1 Analyzing the CCDI fourth plenum work report
On Feb. 27, state mouthpiece Xinhua published the full text of the work report that Central Commission for Discipline Inspection secretary Li Xi delivered at the fourth plenary session of the 20th CCDI held on Jan. 6, 2025.
In his report, Li said that the main tasks of the plenum were to deeply study and implement Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenums of the 20th Central Committee, summarize the disciplinary inspection and supervision work of 2024, and make deployments for 2025.
When reviewing the anti-corruption work of 2024, Li noted that in the face of a “severe and complex international environment” and the “arduous and heavy task of domestic reform, development, and stability,” Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core led social revolution through “self-revolution,” deployed Party-wide disciplinary education, and comprehensively promoted the strict governance of the Party. Also, the anti-corruption agencies adhered to the guidance of “Xi Jinping Thought,” deeply understood the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” resolutely achieved the “Two Safeguards,” and yielded new achievements in discipline inspection and supervision.
Li noted the following key anti-corruption work in 2024:
- Conducted system-wide intensive training on “Xi Jinping Thought” and “self-revolution.”
- Promoted Party-wide commitment to the “Two Safeguards” through specific, precise, and normalized political supervision.
- Disciplined 12,000 individuals nationwide for violating political discipline.
- Investigated and disciplined 3,375 disciplinary inspection and supervision cadres. Handed out Party and administrative sanctions to 3,917 individuals.
- Handed 107,000 cases of formalism and bureaucratism nationwide. Educated and disciplined 156,000 individuals.
- The CCDI and National Supervisory Commission investigated 92 officials from centrally managed agencies, including Tang Renjian, Tang Yijun, Li Yuefeng, Gou Zhongwen, Wu Yingjie, Li Weiwei, Luo Baoming, and Wu Cunrong. Nationally, 877,000 cases were filed; 38,000 individuals were detained; 889,000 individuals received Party and administrative sanctions, including 17,000 in the financial sector, 94,000 in state-owned enterprises, 3,147 in the tobacco system, and 60,000 in the pharmaceutical sector.
- Under high-pressure anti-corruption deterrence, 25,000 individuals voluntarily turned themselves in to the authorities, and 91,000 voluntarily confessed to their problems.
- Discipline inspection and supervisory agencies nationwide filed cases against 26,000 people for bribery.
- Since the 18th Party Congress, Party Central with Comrade Xi at the core has led the entire CCP to deepen the comprehensive and strict governance of the Party and fight against corruption with a high degree of self-consciousness in “self-revolution” and the mission of “offending thousands to not let down 1.4 billion people,” and has achieved historic results in the fight against corruption.
- At present, the anti-corruption struggle situation remains “severe and complex” … any hesitation, wavering, slackness, or half-hearted efforts would lead to catastrophic mistakes.
When speaking about 2025 deployments, Li Xi said that to effectively carry out anti-corruption work this year, it is necessary for officials to adhere to the guidance of Xi Jinping Thought, fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenums of the 20th Central Committee, deeply study and implement Xi’s important thoughts on “Party-building” and “self-revolution,” profoundly understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” strengthen the “four consciousnesses,” adhere to the “four confidences,” achieve the “Two Safeguards,” and promote comprehensive and strict Party governance.
Li made the following key points for 2025 work anti-corruption work deployments:
- Strengthen political supervision around the major deployments of the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee.
- Maintain the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central over further deepening comprehensive reforms with robust supervision.
- Resolutely investigate and punish individuals and matters that interfere with or undermine reforms.
- Firmly prevent behaviors such as failing to comply with orders, disregarding prohibitions, making selective enforcement, finding shortcuts, and watering down implementation.
- Resolutely guard against disregarding the bigger picture and engaging in departmental or local protectionism.
- Promote the normalization and long-term effectiveness of Party discipline education.
- Regard General Secretary Xi Jinping’s important expositions on comprehensively strengthening Party discipline as the top priority.
- Highlight key targets for discipline education and enhance discipline training for key groups such as leading cadres, young cadres, newly promoted cadres, and cadres in critical positions.
- Rectify and eliminate the root causes of misconduct and corruption.
- Formulate a three-year action plan (2025 to 2027) for building a culture of integrity in the new era.
