1 Zhong Shaojun’s defense university post hints at his career prospects, current political dynamics in the CCP
New post of key PLA political officer revealed
In an Aug. 19 Facebook post, the Singapore defense ministry wrote that the country’s permanent secretary for defense Chan Heng Kee met with PRC defense minister Dong Jun and several senior leaders from the People’s Liberation Army during a working visit to Beijing from Aug. 18 to Aug. 19. The senior leaders included PLA deputy chief of joint staff Xu Qiling, PLA Academy of Military Sciences president Yang Xuejun, and PLA National Defense University political commissar Zhong Shaojun.
Backdrop
A pro-Beijing media outlet in Hong Kong reported in April 2024 that then-Central Military Commission General Office director Zhong Shaojun had been appointed as PLA National Defense University political commissar. The media outlet added that Fang Yongxiang, the deputy political commissar of the Southern Theater Command and political commissar of the PLA Ground Force, had replaced Zhong as CMC General Office director.
Zhong’s appointment as political commissar of the PLA National Defense University had not been publicly reported on or confirmed until the Singapore defense ministry’s recent Facebook post. This is in line with the CCP authorities’ apparent move from the 19th Party Congress to greatly restrict the information available publicly on personnel changes in the PLA.
Because Zhong Shaojun is regarded as an ally of Xi Jinping, overseas Chinese commentators who argue that Xi is “losing power” view his move out of the CMC General Office as a sign of Xi’s “power lost.”
Our take
1. Zhong Shaojun’s transfer out from the CMC General Office and appointment as political commissar of the PLA National Defense University is likely not a sign that he is being sidelined because Xi Jinping’s grip on power is weakening. Rather, the move appears to be an effort by Xi to further consolidate his control over the political work apparatus in the PLA (and therefore, the entire military) through personnel reshuffles.
2. In the Nov. 10, 2024 newsletter, we analyzed that if then-rumors about Zhong Shaojun’s new appointment were true, then it is possible that Xi Jinping is preparing to elevate him to full general given that all past political commissars and presidents of the National Defense University eventually obtained the general rank. We also noted that Zhong could potentially be made CMC Political Work Department director since the position was vacant with the purge of Miao Hua. Below, we will expand on our earlier analyses.
Zhong Shaojun is a long-time political aide of Xi Jinping. When Xi was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007, Zhong would follow him to the central government and worked in the CCP General Office. After the 18th Party Congress, Zhong would be “parachuted” into the CMC General Office, serving as deputy director and then director. Zhong’s background as a civilian official and lack of military experience, however, meant that it would be hard for Xi’s trusted overseer in the military to rise further; Zhong has been stuck at the lieutenant general rank since December 2019. But Zhong’s transfer to the National Defense University appears to set him up to receive the general rank on a technicality.
We believe that Zhong could become full general as early as 2026, or around the 21st Party Congress period at the latest. At that point, he would be eligible to become CMC Political Work Department director and possibly join the CMC around the 21st Party Congress period.
For Xi, having a trusted confidant lead political work in the military is crucial since the CMC Political Work Department oversees ideological indoctrination across the armed forces and conducts political vetting for promotions of senior officers. Unlike Miao Hua, Xi likely does not have to worry about Zhong Shaojun tapping political networks and forming “cliques and factions” as the latter has shallow roots in the PLA, is likely not well-regarded among senior officers in the PLA given that he was “parachuted” in as a civilian, and is still relatively young (56) for his position. In contrast, Miao was a career military officer who rose through the ranks during the Jiang Zemin-Hu Jintao era when the Jiang faction saw that officers who were sufficiently corrupt or were aligned with their interests had good career prospects.
What’s next
If Xi Jinping indeed plans to eventually install Zhong Shaojun as CMC Political Work Department director, then there is an increased chance that current CMC Discipline Inspection Commission secretary Zhang Shengmin could be elevated to CMC vice chairman. Those personnel changes would foreshadow a major reshuffle of the PLA leadership, with some generals being made to retire early, some transfers of senior military leaders from theater commands to the CMC, and the purge of others.
2 ‘Whole military’ symposium in Beijing underscores Xi’s control over the PLA
On Aug. 26, PRC state media reported that a “whole military” symposium to commemorate the “80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese people’s War of Resistance against Japanese aggression and the World Anti-facist War” was held in Beijing with Xi Jinping’s approval.
Central Military Commission vice chairman Zhang Youxia attended the symposium and delivered a speech emphasizing the following key points:
- Promote the spirit of resistance: Deeply study and implement Xi Jinping’s important instructions, draw lessons from history, consolidate the will to strengthen the military, and strive to achieve the centennial goal of building the armed forces.
