1 Analyzing the impact of Takaichi’s massive election win on Sino-Japanese relations
Takaichi wins landslide victory
Japan held a general election on Feb. 8. Under the leadership of Japanese prime minister Sanae Takaichi, Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party regained its majority in the House of Representatives in a landslide victory, winning 316 out of 465 total seats in the lower house. This marks the first time since the Second World War that a single party has a supermajority in parliament.
Sanae Takaichi became Japan’s first female prime minister in October 2025. Shortly after taking office, the LDP’s longtime coalition partner Komeito split from it and allied instead with the largest opposition party, the Constitutional Democratic Party, to form the Centrist Reform Alliance. Faced with a minority control of government and needing stronger legislative power to pursue her policy agenda items (“responsible, proactive fiscal policy,” economic reforms, defense reforms, restarting nuclear power plants to ensure energy security, strengthening cooperation with the U.S. and Taiwan, etc.), Takaichi called a snap election to seek voter endorsement.
In addition to the LDP’s supramajority, the party’s new coalition partner, Nippon Ishin no Kai, won 36 seats, giving the conservative alliance a total of 352 seats in the House of Representatives.
Takaichi provoked Beijing’s ire in November 2025 when she said that a PRC invasion of Taiwan could “constitute a survival-threatening situation” for Japan and would allow the latter to mobilize its military in self-defense.
PRC responds cautiously
When asked about Takaichi’s election victory, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said at a regular press conference that the election “reflected some deep-seated and structural issues as well as certain emerging views, trends and developments” in Japan. Lin added that Takaichi should “follow the path of peaceful development rather than return to militarism” and “take concrete actions to demonstrate the necessary sincerity to uphold the political foundation of China-Japan relations.”
US congratulates Takaichi
On Feb. 8, U.S. President Donald Trump sent a Truth Social post congratulating Sanae Takaichi on her election victory. “I wish you great success in passing your conservative, peace through strength agenda. The wonderful people of Japan, who voted with such enthusiasm, will always have my strong support,” Trump wrote.
Raymond Greene, director of the American Institute in Taiwan, also offered congratulations, saying that he looks forward to “deeper coordination and cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan to jointly promote regional stability and prosperity,” according to reports in Taiwanese media.
Taiwan happy with Takaichi’s victory
Taiwanese government officials warmly welcomed the results of Japan’s snap general election. ROC president William Lai Ching-te said that Takaichi’s win “demonstrates the trust and expectations Japanese voters have in (her) leadership and vision.” Vice president Hsiao Bi-khim expressed hope that the Taiwan–Japan partnership would grow even stronger.
Frank Hsieh Chang-ting, Taiwan’s former ambassador to Japan and current chairman of the Taiwan–Japan Relations Association, said Japanese voters had used their ballots to respond to the PRC’s economic coercion. He added that cooperation between Taiwan and Japan in semiconductors (such as expanded TSMC investment) and regional security is expected to enter a new phase.
Market reactions
On Feb. 9, the Tokyo stock market surged sharply as investors showed strong expectations for the expansionary fiscal stance dubbed “Takaichinomics.” The Nikkei 225 jumped 2,110 points (up 3.89 percent) to close at 56,363, briefly breaking the 57,000 level intraday and setting a new all-time high. The phrase “Takaichi trades” became a market buzzword as investors placed bets on defense and technology development and reforms.
- Defense stocks: Boosted by Tokyo’s plans to double defense spending, Kawasaki Heavy Industries surged 17.95 percent at close, while Mitsubishi Heavy Industries also rallied strongly.
- Semiconductor stocks: Japanese precision tools maker Disco rose over 10 percent, reflecting optimism about Takaichi’s “digital sovereignty” push and semiconductor subsidy policies.
- Blue-chip stocks: Toyota rose 5.82 percent to a two-year high. Meanwhile, financial stocks such as MUFG strengthened on expectations of rising interest rates.
The currency market saw more volatility, reflecting a balance between expectations of fiscal expansion and possible Bank of Japan rate hikes. Shortly after the election results were confirmed, concerns over government borrowing to fund the two-year zero food consumption tax pushed the yen down to 157.25 per dollar. As markets interpreted political stability as enhancing reform execution and overseas capital flowed back into equities, the yen rebounded this afternoon to around the 155.90–156.40 range.
