1 Analyzing recent rumors of changing political dynamics in the CCP
Recent CCP elite rumors and speculation
Xi resignation ‘just a matter of time?’
Feb. 23
Overseas Chinese self-media commentator Cai Shenkun said on his show that he obtained alleged “insider information” from friends connected with CCP leaders. Key takeaways include:
- Xi Jinping’s power “significantly weakened” since the CCP’s whole-military political work conference at Yan’an in June 2024.
- Xi’s resignation is a matter of waiting for an official announcement, and the announcement will not be delayed for too long. It could happen at the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee, and would not be postponed beyond next year at the latest.
- Zhang Youxia now controls the military and Xi is just a nominal chairman of the Central Military Commission.
- Power in the CCP has now returned to three senior Party elders born in 1942. These elders will lead China’s political transition during the transitional period after Xi steps aside.
- Xi has offended all factions in the CCP over the past decade. Second and third-generation “red” elites, as well as former “Zhao family” (i.e. CCP) interest groups, have all felt threatened. At the Third Plenum in 2024, Party members came to a consensus that there would be disastrous consequences for all if Xi continues on his path, and therefore it is necessary to stop him from staying in office.
- Powerful elite groups in the CCP are concerned that existing vested interest groups will take control of China’s political landscape after the Xi era ends. These elite groups are said to have transferred assets of up to $30 trillion out of China over the past few decades. Also, these powerful interest groups are said to amass assets that reportedly exceed $60 trillion through various overseas operations, including close cooperation with a group of Wall Street financial oligarchs.
Cai Shenkun stressed that he was merely sharing the information that he heard and had no solid evidence to support the claims.
Speculation about Xi’s successor
Overseas Chinese observers have been speculating as to who would succeed Xi Jinping should something happen to him during his term in the wake of recurring rumors that Xi could step away from power due to health reasons or a coup.
Some observers believe that Ding Xuexiang, the 62-year-old sixth-ranking member of the Politburo Standing Committee, could be a potential successor. Concurrently, some have speculated that Ding could be placed under investigation.
Xi attacking Wang Qishan?
Feb. 21
Yuan Hongbing, an Australia-based Chinese dissident and jurist, told Dajiyuan (Chinese language edition of The Epoch Times) that the CCP princelings are attempting to block Xi Jinping’s reappointment as Party leader at the 21st Party Congress and planning to Xi ally Wang Qishan replace him. Yuan added that this is why Xi Jinping is allegedly launching a “devastating crackdown” on Wang’s faction.
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Some commentators see the investigation of several officials who were former subordinates of Wang Qishan as evidence of Xi’s efforts to weaken Wang’s influence. Some of Wang’s former subordinates include:
- Fan Yifei, former deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China, who was handed a suspended death sentence on Oct. 10, 2024. Fan was general manager of the financing and accounting department at China Construction Bank when Wang was in charge of the bank from 1994 to 1997.
- Tian Huiyu, former president of China Merchants Bank, was handed a suspended death sentence in February 2024. Tian served as Wang’s secretary when the latter headed China Construction Bank.
- Dong Hong, former deputy head of the central inspection team, received a suspended death sentence in January 2022. Dong is regarded as Wang’s “chief aide” because he served under Wang in various positions from 2000 to 2006, including roles in Guangdong Province, the State Council Office for Economic Reform, Hainan Province, and Beijing Municipality.
Xi’s political opponents subjected to damaging psychiatric treatment?
Yuan Hongbing also told Dajiyuan that the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection had issued a top secret internal directive in 2023 calling for officials who were purged over political issues, and especially disloyalty towards Xi, to be injected with psychotropic drugs upon the conclusion of their case, citing “conscientious insiders.” The “insiders” said that the drugs would damage the nervous system of those officials and incapacitate them.
The “conscientious insiders” also claimed that former PRC defense ministers Li Shangfu and Wei Fenghe, as well as former air force general Liu Yazhou, are all being targeted for “psychotropic drug treatment.” The “insiders” added that the cases of former CMC Political Work Department head Miao Hua and the hundreds of military officers under him are still under review, and they too will be injected with psychotropic drugs once testimonies have been extracted from them and their cases are concluded.