- Empower the fight against corruption and the rectification of undesirable tendencies with big data and informatization.
- Systemically address prominent issues in areas concerning people’s livelihoods.
- Deepen political inspections using the “Two Safeguards” as the fundamental orientation, identify problems from a political perspective, detect political deviations, eliminate political risks, and ensure political security.
- Deepen the implementation of reforms in the disciplinary inspection and supervision system.
- Strengthen the political responsibility for comprehensive and strict governance of the Party.
In conclusion, Li Xi urged anti-corruption agency personnel to “rally more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core” in advancing the high-quality development of disciplinary inspection and supervision work in the new era and on the new journey.
Our take
1. Li Xi’s work report delivered at the fourth plenary session of the 20th CCDI is the clearest public indication yet that Xi Jinping’s power has not diminished and he remains firmly in charge, contrary to the rumors that have been circulating in Chinese-speaking circles that Xi has “lost power,” ceded control over the military to others, and is on his way out.
The CCDI under the Xi leadership is akin to the Ming Dynasty’s Eastern Depot, the powerful secret police agency with supreme authority to monitor all officials and decide their fates. Therefore, it is politically significant that Li Xi and the CCDI pledged to uphold Xi Jinping’s various political theories and safeguard the “Xi core” during its plenary session. This indicates that Xi remains firmly in charge of the anti-corruption apparatus, and by extension, the military (via the anti-corruption body in the People’s Liberation Army) and the rest of the regime.
2. While Xi Jinping’s paramount position in the Party is currently unshakeable, some of the details in Li Xi’s work report suggest that Xi continues to face intractable problems with corruption in the officialdom and resistance to his rule. For one, the anti-corruption authorities are still handling close to 900,000 cases and punishing about as many officials in a year more than a decade after the anti-corruption campaign was launched.
Even more concerning for Beijing is that the anti-corruption struggle situation is described as “severe and complex.” The regime is seemingly fragile and on a knife’s edge, with the possibility of being undone by the “catastrophic mistakes” of individuals who “interfere with or undermine reforms,” “disregard the bigger picture and engage in departmental or local protectionism,” and “fail to comply with orders, disregard prohibitions, make selective enforcement, find shortcuts, and water down implementation.”
To resolve entrenched corruption and bureaucratic maladies while working within the CCP system, Xi can only resort to intensifying political pressure, indoctrination, stringent political inspections, and purges. Such measures, however, are likely to generate more problems for the Xi leadership in the long run even if they do bring short term results. For instance, the demands of political indoctrination take away time from officials that could be better spent on governance and the pursuit of reforms. Political inspections can also be tedious and time-consuming, and would impact the performance of officials if they are constantly kept paranoid and on edge. The various small inefficiencies caused by the rigors of the anti-corruption campaign are likely to accumulate and lead to greater government dysfunction at the local level. As small issues turn into “catastrophic mistakes,” the PRC’s many economic and social problems would eventually transform into political crises for Xi and the CCP.
2 Xi rolls out five-year indoctrination plan
Feb. 27
PRC state media reported that the CCP General Office had issued a five-year work plan for Party member education and training (全國黨員教育培訓工作規劃 [2024－2028年]; henceforth referred to as the “Plan”) and required all regions and departments to implement the plan conscientiously in accordance with their respective circumstances.
The Plan, which is divided into five sections and 17 articles, including the following noteworthy points:
- “General requirements”
- Adhere to Xi Jinping Thought as the guiding principle, thoroughly implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions, and fully implement Xi’s important thoughts on “Party-building” and “self-revolution.”
- Educate and guide all Party members to deeply understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” strengthen the “four consciousnesses,” adhere to the “four confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards.”
- Achieve greater results in using Xi Jinping Thought to “concentrate their hearts and cast their souls” (凝心鑄魂).
- Fully implement educational tasks over approximately five years and conduct tiered and categorized training for Party members.
- Ensure that Party members participate in at least 20 days or 160 hours of centralized study and training over five years.
- Ensure that grassroots Party organization secretaries participate in at least 35 days or 280 hours of centralized study and education over five years.
- More than 50 percent of total education hours should focus on the Party’s innovative theories.