Compared with equity optimism, the bond market appeared more cautious. Investors have begun worrying about Japan’s debt sustainability. The 10-year Japanese government bond yield surged to 2.282 percent on Feb. 9. Markets fear that a 21 trillion yen stimulus package combined with consumption tax reductions could significantly increase government bond issuance and push up inflation expectations.
Our take
The LDP’s increased majority in the legislature allows Sanae Takaichi to pursue many of her policy agendas and even enables Japan to adopt a more assertive posture in the Indo-Pacific. Notably, the LDP’s right-wing faction is within reach of amending the Japanese constitution’s Article 9 prohibition on offensive military capability and deployment. This presents more geopolitical dilemmas for Communist China and the Xi leadership.
1. Takaichi’s election victory reflects a structural political shift in Japan. Previously, the LDP had to rely on coalition partners like Komeito to stay in power. Being part of a coalition had the effect of moderating LDP’s policies towards centrism.
With the current supermajority in the lower house, however, Takaichi and the LDP have a strong hand to pursue their right-leaning policies. First, Article 59 of Japan’s constitution allows the House of Representatives (lower house) to override a House of Councillors (upper house) veto through a second vote. While the LDP lacks a majority in the upper house, the aforementioned “nuclear option” legislative procedure means that the opposition can only delay, but not block, Takaichi’s agenda items. Second, the LDP’s two-thirds majority meets the threshold required to initiate constitutional amendments under Article 96. Together, the LDP and the pro-revision Japan Innovation Party control 352 lower-house seats (about 75 percent), turning revision of Article 9 (Japan’s “peace”/pacifism clause) from a theoretical possibility into a feasible goal.
Takaichi has pledged to revise Japan’s three key national security documents (the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program) during her tenure, with plans to draw up new documents by the end of 2026. The revisions could include eliminating ambiguity surrounding the constitutional clause renouncing war, allowing the entry of nuclear weapons into Japan (i.e. permitting the U.S. to station nuclear weapons on Japanese territory), and formally writing the Self-Defense Forces into the constitution (thereby transforming what is now officially a purely defensive military force into one with offensive capabilities and missions).
In the FY2026 budget, the Takaichi government proposed a record 122.3 trillion yen total budget, with defense spending increased to 9.04 trillion yen (about $58 billion). This puts Japan on track to reach defense spending equal to 2 percent of GDP ahead of schedule, and places the country among the world’s top five military spenders. Other defense expansion and strategic shifts under Takaichi include:
- Fortification of the Ryukyu Islands: Roughly one-third of Japan’s defense funds are allocated to strengthening deployments from Kyushu to Okinawa. This includes deploying long-range cruise missiles (such as U.S. Tomahawks and upgraded domestic systems) to build anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
- Improving counterstrike capability (enemy-base strike ability): Japan is accelerating development and procurement of offensive weapons capable of targeting enemy command nodes and missile launch bases, effectively moving beyond the traditional interpretation of an exclusively defensive posture.
- Defense industry as growth driver: “Takaichinomics” treats defense technology as a growth sector. Plans include revising the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment” by 2026 to fully lift restrictions on lethal weapons exports, enabling companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries to integrate more deeply into global defense supply chains. With a strong parliamentary mandate, Takaichi’s government is expected to deepen integration between defense R&D and civilian high-tech sectors such as robotics and optical communications. Japan’s defense industry is shifting from “self-sufficiency” toward “joint procurement within the democratic alliance,” providing a stable outlook for the sector over the next two decades.
2. The LDP’s supermajority in the lower house allows the Takaichi government to deepen ties with Taiwan. Takaichi has long maintained close ties with Taiwan’s authorities, publicly supporting Taiwan’s accession to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership and stronger security cooperation. With a two-thirds parliamentary advantage, she now has sufficient political capital to pursue legislation similar to a Japanese version of the U.S. Taiwan Relations Act. Security cooperation between Japan and Taiwan is therefore likely to undergo both quantitative expansion and qualitative change.
As the LDP consolidates its hold on power, interactions between Japanese and Taiwanese officials will become more frequent and more public. This could potentially lead to open parliamentary discussions on the legal framework for mobilizing the Self-Defense Forces to support Taiwan.
