1 Analyzing Xi’s glowing tribute to Hu Yaobang on his 110th birth anniversary
On Nov. 20, the CCP held a symposium in the Great Hall of the People to commemorate the 110th anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s birth. Per state media reports, senior officials who attended the event include Xi Jinping, Li Xi, Shi Taifeng, Li Ganjie, Li Shulei, Li Hongzhong, Chen Wenqing, Liu Jingguo, Wang Xiaohong, and Zhang Shengmin, with Politburo Standing Committee member Cai Qi performing a presiding role.
Xi delivered an important speech at the symposium. In his speech, Xi reviewed what he called Hu Yaobang’s “glorious” lifetime of striving for the Party, and lauded him as “a loyal communist fighter who stood the test of time, a great proletarian revolutionary and statesman, and an outstanding political worker of our military.”
Xi highlighted five qualities of Hu that he hopes Party members will emulate:
- Xi called on the entire Party to be as steadfast in ideals and as loyal to the CCP as Hu Yaobang, and to actively contribute to the PRC’s model of modernization.
- Xi said Hu Yaobang always emphasized starting from reality in all matters and made important contributions to “bringing order out of chaos” (撥亂反正). He urged the Party to follow Hu’s example in pursuing truth and to use the Party’s innovative theories to guide practice.
- Xi said Hu Yaobang actively advocated and promoted reform and opening. He called on the Party to emulate Hu in standing at the forefront of the tide, daring to pioneer, and deepening reforms with the grit needed to “chew tough bones.”
- Xi pointed out that Hu Yaobang possessed deep and genuine affection for the people. He urged all Party members to follow Hu’s example by staying connected to the people and adhering to the mass line.
- Xi emphasized that Hu Yaobang attached great importance to upholding Party conduct and integrity. He called on all Party members — especially leading cadres — to emulate Hu in maintaining integrity, leading by example, implementing the central government’s Eight-point Regulations, and preserving a clean and upright character.
In the conclusion of his speech, Xi invoked Hu Yaobang’s metaphor of “climbing Mount Tai” to rally the entire Party to unite closely around Party Central, stay true to its original aspiration and founding mission, strengthen historical confidence, forge ahead with determination to advance all undertakings, and realize the long-cherished wishes of the older generation of revolutionaries.
Footage from CCTV’s primetime program Xinwen Lianbo showed Hu Deping, Hu Yaobang’s eldest son, seated toward the back of the third row in a corner of the hall. Hu Deping did not receive a close-up shot. Xinwen Lianbo footage also showed that retired PLA general and “second generation red” Liu Yuan and Xi Jinping’s younger brother Xi Yuanping attended the symposium.
Brief background of Hu Yaobang and CCP elite politics
Hu Yaobang’s political achievements and rivals
Hu Yaobang held the top position in the CCP between 1981 to 1987 (Party Chairman from 1981 to 1982, CCP General Secretary from 1982 to 1987), but was politically subordinate to then-paramount leader Deng Xiaoping. Hu was regarded as an open-minded and responsible figure within the CCP, and was well-received by intellectuals and the general public.
Hu’s most significant and most widely supported political accomplishment was leading the largest effort in the PRC’s history to overturn wrongful convictions and political persecution cases. Together with Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang, Hu undertook the following notable actions after the end of the Cultural Revolution:
- Hu spearheaded the “Truth Criterion Debate” in 1978, which led to the rejection of Hua Guofeng’s “Two Whatevers” and laid the ideological foundation for Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening up.”
- Hu led the rehabilitation of around 3 million cadres between 1978 to 1982.
- Hu removed the labels of “landlord, rich peasant, counter-revolutionary, bad element, and rightist,” restoring the reputations of tens of millions of people.
- Hu fully rehabilitated the so-called “Hu Feng counter-revolutionary clique” and “rightists.”
- Hu restored the reputations of hundreds of thousands who were persecuted to death or imprisoned during the Cultural Revolution.
Hu Yaobang’s actions salvaged many families and earned him immense respect and admiration among veteran cadres, intellectuals, and ordinary citizens.
However, Hu was not universally acclaimed. His main political opponents were the conservative, left-leaning Party elders like Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, and Deng Liqun who opposed what they viewed as Hu’s overly liberal reform agenda. Hu’s opponents feared that openness would undermine the Party’s absolute control, and they would take advantage of Hu’s weak handling of student protests in late 1986 and his refusal to crack down on “liberalization” to oust him from top office in 1987. Taking advantage of Hu Yaobang’s weak handling of the 1986 student movement and his refusal to crack down on “liberalization,” they removed him from his top leadership position in 1987.