- “Continuously unify the Party’s thinking, will, and actions with Xi Jinping Thought”
- Deepen study and education. Emphasize the central theme of learning and implementing Xi Jinping Thought. Encourage Party members to read original texts, study original works, and understand fundamental principles by engaging with Xi’s important works, latest speeches, and key discussions.
- Strengthen interpretation and explanation. Launch a series of Party education and training courses on Xi Jinping Thought and guide Party members to gain a thorough understanding of the Party’s innovative theories.
- Establish and implement long-term effective mechanisms.
- “Conduct tiered and categorized specialized training”
- Emphasize the political leadership and tailored guidance of specialized training.
- Conduct targeted training for rural areas, urban communities, government agencies, public institutions, enterprises, and emerging sectors.
- “Enrich the methods and approaches of Party member education and training, and promote the development of an informatized platform for Party member education”
- “Strengthen organizational implementation”
State media said that the Central Military Commission will formulate and implement specific measures based on the Plan for the education and training of Party members in the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police.
Feb. 28
1. State media reported on a Q&A session on the formulation and implementation of the Plan with a person-in-charge from the CCP Organization Department.
The person-in-charge said that both the 20th Party Congress and the third plenary session of the 20th Central Committee made arrangements for Party member education and training. The Organization Department then made a first draft of the Plan, which was reviewed and approved by the Politburo Standing Committee on Nov. 28, 2024.
The person-in-charge said that the Plan highlights the central theme of studying and implementing Xi Jinping Thought throughout its entirety and positions Party member education and training within the broader context of Party-building and organizational work. Over approximately five years, the Plan aims to fully implement the basic tasks specified in the “Regulations on the Education and Management of Party Members” by conducting tiered and categorized, well-organized specialized training to ensure all Party members receive the necessary training.
The person-in-charge also said that the Plan specifically calls for promoting the Marxist style of integrating theory with practice and firmly preventing the phenomena of “superficial loyalty” and “covert opposition.”
2. State media reported that a teleconference seminar on studying and implementing the Plan was held in Beijing on Feb. 27. Li Ganjie, the head of the Organization Department, attended the seminar and delivered a speech.
Backdrop
The Chinese economy faces strong headwinds and the international environment is worsening for the PRC. Concurrently, rumors that Xi Jinping has “lost power” or is “imminently resigning” have been circulating externally.
Our take
1. The Xi leadership’s five-year work plan for Party member education and training appears to be part of the broader “self-revolution” campaign to both rectify the regime of Xi Jinping’s remnant factional enemies and opposition, and indoctrinate officials and cadres to ensure their loyalty to Xi and Party Central. Xi had earlier hinted that he was preparing to undertake a “Yan’an-style” rectification campaign when he brought the Politburo Standing Committee to CCP’s old revolutionary base at Yan’an shortly after the end of the 20th Party Congress.
The implementation of the Plan in the PLA and the People’s Armed Police also indicates that Xi is looking to further strengthen his control over the military. Xi could believe that his grip over the military is shaky in light of the rectification of the PLA Rocket Force and logistics support force following the exposure of serious corruption in mid-2023, and is hence looking to inculcate loyalty in the troops through more indoctrination.
The seeds of the Party member education and training plan appeared to have been laid as early as March 30, 2023 when a Politburo meeting decided to launch a thematic education campaign focused on studying and implementing Xi’s political theories in April 2023, with the goal of “unifying thinking, will, and actions through the Party’s innovative theories.”
2. Details from the Plan suggest that Xi Jinping is also laying the groundwork to take a fourth term at the 21st Party Congress in 2027. The end date of the five-year plan is 2028, or a year after the 20th Central Committee’s term ends. If the Party is still studying Xi Jinping Thought and following its guidance by the 21st Central Committee, then this means that Xi has no intention to designate a successor and wants to stay in power.
Xi had previously hinted vaguely at his desire to continue for a fourth term at the Third Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in July 2024. Per the plenum’s communiqué, the CCP regime aims to complete the reform tasks outlined in the Decision made at the plenary session by 2029 and fully establish a “high-level socialist market economic system” by 2035. The wording suggests that Xi at least wants a fourth term to see through his proposed reforms.