Meanwhile, Taiwan has reciprocated Japan’s efforts at further cooperation. On Feb. 4, TSMC announced that it would use 3-nanometer process technology for production (up from 6-nanometers) at its second fab in Kumamoto and increase investment to $17 billion. Japanese newspaper Yomiuri said that the Japanese government is considering additional support for the new investment plan. Efforts by Taiwanese semiconductor companies to upgrade chip production in Japan appear to be a strategic move to incorporate the latter as an extension of Taiwan’s “silicon shield.”
3. Takaichi’s election win will likely result in a further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Some early observations:
- Assuming Takaichi’s defense reforms go through, Japan is on pace to become the strongest “flank” for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific. A more proactive Tokyo could reduce Washington’s burden in defending the First Island Chain.
- To offset tariff pressure from the Trump administration, Japan pledged in July 2025 to invest $550 billion in the United States. With its parliamentary majority, the Takaichi government can now revise the Economic Security Promotion Act to mandate the “de-China-ization” of key industries — semiconductors, rare earths, pharmaceuticals — by 2027, driving a comprehensive relocation of production bases out of China and into the U.S. and Southeast Asia.
- Japan’s large-scale fiscal stimulus effectively helps shoulder part of the cost of building a “resilient Indo-Pacific supply chain” for the United States. On the current course, Japan is positioned to become Washington’s most trusted “secure supply-chain hub” in the region.
- A major bottleneck in U.S. decoupling from China lies in intermediate raw materials and precision components. Japan’s state-driven industrial upgrading helps fill this gap. If Japanese photoresists, precision machine tools, and specialty chemicals no longer depend on China’s market, U.S. advanced manufacturing sectors — aerospace, defense, and next-generation semiconductors — gain a more secure industrial base. This trend has attracted substantial U.S. and international capital into Japan’s high-tech manufacturing sector, aiming to establish export bases free of Chinese supply-chain exposure. For example, Japan successfully conducted rare-earth test mining near Minamitorishima in February 2026, aiming to reduce reliance on Chinese rare earth imports from about 70 percent to below 50 percent.
- As Japanese capital leaves China, much of it flows into U.S. Treasury markets or domestic U.S. investments, providing financial support for stabilizing U.S. inflation and encouraging the reshoring of American manufacturing.
4. The outcome of Japan’s snap election will likely lead to a worsening of Sino-Japanese relations as Beijing attempts to curb Tokyo’s growing “militarism.” However, Beijing’s actions could ultimately prove counterproductive, accelerating “de-Chinafication” in Japan and leading to a form of “strategic self-entrapment.”
i) Beijing could potentially increase sanctions on Japan as it attempts to sway the Takaichi government away from its current course. For instance, the PRC Ministry of Commerce’s Announcement No. 1 [2026] issued on Jan. 6 implemented export controls on “dual-use” items aimed at Japan, including measures such as:
- Strictly limiting exports of medium and heavy rare earths (such as dysprosium and terbium) and high-performance permanent magnet materials to Japan, directly targeting Japan’s defense and EV industries.
- Utilizing the Counter-Espionage Law and Data Security Law to conduct “compliance” interviews or impose exit bans on senior executives of Japanese companies in China.
- Imposing long-term “customs detentions” on precision machine tools and chemicals imported from Japan, citing environmental or safety concerns.
Excessive sanctions on Japan, however, could backfire on the PRC and accelerate decoupling between the two countries. Also, PRC sanctions and other efforts to “punish” Japan would likely end up boosting Takaichi’s case for increasing the defense budget and revising Japan’s three key national security documents; the Japanese public would too be more accepting of some economic pain if it means increased national security. Finally, excessive PRC sanctions would ultimately push Japan to align completely with the Trump administration in decoupling supply chains from China and transforming itself into the “second heart” of the U.S. Indo-Pacific military-industrial capacity.
ii) Beijing risks an erosion of its authority and nationalist backlash if it is perceived to have failed to respond strongly to Japan’s “blatant” shift towards “militarism” (in fact, the normalization of Japanese military forces) and adoption of pro-Taiwan positions. This is partly the CCP’s own doing as it has spent decades mobilizing “anti-Japan” sentiment through state media and education, framing Japan as “the U.S.’s top lackey in Asia.” If the Xi leadership does not take sufficient action to counter Takaichi’s “provocations,” nationalist forces in the regime (“little pinks,” leftist Party hardliners, etc.) will surely question Beijing and could resort to social agitation. Such agitation could easily translate into domestic instability as China’s economy deteriorates further and unemployment levels rise.
