech at the meeting, He stressed that studying, propagandizing, and implementing the “spirit of the plenum” is a major political task for the financial system both now and in the coming period. Therefore, the financial system should rapidly ignite a “learning wave,” organize “full-coverage training” in a tiered, phased, and batched manner, and ensure the “spirit of the plenum” deeply resonates and takes root throughout the entire system.

He also emphasized the need to solidly complete financial work for the fourth quarter of 2025, closely monitor risks, and strictly prevent major financial blowups.

4. Li Xi, secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, presided over a meeting of the Standing Committee of the 20th CCDI to convey and study the spirit of the Fourth Plenum.

Li said that discipline inspection and supervisory organs must thoroughly study and implement the “spirit of the plenum,” more firmly uphold the “Two Establishes” and resolutely achieve the “Two Safeguards,” and effectively unify their thinking and actions with the decisions and deployments of Party Central. He also urged discipline inspection and supervisory organs to “persistently advance the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and ensure the implementation of the CCP’s ‘self-revolution’ requirements.”

5. Zhao Leji, chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, presided over a meeting of the Party Leadership Group of the NPC Standing Committee to convey and study Xi Jinping’s important speech at the Fourth Plenum and the “spirit of the plenum.”

The meeting emphasized that the Party Leadership Group of the NPC Standing Committee, the Party leadership groups of NPC organs, and the Party organizations of its special committees at all levels must conscientiously and thoroughly study Xi’s important speech, report, explanations, and the proposals and communiqué adopted at the Fourth Plenum. They must fully and accurately understand the “spirit of the plenum,” resolutely support its decisions, and consciously unify their thinking and actions with Party Central’s decisions and deployments.

The meeting also stated that the NPC must consciously adhere to the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central, and through practical actions, uphold the “Two Establishes” and achieve the “Two Safeguards” to ensure that Party Central’s decisions and deployments are fully implemented in the NPC’s work.

6. Wang Huning, chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, presided over a meeting of the Party Leadership Group of the CPPCC to convey and study the “spirit of the Fourth Plenum.”

The meeting emphasized that the CPPCC must regard the study, propagandization, and implementation of the “spirit of the plenum” as a major political task. The CPPCC must also deeply understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” strengthen the “Four Consciousnesses,” reinforce the “Four Confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards.” It must also grasp Party Central’s correct assessment of domestic and international situations, as well as the major significance, guiding principles, key strategies, and fundamental guarantees of economic and social development during the 15th Five-Year Plan period. Furthermore, the CPPCC must ensure that its thinking and actions align with the “spirit of the plenum,” and implement it throughout all aspects of the CPPCC’s consultative work.

The meeting also reviewed and approved the “Work Plan of the Party Leadership Group of the CPPCC on Deeply Studying, Propagandizing, and Implementing the Spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.”

7. Wang Dongming, vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the NPC and chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions, presided over and delivered a speech at the Sixth Chairpersons’ Meeting (expanded) of the 18th ACFTU Executive Committee.

Wang pointed out that the ACFTU and trade unions at all levels must deeply study, propagandize, and implement the spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, and effectively align their thoughts and actions with Xi Jinping’s important speech and the “spirit of the plenum.” The ACFTU must also uphold the Party’s overall leadership over trade union work.

8. The CCP Central Committee held a press conference to introduce and interpret the spirit of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.

Officials at the press conference stated that Xi Jinping personally served as the head of the drafting group for Party Central’s proposal on “formulating the 15th Five-Year Plan for national economic and social development,” and provided guidance throughout the process. The officials describe the proposal as a “major programmatic document of the Party,” with “scientific and precise guiding principles, clear objectives, and pragmatic measures, exerting a profound and far-reaching impact on Chinese-style modernization.

  Official PRC media’s post-Fourth Plenum propaganda

Oct. 23
State mouthpiece Xinhua published a series of “quick commentary and learning” (學習快評) articles overnight to interpret and promote the “spirit of the Fourth Plenum.”

The commentaries are titled:

• “Unswervingly Promote High-Quality Development”
• “Breaking New Ground Through Reform and Innovation”
• “Ensuring That the Achievements of Modernization Better Benefit the People”
• “Creating New Miracles Under the Strong Leadership of the Party”

Oct. 24
Party mouthpiece People’s Daily published an editorial titled “Striving to Open Up a New Chapter in the Construction of Chinese-Style Modernization.”

