What the probe of former CSRC chief Yi Huiman says about Xi’s political ambitions

  1   What the probe of former CSRC chief Yi Huiman says about Xi’s political ambitions

  Former securities regulatory chief probed

On Sept. 6, the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection and the National Supervisory Commission announced that Yi Huiman, the deputy director of the economic committee of the 14th Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, is under investigation.

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Yi Huiman, 61, previously succeeded Liu Shiyu to serve as chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission between January 2019 to February 2024. Prior to that, Yi spent the bulk of his career at the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (1985 to 2019) where he eventually served as bank president and chairman.

During Yi’s tenure at the CSRC, the CCP authorities launched the STAR Market (Shanghai Stock Exchange Science and Technology Innovation Board) and the Beijing Stock Exchange; implemented a comprehensive registration-based IPO system; and introduced new delisting rules. The Shanghai Composite Index also rose from 2,601 to 2,829 points (up 8.76 percent) during Yi’s time at the CSRC, but fell below the 3,000-point at closing time 20 times.

Under Yi, China’s A-share market saw rapid expansion. A total of 1,909 companies were newly listed, including 620 on the ChiNext and 570 on the STAR Market. Those two pilot markets for the registration-based IPO system accounted for 62 percent of all listings during Yi’s tenure. The wave of IPOs drained 2.2 trillion yuan in market liquidity, leading to heavy losses for retail investors.

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According to mainland media reports, Yi Huiman’s case involves systemic corruption in the financial sector, as well as collusion between officials and businesses. The reports added that Yi was implicated by Zhu Congjiu, the former vice governor (in charge of finance) of Zhejiang who was placed under investigation in May 2023. Zhu has accepted bribes totaling more than 105 million yuan — ordinarily a death penalty offense — but he received a life sentence in November 2024 after providing key evidence of corruption networks within the financial system. His testimony exposed collusion between banks, brokerages, private equity firms, and senior CSRC officials through a “politics-banking-private equity cooperation model,” including illegal lending and project collusion.

Mainland media said Zhu Congjiu’s confession triggered a chain reaction. Between 2023 and 2025, six bank heads in Zhejiang fell, including Guo Xingang (Bank of China), Feng Jianlong (Agricultural Bank of China), Gao Qiang (China Construction Bank), Shen Rongqin (ICBC), Yu Liming (Hangzhou Bank), and Shen Renkang (Zheshang Bank). Senior executives at CICC Capital (including Ding Wei and An Yuan) were also investigated. A 30-billion-yuan outsourced investment scandal revealed evidence of benefit transfers involving Yi Huiman’s family.

Some mainland media outlets reported that a total of 37 senior executives from A-share listed companies have been placed under investigation and detained by supervisory authorities since the start of 2025, a record-high figure for the time frame. Previously, around 31 company chairpersons or senior executives were detained in the whole of 2023, while 51 were detained in the whole of 2024.

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Yi Huiman’s three predecessors as CSRC head — Liu Shiyu, Xiao Gang, and Guo Shuqing — all served less than three years.

• Guo Shuqing was succeeded by Xiao Gang in March 2013. He was then parachuted into Shandong as governor, later returning to finance as vice governor of the People’s Bank of China and chairman of the China Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission. He is now a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and deputy director of the NPC finance and economics committee. In August 2025, rumors circulated that Guo was under investigation, but mainland media reported that Guo had attended and delivered a speech at a Swiss Chamber of Commerce awards banquet on August 27.
• Xiao Gang was replaced by Liu Shiyu in February 2016 and was appointed to a “second-line” role as a member of the CPPCC economic committee.
• Liu Shiyu was succeeded by Yi Huiman in January 2019, and was transferred to serve as head of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives. In May 2019, Liu voluntarily turned himself in for corruption investigations, and was later found guilty of abusing his power for personal gain and making improper personnel arrangements in the financial system. Liu was placed on a two-year probation within the Party and removed from office, but resurfaced in July 2023 as a “consultant of the PBoC’s head office,” according to semi-official mainland media The Paper.