- Strengthen Party leadership: Fully recognize the Party’s so-called role as the “mainstay” (中流砥柱) during the War of Resistance, consolidate the fundamental advantage of “the Party commanding the gun,” advance “political army-building,” and ensure that the military always “obeys the Party’s command and follows the Party’s lead.”
- Enhance military capability: Develop strategies and tactics of people’s war, conduct comprehensive training and combat preparations, and innovate in operational methods and training approaches.
- Advance modernization: Accelerate the modernization of national defense and the armed forces through deepened reforms, self-reliance in science and technology, and military governance to achieve high-quality development.
- Inherit revolutionary traditions: Strengthen the spirit of sacrifice, dedication, and practical struggle, and preserve the integrity and character of revolutionary soldiers.
- Safeguard world peace: Defend the hard-won victory of peace and justice, uphold a “correct” view of World War II history, maintain the postwar international order, and promote the building of a community with a shared future for mankind.
Backdrop
1. During Xi Jinping’s visit to Tibet, advocates of the “Xi losing power” narrative made several military-related speculations, including:
- Both Fang Yongxiang (director of the CMC General Office) and Wang Kai (commander of the Tibet Military Region) were not in an official group photo of Xi and military officers and troops stationed in Tibet. This led some overseas Chinese commentators to speculate that Xi is essentially a “commander without troops” (光桿司令) as three successive directors of the CMC General Office appear to have run into problems.
- Some overseas Chinese commentators argue that Beijing not having announced who would serve as chief commander for Xi’s military parade on Sept. 3, 2025 is a sign of Xi’s weakened control over the People’s Liberation Army. By convention, the head of the Central Theater Command would be designated as parade commander. However, that position has been vacant since August 2024 following the transfer of former commander Huang Ming to the Northern Theater Command.
- Some overseas Chinese commentators speculated that Zhang Youxia, whom they argue has “real” control over the military, may ride in the same vehicle with Xi Jinping to review the troops.
2. After concluding his Tibet trip, Xi Jinping held two diplomatic meetings in Beijing on Aug. 26:
- Xi and his wife met with Cambodian King Norodom Sihamoni and Queen Mother Norodom Monineath Sihanouk at Chunyi Zhai in Zhongnanhai. Chunyi Zhai is the same venue where Xi met Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko in June 2025.
- Xi also met with Vyacheslav Volodin, chairman of the Russian State Duma, at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing.
Our take
1. Rumors and speculation about Xi Jinping “losing power” continue to swirl post-Beidaihe despite the absence of any evidence of abnormalities in the CCP’s power operations or propaganda. We previously analyzed from Party propaganda, official documents, and other publicly available information that Xi’s political position remains stable (see here, here, and here).
The recent “whole military” symposium to mark the CCP’s efforts in the Second World War affirms our assessment of Xi’s political situation. Official reporting about the symposium makes it clear that it was held with Xi’s approval, while CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia emphasized the need to “deeply study and implement Xi Jinping’s important instructions” in his speech at the gathering. This shows that Zhang is firmly subordinate to Xi and does not have “real” power over the PLA as the “Xi losing power” camp has asserted.
2. Zhang Youxia not accompanying Xi Jinping to Tibet to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the Tibet Autonomous Region does not signal political discord between the two. There are several more plausible reasons, including Zhang’s health being unsuitable for his stay in a high-altitude region (Zhang is also 75 this year; in contrast, Zhang Shengmin, the CMC member who joined Xi in Tibet, is 67), and Zhang being occupied with other important tasks, including undertaking preparations for the Sept. 3 parade.
Meanwhile, CMC General Office director Fang Yongxiang not joining Xi in Tibet also does not necessarily mean that he is in trouble. With the Sept. 3 military parade just around the corner, Fang and other senior officials would be engaged in extensive preparations and rehearsals.
It is also not unusual that the chief commander of the military parade or the Central Theater Command leader — who are likely the same person — has not been publicly disclosed. This is so as the CCP has greatly restricted publicly available information on military personnel changes since the 19th Party Congress, likely to prevent outsiders from discerning too much about the PLA and its operations as it undergoes reforms and modernization.
3. Xi Jinping meeting with Cambodian royal dignitaries at the same venue in Zhongnanhai as where he met Belarusian president Alexander Lukashenko some months earlier further dispels speculation at the time that Xi had “lost power” and was under house arrest. Xi’s travels and freedom of movement since the speculation first made the rounds also greatly undercut its credibility.