Currently, Beijing is attempting to create “controlled anger” over Japan while working to prevent the breakout of uncontrolled riots. For instance, flagship official publications like People’s Daily and Global Times continue to condemn Japan for “reversing the wheels of history” and “reviving militarism,” a move that allows for the venting of pressure internally and preserves Beijing’s image of showing “nationalist resolve.” Concurrently, CCP censors are tightly suppressing extremist rhetoric (such as calls to “reclaim Japan” or “kill all Japanese expats”) to cool down public discourse about Japan and prevent a repeat of the 2024–2025 attacks on Japanese nationals (bloodshed would provide Japan with additional excuses to accelerate decoupling from China).
iii) What Beijing fears more is that regardless of the severity of sanctions, the expectation of deteriorating relations makes the withdrawal of Japanese capital inevitable. Such a trend will have massive negative ripple effects on China’s politics and economy:
- As Japanese capital exits, Beijing’s ability to use Japanese firms and expats as “bargaining chips” to influence Tokyo’s decision-making declines sharply. By late 2025, the number of Japanese nationals in China had fallen to about 92,900, a 20-year low (down from 150,000 in 2012). Further harassment of Japanese businessmen will only solidify a “divestment consensus” in Japan, leaving Tokyo with fewer inhibitions.
- Divestment is not just about capital outflow. It is the dismantling of the foundation of Chinese manufacturing, potentially triggering a “systemic collapse” of SME chains and a wave of unemployment. Japanese manufacturing relies on “vertical integration” — one Toyota or Sony factory supports a cluster of hundreds of SME suppliers. If the core Japanese assets complete their strategic transfer in the first half of 2026, an estimated 15 percent of precision machinery and chemical SMEs face bankruptcy within a year. The affected population (including indirect employment) is estimated at 5 to 8 million people. Such structural unemployment would trigger debt defaults and strain social security systems, particularly in the context of a sluggish real estate sector and weak consumption. Massive unemployment would also severely challenge the PRC’s already strained “stability maintenance” system.
Sanctions that lead to a total breakdown in relations will undermine Xi Jinping’s push for “new quality productive forces,” which remain heavily dependent on Japanese mid-stream equipment:
- China remains reliant on Japanese firms for high-end bearings, sensors, and servo motors, the “mother machines” of manufacturing.
- The localization of “reducers” for industrial robots will likely be delayed by 5 to 8 years.
- Despite strength in bulk chemicals, China relies on Japanese firms for specialty chemicals, photoresists, and high-performance resins. Their departure would mean supply-chain rupture, not simple substitution.
- Yield rates for Chinese processes below 28nm will stagnate due to the cut-off of Japanese photoresists.
5. The outcome of Japan’s recent general election and future geopolitical developments are likely to exacerbate the internal contradictions within CCP elite politics.
i) Currently, the Xi leadership is resorting to propaganda and rhetorical toughness against Japan to mask the strategic “missteps” that contributed to Takaichi’s historic election victory. However, greater Sino-Japanese decoupling and withdrawal of Japanese capital could eventually divide internal CCP opinions into two major camps:
- Security hardliners (centered on ideology, national security, and the political and legal affairs system): These officials are likely to view things from the “great changes unseen in a century” framework and blame China’s worsening economic downturn on the “blockade” by the “U.S.-Japan-Taiwan anti-China alliance.” This framing aims to convert social discontent into a driving force for Xi’s “comprehensive national security concept.” Officials in this camp could seize the opportunity to strengthen social control, including using Big Data to monitor the movements of the unemployed. They could also advocate the promotion of “new quality productive forces” to fill the vacuum left by the lack of substantive economic growth.
- Pragmatic technocrats (centered on local governments): Often highly educated or with experience studying abroad, these officials will eventually reach a state of extreme panic as Sino-Japanese decoupling contributes to an “avalanche-style collapse” of SMEs in the Yangtze and Pearl River Deltas. These officials know that the void left by Japanese capital cannot be filled by domestic capital in the short term, and may attempt to show goodwill to Japanese businesses in “non-strategic fields” and covertly use local policies to retain talent. However, these officials are prone to being sidelined for “politically incorrect” actions in a “security first” environment. The marginalization of such officials will leave the CCP bureaucracy more prone to “inaction” and “lying flat.”
ii) As the consequences of the PRC-Japan fallout manifest, Xi Jinping will be increasingly forced to pursue policies that fostered the fraying of bilateral relations in the first place.