  Xi’s ‘rectification’ of the financial sector

Beijing’s anti-corruption efforts focusing on China’s financial sector deepened after the 20th Party Congress (October 2022). Xi Jinping repeatedly spoke about the need to prioritize combating corruption in the financial sector at CCDI plenary sessions and related meetings. The anti-corruption agencies then engaged in a “tough and protracted battle” against corruption in the financial sector through plenary meetings, communiqués, and special deployments.

Some key developments include:

• Jan. 9, 2023: At the 2nd plenary session of the 20th CCDI, Xi Jinping stressed that, from the perspective of the CCP’s long-term governance and regime stability, corruption must be prevented and controlled in a scientific and effective manner. He added that financial anti-corruption must be incorporated into the overall framework of strict Party governance, reiterating a “zero tolerance” stance. The meeting communiqué called for deepening anti-corruption in key areas such as finance and for cracking down on collusion between officials and businesses.
• Oct. 2023: At the Central Financial Work Conference, Xi delivered a speech emphasizing the need to “comprehensively strengthen financial anti-corruption.” He introduced the “Four Returns” (finance must return to its original purpose, the real economy, professionalism, and risk prevention and control), linking anti-corruption with the prevention and resolution of financial risks, and framing anti-corruption work as a safeguard for regime financial security. This was the first dedicated financial work meeting since the 20th Party Congress, and marked the start of a systemic phase of financial anti-corruption.
• Jan. 8, 2024: At the 3rd plenary session of the 20th CCDI, Xi emphasized the need to advance the Party’s self-revolution further and to resolutely win the “tough and protracted battle” against corruption. He specifically highlighted deepening anti-corruption work in the financial sector, state-owned enterprises, energy, and pharmaceuticals, as well as severely punishing bribery and new forms of corruption. The communiqué reaffirmed the “overwhelming victory” in financial anti-corruption and called for consolidating its achievements.
• Dec. 9, 2024: The Politburo held a meeting to hear the CCDI and National Supervisory Commission’s work report and to plan Party discipline and anti-corruption work for 2025. Xi chaired the meeting and stressed the need to continue deepening anti-corruption efforts in the financial sector and other sectors, integrating it with economic governance to guard against systemic risks.
• Jan. 6, 2025: At the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th CCDI, Xi stressed the need to govern the Party with the spirit of reform and strict standards, to resolutely fight the overall battle of anti-corruption, and to further expand anti-corruption in finance, state-owned enterprises, tobacco, and pharmaceuticals. He also called for serious investigations of official-business collusion. The communiqué reaffirmed the institutionalization of financial anti-corruption.
• Jan. 13, 2025: The National Financial Regulatory Administration (NFRA) held a meeting on comprehensive and strict Party governance. The meeting studied Xi’s Jan. 6 speech at the 4th Plenary Session of the 20th CCDI. It also emphasized internal cracking down on corruption in the financial system, strict investigation of violations, integration with targeted warning education, and efforts to reduce bureaucratic and personal-interests-driven practices in financial regulation.

More broadly, anti-corruption work in the financial sector has been incorporated into the framework of “comprehensively strengthening financial anti-corruption” after the 20th Party Congress. Key priorities include reviewing local corporate banks and provincial branch executives, tracing shadow relationship networks, and tracking outsourced investment activities. New institutions were set up to strengthen Beijing’s regulation of finance — the NFRA was established in 2023, and the Central Financial Work Commission was set up in 2024 to strengthen digital supervision and lifelong accountability.

According to the CCDI/NSC website and media statistics, more than 320 officials and executives in the financial system (including banking, securities, insurance, and regulatory agencies) have been investigated from the 20th Party Congress to the present (October 2022 to September 2025).