The editorial stated that the 15th Five-Year Plan is a programmatic document crucial to ensuring decisive progress toward “basically achieving socialist modernization.” The editorial further emphasized that the new and major achievements of the Party and the nation fundamentally stem from the leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core and from the scientific guidance of Xi Jinping Thought.

The editorial concluded that practice has fully proven that the “Two Establishes” hold decisive significance for China in addressing various risks and challenges, and in advancing the cause of Chinese-style modernization.

  PLA Daily’s post-Fourth Plenum editorial

Oct. 24
The PLA Daily published an editorial titled, “Resolutely Safeguard the Political Nature of the People’s Army.”

The main points of the piece are as follows:

• The editorial wrote that the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee had reviewed and approved disciplinary actions against several senior military officers, including He Weidong and Miao Hua. This demonstrates Party Central and the Central Military Commission’s determination to pursue anti-corruption work with “no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance.” The editorial then called on the entire military to “firmly support the decisions of Party Central, unify thought and understanding, strengthen confidence and resolve, maintain a high degree of unity with Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core in ideology, politics, and action, and resolutely follow the command of Party Central, the CMC, and Chairman Xi.”
• The editorial emphasized that the PLA is a military created and led by the Party, and is tasked with defending the “red regime” (保衛紅色江山). The military must therefore uphold the fundamental principle and system of the Party’s absolute leadership over the military (“the Party commands the gun”). Since the 18th Party Congress, Xi has “turned the tide, rectified the military, and pursued strict governance of the Party and the military with unprecedented determination and intensity,” and has achieved “historic progress in building a politically loyal military in the new era.”
• The editorial argued that because the military “holds the gun,” there must be no place for corrupt elements within it. It added that amid “complex and profound changes in global, national, Party, and military conditions,” the CCP faces “four major tests” (governance, reform and opening up, market economy, and external environment) and “four dangers” (lack of vigor, incompetence, detachment from the people, and passivity and corruption). Further, the PLA faces “complex and intricate political tests, with numerous factors that undermine the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and erode the political character of the people’s army still present in reality.” The investigation and removal of corrupt figures such as He Weidong and Miao Hua has eliminated major political risks.
• The editorial stated that political rectification of the military must be deepened continuously, and leading cadres — especially senior ones — must take fallen corrupt officials as cautionary examples. Also, the principle of political military-building should be implemented throughout the planning and execution process of military work.
• Finally, the editorial called on the entire military to unite even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, to adhere to Xi Jinping Thought as the guiding principle, fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and its plenary sessions, deeply carry out Xi Jinping Thought on Strengthening the Military, fully grasp the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” strengthen the “Four Consciousnesses,” fortify the “Four Confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards.” The editorial also urged the military to adhere to the CMC Chairman Responsibility System, and “always remain loyal to the core, embrace the core, safeguard the core, and defend the core” (i.e. the Xi “core” leadership).

  Our take

1. We see several reasons why the CCP has hastily rolled out a sweeping political campaign to study and implement the “spirit of the plenum” immediately following the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee:

• The urgency at which the campaign was rolled out suggests that the Xi leadership is feeling immense pressure from mounting domestic and international troubles, and believes that the CCP regime’s best chance of surviving its struggles lies with all officials getting on the same page as the Xi leadership as possible, uniting firmly around “Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core,” and duly implementing Party Central’s decisions and deployments.
• The campaign partially seeks to consolidate Xi’s “quan wei” both inside and outside the Party.
• The campaign is likely intended to build on post-Beijing military parade propaganda in talking up Xi’s “achievements” and portraying him as an indispensable leader in guiding the PRC’s development who must remain in office for another term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027.
• The campaign serves to deflect some attention away from the problems plaguing the regime and keep officials occupied to suppress dissent.
• The campaign will indirectly and partially allow the Xi leadership to avoid accountability for governance failures by spinning Xi Jinping’s missteps into “success” and crafting a narrative of dependence on Xi’s personal “wisdom.”
• The propaganda thrust alongside the political campaign is an effort at generating so-called “positive energy” to reshape public perception about growing crises in China and bleak development prospects into one where a united CCP and a confident Xi lead the PRC towards a brighter future.