Hu suffered a heart attack and died in April 1989. His death was mourned nationwide and indirectly became one of the catalysts of the 1989 Tiananmen protests.
CCP commemoration of Hu Yaobang
The association between Hu Yaobang’s death and the protest on Tiananmen Square that the CCP violently suppressed meant that the former general secretary had become a politically sensitive issue. State media would limit their mentions of Hu’s name and the CCP authorities avoided officially commemorating Hu’s birthday entirely during the Jiang Zemin years.
Beijing’s first official commemoration of Hu’s birthday was held in 2005 during the Hu Jintao era. In the symposium to mark Hu’s 90th birthday, then-PRC vice president Zeng Qinghong delivered a speech on behalf of the Central Committee. In attendance were several members of the Politburo Standing Committee (including Wen Jiabao and Wu Guanzheng), as well as persons-in-charge at ministries, representatives from various sectors, and Hu Yaobang’s family. State media gave the event extensive coverage. From then on, the CCP authorities would officially commemorate Hu’s birthday at every significant milestone year, such as his 100th and 110th birthday anniversaries. This signaled a gradual official acknowledgment of Hu’s historical role and a “de-sensitization” of his legacy.
In November 2015, CCP under Xi Jinping held an especially large-scale commemoration for the 100th anniversary of Hu Yaobang’s birth. In attendance were all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, as well as the persons-in-charge of central departments, representatives of democratic parties, Hu Yaobang’s family, and delegates from Hu’s hometown. The Xi leadership also published the “Selected Works of Hu Yaobang,” released a documentary series bearing his name, and produced a commemorative photo album. The CCP propaganda apparatus would go on to extensively promote the commemoration of Hu’s 100th birthday.
The relationship between the Xi and Hu families
Xi Jinping’s father Xi Zhongxun and Hu Yaobang were close colleagues and political allies. As head of the Organization Department after the Cultural Revolution, Hu was key in rehabilitating Xi, who was also a victim of Mao Zedong’s last big political campaign. After a stint in Guangdong, Xi would later directly assist Hu in managing Party affairs when he was appointed Secretary of the Secretariat in 1982. The reform-minded Xi and Hu would jointly promote the establishment of special economic zones (such as Shenzhen) and the rehabilitation of wrongful convictions.
When Hu Yaobang was ousted by Party hardliners in 1987 and forced to make a humiliating “self-criticism” at a “Party life” meeting, Xi Zhongxun was the only Politburo member who defended him. At the time, Hu reportedly said, “Don’t worry about it, Zhongxun, I’ve got this,” in trying to stop Xi from really losing his temper. Likely as a consequence of standing up for Hu, Xi was later marginalized and transferred from the Secretariat to the National People’s Congress to serve as a vice chairman. After Hu’s death in 1989, Xi wrote to the Party leadership warning that mishandling the funeral arrangements could trigger popular unrest. These episodes forged a bond of mutual trust between the Hu and Xi families.
As a child, Xi Jinping witnessed his father’s persecution during the Cultural Revolution and later saw him stand up for Hu Yaobang. These experiences likely deepened the Xi family’s respect for Hu and saw an extension of personal ties to the next generation. Xi Jinping and the Hu family appeared to be on good terms before Xi took power. According to overseas Chinese language media, Xi reportedly visited Hu Yaobang’s widow Li Zhao and held a private one-hour meeting with Hu’s youngest son Hu Dehua in 2009 when Xi was selected to succeed Hu Jintao. Hu Dehua reportedly said later that Xi expressed admiration for Hu Yaobang’s spirit and discussed the legacy of reform. Hu said that the meeting made him optimistic about Xi’s potential to advance reforms.
In 2012, Hu Yaobang’s eldest son Hu Deping reportedly met with Xi before he formally took office. Hu and Xi discussed Party reforms and Hu Deping left the meeting feeling hopeful that Xi would lead the CCP in the reformist, open-minded direction associated with Hu Yaobang. The Hu-Xi meeting could be one of the reasons why the Party princelings initially backed Xi during his first term. However, Xi’s subsequent centralization of power and strengthening of Party control deeply disappointed many reform-minded princelings. Those princelings were reportedly dismayed in particular by the Xi leadership’s crackdown on Yanhuang Chunqiu — a reform-minded publication where Hu Dehua was deputy editor-in-chief — that culminated in its closure in July 2016.