- The Xi leadership constantly puts out propaganda regarding so-called “bottom-line thinking,” “the East is rising and the West is declining,” and the narrative of a “U.S.-Japan-Taiwan alliance” being a threat to the PRC’s security. Yet, the unprecedented tightness of this alliance and Japan’s move towards “militarism” is precisely the product of Beijing’s “wolf warrior diplomacy” and hardline Taiwan policy. As “threats” that CCP propaganda has been warning about increasingly crystallize, Xi is now forced to double down on projecting “toughness” to prove that his initial warnings and stance were correct.
- By substituting “national security” for “economic development” as a source of legitimacy, Xi must continually construct external enemies. But when that enemy (in this case, Japan) responds to the PRC’s growing bellicosity by withdrawing capital and cutting off technology, the “social stability” that Xi values most is at risk of breaking down with the rise in domestic unemployment and sustained deflationary pressure.
- Xi’s “wolf-warrior diplomacy” has sealed off Beijing’s avenues of retreat and de-escalation. He cannot appear weak toward Japan without shattering his strongman image. Yet escalating sanctions only accelerate Japan’s transformation into the sharpest flank of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy.
All in all, the “self-fulfilling strategic trap” that Xi finds himself will likely escalate his and the CCP’s political risks, with limited ways to extricate themselves from the quagmire.
2 Xi’s new year greetings to retired military cadres reflect tensions in elite politics
On Feb. 6, Xi Jinping attended a Lunar New Year cultural performance organized by the Central Military Commission to extend regards to veteran military cadres based in Beijing. He was accompanied by CMC vice chairman Zhang Shengmin as well as several retired former CMC members.
State media reported that Xi engaged in “cordial exchanges and mutual greetings” with the veteran military cadres. He also jointly reviewed with them the “extraordinary course” of the past year in the Party, the country, and the armed forces, along with the major achievements made. State media added that the veteran military cadres unanimously stated they would rally even more closely around Party Central with Comrade Xi Jinping at the core, adhere to Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era, thoroughly implement Xi’s “strong military” ideology, deeply understand the decisive significance of the “Two Establishes,” resolutely uphold the “Two Safeguards,” and implement the “CMC Chairman responsibility” system.
Footage from CCTV’s primetime program Xinwen Lianbo showed defense minister Dong Jun, dressed in civilian clothing, seated toward the back of the theater watching the performance.
Backdrop
The CCP authorities announced that CMC vice chairman Zhang Youxia and chief of the CMC joint staff department Liu Zhenli were being investigated on Jan. 24. As of the time of writing, no military unit in the People’s Liberation Army has issued public statements supporting Party Central’s handling of the Zhang and Liu case. Some overseas Chinese commentators and media outlets believe that the “silence” of military units on the Zhang and Liu purge is indicative of their disagreement and resistance towards the Xi leadership over the issue.
Our take
The Lunar New Year CMC cultural performance for veteran military cadres where the CCP leader conveys greetings to retired military officers is an event that occasionally offers insights into the state of military-political affairs in the PRC. The 2026 edition of this event reveals that Xi Jinping has purged virtually all of the senior officers that he himself promoted, and hints at tensions in the CCP elite.
1. The only CMC member who accompanied Xi at the cultural performance was newly promoted CMC vice chairman Zhang Shengmin. By contrast, Xi was accompanied by CMC vice chairs Zhang Youxia and He Weidong, as well as other CMC members, for the 2024 and 2025 performances (the event was suspended for three years during the COVID-19 outbreak and resumed in 2024). Of the twelve CMC members promoted only after Xi came to power, only three (Zhao Keshi, Fan Changlong, and Zhang Shengmin) attended the 2026 performance while eight have officially been placed under investigation. Conversely, retired military figures who rose to the top during the Jiang-Hu era when Jiang Zemin and his faction held sway over the military appeared to be relatively unscathed by the sweeping anti-corruption probes targeting the PLA in recent years.
Below is a list of active and retired CMC members who attended the CMC Lunar New Year cultural performances between 2024 and 2026:
2024
- Five active: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Miao Hua, Liu Zhenli, and Zhang Shengmin.
- Eight retired: Li Zuocheng, Li Jinai, Liang Guanglie (died November 2024), Fan Changlong, Cao Gangchuan, Wu Shengli, Chen Bingde, and Zhao Keshi.