If Xi wants a fourth term, then his five-year work plan for Party member education and training is partly intended to minimize the political risk of extending his term again by making officials and cadres “unwaveringly loyal” to him through ideological indoctrination. By the time Xi begins a fourth term, there will be a young generation of officials who have been subjected to 15 consecutive years of political education focused on Xi Jinping Thought and “rallying more closely behind Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.” This fact alone is likely to give Xi a greater sense of political security about staying in office.
However, Xi is far from guaranteeing his political security through stepping up indoctrination. The CCP faces considerable economic, social, and geopolitical risks over the next four years, especially with President Donald Trump in the White House. Such risks could rapidly transform into political risks that could undo whatever gains Xi could make through intensifying indoctrination.
3. The Xi leadership’s rollout of the five-year education and training plan partially affirms our analyses of dynamics in the CCP elite after the 20th Party Congress:
- In the Nov. 28, 2022 newsletter, we noted that while Xi Jinping’s power centralization was almost complete after the 20th Party Congress and his political strength was peaking, he “still has unfinished business left with the lingering ‘evil’ left in the regime, notably, the Jiang faction with its ‘strongholds,’ ‘persistent miasma,’ and ‘shocking corruption issues.’”
- In the April 3, 2023 newsletter, we noted in analyzing the Politburo’s launching of study session to study and learn Xi Jinping Thought that Xi hopes that “greater political indoctrination can produce more loyal and obedient officials who will better implement his decisions and deployments.” However, we believe that Xi “will not be able to overcome the dilemma of ‘orders not leaving the gates of Zhongnanhai’ merely by intensifying the degree of political indoctrination due to Party culture and other systemic deficiencies of the CCP authoritarian dictatorship.”
- In the April 6, 2023 newsletter, we noted that “internal and external crises facing the CCP regime have likely heightened Xi’s sense of insecurity and paranoia, leaving him with an urgent need to ‘unify the thinking of the whole Party,’ boost his ‘quan wei,’ and realize his political agendas.”
Finally, the existence of the Plan debunks the rumors that Xi is “losing power” or “stepping down imminently.”
3 Politburo rolls out lackluster economic agenda for 2025
Feb. 28
The Politburo held a meeting to discuss the draft of the government work report, which is due to be submitted for review at the third session of the 14th National People’s Congress during the Two Sessions.
Per state media reports, the meeting lauded the leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core for steering the country through challenges and successfully achieving the primary economic and social development goals over the past year. The meeting noted that the Chinese economy operated with overall stability and steady progress (整體平穩，穩中有進) in 2024, with solid advancement in high-quality development and maintenance of social stability.
The meeting emphasized that in 2025, the PRC must — under the strong leadership of Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core and guided by Xi Jinping Thought — fully implement the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee, as well as follow deployments made at the Central Economic Work Conference. The deployments include:
- Maintaining the principle of seeking progress while ensuring stability.
- Further deepening comprehensive reforms.
- Building a modern industrial system.
- Expanding domestic demand.
- Promoting the integration of technological and industrial innovation.
- Stabilizing the real estate and stock markets.
- Preventing and mitigating risks in key areas and addressing external shocks.
- Stabilizing expectations, boosting vitality, and promoting continued economic recovery and improvement.
- Continuously improving the people’s living standards and maintaining social harmony and stability.
March 1
Qiushi, the CCP Central Committee ideological journal, published excerpts from Xi Jinping’s speech delivered on Dec. 11, 2024 at the Central Economic Work Conference under the title, “Economic Work Must Balance Several Key Relationships.”
The article begins by evaluating the CCP authorities’ economic work in 2024. The article noted that the PRC under Party Central led by Xi faced a “complex and severe environment with increasing external pressure and growing internal challenges,” but the CCP was able to unite and lead the entire Party and people of all ethnic groups across the country to calmly respond to changes and implement comprehensive measures. Also, the Chinese economy operated smoothly on the whole with steady progress, and achieved “encouraging results.”
The article praised the “decisive measures” adopted at the Politburo meeting on Sept. 26, including incremental policies that “effectively boosted the real estate market and stock market, strengthened market expectations, and restored social confidence.” This led to noticeable economic recovery and facilitated the achievement of annual targets. The article added that positive changes were observed in the real estate sector, while local government debt risks and the risks associated with small and medium-sized financial institutions were effectively alleviated and managed. Further, employment and price levels remained stable, and overall social stability was maintained.