Our take
Xi Jinping appears to be taking the opportunity of commemorating Hu Yaobang — a figure closely linked with reform and hailed as the “Party’s conscience” — to advance several political objectives:
i) Xi is looking to further consolidate his “quan wei” (authority and prestige) within the Party and reinforce the “historical legitimacy” of his leadership through paying tribute to Hu Yaobang.
By praising Hu as a “loyal communist warrior and a great revolutionary” and calling on all Party members to “be like him” in advancing Chinese-style modernization, Xi is “borrowing” Hu’s unassailable political legacy to legitimize his adherence to Marxism-Leninism and strengthening of the Party’s leadership over the regime.
In urging the Party to remember Hu for his “firm belief, idealism and high morals,” as well as hailing him as a “shining example” for integrity, Xi is looking to justify his extended anti-corruption efforts (“self-revolution,” “comprehensive strict governance,” etc.) and Party-building initiatives (Eight-point Regulations, etc.) as the “continuation and elevation” of Hu’s spirit. By associating his actions with Hu Yaobang, Xi is looking to mitigate internal grumblings about his strongman approach to governance.
Finally, Xi is likely looking to reassure reform-minded elements in the Party elite (including Hu’s family and descendants) with a high-profile commemoration of Hu Yaobang and calls to “comprehensively deepen reform” at the Fourth Plenum of the 20th Central Committee in October that he does not intend to abandon reform. While Hu has not exactly been rehabilitated per se (the CCP continues to avoid mentioning Hu’s forced resignation in 1987 and how his death sparked pro-democracy student movements in 1989), the Xi leadership’s lavish tribute to Hu offers the reformist elements in the Party a measure of emotional solace and encourages them to maintain confidence that Xi Jinping will eventually follow in Hu Yaobang’s footsteps despite currently being the antithesis of what the latter advocates (note that this is the perception that Xi’s tribute is likely intended to create; whether Xi is genuine or engaging in empty gestures remains to be seen).
ii) Xi Jinping is taking advantage of commemorating Hu Yaobang to get the Party on the same page as him in tackling current economic challenges and promoting “Chinese-style modernization.” Notably, Xi wants all Party members to follow Hu’s spirit of “standing at the forefront of the tide,” “daring to pioneer,” and deepening reforms with the grit needed to “chew tough bones” to resolve China’s present economic malaise, including the real estate crisis, weak consumption, and external containment. Xi also wants Party members to be like Hu in being “bold enough to face all kinds of difficulties and challenges” so as to “resolutely eliminate all institutional and systemic obstacles that hinder high-quality development, and continuously unleash and develop social productive forces, and stimulate and enhance social vitality.” By remembering Hu this way, Xi is effectively recasting the former’s early advocacy for special economic zones into the CCP’s contemporary blueprint of “high-quality development.”
Xi could also be looking to reinvigorate morale within the Party through commemorating Hu as the regime prepares to implement the 15th Five-Year Plan. By invoking Hu’s “deep and genuine affection for the people,” Xi seeks to underscore the importance of enhancing the people’s sense of gain and alleviating social discontent (youth unemployment, income inequality, etc.). The integration of Hu’s political legacy of “reform and opening-up” into the overarching narrative of “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” lends historical legitimacy to the Xi leadership’s effort to “deepen reform” under “Chinese-style modernization,” and works to obscure the impression that reform has stalled or regressed under Xi.
iii) Xi Jinping’s lavish commemoration of Hu Yaobang may also serve as a calculated gesture toward the princelings, leveraging the historic ties between the Xi and Hu families to mend fences after years of financial sector purges that have bruised the interests of the “second generation red.”
As previously noted, China’s economic arteries — especially finance — were carved up among the Party and business elites during the Jiang Zemin era. As a prerequisite for any meaningful reform, Xi has to reassert Party control over the heavily elite-influenced financial sector and the broader economy. Since 2017, and with redoubled intensity after the 20th Party Congress, Xi’s anti-corruption dragnet has swept through the financial sector. Yet, no actual princeling has been publicly taken down to date, only their proxies and “white-glove” operatives like Tomorrow Group’s Xiao Jianhua and Anbang’s Wu Xiaohui. Xi’s moves against the financial sector and elite interests, however, transformed the princelings’ attitude from broad support during Xi’s first term into simmering resentment. Elite discontent towards Xi could partly explain why rumors and speculation in the Chinese diaspora of “Xi losing power” refuse to die down and why those who buy the argument insist that Hu Deping belongs to the “anti-Xi forces.”