Recent CCP activities upholding Xi
Xi issues three military regulations
Feb. 21
Xi Jinping signed three separate regulations governing internal affairs (中國人民解放軍內務條令), discipline (中國人民解放軍紀律條令), and military formations (中國人民解放軍隊列條令) in the People’s Liberation Army. The regulations, which are referred to as the “common regulations” (共同條令), will take effect on April 1, 2025.
Mainland media reported that the “common regulations” are guided by Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, and “thoroughly implement” Xi’s “strong military” theory and strategic guidelines for military affairs in the new era.
NPCSC upholds Xi
Feb. 24
The 14th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 14th National People’s Congress (NPCSC) held a group discussion on its draft work report.
State media said that NPCSC members and other meeting attendees fully affirmed the committee’s work over the past year and generally supported the draft report. They unanimously agreed that the NPCSC adhered to Xi Jinping Thought, fully implemented the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee, and thoroughly studied and implemented Xi’s important speech on the 70th anniversary of the NPC. They also said that they strengthened their sense of mission, diligently fulfilled their duties, and achieved new progress and results in various areas of work.
State media added that the NPCSC had earnestly studied Xi’s work, “On Adhering to and Improving the People’s Congress System” (論堅持和完善人民代表大會制度), strengthened its theoretical foundation, continued to improve its work style, and consistently enhanced its ability and level of performing its duties in accordance with the law.
Finally, state media said that the NPCSC members expressed their unanimous support for uniting even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core.
Xi book on ‘Party building’ launched
Feb. 24
A symposium to launch “An Introduction to Xi Jinping Thought on Party Building” (習近平總書記關於黨的建設的重要思想概論) was held in Beijing. The National Research Society on Party Building hosted the symposium, with participation from relevant departments of central and state organs, Party building research societies from the provinces, regions, and municipalities, the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps, as well as representatives from centrally managed enterprises, universities, and experts on Party history and Party building. Participants exchanged their understanding and experiences of studying and implementing Xi Thought on Party building with reference to the book.
According to mainland media, the symposium said that the book serves as an authoritative supplementary reading for Party members and cadres to gain a deeper understanding of Xi Thought on Party building. Xi Thought on Party building is a “rigorous, rich, systematic, and profound scientific system” that continues and develops the Marxist theory of Party building with Chinese characteristics, and forms the “Party building chapter” of Xi Thought.
Senior officials submit written reports to Xi
Feb. 26
State media reported that members of the Politburo, secretaries of the CCP Secretariat, members of leading Party groups of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, and the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, as well as Party secretaries of the Supreme People’s Court and Supreme People’s Procuratorate, submitted personal work reports (述職)to Party Central and General Secretary Xi Jinping.
State media said Xi carefully reviewed the reports and issued important instructions, including:
- Senior officials must thoroughly study and implement the thought of “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.”
- Senior officials must fully carry out the spirit of the 20th Party Congress and the second and third plenary sessions of the 20th Central Committee.
- Senior officials must strengthen the “four consciousnesses,” reinforce the “four confidences,” and achieve the “Two Safeguards.”
- Senior officials must unwaveringly implement the major policies and decisions of Party Central.
- Senior officials must enhance their political capacity and respond calmly to challenges arising from changes in domestic and international situations.
Our take
1. The continued promotion of Xi Jinping’s political theories in the regime and public efforts by key institutions to show support for the “Xi core” indicates that there is no noticeable change in Xi’s political strength. Also, senior officials submitting personal work reports to Xi — a symbolic gesture that underscores his paramount status in the CCP and shows that he is not simply “first among equals” in the Politburo Standing Committee — is further affirmation that Xi is still firmly in charge.