The article said that the greatest consensus across the Party is that the centralized and unified leadership of Party Central is the fundamental guarantee for successful economic work.
The article further outlined the need to balance several critical relationships in economic work:
- It is necessary to coordinate the relationship between an effective market and a proactive government, creating an economic order that is both “flexible enough to thrive” and “well-regulated.”
- The government must act where it should and refrain where it should not, address issues of absences and overreach.
- It is necessary to coordinate the relationship between aggregate supply and aggregate demand. There must be continued efforts to deepen supply-side structural reforms. The shortcomings in domestic demand, particularly in consumption, must be addressed and strengthened swiftly.
- It is necessary to coordinate the relationship between fostering new drivers of growth and upgrading old ones. Taking scientific and technological innovation as the guide, emerging industries and future-oriented industries must be vigorously nurtured and expanded.
- It is necessary to coordinate the relationship between optimizing new growth and revitalizing existing resources. Promote the transformation of industrial parks through “replacing old with new” and make effective use of policies to replace hidden debt and revitalize idle land resources.
- It is necessary to coordinate the relationship between improving quality and increasing total volume. Leverage the advantages of China’s vast markets and diverse application scenarios to cultivate more world-class enterprises and leading technologies.
Our take
1. The Politburo meeting on Feb. 28 and the Qiushi article on March 1 set the tone for how the Xi leadership will address the issue of economic work at the upcoming Two Sessions.
In explaining China’s poor economic performance over the past year, the Xi leadership has defaulted to the CCP’s “great, glorious, correct” (偉大、光明、正確) framing. The Qiushi piece adopts the usual tactic of “spinning tragedy into victory” (喪事當喜事辦) by blaming the “complex and severe environment with increasing external pressure and growing internal challenges” for why the Chinese economy fared worse in 2024 as compared to the three years of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Xi leadership then pats itself on the back in claiming that the CCP authorities’ “calm response to changes” and “comprehensive measures” ensured that the economy remained “generally stable,” “made steady progress,” and achieved “encouraging results.”
Meanwhile, the Politburo meeting urges officials to adhere to “Xi Jinping Thought” and the “centralized and unified leadership of the Party” in planning China’s economic development. This indicates that the CCP regime is unlikely to roll out genuine liberal economic reforms and will continue to have the Party lead the economy.
2. The CCP’s narrative that the Chinese economy operated with “overall stability and steady progress” in 2024 is likely to cause confusion when officials implement economic work policy in 2025. How officials proceed with economic work could differ significantly depending on how they interpret the central government’s assessment of China’s economic performance.
If officials view the “overall stability and steady progress” assessment optimistically, they could become overly ambitious when formulating local policies or investing in projects, thus setting themselves up for potential failures down the road. Conversely, officials who are skeptical of Beijing’s economic optimism will find “countermeasures” to orders from above (上有政策, 下有對策) and mislead the central government by reporting only positive outcomes and concealing problems. Either way, the Xi leadership will receive more “good news” than bad, thereby exacerbating Beijing’s misjudgment of the actual economic situation.
3. The details in the Politburo meeting and the Qiushi article about economic work are more rhetoric than substance, with few specifics that suggest Beijing has solutions to spark economic revival. The most promising economic agenda is the promotion of China’s technology industry, but this appears to be partly aimed at addressing external challenges (i.e. bottlenecks caused by Western tech restrictions, etc.) and future needs rather than tackling the more immediate and urgent requirement of expanding domestic demand (i.e. driving consumption by increasing fiscal investment in public welfare and social security, etc.) to boost the economy.
The CCP authorities also have not acknowledged China’s growing demographic crisis and its impact on shrinking domestic demand. Observers are wondering whether China has seen a sharp population decline due to the pandemic and other issues, with questions being widely raised on Chinese social media and in overseas Chinese-language media about why the usual bustling crowds were absent in both major cities and rural areas during the Chinese New Year celebrations. People are also wondering why the streets and shopping malls in China are so quiet, with fewer people, less business activity, and an overall lackluster atmosphere compared with past years.
All in all, China is unlikely to see real and sustained economic recovery so long as Xi and the CCP continue speaking in vague terms about the economy without addressing real and pressing concerns.