The deep friendship between Xi Zhongxun and Hu Yaobang lends this commemoration a personal tint. When Xi Jinping quotes Hu’s “climb Mount Tai” metaphor, he is not only paying homage to his father’s generation but also subtly invoking bloodline solidarity among the “red” aristocracy. This is an important gesture at a time when many princelings are losing confidence in Xi.
At a time of fraught domestic and external conditions (U.S.–China rivalry, Taiwan tensions, quarrels with Japan, etc.), spotlighting Hu Yaobang allows Xi to broadcast an intra-Party message of “unity and struggle” while burnishing his “self-revolution” narrative with Hu’s reputation for personal integrity and aversion to privilege. In doing so, Xi is likely attempting to guard against factionalism and preventing the formation of rival power centers.
In sum, Xi Jinping’s high-profile tribute to Hu Yaobang appears to be a multifaceted political maneuver aimed at shoring up the former’s political legitimacy through associating with the latter, building up intra-Party cohesion, managing elite discontent, and reshaping the Party’s narrative in Xi’s favor amid a turbulent domestic and global landscape, as well as growing internal skepticism towards Xi’s rule. However, there is definitely some discrepancy between what Xi likely intends and what the various constituencies that the Hu tribute is meant to reach believe; Xi cannot easily regain the trust of the Party elite (particularly as his actions speak louder than words on reform) while the rank-and-file officials are not going to move away from “lying flat”and “inaction” simply by being inspired by the spirit of Hu Yaobang.
2 Beijing’s bullying of Japan over new PM’s Taiwan remarks likely to backfire
PM Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks
On Nov. 7, Japan’s new prime minister Sanae Takaichi said during deliberations in the House of Representatives’ budget committee that a PRC attack on Taiwan could constitute a threat to Japan’s survival and would allow Japan to mobilize the military in self-defense. Takaichi said that if an emergency in Taiwan involved “warships and the use of force, then that could constitute a survival-threatening situation, whichever way you look at it.” She added that the “so-called Taiwan contingency has become so serious that we have to anticipate a worst-case scenario.”
Takaichi’s remarks were the first time that a sitting postwar Japanese prime minister had explicitly linked a Taiwan crisis to the “survival-threatening situation” doctrine. Under the legal threshold of Japan’s 2015 security legislation, Japan can mobilize its Self-Defense Forces to exercise “collective self-defense” with allies like the United States in the event of a “survival-threatening situation.” Shinzo Abe, the former Japanese prime minister and Takaichi’s mentor, had made similar remarks on the Taiwan issue in 2021 (see below).
After receiving pushback from the PRC, Takaichi said in the National Diet on Nov. 10 that she did not intend to withdraw her remarks on Taiwan. She said, “Although I did state a number of hypothetical scenarios, I also said the government will make a comprehensive judgment on whether the situation constitutes a ‘survival-threatening situation’ taking into account all information.”
On Nov. 19, the Asahi Shimbun reported that Takaichi privately admitted to close aides that she had gone “a bit too far” with her remarks about Taiwan. Takaichi’s staffers reportedly said that the prime minister’s office was “indeed inadequately prepared” in allowing her response without thorough vetting.
Speaking to reporters on Nov. 21 before departing for a G-20 meeting in South Africa, Takaichi repeated her earlier position. She said, “Regarding a situation threatening Japan’s existence, the government will make a comprehensive judgment based on all available information, taking into account the specific circumstances of each actual situation as it arises. I myself have repeatedly stated this position in my responses. The government’s stance remains consistent.”
Takaichi also said that she wants to continue to try improving relations with the PRC after meeting Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in October, “President Xi and I confirmed the broad direction of comprehensively advancing our strategic and mutually beneficial relationship and building a constructive and stable relationship. There has been no change whatsoever in this stance.”
***
‘A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency’
Speaking via video link for a forum hosted by the Taiwan’s Institute for National Policy Research on Dec. 1, 2021, former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe floated the idea that Japan could come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of a PRC invasion. “A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency, and therefore a contingency for the Japan–U.S. alliance,” Abe said.