  Our take

Aside from mopping up loose ends in a “tough and protracted battle” against corruption in the financial sector, the purge of Yi Huiman suggests that factional struggle between the Xi Jinping camp and elements in the CCP who oppose Xi — chief of which is the remnant Jiang Zemin faction — is still ongoing behind the scenes well into Xi’s third term in office. Xi appears to be using the case against Yi to keep “anti-Xi” forces on their toes ahead of the 21st Party Congress and pave the way politically to ensure that taking a fourth term as Party boss is a fait accompli.

1. Corruption in China’s financial sector has deep roots and is closely connected with powerful CCP interest groups. Particularly when the Jiang Zemin faction was in ascendance (1997 to 2012) and as recently as during Xi Jinping’s first two terms, Party and business elites saw the capital market as their personal “cash machine.” The elites’ wealth extraction was done through proxies or “white gloves,” and would often come at the cost of heightening the PRC’s financial risks and endangering regime security.

While the financial sector was a hotbed of corruption, the involvement of CCP political elites also meant that Xi had to move gradually and cautiously to “rectify” the sector during his tenure. The anti-corruption campaign barely made any headway into the financial sector in Xi’s first term as he had to consolidate control over key apparatuses, acquire “core” leadership, and secure his grip on power. Xi would move more boldly to tackle financial sector corruption and take on elite interest groups in his second term, including:

• Investigating the “white gloves” and “money bags” of the Jiang faction and other elites like Tomorrow Group’s Xiao Jianhua, CEFC China Energy’s Ye Jianming, and Anbang’s Wu Xiaohui. In 2017, Xi Jinping noted in a speech that “around every power center gathers a group of vested interests who depend on it. These people monopolize resources and reap huge profits because of their proximity to power. They may be powerful elites, or ‘white gloves’ — middlemen who collude with power at the margins.”
• Suspending the IPOs of Ant Group and Didi Chuxing. Both companies are linked with the Jiang faction; in particular, Ant Group’s shareholders including Jiang Zemin’s grandson Alvin Jiang Zhicheng, Jia Qinglin’s son-in-law Li Botan, Fosun chairman Guo Guangchang, Giant Network’s Shi Yuzhu, and Oceanwide Holdings’ Lu Zhiqiang.
• Cracked down on capital-heavy sectors such as technology, private education, and gaming. By June 2022, economist and former People’s Bank of China adviser David Li Daokui declared at the UOB Private Bank forum that “the political influence of internet companies is now nil” and the worries of senior officials have been dispelled.

Xi’s financial sector “rectification” effort was not without pushback. The career ups and downs of former CSRC head and Xi ally Liu Shiyu suggest that his ousting could have been linked to fierce factional fighting in the backdrop:

• Liu Shiyu replaced Xiao Gang as chairman of the CSRC in February 2016 in what appeared to be Xi’s nascent attempt to gradually reclaim control over the financial sector after 2015 stock market turbulence. Observers at the time believed that the market turbulence was a “financial coup” by the Jiang faction against the Xi leadership. During Liu Shiyu’s three years at the CSRC, the number of administrative penalties and the amounts of fines reached record highs.
• December 2016: Liu delivered his famous “monster” speech about China’s stock market. Liu said, “I hope asset managers do not behave like debauched tycoons, do not become disruptive monsters, and do not turn into demons that harm the people.”
• Jan. 5, 2017: At an enforcement work symposium, Liu said: “The capital market cannot allow giant crocodiles to manipulate the weather and suck the blood of retail investors,” with “giant crocodiles” being shorthand for corrupt business people like Xiao Jianhua and others. Liu added that the authorities “must plan to capture a batch of these big crocodiles.”
• October 2017 (19th Party Congress): Liu hinted at coup attempts against Xi, accusing several already-disgraced Jiang faction officials of plotting to “seize the Party and usurp power.”
• In 2018, another stock market crash occurred, wiping out 13.9 trillion yuan (about USD 2.02 trillion) in market value by December 28. On Jan. 26, 2019, Liu was reassigned as deputy Party secretary and director of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives.
• In May 2019, Liu voluntarily surrendered for investigation and later received clemency.
• Liu Shiyu was replaced at the CSRC by Yi Huiman. Yi, who rose steadily up the ranks of the ICBC during the Jiang-Hu era and is likely favored by the CCP elites with interests in the financial sector and who oppose Xi, proceeded to facilitate official-business collusion and other corrupt activities. It is possible that Xi Jinping’s hands were tied on Yi’s appointment as he sought leniency for his ally Liu in negotiating with the “anti-Xi” elements in the Party elite who could have a hand in creating the conditions that led to Liu’s ouster (the stock market crash in 2018).