Yet cracks in the Xi leadership’s facade of optimism can be glimpsed from the various announcements about the launch of the “spirit of the plenum” campaign:

• Propaganda chief Li Shulei’s efforts to credit Xi Jinping with the “two great miracles” rings hollow in view of China’s rapid economic slowdown, rising unemployment, and a real estate sector in deep slump. The lack of genuine reform and opening-up in the 15th Five-Year Plan also does little to boost confidence.
• Premier Li Qiang remarks about “anticipating external shocks” and the need to “maintain strategic composure” in two separate meetings implicitly acknowledges that the PRC is facing an increasingly hostile global environment and is facing domestic economic fragility. Instead of offering concrete solutions, Li attributed recovery to “Xi Jinping’s steadfast leadership” — a move that highlights the Xi leadership’s helplessness in dealing with the PRC’s current problems.
• Vice premier He Lifeng’s talk of “closely monitoring risks” and “strictly preventing major financial blowups” is an indirect acknowledgment of China’s financial vulnerabilities. While the campaign to study and implement the “spirit of the plenum” is intended to will financial stability into being, the political mobilization could have the opposite effect of heightening market anxiety as investors recognize that the CCP is resorting to enforced ideological compliance in lieu of workable technical policy action.
• Anti-corruption head Li Xi’s call to “persistently advance the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and ensure the implementation of the CCP’s ‘self-revolution’ requirements” indicates that the anti-corruption apparatus will follow Xi Jinping’s directives to monitor the loyalty of officials at all levels and purge dissenting elements.
• NPC head Zhao Leji and CPPCC chief Wang Huning both emphasized the need to adhere to Xi Jinping’s political theories and rally around Party Central when implementing the “spirit of the plenum.” The uniformity in their statements appears to hint at a performative element — two ex-Jiang Zemin faction officials making ritualized declarations of loyalty to Xi to safeguard their personal political survival.

2. The PLA Daily’s Oct. 24 editorial indicates that while there might be disloyal and corrupt elements in the PLA, the military remains very much under Xi Jinping’s control.

The editorial hints at the lingering political dissent towards Xi in the military by noting that the PLA faces “complex and intricate political tests, with numerous factors that undermine the Party’s absolute leadership over the military and erode the political character of the people’s army still present in reality.” The editorial then implies that senior military officers like He Weidong and Miao Hua were purged due to loyalty issues by noting that investigating them “eliminated major political risks.” The editorial also implicitly indicates that Xi’s control over the Party’s “gun” could potentially be undermined when there is corruption and disloyalty in the ranks, and therefore the military must put up with anti-corruption work with “no forbidden zones, full coverage, and zero tolerance” until the issue has been rectified. This in turn suggests that political purges targeting the PLA will likely continue for some time after the removal of the nine generals.

The editorial also subtly exhorts the PLA to be loyal not just to the Party, but also to Xi Jinping personally. Notably, the editorial instructs the PLA to “resolutely follow the command of Party Central, the CMC, and Chairman Xi,” as well as “always remain loyal to the core, embrace the core, safeguard the core, and defend the core” that is Xi. The editorial justifies the need for the military to be loyal to Xi by casting him in a “savior” role — Xi is the one who “turned the tide, rectified the military, and pursued strict governance of the Party and the military with unprecedented determination and intensity” since the 18th Party Congress, achieving “historic progress in building a politically loyal military in the new era.”

3. The post-Fourth Plenum propaganda drive and political mobilization campaign are likely to see only superficial success in improving governing efficacy and resolving the many crises facing the CCP regime. Outwardly, officials will put on diligent displays of loyalty and adherence to Party Central’s decisions and deployments. However, the actual implementation of Beijing’s policies are likely to make limited progress as officials prioritize avoiding blame and accruing very modest “achievements” over taking initiative and risking subsequent failure.

Meanwhile, the Xi leadership will continue to suffer angst over the military’s loyalty and corruption problems regardless of how thoroughly it undertakes anti-corruption operations because those issues are deeply rooted and endemic. Sustained purges, however, will only increase Xi and the military’s paranoia towards each other, affecting the military’s performance and Xi’s trust in the PLA to undertake critical operations.