At an event in early May 2024, then-Taiwan president-elect William Lai Ching-te echoed Abe in saying, “A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency, and a Japan contingency is a Taiwan contingency.” PRC foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian slammed Lai’s remark as “seeking independence by relying on foreign forces.”
PRC lashes out
Sanae Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks sparked a strong response from the PRC.
‘Wolf warrior’ diplomacy
On Nov. 7, Xue Jian, the PRC consul-general in Osaka, slammed Japan’s stance regarding a crisis over Taiwan as a threat to its survival as a fatal path chosen by “foolish politicians.” In a subsequently deleted post on X, Xue wrote, “If you go sticking that filthy neck where it doesn’t belong, it’s gonna get sliced right off. You ready for that?”
In a regular news conference on Nov. 10, PRC foreign ministry spokesman Lin Jian said that Xue was responding to Takaichi’s “wrongful and dangerous” remarks on Taiwan, and urged Tokyo to “take a hard look at its historical responsibilities.”
Official response
From Nov. 10
The PRC foreign ministry issued several statements saying that Takaichi’s remarks constitute a “serious interference” in China’s internal affairs and violate political documents between the two countries. The ministry also warned that Japan will “pay a price” if it intervenes in the Taiwan Strait.
Nov. 13
PRC vice foreign minister Sun Weidong summoned the Japanese ambassador in Beijing to lodge stern representations over Takaichi’s remarks.
Nov. 14
The PRC Taiwan Affairs Office criticized Takaichi’s remarks and threatened that if Japan dares to intervene militarily in the Taiwan issue, the CCP “will certainly launch a direct attack and resolutely crush it.”
Nov. 16
PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning posted four posters in both English and Japanese on X reiterating the “one-China” principle.
Nov. 19
PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said in a regular press conference that Takaichi’s remarks “aroused strong indignation and condemnation among the Chinese people” and the PRC “firmly opposes them.”
Nov. 21
PRC’s ambassador to the United Nations Fu Cong wrote a letter to U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres criticizing Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks. Cong claimed that Takaichi committed “a grave violation of international law” and diplomatic norms with her remarks.
He added, “If Japan dares to attempt an armed intervention in the cross-Strait situation, it would be an act of aggression,” and the PRC will “resolutely exercise its right of self-defence under the U.N. Charter and international law and firmly defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
Nov. 23
In a statement released by the PRC foreign ministry, foreign minister Wang Yi said, “It is shocking that Japan’s current leader has publicly sent the wrong signal of attempting military intervention in the Taiwan issue, said things that shouldn’t have been said, and crossed a red line that should not have been touched.”
Media framing
From Nov. 12
PRC state media such as Xinhua and CCTV published commentaries containing strong language insinuating that Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks were a pretext for Japan’s military expansion.
Nov. 18
CCTV aired a segment on Xinwen Lianbo aired a clip that appeared to show Masaki Kanai, the director-general of the Asian and Oceanian affairs bureau at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “bowing” his head to Liu Jinsong, the director-general of the PRC foreign ministry’s Asian affairs department. The CCTV narrator claimed that the clip showed a “senior Japanese official listening to China’s stern position.” Global Times later reported on and shared the CCTV clip, driving the hashtag “Japan bows its head” into the top three searches on mainland social media. The following day, Japan’s foreign ministry said that the CCTV clip was used without consent and explained that Kanai’s gesture was a customary “slight bow” and not a sign of weakness. Japanese media also reported that the clip, aside from being covertly filmed, omitted a handshake between the two and conversation showing that they spoke on equal footing.
Nov. 20
The People’s Daily wrote in an editorial that Takaichi’s remarks had strayed from the constraints of Japan’s pacifist constitution.
Boycotts
The PRC carried out a series of gestures that were likely intended to “punish” Japan over Takaichi’s remarks.
Nov. 15
Three Chinese airliners offered refunds or free changes on Japan-bound routes.
Nov. 16
The PRC urged Chinese students in Japan or those intending to study there to step up risk assessment and plan prudently.
Nov. 17
1. Chinese film distributors suspended domestic screening of at least two Japanese films.
2. PRC premier Li Qiang said he had no plans to meet with Takaichi on the sidelines of the G20 summit in South Africa over the weekend.
Nov. 19
The PRC reportedly told Japan that its import procedures for Japanese seafood were insufficient, which hints at a possible blanket ban. Japanese media outlets said that China reimposed its recently lifted suspension of imports of Japanese seafood. However, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary Minoru Kihara told reporters that Tokyo had not received any notification from the PRC government about a ban on seafood.