We have noted on numerous occasions that there would be clear shifts in Party propaganda and mainland media reporting, as well as personnel arrangements, should Xi’s grip on power be severely weakened. We also previously noted that a “potential Xi downfall is less likely to be heralded by gradual signs of a power shift and Xi slowly ‘retreating’ from the scene” and would instead be “abrupt and dramatic” because the regime “adheres to a one-man dictatorship instead of the ‘collective leadership’ model, and any effort to oust Xi will lead to a zero-sum outcome (akin to the removal of the “Gang of Four” after the Cultural Revolution).”
2. We have not been able to independently verify the recent rumors and speculation about Xi “losing power.” While the bulk of those rumors and speculation are very likely inaccurate given the glaring lack of public evidence, they are still worth going through to glean insight into the thinking of those opposed to Xi.
i) The constant stream of rumors and speculation about Xi Jinping “losing power,” including his “imminent” removal from office and factional struggles, could be partly a sustained effort by “anti-Xi” forces both inside and outside the country. Some of the narratives circulating about Xi seem to follow the pattern set by the article, “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping,” that emerged in January 2022. We analyzed at the time that the piece contains strong Jiang Zemin faction bias and likely originated from that faction.
The “anti-Xi” forces could be attempting to shape the narrative about Xi outside China to make whatever inroads they can into impeding Xi’s likely push for another term in 2027. Such efforts, however, would be ultimately futile if Xi’s political power is intact and Beijing maintains very strict censorship standards in China.
ii) The rumors from Cai Shenkun suggest that the “anti-Xi” CCP elites are furious with Xi Jinping for blocking their efforts to amass huge wealth in collaboration with Western financial interests on Wall Street. The Jiang faction in particular was known for “making a fortune while keeping a low profile” (悶聲發大財), including by working with foreigners.
iii) There has been occasional discussion and speculation in the West about the issue of CCP leadership succession, particularly after Xi Jinping took a third term in 2022. Western analysts were chiefly concerned about what the succession issue would mean for political stability in China and the CCP regime’s future directions, as well as the geopolitical implications of a post-Xi PRC.
The recent speculation in Chinese-speaking circles about the issue of “Xi’s successor,” however, is focused on the more immediate “concern” of Xi’s “imminent departure” from the political scene. If “anti-Xi” forces are driving the “Xi’s successor” debate and rumors, it is possible that they are hoping to indirectly influence Xi’s thinking on the issue and even nudge him into investigating “disloyal” allies.
iv) The rumor about Party princelings looking to Wang Qishan to replace Xi Jinping is severely lacking in credibility given factional dynamics in the CCP elite and the warped political sense of the move. For one, the princelings would unlikely want to appoint someone who knows their dirty laundry from his personal acquaintance with them and previous stint as anti-corruption head. Wang is also very unlikely to betray his greatest political patron (Xi notably broke retirement conventions to keep Wang on as PRC vice president at the 19th Party Congress) lest he jeopardize his safety.
There is also no evidence that Xi is going after Wang Qishan or members of his “faction.” The former subordinates of Wang who were purged appear to be merely work associates rather than “faction members” who enjoy patron-client relations with him. Notably, none of the three of Wang’s former subordinates who were purged saw rapid promotion or other forms of obvious political success after Wang joined the Politburo in 2007. We also previously analyzed after a review of Dong Hong’s career trajectory that he does not appear to be a “close confidant” of Wang’s as many observers believe, but merely had a superior-subordinate relationship with the latter.
v) Yuan Hongbing’s “insider information” that Xi Jinping is subjecting his political opponents to damaging psychiatric treatment cannot be independently confirmed. However, the CCP does have a long history of using psychiatric drugs against dissidents and persecuted groups like Falun Gong practitioners, so it cannot be entirely ruled out that Xi had ordered similar treatment to be meted out to his enemies and “disloyal” officials.
Even if Xi did not order the use of psychotropic drugs against his political opponents, it is possible that officials seeking to curry favor with him might resort to such methods to ensure a “permanent” solution to weeding out corruption and “disloyalty” toward the “Xi core.” At the very least, the accusation would fuel greater dissatisfaction towards Xi, especially among groups that have suffered such abuses.