Meanwhile, the surge in attacks and “misfortunes” against Xi and his allies — both inside and outside China — since early 2022 and extending into Xi’s third term could partly be the result of retaliatory actions by the princelings and other CCP elite whose interests were hurt by Xi’s financial anti-corruption drive. Notably:

• Early 2022: “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping,” an over 42,000 character-long article highly critical of Xi and favorable to Bo Xilai and the Jiang faction, went viral online overseas.
  2023: Xi ally Qin Gang (foreign minister) and loyalist Li Shangfu (defense minister) were disgraced and investigated within a few short months after taking office at the 20th Party Congress.
• Shortly after, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force was rocked by a serious corruption scandal, forcing Xi to purge generals he had personally promoted and vetted. Those incidents caused Xi major embarrassment and eroded his “quan wei” (authority and prestige).
• July 2024: Rumors of Xi “losing power” began to circulate. Such rumors, which often die out very fast, continue to be circulated today.
• November 2024: Miao Hua, a close associate of Xi and a longtime military ally, was purged.

2. The Xi leadership’s handling of the Yi Huiman investigation suggests that he is planning to use the case as political leverage to clear potential obstacles to him taking a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027.

Mainland media reported that former Zhejiang vice governor Zhu Congjiu was the one who implicated Yi Huiman. It is likely that Zhu implicated Yi sometime between May 2023 and November 2024 when he was sentenced. However, the official investigation of Yi was only announced more than a year after he stepped down as CSRC chairman in February 2024. Technically, the CCP authorities could have publicly announced the probe of Yi much earlier. Zhu was expelled from the Party and removed from office in November 2023, and his case was handed over for judicial prosecution. Once the CCDI completes its investigation and transfers the case to the judiciary, it typically has already extracted all that it can from the accused, including incriminating material on others. However, the Xi leadership somehow delayed moving against Yi for almost two years.

A possible reason for the Xi leadership’s belated purge of Yi Huiman emerges in considering regular procedures for corruption investigations. In general, an official is sentenced about one to one-and-a-half years after their investigation is made public. This means that the CCDI will likely conclude its probe of Yi around March 2026 and sentencing will occur around September 2026. With the official verdict of Yi’s case expected to arrive just around the Beidaihe work retreat (July-August 2026) and the Fifth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee (likely fourth quarter of 2026, focusing on Party-building and ideology), Xi will have an opportunity to proverbially dangle the incriminating evidence gathered from Yi’s case over the heads of Party princelings and leave them no choice but to accept his “re-election” as CCP boss come 2027.

Once internal Party consensus on Xi’s fourth term is reached, the Xi leadership can oversee key personnel reshuffles for local government leadership positions between October 2026 and February 2027 so as to lock in members and alternate members for the new Central Committee. The political leverage that Xi would likely gain through the Yi Huiman case and other potential corruption cases connected with “anti-Xi” forces will serve as a powerful deterrent and grant Xi greater influence over personnel appointments.

If Xi is successful in removing obstacles to his bid for a fourth term in 2026, then the proceedings at the Sixth Plenum of the 20th Party Congress — which sets the personnel arrangements for the 21st Party Congress — will be a formality in his favor. (Note: The Sixth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee should be the Seventh Plenum. But since the Fourth Plenum was delayed, the 20th Central Committee is unlikely to convene a Seventh Plenum.)

  What’s next

The Xi leadership is likely to step up its rectification of the financial sector in seeking to lower both financial and political risks. This could lead to the purge of more “tigers” and “giant crocodiles” before the 21st Party Congress.