When asked about the issue, PRC foreign ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning said, “Under the current circumstances, even if Japanese seafood were to be exported to China, it would find no market.”
The PRC had only resumed importing Japanese seafood products from most of Japan’s prefectures in June 2025 after imposing restrictions in 2023 on the pretext that it had concerns over Japan’s release of treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant.
Meanwhile, Kyodo News Agency said China suspended talks on resuming beef imports from Japan.
Nov. 21
According to media reports, about a dozen concerts with Japanese musicians in major Chinese cities were suddenly cancelled in the week of Nov. 17.
***
The PRC has previously sanctioned Japan over various incidents.
2010 Senkaku Island dispute
In response to Japan arresting the captain of a Chinese fishing boat that collided with Japanese coast guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands), the PRC halted rare earth exports to Japan. Japan, which then relied on China for about 90 percent of its rare earth supply, was hit hard by the export ban and subsequently spurred Japan to diversify its supply chains and reduce its dependence on China.
2012 Senkaku Island nationalism
The CCP stirred up nationalism in China over another PRC-Japan dispute over the Senkaku Islands, resulting in widespread boycotts of Japanese goods on the mainland. Japan’s exports to China plummeted and the number of Chinese tourists to Japan dropped by roughly 30 percent. Supply chains were again temporarily disrupted and the bilateral relationship deteriorated.
2023 Fukushima wastewater issue
Beijing imposed a full ban on Japanese seafood imports over Japan’s decision to release treated water from the Fukushima nuclear power plant into the Pacific Ocean. At the time, Japan’s seafood exports to China were estimated at around 20 percent of its total exports. Japan then redirected exports to the U.S., the EU, and Southeast Asia, with the Japanese government allocating 1.2 trillion yen to supporting the fisheries sector.
Separately, Japan’s share of trade with China has continued to decline since 2022 to approach the 20 percent level.
Responses from the US and Taiwan
United States
In an interview with Fox News host Laura Ingraham that aired on Nov. 10, President Donald Trump said when asked to agree that China is not a friend in light of the PRC’s response to Takaichi’s Taiwan remarks, “Well, a lot of our allies aren’t our friends, either, Laura. Our allies took advantage of us on trade more than China did.” PRC state media framed Trump’s comment as him “defending China.”
On Nov. 10, US Ambassador to Japan George Glass criticized PRC consul-general in Osaka Xue Jian for his implicit threat to Takaichi. In a post on X, Glass wrote, “Coercion is a hard habit to break for Beijing. But just as the United States stood by Japan during China’s last unwarranted ban on Japanese seafood, we will be there for our ally again this time.” On Nov. 20, Glass said in a meeting with Japanese foreign minister Toshimitsu Motegi, “This is a classic case of Chinese economic coercion, and I just want to say directly from the president and from myself and from the embassy for the prime minister, we have her back,”
Also on Nov. 20, State Department spokesman Tommy Pigott wrote on X that U.S. commitment to its alliance with Japan and to Japan’s defense is “unwavering.” He added, “We firmly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo, including through force or coercion, in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, or South China Sea.”
Taiwan
On Nov. 20, Taiwan president William Lai showed his support for Japan by posting a picture of himself with a lunch of Japanese-sourced sushi on his social media accounts. “What are you eating? Now is perhaps a good time to eat Japanese food,” Lai wrote, adding that it “fully shows the firm friendship between Taiwan and Japan.”
Our take
1. We see several reasons why the PRC reacted strongly against Japan over Sanae Takaichi’s remarks on Taiwan:
i) The CCP considers Taiwan to be a part of the PRC despite having never taken the territory in ousting the Kuomintang government from the mainland. As the CCP’s “national sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” is at stake, it considers the concept of Japan or other countries coming to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a PLA invasion to be interference in “internal affairs” and a challenge to its rule and legitimacy.
Therefore, Beijing believes that it must make strong protests and find ways to “punish” Japan for pushing its “red line” — regardless of the cost or the efficacy of the move. The CCP’s reaction, however, also reveals its continued insecurities about its legitimacy and the CCP authoritarian system’s lack of flexibility in dealing with issues concerning its “red lines.”
ii) The CCP likely believes that it will escape consequential international pushback over its efforts to censure and indirectly sanction Japan. Notably, the U.S. — Taiwan and Japan’s strongest ally — has responded to the PRC’s moves against Japan in a lackluster manner. President Trump’s reply to Laura Ingraham that “a lot of our allies aren’t our friends” in the context of the PRC’s “wolf warrior” statements targeting Takaichi have undercut his administration’s later moves to express solidarity with Japan and likely emboldened Beijing to become more abusive towards Japan.