2025
- Four active: Zhang Youxia, He Weidong, Zhang Shengmin, and Liu Zhenli.
- Six retired: Li Jinai, Fan Changlong, Cao Gangchuan, Wu Shengli, Chen Bingde, and Zhao Keshi.
2026
- One active: Zhang Shengmin.
- Six retired: Li Jinai, Fan Changlong, Cao Gangchuan, Wu Shengli, Chen Bingde, and Zhao Keshi.
Six retired CMC members who were promoted to full general during the period when the Jiang faction controlled the military have attended the past three CMC cultural performances:
- Cao Gangchuan (CMC vice chairman, 16th CMC), age 90, promoted March 1998
- Li Jinai (CMC member, 16th and 17th CMC), age 83, promoted June 2000
- Wu Shengli (CMC member, 17th CMC), age 80, promoted June 2002
- Chen Bingde (CMC member, 17th CMC), age 84, promoted July 2007
- Fan Changlong (CMC vice chairman, 18th CMC), age 79, promoted July 2008
- Zhao Keshi (CMC member, 18th CMC), age 78, promoted July 2010
One explanation for the regular attendance of these senior officers suggests that they are in relatively stable political standing. Another possible explanation is that Xi’s anti-corruption campaign is currently targeting officials who continued to engage in corrupt practices after the 18th Party Congress, but those retired CMC members have ceased to partake in corruption (particularly because they are out of active service and have minimal opportunities to be corrupt) and have therefore avoided scrutiny. In contrast, active generals and those who reached the upper echelons of the military under Xi have more opportunities to engage in corruption and are more vulnerable to investigation.
Meanwhile, retired CMC members who were elevated to the CMC during Xi’s tenure have made only sporadic appearances at the annual cultural performance. Chang Wanquan (former defense minister, promoted to full general in November 2007 at age 58) and Ma Xiaotian (former air force commander, promoted to full general July 2009 at age 59) have not attended the performances in recent years. Li Zuocheng (former PLA Ground Force commander, promoted to full general in July 2015 at age 61), a member of the 19th CMC, attended only the 2024 performance. Those three ex-CMC members are not particularly old and presumably would not have major health problems. If so, it is possible that they have been subjected to probes or internal disciplinary measures that were not publicly announced, and lost the eligibility to receive new year greetings from Xi and attend the cultural performance.
2. The security arrangements at the CMC Lunar New Year cultural performance reflect an atmosphere of extreme distrust in the CCP elite. State media footage of the event showed many younger soldiers wearing earpieces and maintaining stern expressions seated among the white-haired retired generals. This suggests that veteran military cadres, including remnants of an earlier political era, are being kept under tight surveillance by Xi Jinping’s security apparatus. Instead of creating the impression that retired senior officers are genuinely rallying around the Party “core,” the scene reinforced the heavily staged nature of the event and the largely performative function of loyalty declarations by the military and the officialdom.
3. Defense minister Dong Jun likely attended the cultural performance in civilian clothing as a way to reflect his lack of seniority versus the veteran military cadres. It is also possible that Dong’s attire marks him as a transitional figure who is unlikely to retain his position or receive further promotion at the 21st Party Congress.
4. Xi Jinping’s merciless purge of the PLA — particularly the generals whom he promoted to high office — seems to echo the assessments made in a widely-shared political tract that emerged in January 2022. The essay, “An Objective Evaluation of Xi Jinping,” accused Xi of secretly laying the foundations to end the CCP, including “eroding the CCP’s ruling foundation layer by layer,” “precisely attacking all of the regime’s vital organs,” “constantly dismantling this totalitarian government in an almost surgical manner,” and “cutting off the Party’s escape route.” The essay speculated that Xi could have retained some influences from his reform-minded father, Xi Zhongxun, but could end up subverting the regime by “switching tactics and adopting a politically regressive approach.” We previously assessed that the “Objective Evaluation” seems to be the work of the Jiang faction and its associates, and reads like an unofficial Jiang faction counter to Xi’s “historical resolution.”
Based on publicly available information and developments, it appears that Xi’s “politically regressive approach” is geared more towards improving the CCP’s governance (including military modernization) and rescuing the regime rather than demolishing it. However, Xi’s “good intentions” will more likely than not backfire given the inherent deficiencies of the CCP system, ultimately affirming the prognostications of his political enemies.