Trump’s statement on Fox News aside, Beijing would have gambled that there is little appetite in Washington for an escalation of bilateral tensions over Japan and Taiwan in light of the Trump administration recently agreeing to trade truce with China and mounting domestic problems (worsening U.S. economy, very poor local election results for the Republicans, Trump’s flagging approval rate, etc.) in the United States.
iii) The CCP could be looking to test the mettle of the new Japanese prime minister and her cabinet. While Sanae Takaichi appeared to have made an unforced error with her Taiwan remarks, she has since shown resilience to CCP pressure.
2. To date, the CCP has shown relative restraint in lashing out at Japan. For one, Xue Jian’s social media posts where he threatened to decapitate Takaichi were deleted and the PRC subsequently resorted to strongly-worded editorials in state media and complaints by its diplomatic corps. This suggests Beijing believes that extreme “wolf warriorism” could be counterproductive (i.e. attract more international sympathy and support for Takaichi, etc.) and would undermine its efforts to get tough diplomatically against Japan.
Further, the CCP’s retaliatory actions thus far pale in comparison to previous moves. Even the situation with the boycott of Japanese seafood is unclear and likely not very disruptive given that the previous lengthy boycott over the Fukushima treated water incident was only just lifted in June 2025. The mostly performative rather than substantive nature of the CCP’s retaliation against Japan over Takaichi’s remarks indicates that Beijing is more interested in making a point about a “red line” issue and “setting the tone” diplomatically with the new Japanese administration rather than looking to take the bilateral relationship off a cliff. And while Beijing could believe that it would largely escape international pushback, it likely does not want to bully Japan to the point where the international community has no choice but to respond strongly to Japan’s plight.
The CCP also cannot “punish” Japan more harshly now unlike before because the PRC’s earlier advantages have eroded. Japan has already diversified its supply chains in response to the CCP’s previous rare earths restrictions, which means that a repeat of the move would be less painful to Japan and could instead hurt the PRC. The same holds for the latest seafood “boycott,” with Japan already having coping measures in place after the 2023 restrictions. Moreover, Beijing would be wary of encouraging boycotts of Japanese goods when it is currently doing all it can to stimulate consumption and keep businesses afloat.
Looking ahead, the CCP will likely continue making a big fuss over Takaichi’s remarks and continue to engage in mostly performative “punishment” of Japan. But Beijing is likely to end its bullying of Japan sooner rather than later lest it does more damage to itself than to Tokyo.
3. If anything, the CCP’s retaliatory actions against Japan to date will more likely hurt the PRC than affect Japan and its prime minister. A Nov. 16 Kyodo News survey saw the approval rate for Takaichi’s cabinet rise to 69.9 percent, up 5.5 percentage points from the poll conducted shortly after she took office. The disapproval rate for Takaichi’s cabinet was 16.5 percent, compared with 23.2 percent previously.
Japanese approval of Takaichi despite her Taiwan remarks corresponds with hardening attitudes towards the PRC in recent years. An October 2024 survey by the University of Tokyo found 51.7 percent of respondents agreeing that a PRC attack on Taiwan would pose an existential threat to Japan. Also, 91.9 percent of respondents view China as a security threat to Japan while 63.9 percent of respondents think that Japan should reduce its economic dependence on China even if it means suffering economic losses. The PRC’s reaction to Takaichi’s remarks will likely do more to entrench the negative view of China among the Japanese, affecting trade, business, and the bilateral relationship down the road.
Meanwhile, PRC travel restrictions to Japan and Chinese airlines canceling Japan flights could have a more detrimental effect on China than Japan. John Grant, a senior analyst with British aviation intelligence firm OAG, told South China Morning Post that Chinese airlines would probably be more severely affected than Japanese-based carriers because the China-Japan market is dominated by Chinese-based airlines; between Nov. 15 and Nov. 17, Chinese airlines recorded about 491,000 cancellations of tickets to Japan. Separately, Japanese businesses told Western media that their sales have not really been affected as it has become easier for Japanese shoppers to visit given the absence of Chinese tourists.
